THE
SĀMKHYA APHORISMS
OF
KAPILA

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PARIMAL PUBLICATIONS
DELHI
ADVERTISEMENT.

The present work, both in its Sanskrit portion and in its English, is an amended reprint of three volumes,¹ published in India, which have already become very scarce. An abridged form of those volumes,² which subsequently

¹ Their titles hare follow:


² Occupying Fasciculi 32 and 81 of the New Series of the Bibliotheca Indica, issued in 1863 and 1865. The proof-sheets of only 32 pages of the whole, from the beginning, were read by Dr. Ballantyne; the rest, by Professor Cowell.

The title of the abridged form runs: “The Sāṅkhya Aphorisms of Kapila, with Extracts from Vijnāna-Bhikhu’s Commentary,” &c. But this is a misrepresentation, as regards Book I., which takes up 63 pages out of the total of 175. The expository matter in that Book is derived, very largely, from other commentators than Vijnāna.
appeared, contains nothing of the Sanskrit original but
the Aphorisma.
While, in the following pages, all the corrections
obtainable from the abridgment have been turned to
account, an immense number of improved readings have
been taken from another source. Three several times I
carefully read Dr. Ballantyne's translation in as many
different copies of it; entering suggestions, in the second
copy, without reference to those which had been entered
in the first, and similarly making independent sug-
gestions in my third copy. All these were, on various
occasions, submitted to Dr. Ballantyne; and such of them
as did not meet his approval were crossed through. The
residue, many more than a thousand, have been embodied

Vedânti Mahâdeva mainly supplies it at the outset, and, towards
the end, well nigh exclusively, Asiruddha. Some share of it, however,
will not be traced; it having been furnished by one of Dr. Ballantyne's
pupils, with whom I have repeatedly seen the in fact, as by his own
acknowledgment, of preparing his elicitations.

1 Many of them, especially in Books II.—VI., rest on readings
of the original preferable to those which had been accepted.
Though not fully published till 1866, my edition of the Sânkhya-
pravachana-bhâshya, its preface alone excepted, was in print as early as
1853; and Dr. Ballantyne had a copy of it. A few arbitrarily
chosen words apart, his text, after Book I., is borrowed from it
throughout, but with no mention of the fact. My advice was unheeded,
that he should profit by the copious emendations which I had amassed
and digested from better manuscripts than those to which I at first
had access. Greatly to his discredit, he would not be induced even
to look at them. It faring the same with my typographical cor-
rections, he has, here and there, reproduced errors, more or less gross,
which might easily have been avoided. See, for specimens, pp. 327,
285, 357, 373, 374, 381, 390.

in the ensuing sheets, but are not indicated, as success-
ively introduced. The renderings proposed in the foot-
notes are, for the most part, from among those which have
recently occurred to me as eligible.
That Dr. Ballantyne had any thought of reissuing, in
whatever form, the volumes mentioned at the beginning
of this Advertisement, I was unaware, till some years
after he had made over the abridgment of them to
Professor Cowell, for publication. Otherwise, I should
have placed at his disposal the materials towards improve-
ment of his second edition, which, at the cost of no slight
drudgery, are here made available.
The Sânkhya Aphorisms, in all the known com-
mentaries on them, are exhibited word for word. The
variants, now given, of the Aphorisms, afforded by acces-
sible productions of that character, have been drawn from
the works, of which only one has yet been printed, about
to be specified.

I. The Sânkhya-pravachana-bhâshya, by Vijnâna Bhikshu.
Revelant particulars I have given elsewhere. My oldest
MS. of it was transcribed in 1654.

1 Now has attention been topicaly directed to sundry blemishes of
idiom which have been removed; as, for example, by the substitution
of 'unless' for 'without,' of 'in time' for 'through time,' of 'presently'
for 'just,' and of 'between the two' for 'between both.'
2 'At the time of his departure from India, in 1890, Dr. Ballantyne
left with me the MS. of his revised translation of the Sânkhya
Aphorisms.' 'Notice,' in the Bibliotheca Indica, New Series, No. 81.
3 For details respecting these commentaries and their authors, see
my Contribution towards an Index to the Bibliography of the
Indian Philosophical Systems, or my Preface to the Sâkhyas-Aru.
II. The Kapila-sánkhya-pravachana-sūtra-çritti, by Asiruddha. Of this I have consulted, besides a MS. copied in 1818, formerly the property of Dr. Ballantyne, one which I procured to be copied, in 1835, from an old MS. without date. ¹

III. The Laghu-sánkhya-sūtra-çritti, by Nágeśa. Of this I have two MSS., both undated. One of them is entire; but the other is defective by the three first Books.

IV. The Sánkhya-pravachana-sūtra-çritti-sára, by Vedánti Mahádeva. Here, again, only one of two MSS. which I possess is complete. The other, which breaks off in the midst of the comment on Book II., Aph. 15, is, in places, freely interpolated from No. I. ...Neither of them has a date.

Nearly all my longer annotations, and some of the shorter, were scrutinized, while in the rough, by the learned Professor Cowell, but for whose searching criticisms, which cannot be valued too highly, they would, in several instances, have been far less accurate than they now are.

F. H.

Marlesford, Suffolk,  
Aug. 28, 1884.

¹ I once had a second copy of this very rare work, bearing no date, but most venerable in appearance. Like many of my manuscript treasures, it was lent, and never found its way back to me.

THE

SÁNKHYA APHORISMS

OF

KAPILA

BOOK I.

a. Salutation to the illustrious sage, Kapila!¹

b. Well, the great sage, Kapila, desirous of raising the world [from the Slough of Despond in which he found it sunk], perceiving that the knowledge of the excellence of any fruit, through the desire [which this excites] for the fruit, is a cause of people's betaking themselves to the means [adapted to the attainment of the fruit], declares [as follows] the excellence of the fruit [which he would urge our striving to obtain]. ²

अष्ठ कृत्वाधिकृतां विद्याभिधिनियूर्विशिष्टितम् पुरुषाः॥ ९ ॥

The subject proposed. Aph. 1, Well, the complete cessation of pain [which is] of three kinds is the complete end of man.

¹ श्रीकपिलमुनि नाम: ॥

² अष्ठ जगदुद्दिश्येकारां परम्परां साधनप्रतिष्ठा कारारं ।

परि: कपिलसन्थानस्य फलो धारास्य पर्युत्तमां॥
a. The word ‘well’ serves as a benediction;¹ [the particle aha being regarded as an auspicious one].

b. By saying that the complete cessation of pain, which is of three kinds,—viz., (1) due to one's self (ādhyātmika), (2) due to products of the elements (ādhibhūtika), and (3) due to supernatural causes (ādhiprāyika)—is the complete end of man, he means to say that it is the chief end of man, among the four human aims, [viz., merit, wealth, pleasure, and liberation (see Śāñcita-dāpaya, § 2)],² because the three are transitory, whereas liberation is not transitory: such is the state of the case.

A question whether the end may not be attained by ordinary means.

c. But then, let it be that the above-mentioned cessation [of all the three kinds of pain] is the complete end of man; still, what reason is there for taking one's self to a doctrinal system which is the cause of a knowledge of the truth, in the shape of the knowledge of the difference between Nature and Soul, when there are easy remedies for bodily pains, viz., drugs, &c., and remedies for mental pains, viz., beautiful women and delicate food, &c., and remedies for pains due to products of the elements, viz., the residing in impregnable localities, &c., as is enjoined in the Institutes of Polity, and remedies for pains due to supernatural causes, viz., gems [such as possess marvellous prophylactic properties], and spells, and herbs of mighty power, &c.; and when [on the other hand], since it is hard to get one to grapple with that very difficult knowledge of truth which can be perfected only by the toil of many successive births, it must be still more hard to get one to betake himself to the doctrinal system [which treats of the knowledge in question]? Therefore [i.e., seeing that this may be asked] he declares [as follows]:¹

¹ नन्दोनिःकालिकता पुरुषहरूत्त्वायुक्तैः सदा-पुरुषायुक्तायुक्तप्रतिग्रहणं वेदितायुक्तप्रतिग्रहणं

² चिलिखस्वायत्नमः काव्याश्रमकार्यस्चिलिखकन्तः

³ पुरुषोपयोगस्य लम्बवत्वाप्रवृत्तिः पूर्वस्वास्तिकम्

⁴ वीर्याश्रयस्य मानोपयोगस्य भावः।

¹ Instead of निवर्ते, the reading of Aniruddha, and of most MSS., Vījñāna has, to the same effect. निवर्ते. Ed.
THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS.

a. 'the visible,' in the shape of the drugs, &c., above-mentioned [§ 1. c.].

b. 'the effectuation of this,' i.e., the effectuation of the complete cessation of pain. ²

c. why is it not [to be thus effected]? Because, after the cessation (the cessation of pain is understood), we see its restoration, the springing up again of pain in general, [from whichever of its three sources (§ 1. b.)].

d. The state of the matter is this: not by the expedients above-mentioned is there such a removal of pain, that no pain arises thereafter; for, when, by this or that expedient, this or that pain has been destroyed, we see other pains springing up. Therefore, though it be not easy [§ 1. c.], the knowledge of truth [as a complete remedy] is to be desired. ₄

e. But then, grant that future pain is not debarred by drugs, &c., [employed to remove present pain], still, by

BOOK I., APH. 4.
again and again obviating it [as often as it presents itself], there may be the cessation of future pain, also. This doubt he states [as follows]: ¹

प्रात्यविकारवज्ञाताःप्रतिकारवेदनात्मतु- वर्गे भयेम् ॥ ॥

Aph. 3. [Let us consider the doubt] that the soul's desire [the cessation of pain, may result] from exertions for the obviation [of pain], as is the case with the obviation of daily hunger.

a. When pain shall arise [let us suppose one to argue] then it is to be obviated; and thus there is the soul's desire, the cessation of pain; just as one should eat, when there is hunger; and thus there is the soul's desire of the eater, viz., the cessation of hunger. In regard to this [doubt] he states the recognized decision: ²

सत्यसंवयानामदेववन्द्ययां सत्यार्जमखेअः ॥ ॥ ॥

¹ ननु मा भूतैत्थादिनिश्चितमिव भावितुः सनितेत्वमितापि पुनः पुनः प्रतिकारकर्षणे तु भावितुः सनितेत्वमितापि स्पादितासि श्रद्धाश् ॥

² यदादुहुः भूस्मुक्ताति सदा तामिकारत्रव्यः तथा च दुः सनितेत्वाति पुनः पाशायं यथा यदा शुद्धादा भा- त्त्रायं भुज्वानस्य सनिर्वृत्तिः पुनः पाशायं इति सिद्धाभ्याम् ॥

₃ The more ordinary reading of MSS., and that of Aniruddha, is सत्त्राः 'excellence,' not स्त्राः with Vijnāna. Ed
Aph. 4. This [method of palliatives (§3)] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence; because it is not everywhere possible [to employ it at all], and because, even if this were possible, there would be an impossibility as regards [ensuring] the perfect fitness [of the agents employed].

a. For there are not physicians, &c., in every place and at all times; and [to rely on physicians, &c., would not be advisable], even if there were the possibility,—i.e., even if these [always at hand], since physicians are not perfect [in their art];—for pain cannot with certainty be got rid of by means of physicians, &c., with their drugs, &c. Moreover, when corporeal pain has departed, there may still be that which is mental, &c.; so that there is not [under such circumstances], in every respect, liberation from pain. For these reasons, such a soul’s aim [as that which contents itself with temporary palliatives] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence, [i.e., who are acquainted with authoritative treatises].

b. He mentions another proof [of his assertion]:

[Translation of Sanskrit quotes]

1 नाहि सर्वितरं यतिष्ठतः सर्वितरं काले वैद्यादयः सति सर्वितरं सर्वितरं वैद्यादयानं सतवामाया- वहि वैद्यादिरिपोर्वश्च यथार्थादिना हुः साहित्यम् तथ। कि च शारीरिकः यथार्थम् मानसादित्यां संभव इति सर्वितरं हुः भालिमके। तस्मातम- माणकुशलिका वृत्तिपुस्तवियो हेय इति ॥

2 युक्तयत्तमाह॥

Aph. 5. Also [an inferior method] Scriptural evidence in favour of this view. [ought not to be adopted] because of the preeminence of Liberation [as proved] by the text [of Scripture declaratory] of its preeminence above all else.

a. One ought not to endeavour after the removal of this or that pain by these and those expedients [§1. c.]; since Liberation (moksha), by being eternal, is transcendental as a remover of all pains. Moreover, one ought to endeavour only after the knowledge of truth, which is the means thereof [i.e., of Liberation]; because the Scripture tells its pre-eminence above all [other objects of endeavour], in the text: ‘There is nothing beyond the gaining of Soul, [with the utter exclusion of pain].’

b. But then [it may be suggested], when you say liberation, we understand you to mean from bondage. And is that bondage essential? Or is it adventitious? In the former case, it is incapable of destruction; if it come under the latter head, it will perish of itself, [like any other adventitious and, therefore, transitory thing]. What have we to do with your ‘knowledge of truth,’ then? To this he replies [as follows]:

[Translation of Sanskrit quotes]
Aph. 6. And there is no difference between the two.

a. There is no difference in the applicability of liberation, on either of the suppositions, that the bondage is essential, and that it is adventitious, [supposing it were either (see § 10. b.)]. That is to say, we can tell both how the bondage takes place, and how the liberation takes place.¹

b. Now, with the view of demonstrating [the real nature of] Bondage and Liberation, he declares, exclusively, in the first place, the objections to Bondage's being essential.²

Aph. 7. There would be no rule in the enjoining of means for the liberation of one bound essentially.

1 उभये विभावं स्वयं परिवर्त्तते न वास्तवम्। यथा च चित्तोऽद्याय स्वभावान्तः स. ¹
2 अर्थात् च चित्तेऽपि स्वभावान्तः स्वविभावेऽपि। महात्मां ज्ञातो च च चित्तेऽपि। ²

BOOK I, APH. 7.

a. Since Liberation has been stated [§ 1] to result from the complete cessation of pain, [it follows that] Bondage is the junction of pain; and this is not essential in man. For, if that were the case, then there would be no rule, i.e., no fitness, in the Scriptural or legal injunction of means for liberation: such is what must be supplied, [to complete the aphorism]. Because, to explain our meaning [by an illustration], fire cannot be liberated from its heat, which is essential to it; since that which is essential exists as long as the substance exists.¹

b. And it has been declared in the Divine Song [the Śravana-gītā]: “If the soul were essentially foul, or impure, or changeable, then its liberation could not take place even through hundreds of successive births.”²

c. [Since some one may be disposed to say] ‘Grant that there is no fitness [in the Scriptural and legal injunctions, (§ 7. a.)], what have we to do with that?’ Therefore he declares [as follows]:³

¹ द्रुढात्मान्तप्रविष्टमस्तम्याभिन्धयो दुःखोऽथ स. ²
² च चित्ताय स्वभावान्तः स्वविभावेऽपि। महात्मां ज्ञातो च च चित्तेऽपि। ³
³ भवननुसारं विमेलतात्त्वतः च.
Aph. 8. Since an essential nature is imperishable, unauthoritativeness, betokened by impracticableness [would be chargeable against the Scripture, if pain were essential to humanity].

a. That is to say: since the essential nature of anything is imperishable, i.e., endures as long as the thing itself, it would follow [on the supposition that pain is essential to humanity], that, since Liberation is impossible, the Scripture which enjoins the means for its attainment is a false authority, inasmuch as it is impracticable [in its injunctions. And this is out of the question; Scripture being assumed, here, as in all the others of the six systems, to be an exact measure of truth].

b. But then [some one may say], let it be an injunction [to use means for the attainment of an unattainable object], on the mere strength of Scripture; [and, since Scripture is an unquestionable authority, we may be excused from asking or answering the question, why the injunction is given]. To this he replies [as follows]:

Aph. 9. There is no rule, where something impossible is enjoined: though it be enjoined, it is no injunction.

a. There can be no fitness, or propriety, in an injunction with a view to an impossible fruit; seeing that, though something be enjoined, or ordered [to be effected] by means that are impracticable, this is no injunction at all, but only the semblance of an injunction; because it stands to reason, that not even the Veda can make one see sense in an absurdity: such is the meaning.¹

b. Here he comes upon a doubt:²

Aph. 10. If [some one says] as in the case of white cloth, or of a seed, [something essential may be not removable, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

a. But then [the doubter is supposed to argue], the destruction even of what is essential [in spite of what is stated under § 7] is seen; as, for example, the essential whiteness of white cloth is removed by dyeing, and the essential power of germination in a seed is removed by

¹ अशक्काय पश्चार्गतयो विधिनुपासन न संभवति यत्त उपदेष्ठ विशिष्टप्रयोगविधायनेपदेष्ठ एव न संभवति किं तूपदेशभास्य एवं वाचिततमं वेदादिपि च वाधितति न्यायादित्यस्: ||

2 अशक्काय पश्चार्गतयो विधिनुपासन न संभवति यत्त उपदेष्ठ विशिष्टप्रयोगविधायनेपदेष्ठ एव न संभवति किं तूपदेशभास्य एवं वाचिततमं वेदादिपि च वाधितति न्यायादित्यस्: ||
fire. Therefore, according to the analogy of the white cloth and the seed, it is possible that there should be the removal of the bondage of the soul, even though it were essential. So, too, there may be [without any impropriety] the enjoinder of the means thereof. Well, if [any one argues thus], such is the meaning [of the aphorism, to which he proceeds to reply].

b. He declares [the real state of the case, with reference to the doubt just raised]:

शक्तिनाभानामानुष्ठानाय नायाश्वेतपदेः: || 99 ||

Decision that an essential property may be hidden, but not removed.

Aph. 11. Since both perceptibleness and [subsequent] non-perceptibleness may belong to some power [which is indestructible], it is not something impracticable that is enjoined [when one is directed to render some indestructible power imperceptible].

a. In regard even to the two examples above-mentioned [§ 10], people do not give an injunction for [the positive destruction of] something essential, which is indestructible [§ 8]. Why [do we say this]? Because, in these two instances of the perceptibleness and non-perceptibleness of a power [the powers, namely, of appearing white and of germinating (see § 10. a.)], there are merely the manifestation and [afterwards] the hiding of the whiteness, &c., but not the removal of the whiteness, or of the power of germination; because, that is to say, the whiteness of the dyed cloth and the germinating power of the roasted seed can again be brought out by the processes of the bleacher, &c., [in the case of the dyed cloth], and by the will of the Yogin [the possessor of supernatural powers, in the case of the roasted seed], &c.¹

b. Having thus disproved the notion that bondage is essential [to man], wishing to disprove also the notion that it is the result of some [adherent] cause, he rejects the [various supposable] causes, viz., Time, &c.²

¹ उत्तौष्टिस्वामिनिक्षेत्रस्य नाचभविक्षेत्रस्य ग्हालीनाभानामानुष्ठानाय नायाश्वेतपदेः: लोकानां न भवति। कृतः। शक्तिनाभानामानुष्ठानाय सुखादित्यदिविभिः शक्तिनाभानामानुष्ठानाय। वात्स्य: शुक्पनेत्वा ग्रीवाचेऽसि द्वारा। वास्य: काव्यायायों। वात्स्य: काव्यायायों। तस्य: वात्स्यायायों। तवदेव तत्साधनापदेशः स्वादिति चेदिलिपयः।
² समाधिः
³ समाधिः
or not liberated, bondage would [in that case] befall the
liberated, also.¹

नावस्याती देहभ्रमेलात्मक्यः ॥ ९४ ॥

Aph. 14. Nor [does the bondage of the
soul arise] from its being condi-
tioned [by its standing among circum-
stances that clog it by limiting it];
because that is the fact in regard to [not the soul, but]
the body.

a. By ‘condition’ we mean the being in the shape of a
sort of association. The bondage [of the soul] does not
arise from that; because that is the property of the body
[and not of the soul]; because, that is to say, bondage
might befall even the liberated [which is impossible], if
that which is the fact in regard to another could occasion
the bondage of one quite different.²

b. But then [some one might say], let this conditioned
state belong to the soul. On this point [to prevent mis-
takes], he declares:³

¹ न कालनिमित्तकः पृथ्वय वची वायिना
निलक्ष्य कालस्य सवेच: पुरवेच: सत्त्वकालावऽवेदेन
संवस्थामुक्ता-मुक्तावस्थालुप्स्यः: ॥

² अवस्या संघातिविशेषस्या:। ततो न बन्धु-
स्लस्या देहभ्रमेलाद्यमेयस्य साधारणतयतकवि
मुक्ताध्यपरिति भव: ॥

³ ननु वृत्तयुक्तावस्या स्मातचाह ॥
Aph. 15. Because this soul is [unassociated with any conditions or circumstances that could serve as its bonds, it is] absolute.

The soul is absolute.

a. The word iti here shows that it [i.e., the assertion conveyed in the aphorism] is a reason: the construction with the preceding aphorism being this, that, 'since the soul is unassociated, it belongs only to the body to be conditioned.'

Aph. 16. Nor [does the bondage of soul arise] from any work; because [works are] the property of another [viz., the mind], and because it [the bondage] would be eternal, [if the case were as you imagine].

Aph. 16. Nor does the bondage of soul arise from any work; because works are the property of another [viz., the mind], and because it [the bondage] would be eternal, [if the case were as you imagine].

a. That is to say: moreover, the bondage of the soul does not arise from any work, whether enjoined or forbidden; because works are the property of another, i.e., not the property of the soul [but of the mind]. And, if, through a property of another, the bondage of one quite distinct could take place, then bondage might befall even the liberated, [through some acts of some one else].

b. But then [some one may say], this objection does not apply, if we hold that bondage may arise from the acts of the associate [viz., the mental organ]: so, with allusion to this, he states another reason, 'and because it would be eternal,' i.e., because bondage, in the shape of connexion with pain, would occur [where it does not,] even in such cases as the universal dissolution [of the phenomenal universe, including the mental organ, but not the soul].

a. But then [some one may say], if that be the case, then let the bondage, too, in the shape of connexion with pain, belong [not to the soul, but] to the mind alone, in accordance with the principle that it have the same locus as the works [to which it is due]; and, since it is an established point that pain is an affection

1 इतिहितिनिषिद्धकर्मणि पुरुषः
बोधमात्रमेत्थमिति पूच्छूणामवयः

1 न विभिततिनिषिद्धकर्मणि पुरुषः
अर्नमोदितमेत्थमिति कर्मणि

2 Upadhi, for which see p. 51, 1. i.e. it ii.

3 ननु स्वप्राप्तकर्मेण वाचाजीवारि नाम दान
इत्यास्य येन हेतुत्तरमहात्मिकार्थेः प्रचारणमुप्लमुपरयापुष्चन्तर्यात्मिकाविधाः

The commentator Aniruddha omits the final word, च. Ed.

Professor Wilson's Dictionary erroneously gives 'uninterrupted continuance' as one of the definitions of atiprasaktsi; and that definition, in all probability, suggested 'eternal' to the translator, who here had to do with atiprasaktsi. Near the end of a. in the next page but one, atiprasaktsi is rendered 'and the result.' For the synonymous atiprasaktsi and atiprasaktsa, respectively, see Aph. 53. with the comment on it, and the comment on Aph. 161, of this Book.

Colebrooke, on various occasions, represents one or other of these terms by 'wrest,' 'straining a rule,' 'room for misconstruction,' &c. As technicalities, they generally signify 'illegitimately extended application' of a canon, notion, or the like. Ed.
of the mind, why is bondage [i.e., connexion with pain] assumed of the soul, also? With reference to this doubt, he declares [as follows]:

बिचिच्छेनेगानुपपत्तिर्यथमेव || 99 ||

Aph. 17. If it were the property of any other, then there could not be diverse experience.

1. If bondage, in the shape of connexion with pain, were the property of another, i.e., a property of the mind, there could be no such thing as diverse experience; there could be no such different experience as one man's experiencing pain, and another man's not: [for, it must be remembered, it is not in point of mind, but of soul, that men are held, by Kapila, to be numerically different]. Therefore, it must be admitted that pain is connected with the soul, also. And this [pain that belongs to the soul] is in the shape merely of a reflexion of the pain [that attaches to its attendant organism]; and this reflexion is of its own attendant [organism] only; so that there is no undue result [deducible from our theory].

b. He rejects also the notion that Nature (prakṛti) is directly the cause of bondage:

प्रकृतिनिवननस्थिती तस्या ऋषिको पारस्यमयेम || 95 ||

Aph. 18. If [you say that the soul's bondage arises] from Nature, as its cause, [then I say] 'no'; [because] that, also, is a dependent thing.

a. But then [some one may say], let bondage result from Nature, as its cause. If you say so, I say 'no'; because that, also, i.e., Nature, also, is dependent on the conjunction which is to be mentioned in the next aphorism; because, if it [Nature] were to occasion bondage, even without that [conjunction which is next to be mentioned], then bondage would occur even in such cases as the universal dissolution, [when soul is altogether disconnected from the phenomenal].
b. If the reading [in the aphorism] be nībandhānā' [in the 1st case, and not in the 5th], then the construction will be as follows: 'If [you say that] the bondage is caused by Nature,' &c.²

c. Therefore, since Nature can be the cause of bondage, only as depending on something else [i.e., on the conjunction to be mentioned in the next aphorism], through this very sort of conjunction [it follows that] the bondage is reflexional, like the heat of water due to the conjunction of fire;³ [water being held to be essentially cold, and to seem hot only while the heat continues in conjunction with it].

d. He establishes his own tenet, while engaged on this point, in the very middle⁴ [of his criticisms on erroneous notions in regard to the matter; for there are more to come]:

न नित्यशुद्धुबुद्धीमुक्तभावत्व तथोगतंधर्मं

gर्तं। ९५।

¹ This is the lection preferred by Aniruddha and his followers. Ed.
² निबिधना चेदिति पाते प्रकृतिनिवन्धना
ब्रह्मा चेदिति योज्यम्।
³ अतः यत्तिरंगत्त्वप्रकृतिर्विभावारं हेच्छर्ता-
देव संप्रेषणमाण्डाणानाथो वन्यजनिन्वशोभा
जलाधिपतिः।
⁴ सप्तपदसमुन्नेव प्रसन्नजनानारायण कथवादहारति।

1 The Sanskrit word thus rendered was inadvertently omitted in the first edition. Vijnana here supplies the comment. Ed.

2 तस्मात्योगतं क्रृतिसंयाय विना न पुरुषस्य तथोगान् जन्मसंपंजाकादि। अयपु तु तत् एव

3 वन्यस्त्राथिकिरताः नन्दैयेन ब्रजाकाः।
c. In order that there may not be such an error as that of the Vaiseshikas, viz., [the opinion that there is] an absolutely real conjunction [of the soul] with pain, he says 'which is ever,' &c. [§ 19]. That is to say: as the connexion of colour with essentially pure crystal does not take place without the conjunction of the China-rose [the hue of which, seen athwart the crystal, seems to belong to the crystal], just so the connexion of pain with the soul, even essentially pure, &c., cannot take place without the conjunction of some accidental associate; that is to say, pain, &c., cannot arise spontaneously, [any more than a red colour can arise spontaneously in the crystal which is essentially pure].

d. This has been declared, in the Saura, as follows 'As the pure crystal is regarded, by people, as red, in consequence of the proximity of something [as a China-rose]

that lends its colour, in like manner the supreme soul1 is regarded as being affected by pain.'

e. In that [aphorism, 19], the perpetual purity means the being ever devoid of merit and demerit; the perpetual intelligence means the consisting of uninterrupted thought; and the perpetual liberatedness means the being ever dissociated from real pain: that is to say, the connexion with pain in the shape of a reflexion is not a real bondage,2 [any more than the reflexion of the China-rose is a real stain in the crystal].

f. And so the maker of the aphorism means, that the cause of its bondage is just a particular conjunction [§ 19.c.]. And now enough as to that point.3

g. Now he rejects [§ 18.d.] certain causes of [the soul's] bondage, preferred by others:4

1  तद्वसर्वस्थितः प्रथोक्तिः प्रथेवर्गः प्रथेनवन्यस्वरूपः स्नायुः  
कद्वेषवीर्यैः तद्वसर्वस्थितः प्रथेवर्गः प्रथेनवन्यस्वरूपः 
हमनां स्कन्धस्यमेव प्रथेवर्गः प्रथेनवन्यस्वरूपः

2  नम्बर नित्यायः सदस्यायः सदस्यायः नित्यायः 
खानुमुखः सदस्यायः सदस्यायः 
कद्वेषवीर्यैः प्रथेवर्गः प्रथेवर्गः

3  तथा च संयोगविशेष एवत् वाहेतुतया 
सूचकेवाद्य निधित्वविशेष तत्

4  द्वारानीमयाभिमेतान्वधृतेन्तिरस्तति
a. That is to say: and, if you agree that 'Ignorance' is a reality, then you abandon your own implied dogma [see Nyāya Aphorisms I, §31] of the unreality of 'Ignorance';¹ and so you stultify yourself.

b. He states another objection:²

विजातीयेहैतापतिः पूव ॥ २२ ॥

Aph. 22. And [if you assume 'Ignorance' to be a reality, then] there would be a duality, through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; which you assertions of non-duality cannot contemplate allowing].

a. That is to say: if 'Ignorance' is real and without a beginning, then it is eternal, and coordinate with Soul: if [therefore] it be not soul, then there is a duality, through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; and thus the Vedántis cannot intend to establish]; because these followers of the Vedánta, asserting non-duality, hold that there is neither a duality through there being something of the same kind [with soul], nor through there being something of a different kind.³

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¹ यदि चाविद्यण्य चतुिष्णू स्वीकार्यते तद न्यायम्याविद्याृत्ततस्य हानिकारिकम: ॥

² द्विगुणसारसंह ॥

³ यद्यन्याच चतुर्वितानाविद्याविद्याविद्यानृतस्य हानिकारिकमः ॥ अनाच्छेदित्वा मानातीयेहैतापतिः। तेहि चदानित्वा धैतापतिः: सज्जातीयेहैतापतिः महत्त्र इति: ॥
Aph. 23. If [the Vedánti alleges, regarding 'Ignorance,' that] it is in the shape of both these opposites, [then we shall say 'no,' for the reason to be assigned in the next aphorism].

a. The meaning is: if [the Vedánti says that] 'Ignorance' is not real,—else there would be a duality through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul, which a follower of the Vedánta cannot allow],—and, moreover, it is not unreal, because we experience its effects; but it is in the shape of something at once real and unreal,² [like Plato's δύναμις ἐστίν: (see Vedánta-sára, § 21)].

Aph. 24. [To the suggestion that Ignorance is at once real and unreal, we say] 'no,' because no such thing is known [as is at once real and unreal.]

a. That is to say: it is not right to say that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal. The reason of this he states in the words 'because no such thing,' &c.; because any such thing as is at once real and unreal is not known.

For, in the case of a dispute, it is necessary that there should be an example of the thing [i.e. (see Nyáya Aphorisms, I., § 25), a case in which all parties are agreed that the property in dispute is really present]; and, as regards your opinion, such is not to be found; [for, where is there anything in regard to which both parties are agreed that it is at once real and unreal, as they are agreed that fire is to be met with on the culinary hearth?]: such is the import.¹

b. Again he ponders a doubt:²

Aph. 25. [Possibly the Vedánti may remonstrate] 'We are not asserters of any Six Categories, like the Vaiśeṣhikas and others.'

a. 'We are not asserters of a definite set of categories [like the Vaiśeṣikas, who arrange all things under six heads, and the Naiyáyikas, who arrange them under sixteen]. Therefore, we hold that there is such a thing, unknown though it be [to people in general], as 'Ignorance' which is at once real and unreal, or [if you prefer it], which differs at once from the real and the unreal [see

¹ शास्त्रीय तत्त्वावलिताः न स ज्ञानमिति सदादृष्ट्य क्षणिकविद्वन्ने पदार्थमेकानाद्विषाधिकानाति:। विवादाद्वैद्य तस्मीय द्वारा आक्षेपणः स च भवन्यप्रतिर्द्धविद्य इति भावः।

² पुनः शास्त्रीयः
admit, merely on Your Worship's assertion, a thing at once real and unreal, which is inconsistent, contrary to all fitness; otherwise, we might as well accept also the self-contradictory assertions of children and the like: such is the meaning.  

b. Certain heretics [deniers of the authority of the Vedas] assert that there exist external objects of momentary duration [individually; each being, however, replaced by its facsimile the next instant, so that the uninterrupted series of productions becomes something equivalent to continuous duration], and that by the influence of these the bondage of the soul [is occasioned]. This he objects to, [as follows]:  

1 पदार्थानि न तथापि भावायाविरिनियोजनिकस्य युक्तिविकल्पस्य सदसदात्मकपदार्थसंयोजनायेन भविन्नमात्रार्थिका न संज्ञयति। नायिकायथाविक्षिप्तानेतरस्य नयनेतिः॥

2 वसन्त, a term which Dr. Ballantyne has rendered variously, in divers passages of the present work, and also elsewhere. It is well defined, in Prof. Benfey's Sanskrit-English Dictionary: 'An impression remaining unconsciously in the mind, from past actions, etc., and, by the resulting merit or demerit, producing pleasure or pain.' Ed.

3 कृत्यादिकाः सत्ति वातविस्मया: श्रीनिदेशयोऽस्मिन्यायस्वयम्बत्तिष्ठतीति ॥
The mechanical theory of a succession of momentary objects from all eternity, thereby causing the soul's bondage, rejected.

Aph. 27. [The bondage] thereof, moreover, is not caused by any influence of objects from all eternity.

a. 'Therefore, i.e., of the soul. An eternal influence of objects, an influence of objects the effect of which, in the shape of a continued stream, has had no commencement,—not by this, either, is it possible that the bondage [of the soul] has been occasioned: such is the meaning.

b. He states the reason of this [impossibility]:

न वायव्यवाहरणांस्मार्जनं कभी भावनान्तरिक्षे प्रच्छिन्नभूतं वायव्यवाहरणां सन्तःतिवाभिषिक्त

Aph. 28. Also [in my opinion, as well as in yours, apparently], between the external and the internal there is not the relation of influenced and influencer; because there is a local separation; as there is between him that stays at Srughna and him that stays at Pāṭaliputra.

a. In the opinion of these [persons whose theory we are at present objecting to], the soul is circumscribed, residing entirely within the body; and that which is thus within cannot stand in the relation of the influenced and the influencer, as regards an external object. Why? Because they are separated in regard to place; like two persons the one of whom remains in Srughna and the other in Pāṭaliputra: such is the meaning. Because the affection which we call 'influence' (vadānā) is seen only when there is conjunction, such as that of madder and the cloth to which it gives its colour, or that of flowers and the flower-basket [to which they impart their odour].

b. By the word 'also' the absence of conjunction [between the soul and objects (see § 10)], &c., which he himself holds, is connected [with the matter of the present aphorism].

1 तत्मेति परिषेद्वाद देहानां एवामात्मा तथा-

ब्लाम्बार्यमस्वनान्तावमेव वायव्यवाहरणमस्व

सहायकश्चायाप्रज्ञ-भावोपिं संस्थिति। कुः। सुम्प्रस्स्तानांपुष्प-

स्यायोविरो देशङ्गवानानादिः। संयोगेऽस्येव

हि वायव्यवाह उपरागो दृष्टो यथा महिद्वात्म-ये। ये वा पुष्पपरकोविति।

2 ऋषिपरमे तत्मेति संयोगाभावादि: समु-
a. Srugha and Pātaliputra [Palibothra, or Patna] are two several places far apart.1

b. But then [these heretics may reply], 'The influence of objects [on the soul] may be asserted, because there is a contact with the object; inasmuch as the soul, according to us, goes to the place of the object, just as the senses, according to Your Worship.' Therefore he declares [as follows]:

draṣṭविद्याज्ञानवर्गवांशित ॥ 30 ॥

Aph. 30. If [the heretic, wishing to save his theory, suggests that a difference between the two cases (see § 29) does exist] in virtue of the unseen, [i.e., of merit and demerit, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

a. That is to say, [the heretic may argue]: 'But then, granting that they [the free soul and the bound] are alike in respect of their coming into contact with objects, when they become conjoined with them in one and the same locality; yet the reception of the influence may result merely from the force of the unseen, [i.e., from the merit and demerit of this or that soul; the soul that is liberated alike from merit and demerit being able to encounter, with impunity, the object that would enchain one differently circumstanced]: if this be urged, then we look forward:

a. This he disputes,2 [as follows]:

न द्रष्टविद्याज्ञानवर्गवांशित ॥ 31 ॥

a. This he disputes, [as follows]:

1 सुमपाटलिपुत्र विप्रकटेश्वरवेशयेः ॥
2 नन्दु भवतासिद्धियाश्रामसामायात्मनो विययश्वासनादिस्वर्यवतोंगेन विययपरागो व-स्त्रयम: ॥ तत्राह ॥
3 एकारस्वभावंदे लभादुपरागायने न
Aph. 31. They cannot stand in the relation of deserver and bestower, since the two do not belong to one and the same time.

a. Since, in thy opinion, the agent and the patient are distinct, and do not belong to the same time [believing, as thou heretically dost, not only that objects (see § 26. b.) momentarily perish and are replaced, but that the duration of souls, also, is of a like description], there is positively no such relation [between the soul at one time and its successor at another], as that of deserver and bestower [or transmitter of its merits or demerits]; because it is impossible that there should be an influence of objects [§ 27.] taking effect on a patient [say, the soul of to-day], occasioned by the ‘unseen’ [merit or demerit] belonging to an agent [say, the soul of yesterday, which, on the hypothesis in question, is a numerically different individual]: such is the meaning.

b. He pondered a doubt.

Aph. 32. If [the heretic suggests that] the case is like that of the ceremonies in regard to a son, [then he will find his reply by looking forward].

a. But then [the heretic, admitting the principle that

the merit or demerit of an act belongs entirely to the agent, may urge that], as the son is benefited by ceremonies in regard to a son, such as that [ceremony (see Colebrooke’s ‘Hindu Law,’ Vol. III., p. 104) celebrated] in anticipation of conception, which [no doubt] belongs to the father [who performs the ceremonies, to propitiate the gods], in like manner there may be an influence of objects on the experiencer [say, the soul of to-day], through the ‘unseen’ [merit or demerit] that belongs even to a different subject [say, the soul of yesterday]: such is the meaning [of the heretic].

o. He refutes this, by showing that the illustration is not a fact.

नास्ति हि तत सिया एक झालमा यो गर्भाधानादिना 3 संस्कृतेऽ || 32 ||

Aph. 33. [Your illustration proves nothing;] for, in that case, there is no one permanent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c.

a. ‘In that case,’ i.e., on thy theory, too, the benefit of

1 ननु यथा पितृविनिहेत गर्भाधानादिना पुचकमेश्य पुच्छ्यापकारो भवति तदाधिकारेऽणेवादृशेऽ मोक्तुविषयोपारागः स्वादित्यः ||
2 दृश्यालासिद्धा परिहर्दि ||

2 Aniruddha has गर्भाधानादिकमेश्या; and Dr. Ballantyne’s rendering suits it. Ed.

3 A common reading, but inferior, is संस्कृतेऽ य देवा. Ed.
the son, by [means of the performance of] the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c., could not take place; 'for,' i.e., because, on that theory, there is not one [self-identical] soul, continuing from the [time of] conception to birth, which could be consecrated [by the ceremonies in question], so as to be a fit subject for the duties that pertain to the time subsequent to birth [such as the investiture with the sacred thread, for which the young Brāhmaṇ would not be a fit subject, if the ceremonies in anticipation of his conception had been omitted]: and thus your illustration is not a real one, [on your own theory; it is not a thing that you can assert as a fact].

b. And, according to my theory, also, your illustration is not a fact; seeing that it is possible that the benefit to the son should arise from the 'unseen' [merit] deposited in the son by means of the ceremony regarding the son: for it is an implied tenet [of my school], that it [the soul] is permanent [in its self-identity]; and there is the injunction [of Mann, (Ch. II., v. 26), with regard to the ceremonies in question, which proceeds on the same grounds].

\[1\] The brackets are of my inserting. Ed.

\[2\] तत्त्व लक्ष्यमेति गर्भाधानातिकर्मशापि उच्चार्य-पकारो न घटते हि यस्मात्वगर्भाधानाय जन्मप्यर्थस्वयंक आत्मो नालि यो जन्मात्मा-रक्तालीणमाधिकाराः संस्कृतेति तथा च देहान्तासिद्धि: \[2\]

\[3\] अस्तमातेषापि स्वयंभुपुर्णसात्रचन्द्रार्ण पुत्र-कार्येण पुत्रनिष्ठात्तेज्यते। पुत्राकारसंवाहंद्विशालान्त्यासिद्धिरिवर्थः \[2\]

\[4\] Some other heretic may encounter us, on the strength of [the argument here next stated, viz.,] 'But then, since bondage, also, [like everything else] is momentary, let this bondage have nothing determinate for its cause, or nothing at all for its cause,' [which view of matters is propounded in the next aphorism]:

\[5\] िर्करकार्यायितः कुलिकालम् \[34\] \[2\]

\[6\] अध्य. 34. Since there is no such thing as a permanent result [on the heretical view], the momentariness [of bondage, also, is to be admitted].

a. 'Of bondage': this must be supplied, [to complete the aphorism].\[3\]

b. And thus the point relied on is, that it [i.e., bondage] have no cause at all. And so this is the application [of the argument, viz.]:

(1) Bondage, &c., is momentary;
(2) Because it exists,
(3) [Everything that exists is momentary,] as the apex of the lamp-flame, or the like.\[3\]
c. And [continues the heretic, this] [reason, viz., 'existence'] does not extend [as you may object,] to the case of a jar, or the like; because that, also [in my opinion], is like the subject in dispute, [in being momentary]. This [in fact] is precisely what is asserted in the expression, 'since there is no such thing as a permanent result' ² [§34].

d. He objects [to this heretical view]:

न प्रत्यभिज्ञाबाधात् || ३४ ||

Aph. 35. No, [things are not momentary in their duration]; for the absurdity of this is proved by recognition.

a. That is to say: nothing is momentary; because the absurdity of its being momentary follows from the opposite argument [to that under §34 b.], taken from such facts of, recognition as, 'what I saw, that same do I touch,' [an argument which may be stated as follows, viz. :

1. Bondage, &c., is permanent;
2. Because it exists.

³Vyabhichāra is the expression here paraphrased. In this work and others, the translator has given it many meanings; and so has Colebrooke, who renders it, in various contexts, by 'contradiction,' 'derogation,' 'failure,' 'impossibility,' 'unoperativeness,' &c. As a logical technicality, it denotes the presentation of the reason, or middle term, unaccompanied by the major term. Ed.

²न च यद्देहाद्व अभिचारस्त्यायीय पक्षसमवात्।
एतदेवालं धीरकार्यार्थिरस्तिरियनेन।

³कृष्यति।
a. That is to say: the general principle of the momentariness [of all things] is denied; because this momentary character does not [in fact] belong to the apex of the lamp-flame, &c., the instance [on which thou, heretic, dost ground thy generalization, §34. b.]. Moreover, thou quite err'st in regard to momentariness, in that instance, from not taking account of the minute and numerous instants [really included in a duration which seems to thee momentary]: such is the import. 

b. Moreover, if the momentary duration, &c., [of things] be asserted, then there can be no such thing as the relation of cause and effect, in the case of the earth and the jar, and the like.

And you must not say that there is no such thing as that [relation of cause and effect]; because it is proved to be a reality by the fact that, otherwise, there would be no such thing as the efforts of him who desires an effect, [and who, therefore, sets in operation the causes adapted to its production]. With reference to this, he declares [as follows]:

\[ \text{Yugapadyayamaya: karthikarahav – II 35 II} \]

1 तुहाते दीपशिखादी शङिकल्स्यातिवेद्न शङिकलानुमाननिम्न्य:। लिं च मूलसानेक्षणानालकनं शङिकलभम् एव तथं तववतं भावः॥

2 लिं च शङिकलवादे मृदुतास्ति ले कार्यंकारणानारायणाय नापपयते। न च नास्तेव स इति बत्त्यं कार्यार्थम्। प्रवृत्तव्यलानुसंपथ्या तत्तिस्तेरित्यभिमोर्वः॥

Aph. 38. It is not between two things coming simultaneously into existence, that the relation of cause and effect exists.

a. Let us ask, does the relation of product and [material] cause exist between the earth and the jar, as simultaneously coming into [their supposed momentary] existence, or as successive? Not the first; because there is nothing to lead to such an inference, and because we should not [in that case] find the man, who wants a jar, operating with earth, &c., [with a view to the jar's subsequent production]. Neither is it the last; in regard to which he declares [as follows]:

\[ \text{पूर्वापाय उत्तरायेंगात ॥ ३५ ॥} \]

Aph. 39. Because, when the antecedent departs, the consequent is unfit [to arise, and survive it].

a. The relation of cause and effect is, further, inconsistent with the theory of the momentary duration of things; because, at the time when the antecedent, i.e., the cause, departs, the consequent, i.e., the product, is 'unfit,' i.e., is not competent to arise; because, that is to say, a product is cognized only by its inhering in [and being substantially identical with, however formally different from] its

\[ \text{किं च मूदयः पृथ्विप्रवायमाणे। कार्यकारस्य-भाव। किं च वा कृतमिष्येच। नान्य विनिगमकारभावाराष्टिने। मृदादिप्रवृत्तव्यलानुसंपथ्या। नान्य इत्यादि॥} \]
substantial cause, and is incapable, therefore, of surviving it).

b. With reference to this same [topic, viz., the] substantial cause, he mentions another [the converse] objection [to the theory of the momentary duration of things]:

तद्यात् तद्योगाद्यभवभिचारादिपि ॥ ॥

Aph. 40. Moreover, not [on the theory of the momentary duration of things, can there be such a relation as that of cause and effect]; because, while the one [the antecedent] exists, the other [the consequent] is incompatible, because the two keep always asunder.

a. To complete [the aphorism], we must say, 'moreover, [on the theory objected to], there can be no such relation as that of cause and effect; because, at the time when the antecedent exists, the consequent cannot coexist with it, the two being mutually exclusive.' The two suggesters of the relation of cause and effect, in product and substance, are (1) this concomitancy of affirmatives, that, while the product exists, the substance thereof exists, and (2) this concomitancy of negatives, that, when the substance no longer exists, the product no longer exists: and these two [conditions, on your theory] cannot be; because, since things [in your opinion,] are momentary in their duration, the two [viz., the substance and the product], inasmuch as they are antecedent and consequent, belong to opposite times, [and cannot, therefore, coexist; for the product, according to you, does not come into existence until its substance has perished, which is contrary to the nature of the causal relation just defined].

b. But then, [the heretic may say, do not let the coexistence of substance and product be insisted upon, as indispensable to the causal relation between the two, but] "let the nature of a cause belong to the substantial cause,

1 पूर्वस्य कार्यक्षेत्रायायाकाल उत्तरस्य कार्यक्षेत्राय
योगाद्यभवभिचारादिपि ॥ क्षणिकवादवृद्धि ॥

2 उपादानकार्यानुमित्रृत्वैॅ दूधालान्तरस्माः ॥

3 For व्याख्याध्र, the word used in the original, see 1, at p. 38, supra. Ed.

4 Here again occurs, in the Sanskrit, the term व्याख्याध्र. Ed.

5 I have inserted the words 'in product and substance.' Ed.

6 The original dual of 'concomitancy of affirmatives' and 'concomitancy of negatives' is अन्नवान्यतिरीक्त. For other English equivalents of this term, occurring in the singular number, see Book VI., Aph. 15 and 63. Ed.

7 'Antecedent and consequent' renders kramika, translated 'successive' in Aph. 38, a, at p. 41, supra. Ed.

8 पूर्वस्य भावकाल उत्तरस्यसंबन्धानुभवभिचारादिपि ॥ कार्यकार्यण्यातीतीया उपादानानुभावस्तुपादित्या
भव इत्यतन्त्रविद्यायां उपादानाद्वा व च मधुकार्यानुभावविद्या तै च क्षणिकवादवृद्धिञ्च संस्करतः ॥
as it belongs to the instrumentaI cause, in respect merely of its antecedence.' To this he replies: 1

Aph. 41. If there were merely antecedence, then there would be no determination of a substantial or material cause, as distinguished from an instrumental cause.

a. And it could not be determined that this was the substance of this or that product, on the granting of nothing more than its antecedence to the product; because antecedence constitutes no distinction between it and the instrumental causes; for, as we need scarcely remind you, there is a distinction between instrumental and substantial causes, the whole world is agreed: such is the meaning. 2

b. Other heretics say: 'Since nothing really exists, except Thought, neither does Bondage; just as the things of a dream have no real exist-

ence. Therefore it has no cause; for it is absolutely false.' He rejects the opinion of those 1 [heretics]:

Aph. 42. Not Thought alone exists; because there is the intuition of the external.

a. That is to say: the reality is not Thought alone; because external objects, also, are proved to exist, just as Thought is, by intuition. 2

b. But then [these heretics may rejoin], 'From the example of intuitive perception in dreams [see Butler's 'Analogy,' Part I., Ch. I.], we find this [your supposed evidence of objective reality] to exist, even in the absence of objects.' To this he replies: 3

Aph. 43. Then, since, if the one does not exist, the other does not exist, there is a void, [i.e., nothing exists at all].

1 ननु निमित्तिकारश्चेयायादानस्यापि पूर्वभाववाचेतेऽयाचारश्च तद्भव॥

2 पूर्वभाववाचेतायुगमेव चैदेवेदानालिनिति निमित्तिकारश्चेयायादानस्यापि पूर्वभाववाचेतायुगमेव हि निमित्तिकारश्चेयायातिभागः सर्वेलाकिष्चेतायुगमे॥

3 न विज्ञानमात्रं तत्स्य वाचायादानस्यापि विज्ञानविनित्तिस्वादिस्यः॥

4 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

5 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

6 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

7 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

8 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

9 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

10 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

11 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

12 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

13 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

14 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

15 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

16 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

17 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

18 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

19 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

20 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

21 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

22 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

23 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

24 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

25 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

26 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

27 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

28 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

29 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥

30 ननु स्पष्टप्रतिस्पष्टानित्तिस्वादिस्य तदुपपरिप्रतिभागः॥
The Sankhya Aphorisms.

a. That is to say: if external things do not exist, then a mere void offers itself. Why? Because, if the external does not exist, then thought does not exist; for it is intuition that proves the objective: and, if the intuition of the external did not establish the objective, then the intuition of thought, also, would not establish [the existence of] thought.  

b. 'Then let the reality be a mere void; and, therefore, the searching for the cause of Bondage is unfitting, just because a void is all.' with such a proposal [as recorded in the next aphorism] does [some one who may claim the title of] the very crest-gem of the heretics rise up in opposition:  

The Sankhya School.

The reality is a void: what is perishable; because to perish is the habit of things.

a. The void alone [says this prince of heretics, or the fact that nothing exists at all] is the reality, [or the only

1 तर्के वाच्यभावे शून्ये प्रस्तुतेत। कृत्तं
बाच्यभावे विद्यानवाभावप्रतितिभि विषयसाधिकार
साक्ष्यमंत्रीतिचेब विषयं साधंविज्ञानप्रति
तिरुप्य न विज्ञान साधवेणिदिति भावः।

2 नस्ये तर्के तत्तथमतः चन्द्रकारश्चि
विद्यायमयुं तु ज्ञानादिति नातिकशिंयोमशिः।
प्रक्ष्यवतिष्ठेत॥

3 नस्ये तर्के तत्तथमतः चन्द्रकारश्चि
विद्यायमयुं तु ज्ञानादिति नातिकशिंयोमशिः।
प्रक्ष्यवतिष्ठेत॥

Nihilism \(\subseteq\) the indescribable, as the indestructible.

Aph. 45. This is a mere counter-assertion of unintelligent persons.

a. Of unintelligent persons,' i.e., of blockheads, this is 'a mere counter-assertion,' i.e., a mere idle counter-assertion, that a thing must needs be perishable, because it

1 शून्यमेव तत्तथं । यतः सबै शिप्भावे विन
शयति यथा विनाशी स मिथ्या स्माच्छतः। सबै
जनानात्माध्यत्योत्तमान्यात्मानेन शाः
व्याप्तिन्तं न पारसाधिष्ठिनिन चन्द्रहि। ततः स्विन 
क्यों तथ् इवाशयः। भावानं विनाशिश्चेतुव्यवः। विस्मेतेन
विनाशस्य विनाशस्य प्रतिश्चितिक च शास्त्रोऽर्थात
तत्तथाभावं तु विज्ञाय न पदार्थशिष्टान्तर्थः॥

2 परिष्ठति॥

BOOK I., APH. 45. 47

truth]. Since everything that exists perishess, and that which is perishable is false, as is a dream, therefore, as of all things the beginnings and endings are merely nonentities, Bondage, &c., in the midst [of any beginning and ending], has merely a momentary existence,—is phenomenal, and not real. Therefore, who can be bound by what? This [question] is what we rest upon. The reason assigned for the perishableness of whatever exists is, 'because to perish is the habit of things,' because to perish is the very nature of things: but nothing continues, after quitting its own nature; [so that nothing could continue, if it ceased to perish]: such is the meaning.  

b. He rejects* [this heretical view]
exists; [and such an assertion is idle] because things that are not made up of parts, since there is no cause of the destruction of such things, cannot perish.1

b. [But] what need of many words? It is not the fact, that even products perish; [for] just as, by the cognition that ‘the jar is old,’ [we mean that it has passed from the condition of new to that of old], so, too, by such a cognition as this, that ‘the jar has passed away,’ it is settled only that the jar, or the like, is in the condition of having passed away.2

c. He states another objection3 [to the heretical view]:

उष्मप्रसननान्त्यमादायमायियित् ॥ ॥

Nihilism is open to the same objections as both the Momentary and the Ideal theories.

Aph 46. Moreover, this [nihilistic theory] is not a right one; because it has the same fortune as both the views [which were confuted just before].

1 अर्धस्वादनां मूलानामपवद्विमाँ भावाविद्या-निर्मितिमध्यापवद एव नाणागमान्धाश्च निर्मितिमध्यापवद्विमां नाणागमान्धाश्च ॥

2 अर्धस्वादनां मूलानामपवद्विमाँ भावाविद्या-निर्मितिमध्यापवद एव नाणागमान्धाश्च निर्मितिमध्यापवद्विमाँ नाणागमान्धाश्च ॥

3 द्वाप्रसननारसाह ॥

4 Anuruddha, according to the MSS. which I have seen, reads -ल्माद. Ed.

b. Moreover, as for the opinion which is accepted by these [heretics], viz., 'Let the mere void [of absolute nonentity] be the soul's aim [and summum bonum], since herein consist at once the cessation of pain [which cannot continue, when there is absolutely nothing] and also the means thereof [since there can be no further means required for the removal of anything]; if it be settled that the thing positively does not exist,' thus, too, can hardly be: so he declares [as follows].

1 क्याणप्रकाशप्रक्षणं विज्ञानाविद्याय विद्याविद्यायः सह समानकोणातपयनिरस्तहेतुकादायमायित् पत्तते न सम्बंधः। क्याणप्रकाशप्रक्षणं विद्याविद्यायः प्रमाप्रमिताविद्यादिविज्ञानप्रकाशप्रक्षणं समान इति भावः ॥

2 यद्यपि दृष्टिवृत्तिपत्यतया तत्साधनतया च भूयास्थायतु पुरुषार्थलिमित्व तैमै तददपि दृष्टिवृत्तिपत्यतया ॥
BOOK I, APH. 49.

a. 'Bondage' [required to complete the aphorism] is understood from the topic [of discussion].

b. The meaning is, that the soul's bondage, moreover, does not result from any sort of motion, in the shape, for instance, of its entrance into a body.

c. He states a reason for this:

निन्त्यिंकस्य तत्संस्कारान्तः || ८५ ||

What is all-pervading does not change place.

a. That is to say: because this is impossible, i.e., motion is impossible, in the case of the soul, which is inactive, [because] all-pervading, [and, therefore, incapable of changing its place].

b. But then [the objector may say], 'Since, in the books of Scripture and of law, we hear of its going and coming into this world and the other world, let soul be [not all-pervading, as you allege, but] merely limited [in its extent]: and to this effect, also, is the text, 'Of the size
of the thumb is the soul, the inner spirit,' and the like:¹ [but] this conjecture he repels:²

[Aph. 50. [We cannot admit that the soul is other than all-pervading; because] by its being limited, since it would come under the same conditions as jars, &c., there would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishability].

a. That is to say: and, if the soul were admitted to be, like a jar, or the like, limited, i.e. circumscribed [in dimension], then, since it would resemble a jar, or the like, in being made up of parts, and hence in being perishable, &c., this would be contrary to our settled principle,³ [that the soul is imperishable].

b. He now justifies the text [see § 49. b.] referring to the motion ⁴ [of the soul, by showing that the motion is not really of the soul, but of an accessory]:

¹ Śvētāśvatara Upanishad, iii., 13. Ed.
² नन्तु ज्ञ्यत्स्वरूपंस्यकर्त्ताकारणात्मकयमानस: परिक्षित्यत्मकसोर्जनकाठ्यकारणात्
³ यदि च घटादिगत्यमानमृते: परिस्थिति: स्थी-किरि: तता सावधान-विभाविनाशिता: घटादिगत्यमानसः स्वादिश्: ॥
⁴ गतिःश्रुतिमुपपादयति ॥

Aph. 51. The text regarding the motion [of the soul], moreover, is [applicable, only] because of the junction of an attendant;¹ as in the case of the Ether [or Space, which moves not, though we talk of the space enclosed in a jar, as moving with the jar).

a. Since there are such proofs of the soul's unlimitedness, as the declaration that 'It is eternal, omnipresent, permanent,'² the text³ regarding its motion is to be explained as having reference to a movement pertaining [not to the soul, but] to an attendant; for there is the text, 'As the Ether [or space] included in a jar, when the jar is removed, [in this case] the jar may be removed, but not the space; and in like manner is the soul, which is like the sky, [incapable of being moved],'⁴ and because we may conclude that the motion [erroneously supposed to belong to the soul (49. b.);] belongs to Nature [see Vedānta Aphorisms, Part I., § 4. 1.], from such maxims⁵ as this, that 'Nature does the works the fruits of which are blissful or baneful:

¹ Upanādi; often, below, 'investment' and 'adjunct.' I'd.
² Bhagavad-gītā, ii., 24. Ed.
³ 'Text' and 'maxim' are here meant to represent śrutī and smṛti, taken in their more limited senses. Elsewhere the translator has, for the same terms, in wider acceptations, 'books of Scripture and of law,' &c. The first is 'revealed law,' the Vedas; the second, 'memorial law,' or a code of such law, as the Mānava, and also any composition of a man reputed to be inspired. Both are held to have originated from a superhuman source; but only the former is regarded as preserving the very words of revelation. Ed.
⁴ The anacoluthism observable in the translation follows that of the original, with reference to which see the Indische Studien, vol. ii., p. 61.
and it is wilful Nature that, in the three worlds, reaps these 1: such is the import. 2

b. It has already been denied [§ 16] that the bondage [of the soul] is occasioned by works, in the shape either of enjoined or of forbidden actions. Now he declares that the bondage, moreover, does not arise from the ‘unseen’ [merit or demerit] resulting therefrom. 3

न कर्मशास्त्रपादिन्यमवत् ॥ ५२ ॥

Aph. 52. Nor, moreover, [does the bondage of the soul result from the merit or demerit arising] from works; because these belong not thereto.

b. That is to say: the bondage of the soul does not arise directly from the ‘unseen’ [merit or demerit] occasioned by works. 1

1 नियोः स्वयंगतः स्मार्युतविहिति वालस्तिविद्वादिति महाभाषां तत्त्वं वालस्तिविद्वादिति भाषायम् ॥ यद्यो नामास्तिमात्रां नीयमाने घटे यथा ॥

Eka, bondage might cling even to the emancipated. 4

2 नियोः स्वयंगतः स्मार्युतविहिति वालस्तिविद्वादिति महाभाषां तत्त्वं वालस्तिविद्वादिति भाषायम् ॥

a. That is to say: if the case were otherwise, if bondage and its cause were under other conditions [than we have declared them to be], then there might be an undue extension; bondage would befall even the emancipated, 4 [for the same reasons as those stated under § 16 a.].

1 Dr. Ballantyne should have taken ‘unseen’ and ‘works’ as in apposition, and should have made the former explanatory of the latter. Cauer than his original, and yielding substantially his sense, is the gloss of Vedant Mahadeva: कर्मशास्त्रपादिन्यमवत् ॥ एद ॥

2 कर्मशास्त्रपादिन्यमवत् ॥ एद ॥

3 नन्यथाभास्तिविद्वादिति भाषायम् ॥

4 Aniruddha transposes Aphorisms 53 and 54. Ed.

5 अन्यथाभास्तिविद्वादिति भाषायम् ॥
b. What need of so much [prolixity]? He states a general objection why the bondage of soul cannot result from any one or other [of these causes], beginning with its essence [see § 6. b.], and ending with its [supposed] works [see § 16]; inasmuch as it is contrary to Scripture, [that any one of these should be the cause]:

निगीतादिशुचितिविरोधवेदि ॥ ५४ ॥

Aph. 54. And this [opinion, that the bondage of the soul arises from any of these causes alleged by the heretics,] is contrary to such texts as the one that declares it [the soul] to be without qualities: and so much for that point.

a. And, if the bondage of the soul arose from any one or other of those [supposed causes already treated of], among which its essential character [§ 6. b.] is the first, this would be contradictory to such texts as, 'Witness, intelligent, alone, and without the [three] qualities [is the soul].' ¹ such is the meaning.²

b. The expression 'and so much for that point' means.

¹ स्वतः किं वा स्वार्थायां ज्ञानापि पुष्पस्य बन्धोलालिनं घटिते ज्ञातिविरोधवेदि साधारणं बाधकमाह ॥

² Śvetāṣṭarī Upanishad, vi., 11. Ed.

³ स्वार्थायां मृत्युस्य बन्धोलालिना साधी चेता लेवला निगीतादिशुचितिविरोधवेदि ॥

that the investigation of the cause of the bondage [of the soul] here closes.¹

c. The case, then, stands thus: since [all] other [theories] are overthrown by the declaratory aphorisms, 'There would be no fitness in the enjoining,' [see § 7], &c., it is ascertained that the immediate cause of the bondage [of the soul] is just the conjunction of Nature and of the soul.²

d. But then, in that case, [some one may say], this conjunction of Nature and of the soul [§ 54. c.], whether it be essential, or adventitiously caused by Time or something else [§ 5. b.], must occasion the bondage even of the emancipated. Having pondered this doubt, he disposes of it [as follows]:³

तद्यथोपथिविचारं समानवनं ॥ ५५ ॥

Aph. 55. Moreover, the conjunction thereof does not, through non-discrimination, take place [in the case of the emancipated]; nor is there a parity,

¹ इतिश्रद्धा वन्धेनस्यप्रायासस्मातः ॥

² तद्वेदं न वन्धेनस्यप्रायासं प्रदर्शके-तरपितभेदं प्रकृतिपुष्पसंयोगं एव साधारणं-हेतुवधारं ॥

³ ननु तथ प्रकृतिपुष्पसंयोगोऽपि स्वाधि-वालं कालातिनिपिन्तवते वा वृत्तात्स्य सब्ध-पारदृशं वस्माधिः ॥

⁴ तद्यथो, the reading which I find in MSS. of Aniruddha, seems to be indefensible. Ed.
which is to be got rid of, he declares the means of getting rid of it:"

\textit{नियतकारणादुच्छिन्निधीन्तिवत्। ॥ पौष ॥}

\textit{Aph. 56. The removal of it is to be effected by the necessary means, just like darkness.}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{a.} The necessary means, established throughout the world, in such cases as \textit{shell-silver} [i.e., a pearl-oyster-shell mistaken for silver], viz., the \textit{immediacy} of discrimination, by \textit{this alone} is \textit{its removal}, i.e., the removal of the non-discrimination [between Nature and soul], to be effected, and \textit{not by works}, or the like: such is the meaning: just as darkness, the dark, is removed by light alone,\textsuperscript{3} \textsuperscript{[and by no other means].}

  \item \textit{b.} But then \textit{[some one may say], if merely the non-discrimination of Nature and soul be, through the conjunction \textit{[of the two, consequent on the want of discrimination], the cause of bondage, and if merely the discrimination of the two be the cause of liberation, then there would be liberation, even while there remained the conceit \textit{[of one's possessing] a body, \&c.; and this is contrary\textsuperscript{5} to Scripture,}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{1} These words, a bad reading of the 24th Aphorism of Book III., were pointed out, by me, as having, with the sentence of comment attached to them, no place here; and Dr. Ballantyne, when he republished the Sāṃkhya Aphorisms in the \textit{Bibliotheca Indica}, omitted them. Hence the brackets now inserted, and my alteration of the numbering of the Aphorisms throughout the remainder of Book I. Ed.
to the institutes of law, and to sound reasoning.' To this he replies: 1

Aph. 57. Since the non-discrimination of other things [from soul] results from the non-discrimination of Nature [from soul], the cessation of this will take place, on the cessation of that [from which it results].

a. By reason of the non-discrimination of Nature from the soul, what non-discrimination of other things there is, such as the non-discrimination of the understanding [as something other than the soul], this necessarily ceases, on the cessation of the non-discrimination of Nature; because, when the non-discrimination of the understanding, for example, [as something other than soul] does occur, it is based on the non-discrimination [from soul] of that cause to which there is none antecedent [viz., Nature]; since the non-discrimination of an effect [and the 'understanding' is an effect or product of Nature] is, itself, an effect, 2 [and will, of course, cease, with the cessation of its cause].

b. The state of the case is this: as, when the soul has been discriminated from the body, it is impossible but that it should be discriminated from the colour and other [properties], the effects of the body, [which is the substantial cause of its own properties]; so, by parity of reasoning, from the departure of the cause, when soul, in its character of unalterableness, &c., has been discriminated from Nature, it is impossible that there should remain a conceit of [the soul's being any of] the products thereof [i.e., of Nature], such as the 'understanding,' and the like, which have the character of being modifications 3 of primal Nature, while the soul, on the other hand, is a thing unalterable.

c. But then [some one may say], 'What proof is there that there is a conceit [entertained by people in general] of a Nature [or primal principle] different from the conceit of an 'understanding,' &c., [which, you tell us, are products of this supposed first principle]? For all the various conceits [that the soul falls into], such as, 'I am ignorant,' and so on, can be accounted for on the ground simply of an 'understanding,' &c., [without postulating a primal Nature which is to assume the shape of an 'understanding,' &c.].'

1 नन् प्रकृतिपुष्पविवेक एव चेवच्यागाराय
बवहेतुल्मांविवेक एव माहेतुमति देहायभिमानसमाध्यभी मद्वः स्वाच्छ धृतिस्मृतिनिविश्वास्मिति।
तत्राहाः

2 भूहे प्रकृतिविवेकाकोर्णायोऽणाविवेको
कुख्यातिविवेको बुख्यातिविवेके जाते कार्यावि-

3 श्रीराधातन्नी विविक्षं श्रीराधाकारणं
क्यादिश्विवेको न संभवति तथा कृत्यकार
ध्वेषं प्रकृतिविवेकाकन्तकारसति परिश्रामेत
तथारूमकेषु बुख्यातिशंभिनाको न श्यातुमुखेत
तुस्त्यायमार्णाणाशाहेति भावः।
well, if any one says this, I reply, ‘no;’ because, unless there were such a thing as Nature, we could not account for such conceits as the following, viz., ‘Having died, having died, again, when there is a creation, let me be a denizen of Paradise, and not of hell,’ because no products, such as the ‘understanding,’ when they have perished, can be created anew, [any more than ‘a gold-bracelet, melted down, can be reproduced, though another like it may be produced from the materials].

d. Moreover, it is inadmissible to say that men’s conceits of [the identity of themselves with their] ‘understanding,’ &c., is [the primary cause of the soul’s bondage, and is] not preceded by anything; because ‘understanding’ and the rest [as you will not deny] are effects. Now, while it is to be expected that there should be some predetermining agency to establish a conceit of [ownership in, or of one’s identity with,] any effects, it is clear that it is a conceit of [ownership, &c.,] in respect of the cause, and nothing else, that must be the predetermining agency: for we see this in ordinary life; and our theories are bound to conform [differentially] to experience. For [to explain.] we see, in ordinary life, that the conceit of [the ownership of] the grain, &c., pro-

duced by a field, results from the conceit of [the ownership of] the field; and, from the conceit of [the ownership of] gold, the conceit of [the ownership of] the bracelet, or other things, formed of that gold; and, by the removal of these [i.e., the removal of the logically antecedent conceits, that the field, or the gold, is one’s property], there is the removal of those, [i.e., the removal of the conceits that the grain, &c., and that the bracelets, &c., the corresponding products or effects of the field and of the gold, are one’s property: and so the soul will cease to confound itself with the ‘understanding,’ when it ceases to confound itself with Nature, of which the ‘understanding’ is held to be a product].

e. [And, if it be supposed that we thus lay ourselves open to the charge of a repressus in infinitum, seeing that, whatever we may assign as the first cause, we may, on our own principles, be asked what was the ‘predetermining agency’ in regard to it; or if it be supposed that we are chargeable with reasoning in a circle, when we hold that the soul’s confounding itself with Nature is the cause of

\[1\] ननु बुधायायामातिरिक्ते प्रभानविभानि
किं प्रभाणामहम्मसं इत्यादिकलिशिबिनानां बुधायाम
दिवितियानिन्यासपस्यितिवै चेव मूला मूला पुनः
मृते स्वगिः स्यां च नाराजीविभिन्नानां प्रभाणाप्रभायायां
विनानुपपस्येतिततानां बुधायाम-सिद्धिविश्वेश्वरेष्यां पुनः सृष्ट्वमानवात्

\[2\] च बुधारूढः पुरुषार्थयामानां
दिवेश्वर न श्रकतेबुधारूढः जान्यवाल्। कार्यविभिन्नयवस्यां नियमकाकारवान्यां कार्या
भिन्नात्रा च नियमकात्य सिद्धां लोके दृष्टव्याक्तयास्त्र दृष्टासनांत। दृष्टी हि लोके
कृष्णमानात्यां जय्याधिपायां दिशाविभिन्नात्। सुवृ
षाभिन्नात्यज्ञात्यक्तकारित्विभिन्त्वमानस्यानांत्यारितिः
स्यां च तयानित्वारितिः।
its continuing so to confound itself, and its continuing so to confound itself is, reciprocally, the cause why it confounds itself; we reply, that there is no occasion to look for any other 'predetermining agency,' in the case of the concept of [the identity of the soul with] Nature, or in the case of the self-continuance thereof, [i.e., of that error of confounding one's self with Nature]; because [these two are alike] without antecedent, like seed and sprout, of which it is needless to ask which is the first; the old puzzle, 'which was first, the acorn, or the oak?' being a frivolous question.

f. But then [some one may say], if we admit the soul's bondage [at one time], and its freedom [at another], and its discrimination [at one time], and its non-discrimination [at another], then this is in contradiction to the assertion [in § 19], that it is 'ever essentially a pure and free intelligence;' and it is in contradiction to such texts as this, viz., 'The absolute truth is this, that neither is there destruction [of the soul], nor production [of it]; nor is it bound, nor is it an effecter [of any work], nor is it desirous of liberation, nor is it, indeed, liberated; [seeing that that cannot desire or obtain liberation, which was never bound].' This [charge of inconsistency] he repels:  

1 To render vādāna, on which see 2, at p. 29, supra. Ed.

2 प्राध्याणाभिमानत्वात् बीजाकुक्षरवदनादिक्षुचित्तवति तद्भिन्तानन्तियात्प्रति विद्यन्ति ||


4 नन्तु पुरुषस्य चेतनमेको विबेकाविवेको च स्नीवकृताँ तदान्तित्सुखुकुलोत्त्तिरविरुध्यतत्पर् ||

a. That is to say: since bondage, &c., all reside only in the mind [and not in the soul], all this, as regards the soul, is merely verbal, i.e., it is vox et praeterea nihil; because is it merely a reflexion, like the redness of [pellucid] crystal [when a China-rose is near it], but not a reality, with no false imputation, like the redness of the China-rose itself. Hence there is no contradiction to what had been said before; [as the objector (under § 57. f.) would insinuate]: such is the state of the case.

च न निरोधो न चाल्विन्न चोडो न च साधक़
न सुधुतः च इवा इवेन परमात्मित्वादित्वित्वादित्वेऽत्त्वात्  

1 Aniruddha has, instead of न तु, तु न. Hence: 'But it is merely verbal, not a reality,' &c. Ed.

2 वस्मादित्वानं सर्वं चित्त एवावशयनात्त्वव इत्यं हन्त चात्मानं वचनप्रकाशमित्वाविवेकादित्वम् तु तत्त्वातिरिपृत्ति ज्ञानात्मित्वमेदित्वः। चतौऽतन्त्रविवेक इति भावः||
b. That is to say: the bondage, &c., of the soul though [granted to be] merely verbal, are not to be removed by merely hearing, or inferring, without immediate cognition, without directly perceiving; just as the contrariety in regard to the [proper] direction, though merely verbal [as resulting from misdirection], in the case of a person who is mistaken as to the points of the compass [and hence as to his own bearings], is not removed by testimony, or by inference, without immediate cognition, i.e., without [his] directly perceiving [how the points of the compass really lie, to which immediate perception 'testimony,' or 'inference,' may convey, but the necessity of which these media, or instruments of knowledge, cannot supersede].

a. Or it [Aph. 59] may be explained as follows, viz.: But then, [seeing that] it is declared, by the ascription [in Aph. 56], viz., that 'The removal of it is to be effected by the necessary means,' that knowledge, in the shape of discrimination [between Soul and Nature], is the remover of non-discrimination [in regard to the matter in question], tell us, is that knowledge of a like nature with the hearing

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* The truth must be directly discerned, and not merely accepted on the ground of Testimony, or by Inference.

* By 'argument,' we mean thinking. The word 'moreover' is intended to aggregate [or take in, along with 'argument'] 'testimony,' [or verbal authority, which, no more than 'argument,' or inference, can remove the evil, which can be removed by nothing short of direct intuitive perception of the real state of the case].

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1. ननु वचार्यदिं चेतुसुष्पे चाइि ताइहिश्रवणेन सुक्ता व तथा तस्य बाधा भवति। जिसमें ज्ञनिसृयं: साधारणत: विशेषज्ञानमुपादित्यते मोक्षहेतुतद्यति। तत्ताह॥

2. युक्तिसमन्नम्। श्यपिष्टः। अवशयस्मुख्याथः।
Nature], the next thing to be set forth is the 'discrimination' [here referred to].

e. This being the topic, in the first place, since only if Soul and Nature exist, liberation can result from the discrimination of the one from the other, therefore that 'instrument of right knowledge' (pramāṇya) which establishes the existence of these [two imperceptible realities] is [first] to be set forth:

**Aph. 60.** The knowledge of things imperceptible is by means of inference; as that of fire [when not directly perceptible], is by means of smoke, &c.

a. That is to say: 'of things imperceptible,' i.e., of things not cognizable by the senses, e.g., Nature and the Soul, 'the knowledge,' i.e., the fruit lodged in the soul, is brought about by means of that instrument of right knowledge [which may be called] 'Inference' (anumāna), [but which (see Nyāya Aphorisms, I., § 5) is, more correctly, 'the recognition of a Sign']; as [the knowledge that there is] fire [in such and such a locality, where we cannot directly

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1 आयुष्यम् व्यायामेत्र ननु नित्यतावर्षार्थार्थम्
सत्वरित्यनेन विवेकानन्तरविबोधकाण्डमुङ्कं त
t
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\[...
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[...]

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2 तदेव विवेकात्मानस्विन्तयायत: परं विवेक: प्रतिपादितयः

3 नष्टिद्विप्रकृतिपरिषिद्वीति तत्त्वविकामेऽः

साधत्तततिन्द्रं प्रमाणार्थचेतहुः
perceive it,) is brought about by the 'recognition of a Sign,' occasioned by smoke, &c.\(^1\)

6. Moreover, it is to be understood that that which is [true, but yet is] not established by 'Inference,' is established by Revelation. But, since 'Inference' is the chief [among the instruments of knowledge], in this [the Sāṅkhya system], 'Inference' only is laid down [in the aphorism] as the chief thing; but Revelation is not disregarded\(^2\) [in the Sāṅkhya system; as will be seen from Apha. 88 of this Book].

c. He [next] exhibits the order of creation of these things among which Nature is the first, and the elusion of cause and effect [among these, severally], preparatory to the argument that will be [afterwards] stated:\(^3\)

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\(^1\) अनायुक्तायां सामवेदव्यायां प्राकृति पुनवादीतम निन्दनेन प्र्माणाणैैर भवति यथा धूमादिविशिष्ठनिन्दनेन अनुमान वहृः सिद्धिरिष्यं

\(^2\) अनुमानसिद्ध्यां मनस्सात्मक्षिणां विषयं तेन

\(^3\) प्रकृती तथाहृत्त्र सब्जितां बध्यताय अयक्तस्यातभृत्र च दर्श्यातिरूपः
the Vaiseshika system have, themselves, so qualities (see Kanada's 16th Aph.); while these have the qualities of Conjunction, Disjunction, Lightness, Force, Weight, &c. In this [Sankhya] system, and in Scripture, &c., the word 'Quality' (guna) is employed as the name of the three things in question, because they are subservient to Soul [and, therefore, hold a secondary rank in the scale of being], and because they form the cords [which the word guna also signifies], viz., 'Mind,' &c., which consist of the three so-called 'Qualities,' and which bind, as a [cow, or other] brute-beast, the Soul.

c. Of this [Nature] the principle called 'the great one' (mahat), viz., the principle of 'Understanding' (buddhi), is the product. 'Self-consciousness' is a conceit [of separate personality]. Of this there are two products, (1) the

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1 Halavattika; for which I find the variant chalatika, 'mobility.'

2 Read: 'Goodness and the rest are substances, not specific qualities; for they [themselves] possess [qualities, viz., those of] contact and separation, and also have the properties of levity, mobility, gravity, &c.' Vaiseshikā gunaḥ is equivalent to the viśeṣa-gunaḥ in the original of Book V., 35 a. For the 'specific qualities,' see the Bhāskara-parāchheda, st. 90. Ed.

3 For 'is employed,' &c., read, 'is applied to these (tashā), [namely, goodness, passion, and darkness].' Ed.

4 सच्चारोपिता दृष्टि न वैशेषिका गुणः संयोग- गतिभागब्जळाग्यधारबलवस्तुगुणादितिकालाय।

5 For a different translation, see the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 43, 44. Ed.

6 अनुमानकोशमाह सनि।
a. 'The knowledge, by inference,' so much is supplied,' [to complete the aphorism, from Aph. 60].

b. Earth, &c., the 'Gross Elements,' are proved to exist, by Perception; [and] thereby [i.e., from that Perception; for Perception must precede Inference, as stated in Goutama’s 5th Aphorism] are the ‘Subtle Elements’ inferred, [the στουχεία στοχείαν of Empedocles]. And so the application [of the process of inference to the case] is as follows:

(1) The Gross Elements, or those which have not reached the absolute limit [of simplification, or of the atomic], consist of things [Subtle Elements, or Atoms,] which have distinct qualities; [the earthy element having the distinctive quality of Odour; and so of the others]:

(2) Because they are gross;

(3) [And everything that is gross is formed of something less gross, or, in other words, more subtle] as jars, webs, &c.; [the gross web being formed of the less gross threads; and so of the others].

बाबाभ्‌यन्तराभ्यम् तैशाहीकारस्य् II 63 II

Aph. 63. [The knowledge of the existence of Self-consciousness is [by inference], from the external and inter-

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1 अनुमाने वैध इत्यनुसारे II
2 स्यूलं पुष्यिवादित्र प्रच्छसिद्धेतेन तन्मार्णाशयानुसारे II तथा चापकर्षकाभापनवति स्यूल-लभतानि सविशेषगुणवत्‌योपादानकाणि स्यूल-लाभपटर्दिविद्यति प्रयोगः II
3 In my MSS. of Aniruddha there is no च after तैः. Ed.
And this [the objector may go on to say] is not the case; because another man [after the beatification of the potter] recognizes that 'This is that same jar [which, you may remember, was fabricated by our deceased acquaintance].'

d. [In reply to this we say,] it is not thus; because, on one's beatification, there is an end of only those modifications of his internal organ [or 'Intelligent'] which could be causes [as the jar no longer can be] of the emancipated soul's experiencing [either good or ill], but not an end of the modifications of intellect in general, nor an end of intellect altogether: [so that we might spare ourselves the trouble of further argument, so far as concerns the objection grounded on the assumption that the intellect of the potter suceedes, on his beatification: but we may go further, and admit, for the sake of argument, the suceedase of the 'intellet' of the beatified potter, without conceding any necessity for the succeedase of his pottery. This alternative theory of the case may be stated as follows:

e. Or [as Berkeley suggests, in his Principles of Human knowledge, Ch. vi.], let the Self-consciousness of the Deity be the cause why jars and the like [continue to exist], and not the Self-consciousness of the potter, &c., [who may lose their Self-consciousness, whereas the Deity, the sum of all life, Hiranyagarbha (see Vedanta-sara, § 62), never loses his Self-consciousness, while aught living continues]

तेनान्तः कराश्यस् II 68 II

Aph. 64. [The knowledge of the existence] of Intellect is [by inference,] from that [Self-consciousness, § 63,]

a. That is to say: by inference from [the existence of] 'that,' viz., Self-consciousness, which is a product, there comes the knowledge of 'Intelect' (buddhi), the great 'inner organ' (anahkarana), [hence] called 'the great one' (mahat), [the existence of which is recognized] under the character of the cause of this [product, viz., Self-consciousness]

b. And so the application [again rather circular, of the process of inference to the case,] is as follows:

(1) The thing called Self-consciousness is made out of the things that consist of the moods of judgment [or mind];
(2) Because it is a thing which is a product of judgment [proceeding in the Cartesian order of cogito, ergo sum; and]

1 नक्षवें फुलालां कारः स्वातः स्वातः कराश्यस्।
2 नक्षवें कराश्यस्वरुपमेत्यथा कराश्यसा

1 भस्मप्रभुः भिरार्यभोजकार गुञ्यकारामल ना कुलालांहांकरः।
2 तेनान्तः कारः तद्नान्तः महाकारः बुद्धर्मान्तेऽऽव इत्यः।
(3) Whatever is not so [i.e., whatever is not made out of judgment, or mental assurance], is not thus [i.e., is not a product of mental assurance]; as the Soul [which is not made out of this or of anything antecedent], &c.¹

c. Here the following reasoning is to be understood: Every one, having first determined anything under a concept [i.e., under such a form of thought as is expressed by a general term; for example, that which presents itself is a jar, or a human body, or a possible action of one kind or other], after that makes the judgment, 'This is I,' or 'This ought to be done by me,' and so forth: so much is quite settled; [and there is no dispute that the fact is as here stated]. Now, having, in the present instance, to look for some cause of the thing called 'Self-consciousness' [which manifests itself in the various judgments just referred to], since the relation of cause and effect subsists between the two functions [the occasional conception, and the subsequent occasional judgment, which is a function of Self-consciousness], it is assumed, for simplicity, merely that the relation of cause and effect exists between the two sattvatas to which the [two sets of] functions belong; [and this is sufficient] because it follows, as a matter of course, that the occurrence of a function of the effect must result from the occurrences of a function of the cause;² [nothing, according to the Sāṅkhya, being in any

¹ तथा चाय चं प्रयोगः। त्वाहेंकार्यं निष्ठिताय- त्तिर्भुवायपादानां निष्ठितायान्मात्। बचिवं तब्रवं यथा पुष्पादिरिति॥

² अतच तत्त्वो वच्चयः। सर्वादिपं लोकं पदार्थंसदृशं स्थायते निष्कल्य प्रधानबिम्बितो दयन्ते॥
(3) [Every product that has the affections of, or that occasions, Pleasure, Pain, or Dullness, takes its rise in something which consists of these]; as lovely women, &c.1

c. For an agreeable woman gives pleasure to her husband, and, therefore, [is known to be mainly made up of, or] partakes of the quality of ‘Goodness,’ the indiscreet one gives pain to him, and, therefore, partakes of the quality of ‘Foulness,’ and she who is separated [and perhaps forgotten,] occasions indifference, and so partakes of the quality of ‘Darkness.’ 2

d. And the appropriate refutation [of any objection], in this case, is [the principle], that it is fitting that the qualities of the effect should be [in every case,] in conformity with the qualities of the cause. 3

e. Now he states how, in a different way, we have [the evidence of] inference for [the existence of] Soul, which is void of the relation of cause and effect that has been men-

1 अथ यथाकार्याकारशाक्ष्यप्राप्तयश्च पुत्रस्य प्रकारार्तिरेशानुमानमाह ॥

2 कार्यास्तु भवति सुखदेति साक्षी । अभिनयः दुःखदेति जातसि । बिरहिष्णि मोहदेति तामसी भवति ॥

3 कार्येनानुसारेश्च कार्येन्द्रियः चान्तरानुवृत्तः । लक्षणे ॥

BOOK I., APH. 66.

The argument for the existence of Soul.

Aph. 66. [The existence] of Soul [is inferred] from the fact, that the combination [of the principles of Nature into their various effects] is for the sake of another [than unintelligent Nature, or any of its similarly unintelligent products]

a. ‘Combination,’ i.e., conjunction, which is the cause [of all products; these resulting from the conjunction of their constituent parts]. Since whatever has this quality, as Nature, Mind, and so on [unlike Soul, which is not made up of parts], is for the sake of some other; for this reason it is understood that Soul exists; such is the remainder, 3 [required to complete the aphorism].

b. But the application [of the argument, in this particular case, is as follows]:

(1) The thing in question, viz., Nature the ‘Great one, with the rest [of the aggregate of the unintelligent], has, as its fruit [or end], the [mundane] experiences and the [eventual] Liberation of some other than itself:

1 अथ प्रेयोगः । सुखदः कार्याकारशाक्ष्यप्राप्तयश्च पुत्रस्य प्रकारार्तिरेशानुमानमाह ॥

2 Here indicated by the adjective avyakta, the indiscernite. See Aph. 136 of this Book. Ed.

3 संह्त: कार्यस्तु संयोगः । तद्विक्रमहद्द: पराश्मावेदः पुत्रस्य वेध इति शेष: ॥
Because it is a combination [or compages];
(3) [And every combination,] as a couch, or a seat, or the like, [is for another's use, not for its own; and its several component parts render no mutual service].

c. Now, in order to establish that it is the cause of all [products], he establishes the eternity of Nature (prakriti):

1. Because the root has no root, the root [of all] is rootless.

a. Since 'the root' (mula), i.e., the cause of the twenty-three principles, [which, with Soul and the root itself, make up the twenty-five realities recognized in the Sankhya,] 'has no root,' i.e., has no cause, the 'root,' viz., Nature (pradhana), is 'rootless,' i.e., void of root. That is to say, there is no other cause of Nature; because there would be

1. Prayogam lu citrada yuddhakande prakritmahadayam santarasthaya anagapavigarjalkam sankhatalakhwasanadivritam.

2. Ed焉am sarvairasakalam pathya prakrtinimyacumapadvritam.

3. This seems to mean: 'There being no root to a root, the root [or radical principle, in the Sankhya,] is rootless.'

In several MSS. which I consulted in India I found the strange reading: मूल मूलाभावाश्चू मूलानाम्. 'The root of roots, since it has no root, is rootless.' This is very like saying that $A=A$. Ed.

BOOK I., APH. 68. 83

a. regressus in infinitum, if we were to suppose another cause, which, by parity of reasoning, would require another cause; and so on without end.

b. He states the argument [just mentioned] in regard to this, [as follows]:

पार्यायविधयेकं परिनिषिद्धं संज्ञामाचरं ॥ ६५ ॥

1. मूले चयोविशिष्टतत्सवाना कार्षेण मूलाभावात्माकार्षाभावान्मूल्लं प्रधानममूल्लं मूलशून्यम्।

The source of the preceding exposition I have not ascertained.

Vijnana has: चयोविशिष्टतत्सवाना मूलमुपादानं प्रधानम मूलशून्यमन्वस्यपत्य तत्र मूलान्तरां संवेदादित्यायः।

Nâgâra: मूल सर्वस्वमुपादानं प्रधानम मूलशून्यमन्वस्यपत्य मूलभूतेत्तत्र मूलान्तरां संवेदादित्यायः।

Aniruddha: मूलमूलमूलमूलमुपादानं सर्वस्वमुपादानं प्रधानम मूलशून्यमन्वस्यपत्य मूलभूतेत्तत्र मूलान्तरां संवेदादित्यायः।

Sah Prakriti: चयोविशिष्टतत्सवाना मूलं प्रधानेनवस्यपत्य कार्षाभावादकार्षां मध्यनिमित्यायः।

Ed. डाढ युक्तमाह।
THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

Aph. 68. Even if there be a succession, there is a halt at some one point; and so it is merely a name [that we give to the point in question, when we speak of the root of things, under the name of 'Nature'].

a. Since there would be the fault of regressus in infinitum, if there were a succession of causes,—another cause of Nature, and another [cause] of that one, again,—there must be, at last, a halt, or conclusion, at some one point, somewhere or other, at some one, uncaused, eternal thing. Therefore, that at which we stop is the Primal Agent (pra-kriti); for this [word prakriti, usually and conveniently rendered by the term Nature,] is nothing more than a sign to denote the cause which is the root: such is the meaning.¹

b. But then [some Vedánti may object, according to this view of matters], the position that there are just twenty-five realities is not made out; for, in addition to¹ the 'Indiscrete' [or primal Nature], which [according to you], is the cause of Mind,² another unintelligent principle, named 'Ignorance' [see Vedánta-sára, § 21], presents itself. Having pondered this doubt, he declares [as follows]:³

\\

समान: पृथ्विष्णुयोऽ || दृष्ट: \n
Nature and Soul alike

Aph. 69. Alike, in respect of Nature, and of both [Soul and Nature, is the argument for the uncreated existence].²

a. In the discussion of the Primal Agent [Nature], the cause which is the root [of all products], the same side is taken by us both, the asserter [of the Sánkhya doctrine] and the opponent [Vedánti]. This may be thus stated: As there is mention, in Scripture, of the production of Nature, so, too, is there of that of Ignorance, in such texts as this, viz. 'This Ignorance, which has five divisions, was produced from the great Spirit.' Hence it must needs be that a figurative production is intended to be asserted, in respect of one of these [and not the literal production of both; else we should have no root at all]; and, of the two, it is with Nature only that a figurative production, in the shape of a manifestation through conjunction with Soul, &c., is congruous. A production [such as that metaphorical one here spoken of] the characteristic of which is conjunction is mentioned; for there is mention

¹ भूतेन्द्राभास्तः प्रथमप्रायतिः कारण-पारम्पर्येक्षणविद्याधारिततात्सर्वाश्च एकत्त-समस्तनिधिविधिनिष्ठ वर्त-वत्तिति। अति यत पर्यवसान सैव प्रकृतितिः हि मूलकारणसंतः संज्ञामात्मित्वः ||

² Read 'in connexion with.' Ed.

³ Literally, instead of 'Miu,' 'the principle [termed] the Great one.' Ed.
of [such] a figurative origination of Soul and Nature, in a passage of the \textit{Aurma [Purāṇa]}, beginning, 'Of action [or the Primal Agency], and knowledge [or Soul],' and so on. And, as there is no mention, in Scripture, of the origin of Ignorance, as figurative, it is not from eternity. And Ignorance, which consists of false knowledge, has been declared, in an aphorism of the \textit{Yoga}, to be [not a separate entity, but] 'an affection of the mind.' Hence there is no increase to the [list of the twenty-five] Realities, [in the shape of a twenty-sixth principle, to be styled Ignorance].

b. Or [according to another, and more probable, interpretation of the aphorism,] the meaning is this, that the argument is the same in support of both, i.e., of both Soul and Nature: such is the meaning.¹

c. But then, there being [as has been shown.] a mode of arriving, by inference, of a knowledge of the saving truth in regard to Nature, Soul, &c., whence is it that reflexion, in the shape of discrimination [between Soul and Nature], does not take place in the case of \textit{all} [men]²? In regard to this point, he states [as follows]:³

\begin{verse}
\textit{अधिकारिन्वितथा नियम: का 90 का}
\end{verse}

\begin{verse}
\textit{All do not profit by the saving truth; because it is only the best kind of people that are fully serviceable to reason.}
\end{verse}

\begin{verse}
\textit{Aph. 70. There is no rule [or necessity, that all should arrive at the truth]; because those who are privileged [to engage in the inquiry] are of three descriptions.}
\end{verse}

a. For those privileged [to engage in the inquiry] are of three descriptions, through their distinction into those who, in reflecting, are dull, mediocre, and best. Of these, by the dull the [Sāṅkhya] arguments are frustrated [and altogether set aside], by means of the sophisms that have been uttered by the Baudhās, &c. By the mediocre they [are brought into doubt, or, in other words,] are made to appear as if there were equally strong arguments on the other side, by means of arguments which really prove the reverse [of what these people employ them to prove], or by

¹ \textit{अथ च वा इत्यः प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः समान एव न्याय उत्तरेऽः}

² \textit{नन्तु प्रकृतिपुरुषायनुमानप्रकारसः सर्वश्च विवेकमनन्तः कुमो न जमाते। ततः}

³ \textit{नन्तु प्रकृतिपुरुषायनुमानप्रकारसः सर्वश्च विवेकमनन्तः कुमो न जमाते। ततः}
arguments which are not true: [see the section on Fallacies in the "Tarka-sangraha"]. But it is only the best of those privileged, that reflect in the manner that has been set forth [in our exposition of the process of reflexion which leads to the discriminating of Soul from Nature]: such is the import. But there is no rule that all must needs reflect in the manner so set forth: such is the literal meaning.¹

b. He now, through two aphorisms, defines 'the Great one' and 'Self-consciousness';² [the reader being presumed to remember that Nature consists of the three 'Qualities' in equipoise, and to be familiar with the other principles, such as the 'Subtile elements' (see § 61)]:

महाद्वायुपायोऽवायेत्तमनः || ७१ ॥

By 'the Great one' is meant Mind.

Aph. 71. The first product [of the Primal Agent, Nature], which is called 'the Great one,' is Mind.

a. 'Mind' (manas). 'Mind' [is so called], because its function is 'thinking' (manana). By 'thinking' is here meant 'judging' (nischaya). That of which this is the func-

¹ मन इति। मनवृत्तिको मनः। मननमच निश्चयः। तद्वृत्तिका बुद्धि। तन्महाद्वायुपायेत्तमनः।

² आहकारोऽभिमानवृत्तिक पदार्थाकर्षणं महतोऽन्तरसंहकारन इत्यपेयः।

³ यतो भिमानवृत्तिकोशंहकारोऽस्तत्तकायेनस्म-चर्चास्मूपमनुमिवाह॥
Aph. 73. To the others it belongs to be products thereof, [i.e., of Self-consciousness].

1. 'To be products thereof,' i.e., to be products of Self-consciousness: that is to say, the fact of being products thereof belongs to the others; the eleven 'Organs' (indriya), the five 'Subtile elements,' and, meditately, to the [gross] Elements, also, the products of the Subtile elements.

2. But then, if it be thus [some one may say], you relinquish your dogmas, that Nature is the cause of the whole world. Therefore he declares [as follows]:

Nature, immediately the cause of Mind, is, meditately, the cause of all other products.

Aph. 74. Moreover, meditately, through that [i.e., the 'Great one' (§71)], the first [cause, viz., Nature,] is the cause of all products, as is the case with the Atoms, [the causes, though not the immediate causes, of jars, &c.]

1. 'Moreover, meditately,' i.e., moreover, not in the character of the immediate cause, 'the first,' i.e., Nature, is the cause of 'Self-consciousness' and the rest, [mediately,] through 'the Great one' and the rest; as, in the theory of the Vaiseshikas, the Atoms are the cause of a jar, or the like, only [mediately,] through combinations of two atoms, and so on: such is the meaning.

2. But then, since, also, both Nature and Soul are eternal, which of them is [really] the cause of the creation's commencing? In regard to this, he declares [as follows]:

1. Instead of उत्तरेष, which seems to be peculiar to Vijnana, Aniruddha and others have the preferable lection अवेषाः. Ed.

2. To render अवेषाः. Paragraph a is taken, with slight alterations at the beginning and at the end, from Aniruddha. Ed.
Aph. 75. While both [Soul and Nature] are antecedent [to all products], since the one [viz., Soul] is devoid [of this character of being a cause], it is applicable [only] to the other of the two, [viz., Nature]

a. That is to say: 'while both,' viz., Soul and Nature, are preexistent to every product, still, 'since the one,' viz., Soul, from the fact of its not being modified [into anything else, as clay is modified into a jar], must be 'devoid,' or lack the nature of a cause, 'it is applicable,' i.e., the nature of a cause must belong, to the other of the two.

b. But then [some one may say], let Atoms alone be causes; since there is no dispute [that these are causal]. In reply to this, he says:

1 वत्सलकारणोपरताहानिरविकारितमि: । अतिोत्सर्गस्य प्रधानस्य कारणायोः ।
2 इत्यर्थव युक्तकारणिकारणायेवभविनेतद्रे-कार्यस्य प्रश्नस्मार्शिते: हाने कारणातन्त्रम्यते येगः कारणातस्तिम्व इत्यथे: ॥
3 नन्विवादायस्यमानात्मकेव कारणमलिप्त्यत ज्ञात ॥
4 Aniruddha has, according to both my MSS., परिच्छेद्यानां: Ed.

Aph. 76. What is limited cannot be

the substance of all [things].

a. That which is limited cannot be

the substance of all [things]; as yarn cannot be the [material] cause of a jar. Therefore it would [on the theory suggested] be necessary to mention separate causes of [all] things severally; and it is simpler to assume a single cause. Therefore Nature alone is the cause. Such is the meaning.

b. He alleges Scripture in support of this:

तदुपस्तिनियुग्येद ॥ ॥

Aph. 77. And [the proposition that

Nature is the cause of all is proved]

from the text of Scripture, that the

origin [of the world] is therefrom, [i.e., from Nature].

c. An argument, in the first instance, has been set forth

[in § 76; for, till argument fails him, no one falls back

upon authority]. Scripture, moreover, declares that

Nature is the cause of the world, in such terms as, 'From

Nature the world arises,' &c.

1 यत्विप्रिच्छेद्यान न तद्वाभिष्कृतेष्वार्तम् ।
2 तस्मात्यत्वार्थेष्रीपुष्पकृष्णार्थे वाक्यायोविकार्यानेचलापवम् ।
3 तस्मात्यत्वाभिराधानस्य बालास्यायेप्रमाणः ॥
4 खच चुति परिमिति ॥
5 युक्तिताविमृत्तिः । चुतिरिप्त प्रधानस्य जग-नाराष्टामान्त्व प्रधानात्यग्यात्तम इति ॥

BOOK 1., APH. 77.
5. But then [some one may say], a jar which antecedently did not exist is seen to come into existence. Let, then, antecedent non-existence be the cause [of each product]; since this is an invariable antecedent, [and, hence, a cause; 'the invariable antecedent being denominated a cause,' if Dr. Brown, in his 8th lecture, is to be trusted]. To this he replies: 1

Aph. 78. A thing is not made out of nothing.

a. That is to say: it is not possible that out of nothing, i.e., out of a nonentity, a thing should be made, i.e., an entity should arise. If an entity were to arise out of a nonentity, then, since the character of a cause is visible in its product, the world, also, would be unreal: such is the meaning. 2

b. Let the world, too, be unreal: what harm is that to us? [If any ask this,] he, therefore, declares [as follows]: 3

1 नन्तु प्रागस्तो घटस्य भवनं दृष्टे। निष्ट-पूर्वाविवाहानन्त्रागमाव: कारणमन्त्रित्य छाह।
2 सावलुया भवावाहसिद्धिभोभोव्यि संभ- 

1 भवतु जगद्यक्तु जा नो भाषितवित्त छाह।
2 धृष्टकार्यानवागाभ मिथ्येश्वरगम्यते यथा का- जस्मानिदेशायामित्रमां अस्वित। च च जगद्यानस्य सर्वेऽस्य सर्वदा सत्वाच देशात्वत। तस्मानावस्तु जगदित्व।
c. But then [some one may suggest], let a nonentity be the [substantial] cause of the world; still the world will not [necessarily, therefore] be unreal. In regard to this, he declares [as follows]:

भावे तथोऽगे तत्ततिष्ठन्तत्वाचे तदमाळ्यात्तुक्तत्ततां
तत्ततिष्ठः ∥ ५० ∥

Aph. 80. If it [the substantial cause] be an entity, then this would be the case, [that the product would be an entity], from its union [or identity] therewith; [but] if [the cause be] a nonentity, then how could it possibly be the case [that the product would be real], since it is a nonentity, [like the cause with which it is united, in the relation of identity]?

a. If an entity were the substantial cause [of the world], then, since [it is a maxim that] the qualities of the cause present themselves in the product, 'this would be the case,' i.e., it would be the case that the product was real, 'because of union therewith,' i.e., because of the union [of the product] with the reality [which is its substratum]. [But,] since, [by parity of reasoning], if a nonentity [were the substantial cause], the world would be a nonentity, then, by reason of its being a nonentity, i.e., by reason of the world's being [on that supposition] necessarily a nonentity, [like its supposed cause], how could this be the case, [that it would be real]?

BOOK I, APH. 81.

b. But then [a follower of the Mānasas may say], since [it would appear that] nonentity can take no shape but that of nonentity, let works alone be the cause of the world. What need have we of the hypothesis of 'Nature'? To this he replies:

न जगमेव उपादानायोगात्त्वम्ब ॥ ५० ॥

Aph. 81. No; for works are not adapted to be the substantial cause [of any product].

a. Granting that 'the unseen' [merit or demerit arising from actions] may be an instrumental cause, [in bringing about the mundane condition of the agent], yet we never see merit or demerit in the character of the substantial cause [of any product]; and our theories ought to show deference to our experience. 'Nature' is to be accepted; because Liberation arises [see § 56, and § 58], from discerning the distinction between Nature and the Soul.
8. But then [some one may say], since Liberation can be attained by undertaking the things directed by the Veda, what occasion is there for [our troubling ourselves about] Nature? To this he replies:  

क्षुद्रश्चिन्तिति तत्सिद्ध: साध्यवेनावृत्तिवेणाय- 
ढिहुवार्ते च म॥ 82 ॥

Aph. 82. The accomplishment thereof [i.e., of Liberation] is not, moreover, through Scriptural rites: the chief end of man does not consist in this [which is gained through such means]; because, since this consists of what is accomplished through acts, [and is, therefore, a product, and not eternal], there is [still left impending over the ritualist] the liability to repetition of births.

a. ‘Scriptural means,’ such as sacrifices, [are so called], because they are heard from [the mouth of the instructor in] Scripture. Not thereby, moreover, is ‘the accomplishment thereof,’ i.e., the accomplishment of Liberation; because one is liable to repetition of births, by reason of the fact that it [the supposed Liberation] was accomplished by means, i.e., because the [thus far] liberated

8. He shows what does constitute the chief end of man:  

तस्माद्धिति तत्र ब्रह्मविद्या नियुक्तिः: ॥ 83 ॥

Aph. 83. There is Scripture for it, that he who has attained to discrimination, in regard to these [i.e., Nature and Soul], has no repetition of births.

a. ‘In regard to these,’ i.e., in regard to Nature and Soul, of him who has attained to discrimination, there is a text declaring, that, in consequence of his knowledge of the distinction, there will be no repetition of births; the text, viz., ‘He does not return again.’ &c.

1 Literally, ‘liable to return to mundane existence.’  
2 ब्रह्मविद्या नियुक्तिः: । तस्माद्धिति तत्र ब्रह्मविद्या नियुक्तिः: ।
3 पुनर्ज्ञाति: दर्शिति: ।
4 Compare the Chidārjuna Upanishad, vii, 15, 16.
5 तस्माद्धिति: । प्रात्मविशेषाद्विद्वेदाद्विभावद्वारादृश्यमाति: ।
6 न न तु पुनर्ज्ञाति: सति: ॥
2. He states an objection to the opposite view:

The character of the end contemplated makes no difference in regard to the transitoriness of what is effected by works.

a. If Liberation were to be effected by acts, [such as sacrifices], then, since the acts involve a variety of pains, Liberation itself [on the principle that every effect includes the qualities of its cause] would include a variety of pains; and it would be a grief, from the fact that it must eventually end: for, to one who is distressed by chilliness the affusion of water does not bring liberation from his chilliness, but, rather, [additional] chilliness.

b. But then [some one may say], the fact that the act is productive of pain is not the motive [to the performance of sacrifice]; but the [real] reason is this, that the act is productive of things desirable. And, in accordance with this, there is the text, 'By means of acts [of sacrifice] they may partake of immortality,' &c. To this he replies:

1 बिषप्रे देशमाह ...

2 यदि कर्मसाध्या मोदा भवेलमेशा दुःखवनलामस्माणि हुःकुदल स्वादलतः स्विचलनागि हुः स्वाभिष जायमार्ग जायमिनासा जालाभिषेकार्यत जायमेवेति ...

3 ततनु दुःखय कर्मसाध्यतमप्रदशियं बिः तु का...
mediately: [but you will recollect that the present inquiry regards the immediate cause].

b. [But then, some one may say], supposing that Liberation may take place [as you Sānkhyas contend] through the knowledge of the distinction between Nature and Soul, still, since, from the perishability of the Liberation effected by this means, as well as any other means, mundane life may return, we are both on an equality, [i.e., whose Liberation you Sānkhyas look upon as temporary, and you Sānkhyas, whose Liberation we, again, look upon as being, by parity of reasoning, in much the same predicament]. To this he replies:2

निजामुख्य सच्चिदंशरणं 3 परं न समानवन्नि सति ॥

1. [The right means effect Liberation once for all.]

Aph. 86. Of him who is essentially liberated, his bonds having absolutely perished, it [i.e., the fruit of his saving knowledge] is absolute: there is no parity [between his case and that of him who relies on works, and who may thereby secure a temporary sojourn in Paradise, only to return again to earth].

a. Of him 'who is essentially liberated,' who, in his very essence, is free, there is the destruction of bondage. The bond [see § 56,1] is Non-discrimination [between Nature and Soul]. By the removal thereof there is the destruction, the annihilation, of Non-discrimination: and how is it possible that there should again be a return of the mundane state, when the destruction of Non-discrimination is absolute? Thus there is no [such] similarity,2 [between the two cases, as is imagined, by the objector, under § 85.6].

b. It has been asserted [in § 61] that there is a class of twenty-five [things which are realities]; and, since these cannot be ascertained [or made out to be true], except by

which, in conformity with the unadulterated text, might have run somewhat as follows: 'Of him who is, in himself, liberated all extinction of bondage is final,' &c. Such is the interpretation which, on comparison of the various commentaries, seems to be the most eligible. Ed.

1. This is the Aphorism bracketed at p. 58, supra. Ed.

2. निजामुख्य सच्चिदंशरणं वच्चनं। अविच च साधनात्मकं च जगतं ज्ञानमार्गं च। समानान्तान् च प्रलयास्वक्त: संसारस्य पुनरावर्त-नन्ति न समानम्॥

Dr. Taittary, on republishing the Sākhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indicae, adopted the genuine reading, वच्चनं, instead of that given above, which I find, indeed, in the Samsara edition of the Sākhya-pravachana-Sākhya, but in no MS. He ought, however, at the same time, to have altered his translation.
proof, therefore he displays this: [i.e., he shows what he means by proof]:

Aph. 87. The determination of something not [previously] lodged in both [the Soul and the Intellect], nor in one or other of them, is 'right notion' (pramāṇa). What is, in the highest degree, productive thereof [i.e., of any given 'right notion'], is that; [i.e., is what we mean by proof, or evidence, (pramāṇa)].

'a. 'Not lodged,' i.e., not deposited in 'one rightly cognizing' (pramānti); in short, not previously known. The 'determination,' i.e., the ascertaining [or right apprehension] of such a thing, or reality, is 'right notion'; and, whether this be an affection of both, i.e., of Intellect, and also of Soul [as some hold that it is], or of only one or other of the two, [as others hold,] either way, 'what is, in the highest degree, productive' of this 'right notion' is [what we term proof, or] evidence, (pramāṇa): such is the definition of evidence in general; [the definition of its several species falling to be considered hereafter]: such is the meaning.6

1. प्रभावविन्यागिता इत्युत्त प्रभावविन्यागिता न प्रमाण विन्यागिता तथ्याथति।
2. Nāgārjuna has वासं. Ed.
3. Some MSS. have the inferior reading -साधक्. Ed.
4. असंकुम्भः प्रमान्योगानांटो दानवधिति इति
case, are to receive the name of] proof (pramāṇa). You are to understand, that, when the organ of vision, &c., are spoken of as ‘evidence,’ it is only as being mediately [the sources of right knowledge].

d. How many [kinds of] proofs [then,] are there? To this he replies:

निविध प्रमाणं तत्त्विधा सर्वसिद्धान्तिकाधिक्यति:

There are three kinds of evidence.

Aph. 88. Proof is of three kinds: there is no establishment of more; because, if these be established, then all [that is true] can be established [by one or other of these three proofs].

a. ‘Proof is of three kinds,’ that is to say, ‘perception’

अन्तः चाहि प्रमाणां पल्ल सुधिकृतस्मातते
तदा बुधिकृतिरिव प्रमाणम। चाहि बुधिकृतं
वसुष्यं तदा तदेदिक्तस्तनिश्चापरिभावं। चाहि चु
पालकवेनाशो बुधिकृतिसाधारणमयम् प्रोक्त
तदवस्तुसमन्नस्य अनाचार्यं भवति। चढ़ुरादिगु प्रमान-
ख्यात्वहारः परंपरायंभैर्भोजम् ॥

b. But then [some one may incline to say], let ‘com-
parison’ [which is reckoned, in the Nyāya, a specifically
distinct source of knowledge], and the others [such as
‘Conjecture,’ &c., which are reckoned, in like manner, in
the Mānasikā], also be instruments of right knowledge, [as
well as these three,] in [the matter of] the discriminating
of Nature and Soul: he therefore says, ‘because, if these
[three] be established,’ &c. And, since, if there be the
three kinds of proof established, everything [that is really
ture] can be established [by means of them], there is no
establishment of more; no addition to the proofs can be
fairly made out; because of the cumbrousness [that sins
against the philosophical maxim, that we are not to assume
more than is necessary to account for the case]: such is
the meaning.

c. For the same reason, Manu, also, has laid down only
a kind of proofs, where he says [see the Institutes, Ch.
xii., v. 105]: ‘By that man who seeks a distinct knowledge
of his duty, [these] three [sources of right knowledge]
must be well understood, viz., Perception, Inference, and
Scriptural authority in its various shapes [of legal institute,

1 निविध प्रमाणाधिकारम् निविधानुमानश्चद्:
प्रवेशानीस्वप्यः ॥

2 नन्त्वापनांग्राम्यं प्रकृतिपुण्यतापेक्षामान:
स्यन्तरास्वाद्य भविष्यम्। निविधप्रमान-
ाधिकारच सर्वस्मार्थिस्व सिद्धान्तिकाधिक्यते
प्रभाषाधिकारिस्य सिद्धां गौरवादिवशः ॥

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a. So reads Aniruddha; but Vijnāna, Nāgāra, and Vedârî
Mahâdeva end the eighty-seventh Aphorism with these two words.
Hence: ‘That which is, in the highest degree, productive thereof is
proof, of three kinds.’ Ed.
And 'Comparison,' and 'Tradition' (ātīthya), and the like, are included under Inference and Testimony; and 'Non-perception' (anupalabdhi) and the like are included under Perception; 

for the non-perception of an absent jar on a particular spot of ground is nothing else than the perception of that spot of ground without a jar on it.

d. He [next] states the definitions of the varieties [of proof, having already (§ 87) given the general definition]:

'यतस्वर्य यह सहदाकारोपिनिः विज्ञानानि तत्प्रक्ष्य- 

क्षम्' ॥ ८५ ॥

Perception defined.

Aph. 89. Perception (pratyakṣha) is that discernment which, being in conjunction [with the thing perceived], portrays the form thereof.

a. 'Being in conjunction,' [literally,] 'existing in con-

junction,' 'portrays the form thereof,' i.e., assumes the form of the thing with which it is in conjunction [as water assumes the form of the vessel into which it is poured]; what 'discernment,' or affection of the Intellect, [does this], that [affection of the Intellect (see Yoga Aphorisms, I., § 5 and § 8. 1.)] is the evidence [called] Perception: such is the meaning.

b. But then, [some one may say,] this [definition of Perception (§ 89)] does not extend [as we conceive it ought, and presume it is intended, to do,] to the perception, by adepts in the Yoga, of things past, future, or concealed [by stone walls, or such intervening things as interrupt ordinary perception]; because there is, here, no 'form of the thing, in conjunction' [with the mind of him who perceives it, while absent]: having pondered this doubt, he corrects it by [stating, as follows,] the fact, that this [supernatural sort of perception] is not what he intends to define.

'योगिनामवाः प्रक्ष्यमात्र देशः' ॥ २० ॥

' संवर्य सत्तर्य भवदाकारोपिनिः संवर्यस्व- 

स्वाकारधारि भवति यविज्ञान सुविर्हित- 

तत्प्रक्ष्यम् प्रमाणार्थम्' ॥

' नन्य योगिनातीतानागतं विविधित्वमन्यस्तम् 

सम्बन्धं संवर्यस्वाकारभावादिर्याशङ्कु तस्य- 

लक्षणमिति समाधि' ॥
Aph. 90. It is not a fault [in the definition, that it does not apply to the perceptions of adepts in the Yoga] because that of the adepts in the Yoga is not an external perception.

a. That is to say: it is only sense-perception that is to be here defined; and the adepts of the Yoga do not perceive through the external [organs of sense]. Therefore there is no fault [in our definition]; i.e., there is no failure to include the perceptions of these; [because there is no intention to include them].

b. [But, although this reply is as much as the objecter has any right to expect] he states the real justification [of the definition in question]:

लीनवल्लुल्लोत्तिसंवच्चाधारादेषः॥७२॥

Aph. 91. Or, there is no fault [in the definition], because of the conjunction, with causal things, of that [mystical mind] which has attained exaltation.

b. Here the word rendered 'causal' (तथा) denotes the things, not in conjunction [with the senses], alluded to by the objector [in § 89. b.] for we, who assert that effects exist [from eternity, in their causes, before taking the shape of effects, and, likewise, in these same causes, when again resolved into their causes], hold that even what is past, &c., still essentially exists, and that, hence, its conjunction [with the mind of the mystic, or the clairvoyant] is possible.

c. But then, [some one may say:] still this [definition] does not extend to the Lord's perceptions; because, since these are from everlasting, they can-

1 ऐतिहासिकान्तर्यात्तिरर्ति लक्ष्मणोऽधिनिधिवाति- वत्सयायः। खतो न दृष्टं न तत्प्रत्यक्ष्यात्तिरर्तिविरवर्यः॥

2 वास्तवं स्वाधानां माह॥

Thus Vijnâna and Vedânti Mohâdeva. Anurâdhâ has -सं- बयाच देशः. The reading of Nâgâra is -संबयाचा न देशः. Ed.

4 For the term attìṣaya, again rendered, in the next page, by 'exaltation,' vide infra, p. 116, note 4. Ed.
c. But, on the implication ¹ that there is a ‘Lord,’ what we mean to speak of [in our definition of Perception, (§89),] is merely the being of the [same] kind with what is produced by conjunction ² [of a sense-organ with its object; and the perceptions of the ‘Lord’ may be of the same kind with such perceptions, though they were not to come from the same source].

d. Having pondered the doubt, ‘How should the Lord not be proved [to exist] by the Scripture and the Law, [which declare his existence]?’ he states a dilemma which excludes [this].³

Aph. 93. [And, further,] it is not proved that he [the ‘Lord,’] exists; because [whoever exists must be either free or bound; and], of free and bound, he can be neither the one nor the other.

a. The ‘Lord’ whom you imagine, tell us, is he free from troubles, &c.? Or is he in bondage through these?

¹ ननु तथापीर्वमय्येक्ष्यव्याप्तिः श्च निष्के सत्यायस्य नसां कष्टम्ययानावता तथाह ||

² ईश्वरे प्रभक्षयोवावदोषाय इत्यतते | ||

³ श्रद्धास्त्रयं दातायेति न नीर्गराघवादिदित्य विद्यते | ||

¹ Rather, ‘the view being accepted’ (abhyapagane).

² ईश्वरचुप्पगमे तु स्तनिकष्टम्यानीवतीयलमेव विविषितम् | ||

³ बुद्धिस्तमयं कष्टमैशो न सिद्धिन्दित्याशुतं तथावरोथाय वाधकमाह ||
Since he is not, cannot be, either the one or the other, it is not proved that there is a 'Lord'; such is the meaning.\(^1\)

b. He explains this very point:\(^2\)

The force of the Aph. 94. [Because,] either way, he would be inefficient.

 a. Since, if he were free, he would have no desires, &c., which [as compulsory motives] would instigate him to create; and, if he were bound, he would be under delusion; he must be [on either alternative] unequal to the creation, &c.\(^3\) [of this world].

b. But then, [it may be asked,] if such be the case, what becomes of the Scripture-texts which declare the 'Lord'? To this he replies:\(^4\)

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\(^1\) इश्वरार्थभिमत्वि केशादिनिमुखो वा तैरेप्ति ब्रा। अन्यतरस्याधानावादसंबंधवेष्टिप्रसिद्धिरिलथ्यः।

\(^2\) तदेवाः

\(^3\) The reading, in a later handwriting, of one of my MSS. of Aniruddha is सत्केत्तलम्. \(Ed.\)

\(^4\) इश्वरार्थ�िमत्वि केशादिनिमुखो वा तैरेप्ति ब्रा। अन्यतरस्याधानावादसंबंधवेष्टिप्रसिद्धिरिलथ्यः।

\(^5\) नन्देवमीश्वरार्थभिमतपदातापुत्रीं का गति: ।

\(^6\) तत्साधृः

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\(^1\) Another reading, that of Nâgârjuna and of Vedânti Mahâdeva.

\(^2\) उपासासिद्धस्, a compound, is the reading of Aniruddha, followed by Vedânti Mahâdeva. See 4, below. \(Ed.\)

\(^3\) In both places, siddha, 'possessor of supernatural powers.' \(Ed.\)

\(^4\) Aniruddha's exposition of this Aphorism is as follows: रागायमााः विभिन्नकाव्यावाचात। तप्रम्प्युविन्नायत: उपासासिद्धस्य उपासनय लभातिशयय्य योगिनोदितिसिद्धस्य प्रशंसा-
Vishnu, Śiva, or other non-eternal 'Lord,' since these, though possessed of the concept of individuality, &c., [and, in so far, liable to perish], have immortality, &c., in a secondary sense; [seeing that the Soul, in every combination, is immortal, though the combination itself is not so]

b. But then, [some one may say], even if it were thus [as alleged under § 95], what is heard in Scripture, [viz.,] the fact that it [viz., Soul] is the governor of Nature, &c., would not be the case; for, in the world, we speak of government in reference only to modifications [preceded and determined] by resolutions [that so and so shall take place], &c. To this he replies:

According to this, the term śiva, ‘mighty one,’ ‘Lord,’ is applied, by way of eulogy, either to a soul as it were liberated, or to a person who, through devotion, has acquired transcendent faculties, that is to say, the Yogi. Resolution, agentship, and the like, are unpredictable of one absolutely liberated; and such a one, being inert and impassive, cannot be intended by śiva.

2. As the gem, the lodestone, is attracted by iron merely by proximity, without resolving [either to act or to be acted on], &c., so, by the mere conjunction of the primal Soul, Nature is changed into the principle [called the 'Great one,' or Mind, (see § 61. c.)]. And in this alone consists [what we speak of as] its acting as creator towards that which is superadded to it: such is the mean-
c. And thus it is declared, [in some one of the Purāṇas]:

As the iron acts, whilst the gem [the lodestone] stands
void of volition, just so this world is created by a deity
who is mere Existence. Thus it is, that there are, in the
Soul, both agency [seemingly] and non-agency, [really].
It is not an agent, inasmuch as it is void of volition;
and it is an agent, merely through approximation [to
Nature].

d. In respect of worldly products, also, animal souls
overrule, merely through their approximation [to Nature]:
so he declares [as follows]:

In like manner, embodied souls do not ever
give.

Aph. 97. In the case of individual
products, also, [the apparent agency]
of animal souls [is solely through proximity].

a. 'The agency is solely through proximity: so much
is supplied' [from § 96].

b. The meaning is this, that, in the case, also, of particu-
lar productions,—the creation, &c., of things individual
as contradistinguished from that of all things in the
lump, (see Vedānta-sūtra, § 67),—animal souls, i.e., souls in
which the intellects [of individuals] reflect themselves [see
§ 99. a.], overrule, merely through proximity, but not
through any effort; seeing that these [animal souls] are
none other than the motionless Thought.

c. But then, [some one may say], if there were no eternal
and omniscient ‘Lord,’ through the doubt of a blind
tradition, [in the absence of an intelligently effective
guardianship], the Vedas would cease to be an authority;
[a possibility which, of course, cannot be entertained for
an instant]. To this he replies:

1. अधिष्ठातृत् संनिधानादेवात्मनुपज्यते

2. विशेषकार्येषु वार्शसूक्ष्मादिवपि जीवाना-
मन्त: कर्ष्यप्रतिविषिष्ठतेऽनां संनिधानादेवा-
विष्ठातुः न तु केवल्य व्यवहारिण कृत्स्याचिन्मा
चलादिवपि:।

3. नन्दु नित्यसर्वेष्यारामावेत्त्वमयपरंपः
पराश्वय चे-
दामावात्मेऽवात्। अत ज्ञाह।
Aph. 98. The declaration of the texts or sense [of the Veda, by Brahmā, for example], since he knows the truth, [is authoritative evidence].

a. To complete [the aphorism, we must say], 'since Hiranyagarbha [i.e., Brahmā] and others [viz., Visnu and Śiva], are knowers of what is certain, i.e., of what is true, the declaration of the texts or sense of the Vedas, where these are the speakers, is evidence [altogether indisputable].

b. But then, if Soul, by its simple proximity [to Nature (§ 96)], is an overruler in a secondary sense [only of the term,—as the magnet may be said, in a secondary sense, to draw the iron, while the conviction is entertained, that, actually and literally, the iron draws the magnet],—who is the primary [or actual,] overruler? In reference to this, he says:

Aph. 99. The internal organ, through its being enlightened thereby [i.e., by Soul], is the overruler; as is the iron, [in respect of the magnet].

a. The internal organ, i.e., the understanding, is the overruler, through its fancying itself to be Soul, [as it does fancy,] by reason of its being enlightened by the Soul, through its happening to reflect itself in [and contemplate itself in.] Soul; ‘just as the iron,’ that is to say, as the attracting iron, though inactive, draws [the magnet], in consequence of [its] mere proximity, [and so acquires magnetism by magnetic induction].

b. He [now, having discussed the evidence that consists in direct perception,] states the definition of inference (anumāna):

1. Hiranyagarbhaś ca bhūtātmē saśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntāyam bhūtāśvādāntायam bhūtाश्वादान्यमभिन्नात्मादेयात्}

2. Naḥ pūrṇaḥ cēsaṃadhaś ca gūḍhaḥadīśhātāṁ tathā mukhyādīśhātāṁ kṣetra-śākhāyām maḥīḥ

3. Anumāna-śākhāyām maḥīḥ
Aph. 100. The knowledge of the connected [e.g., fire], through perception of the connexion [e.g., of fire with smoke], is inference.

a. That is to say: inference [or conviction of a general truth,] is a kind of evidence consisting in a [mental] modification, which is none other than the knowledge of the connected, i.e., of the constant accompanier, through the knowledge of the constant accompaniment: by connexion (pratibanda) here being meant 'constant attendedness' (vyapti); and through the perception thereof [it being that the mind has possession of any general principle].

b. But a conclusion (anumiti) is knowledge of the soul, whilst an Inference, so far forth as it is an instrument in the establishment of knowledge deducible from it, is an affection of the internal organ, or understanding (see §87. c.)

c. He [next] defines testimony (sabda):

1 प्रतिबन्ध: is the reading of Nágésa and of Vedánti Mahádeva. Ed.
2 प्रतिबन्धो व्यापकम् च यथा प्रतिविध्यान्तितवद्य यथापकस्य ज्ञानं तथसृष्टसंनुमानं प्रमाणमित्वथानं ||
3 अनुमितत्वो पारंपरियाः वाध इति ||
4 श्रवणं लक्षयति ||

Aph. 101. Testimony [such as is entitled to the name of evidence] is a declaration by one worthy [to be believed].

a. Here 'fitness' means 'suitableness'; and so the evidence which is called 'Testimony' is the knowledge arising from a suitable declaration: such is the meaning. And [while this belongs to the understanding, or internal organ (see §100. b.)] the result is that [knowledge] in the Soul, which is called 'knowledge by hearing' (sabda-bodha).

b. He [next] volunteers to tell us what is the use of his setting forth [the various divisions of] evidence:

उपासितत् प्रमाणान्तुपदेशः || १०२ ||

Why the kinds of Evidence have been here set forth

Aph. 102. Since the establishment of [the existence of] both [soul and non-soul] is by means of evidence, the declaration thereof [i.e., of the kinds of evidence, has been here made].

a. It is only by means of evidence that both Soul and non-soul are established as being distinct, [the one from the
for example, having apprehended a constant accompaniment, [e.g., that an act implies an instrument], by taking into consideration such instruments as axes, &c., which are of earthy and other kinds, a quite heterogeneous, imperceptible, instrument of knowledge, viz., [the instrument named] Sense, is established [or inferred to exist]; such is what we mean by Analogy; and it is by this [species of inference], that both, [viz.,] Nature and Soul, are proved [to exist]: such is the meaning.1

6. Of these [viz., Nature and Soul,] the argument from analogy for [the existence of Nature] is as follows: the Great Principle [viz., Understanding (see § 61. c.)] is formed out of the things [called] Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion, [to the aggregate of which three in equipoise (see § 61) the name of Nature is given]; because, whilst it is [undeniably] a production, it has the characters of Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion; just as a bracelet, or the like, formed of gold, or the like,2 has the characteristic pro-

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1 यथः सामान्यतः प्रत्येकातिद्वितीयमाध्यमात्मक-प्राप्ति यथः पृथ्वीविद्यविद्वस्थमात्रेऽतिग्रहाः प्रेयोगानुपातिक-र्यामाध्यमात्मक-प्राप्ति गृहीता तविजातीयमात्रेऽतिग्रहाः ज्ञानज्ञातिप्रकृतिपूर्णः विविध साधनीयः तत्तत्त्वः।

2 तत्र सन्तुलनानुविन्यस्य प्रत्यक्षेण मूल्य-लोक प्रकृतिपूर्णः विविध साधनीयः तत्तत्त्वः।

3 My MS. of Nāgara has द्वारालखः. Ed.
properties of the gold, or the like, and is thereby known to have been formed out of gold, or the like.

c. But, [as regards the argument from analogy, in proof of the existence] of Soul, [it is, as stated before, under § 86, to the following effect: Nature is for the sake of another; because it is something that acts as a combination; as a house, for instance, [which is a combination of various parts combined for the benefit of the tenant]. In this instance, having gathered, in regard to houses, &c., the fact established on sense-perception, that they exist for the sake of [organized] bodies, for example, something of a different kind therefrom, [i.e., from Nature, viz.], Soul, is inferred [by analogy,] as something other than Nature, &c., [which, as being a compound thing, is not designed for itself]: such is the meaning.¹

d. But then [some one may say], since Nature is eternal, and exertion is habitual to her, [and the result of her action is the bondage of the Soul], there should constantly be experience [whether of pleasure or of pain], and, hence, no such thing as thorough emancipation. To this he replies:²

The fruit of the action is not always the agent's.

Aph. 105. The experience of the fruit may belong even to another than the agent; as in the case of food, &c.

¹ चिदादनमः । तद्विवेकाकाशानो मेंगः । यथा-नादिराप्रागभावती नस्यति तथा नित्यायः: प्रकृतेवेच्चुड़ानपर्यन्त: प्रसर इति न सर्ववा भो-गापरितिरति भावः ॥
² यदि कर्तृ प्रथान भोक्ता पुष्पस्वदेव्यकृः जन्मि सो भावित्स्वादिस्वाह ॥
a. As it belongs to the cook to prepare the food, &c., and to one who was not the agent, viz., the master, to enjoy the fruit [thereof; i.e., the fruit of the cook’s actions], so is the case here, also.

b. Having stated an exoteric principle [which may serve, in practice, to silence, by the argument ad hominem, him on whose principles it may be valid], he [next] declares his own doctrine," [in regard to the doubt started under § 104. b.]:

To expose that Soul acts and experiences is an error.

Aph. 106. Or, [to give a better account of the matter than that given in § 105], since it is from non-discrimination that it is derived, the notion that the agent [soul being mistaken for an agent] has the fruit [of the act is a wrong notion].

a. The soul is neither an agent nor a patient; but, from the fact that the Great Principle [the actual agent (see § 97. b.)] is reflected in it, there arises the conceit of its being an agent. ‘Or, since it is from non-discrimination; that is to say, because it is from the failure to discriminate between Nature and Soul, that this takes place, i.e., that conceit takes place, that it is the agent that experiences the fruit;’ [whereas the actual agent is Nature, which, being unintelligent, can experience neither pain nor pleasure].

1 यथा सुप्रकाशयाजेष्ठार्थमविद्यार्थीश्च फलापभोज्ये पत्याशास्ये
2 जनां पुरुषा च ऐवं विवेकाचार्यानि ख्याति महारूपः
3 न पुरुषं कर्तवं न बोधिता किं तु महारूपः

b. The opposite of this [wrong view, referred to in § 106], he states [as follows].

Aph. 107. And, when the truth is told, there is[seen to be] neither[agency, in Soul, nor experience].

a. ‘When the truth is told’ [and discerned], i.e., when, by means of evidence, Nature and Soul are perceived [in their entire distinctness, one from the other], ‘there is neither,’ i.e., neither the condition [as regards soul,] of an agent nor that of a patient.

b. Having discussed [the topic of] evidence, he [now] states the distribution of the subject-matter of evidence:

विषयोऽविषयस्यार्थार्थितृतृतिविण्यायायान्यायायायामन्त्रितस्य

1 नित्यविपरिवार्थाचेतासमानेन भेद्याभिषेकिति
2 ज्ञातकेतासमानेन भेद्याभिषेकिति
3 प्रमाणयां भेदकेतासमानेन भेद्याभिषेकिति
What is perceptible, under certain circumstances, may be imperceptible, under others.

Aph. 108. [A thing may be] an object [perceptible], and also [at another time] not an object, through there being, in consequence of great distance, &c., a want of [conjunction of the sense with the thing], or [on the other hand] an appliance of the sense [to the thing].

a. An object [is a perceived object], through the proximity, or conjunction, of the sense [with the object]. [A thing may be] not an object [perceived], through the want of the sense, i.e., through the want of conjunction [between the sense and what would otherwise be its object]. And [this] want of conjunction [may result] from the junction's being prevented by great distance, &c.1

b. [To explain the '&c.,' and to exemplify the causes that may prevent the conjunction, required in order to perception, between the thing and the sense, we may remark, that] it is in consequence of great distance, that a bird [flying very high up] in the sky is not perceived; [then again,] in consequence of extreme proximity, the collyrium located in the eye [is not perceived by the eye itself]; a thing placed in [the inside of, or on the opposite side of] a wall [is not perceived], in consequence of the obstruction; from distraction of mind, the unhappy, or other [agitated person], does not perceive the thing that is at his side [or under his very nose]; through its subtility,

an atom [is not perceived]; nor is a very small sound, when overpowered by the sound of a drum; and so on.1

c. How [or, for which of the possible reasons just enumerated] comes the imperceptibleness of Nature? In regard to this, he declares:2

saNichCharaNandusAMma: || 709 ||


a. 'Her,' i.e., Nature's, imperceptibleness is from subtilty. By subtilty is meant the fact of being difficult to investigate; not [as a Naiyāyika might, perhaps, here prefer understanding the term,] the consisting of atoms; for Nature is [not atomic, in the opinion of the Sāṅkhya, but] all-pervasive.4
b. How, then, [it may be asked.] is [the existence of] Nature determined? To this he replies:

कायमिद्विविलक्षणकारणा́सहिष्णुति चेत् II १९५ II

Aph. 110. [Nature exists;] because her existence is gathered from the beholding of productions.

a. As the knowledge of [there being such things as] atoms comes from the beholding of jars, &c., [which are agglomerations], so the knowledge of Nature comes from the beholding of products which have the three Qualities; [see § 62. a.] and the existence of which implies a cause, to which the name of Nature is given, in which these constituents exist from eternity.

b. Some [the Vedántas.] say that the world has Brahma as its cause; others [the Naiyáyikas], that it has atoms as its cause; but our seniors [the transmitters of the Sánkhya doctrine], that it has Nature as its cause. So he sets forth a doubt [which might naturally found itself] thereon:

वातिविप्रात्यपेल्शसदसिष्णिति चेत् II १९६ II

Aph. 111. If [you throw out the doubt that] it [viz., the existence of Nature,] is not established, because of the contradiction of asserters [of other views, then you will find an answer in the next aphorism].

a. 'Because of the contradiction of asserters [of the Vedánta or Nyāya], it is not established,' i.e., Nature [as asserted by the Sánkhyas.] is not established.

b. But then, [to set forth the objection of these counter-asserters], if a product existed antecedently to its production [as that product], then an eternal Nature [such as you Sánkhyas contend for.] would be proved to exist as the necessary substratum thereof; since you will declare that a cause is inferred only as the [invariable] companion of an effect; but it is denied, by us asserters [of the Vedánta, &c.,] that the effect does exist [antecedently to its production; well.] if [this doubt be thrown out]: such is the meaning [of the aphorism].

c. I.e. states [his] doctrine [on this point]:

तथापेन्नाकतर्दृष्टीकेतरसंदेशनालीयप् II १९७ II

1 वा दिनां विप्रात्यपेल्शसदसिष्णिति प्रश्नान्विति: II

2 ननु कार्यं चेतुष्ट्यः प्राक्ति स्वार्धः सदाधारतः नित्यान्तः प्रकृतिः कार्यसाहित्येन वार्षीकुमानवायुपाये दार्शनिकादिपर्ष्ठानायेकार्यस्यास्वासिष्णिति यदीतथः II

3 सिद्धान्तमाह: II
Aph. 112. Still, since each [doctrine] is established in the opinion of each, a [mere unsupported] denial is not [decisive].

a. If one side were disproved merely by the dissent of the opponent, then [look you!] there is dissent against the other side, too: so how could it be established? If the one side is established by there being inevitably attendant the recognition of the constant companion, on the recognition of that which is constantly accompanied [by it], it is the same with my [side], also: therefore [my] inference from effect [to cause] is not to be denied² [in this peremptory fashion].

b. Well, then, [the opponent may say], let [the inference of] cause from effect be granted: how is it that this [cause] is Nature, and nothing else, [such as Atoms, for instance]? To this he replies:³

1 I have corrected the translator's 'But, since thus,' which rendered the unwarranted reading तथा तु, now replaced by तथापि, the correlative of चेत्, the end of the preceding Aphorism. Ed.

2 यदि चार्दिविक्षिप्तिप्रभिमानेशः यक्षासिद्धं विपशेषभि विविधपरिवर्तीति कस्य तत्तस्चि।
   यदि चाष्ट्रान्नायापक्षान्नस्वायत्नाभिविक्तावलयसमिक्तिः ममाचे भविष्यति न कार्यदनमानां
   पलापः ||

3 नन् कार्याद्विवकास्मत् तस्म कृतिरतेऽवेति कयः
   मित्रत्वात् ज्ञात ||

1 Yadvánti Mahādeva ends this Aphorism with the word येषः; and so does Vijnāna, according to some MSS. Ed.

2 भिबिधवा गुष्ठः सत्त्राज्ञानसंस्थि तस्भिरार इत्येऽः

3 द्विजाकृतं यदि परमात्मातीयं कारशं तदा जम्बुपल्लभानाय सुकुमारसत्कादस्य
   विभोधः स्वादिशतः

   'ददानी कार्येष्व सत उसविरष्ट्वतो चैति संक्षरं
   निरस्वति'
The Sankhya Aphorisms.

Aph. 114. The production of what is no entity, as a man's horn, does not take place.

(a) Of that which, like the horn of a man, is not an entity, even the production is impossible: such is the meaning. And so the import is, that that effect alone which [antecedently] exists is [at any time] produced.¹

(b) He states an argument why an effect must be some [previously existent] entity.²

A product cannot be of nothing.

Aph. 115. Because of the rule, that there must be some material [of which the product may consist].

(a) And only when both are extant is there, from the presence of the cause, the presence of the effect. Otherwise, everywhere and always, every [effect] might be produced; [the presence of the cause being, on the supposition, superfluous]. This he insists upon [as follows].³

1. नसुङ्कवत्स्या सत्त्वमी न संभवतः न संभवतः-तथा च सदैव कार्यमुक्यतः इवाश्च।
2. सत्त्वमाये व्यासशान।
3. कारणसंबंधायं कारणायं विद्यमानयेव।

BOOK I., APH. 117.

Aph. 116. Because everything is not possible everywhere and always, [which might be the case, if materials could be dispensed with].

(a) That is to say: because, in the world, we see that everything is not possible, i.e., that everything is not produced; 'everywhere,' i.e., in every place; 'always,' i.e., at all times.¹

(b) For the following reason, also, he declares, there is no production of what existed not [antecedently]:

एकस्य शक्तिकारणात् ॥ १२४ ॥

Aph. 117. Because it is that which is competent [to the making of anything] that makes what is possible, [as a product of it].

(a) Because the being the material [of any future product] is nothing else than the fact of [being it, potentially, i.e., of] having the competency to be the product; and [this] competency is nothing else than the product's condition as that of what has not yet come to pass: therefore, since 'that which is competent,' viz., the cause, makes the product which is 'possible' [to be made out of it], it is not of any nonentity that the production takes

सर्वो भिमहिमेश्वरे सर्वेऽसर्वप्रि नसुङ्कवत्स्या सत्त्वमी न संभवतः ॥

भव्यविवेदायं कष्टादन्तादिवन्यातः ॥

¹ नसुङ्कवत्स्या सत्त्वमी न संभवतः न संभवतः-तथा च सदैव कार्यमुक्यतः इवाश्च।
² सत्त्वमाये व्यासशान।
³ कारणसंबंधायं कारणायं विद्यमानयेव।

इति नसुङ्कवते इवाश्च ॥
place, [but of an entity, whose *esse* antecedently, was possibility]: such is the meaning.  

b. He states another argument:  

कारणभावाभ न १२५ ॥  

*Aph. 118. And because it [the product] is [nothing else than] the cause, [in the shape of the product]. 1*  

a. It is declared, in Scripture, that, previously to production, moreover, there is no difference between the cause and its effect; and, since it is thereby settled that a product is an entity, production is not of what [previously] existed not: such is the meaning.  

b. He ponders a doubt:  

न भावे भावोगतेऽ १२५ ॥  

*Aph. 119. If [it be alleged that] there is no possibility of that's becoming which already is, [then the answer will be found in the next aphorism].  

a. That is to say: but then, if it be thus [that every effect exists antecedently to its production], since the effect [every effect] must be eternal [without beginning], there is no possibility of [or room for] the adjunction of *becoming*, the adjunction of *arising*, in the case of a product which is [already, by hypothesis,] in the shape of an entity; because the employment of [the term] *arising* [or the fact of being produced] has reference solely to what did not exist [previously]; if this be urged: such is the meaning.  

b. He declares the doctrine [in regard to this point]:  

नामाज्ञिकिनिबन्धनी तवहाराष्ट्रवहरी १२० ॥  

*Aph. 120. No; [do not argue that what is cannot become; for the employment and the non-employment [of the term 'production'] are occasioned by the manifestation [and the non-manifestation of what is spoken of as produced, or not].  

a. 'No;' the view stated [in § 119] is not the right one: such is the meaning.  

b. As the whiteness of white cloth [which has become] dirty is brought manifestly out by means of washing, &c.,
so, by the operation of the potter, is the pot brought into manifestation; [whereas], on the blow of a mallet, it becomes hidden, [and no longer appears as a pot].

c. And manifestation [is no fiction of ours; for it] is seen; for example, that of oil, from sesamum-seeds, by pressure; of milk, from the cow, by milking; of the statue, which resided in the midst of the stone, by the operation of the sculptor; of husked rice, from rice in the husk, by threshing; &c.

d. Therefore, the employment and the non-employment of the [term] ‘the production of an effect’ are dependent on manifestation, dependent on the manifestation of the effect; that is to say, the employment of [the term] ‘production’ is in consequence of the manifestation [of what is spoken of as produced]; and the non-employment of [the term] ‘production’ is in consequence of there being no manifestation [of that which is, therefore, not spoken of as produced]; but [the employment of the term ‘production’ is] not in consequence of that’s becoming an entity which was not an entity.

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1. यथा दुकान्तस्य मलिनस्य द्वाराधिना दुक्कान्तविश्वेषते तथा कुलालस्य सहापारिहर्द्र उत्पत्ति तथा मुद्रारंभातात्तिरिसूवते।

2. तृष्णा चाभिभक्षिः पीडनेन नित्येन तृणस्य देहनेन गवी पवयिः शिलामधुस्प्रस्तिस्य लीलाक्षणार्काधिते धाये तथाहि तथातः।

3. तस्मातायात्मकं तवव्रहारायबहुरा भविष्य-विनिवधनो कार्याभिभक्षिनिमित्तकः। भविष्य-
But some one may say, if there were only a resolution of a product into that from which it arose, a resurrection of παλιγγενεσία of it might be seen; and this is not seen: well [we reply], it is not seen by blockheads; but it is seen by those who can discriminate. For example, when thread is destroyed, it is changed into the shape of earth [as when burned to ashes]; and the earth is changed into the shape of a cotton-tree; and this [successively] changes into the shape of flower, fruit, and thread [spun again from the fruit of the cotton-plant]. So is it with all entities.

Pray [some one may ask], is this manifestation that you speak of under § 120 something real, or something not real? If it be something real [and which, therefore, never anywhere ceases to be], then [all] effects [during this constant manifestation] ought constantly to be perceived; and, if it be not real, then there would be the absence of [all] products, [in the absence of all manifestation. Manifestation, therefore, must be something real; and] there must be [in order to give rise to it,] another manifestation of it, and of this another; [seeing that a manifestation can be the result of nothing else than a manifestation, on the principle that an effect consists of neither more nor less than its cause]; and thus we have a regressus in infinitum. To this he replies:

पारंपर्येवेताःन्येषांश्यामीशायुक्तः \| ९२२ \|

Aph. 122. Because they seek each other reciprocally, as is the case with seed and plant, [manifestation may generate manifestation, from eternity to eternity].

1 Be it so, that there are thousands of manifestations; still there is no fault; for there is no starting-point; as is the case with seed and plant, [which people may suppose to have served, from eternity, as sources, one to another, reciprocally].

किमभिषयकः सत्यसति वा। सति चेतनाय-कार्यायमपि वात्। सति चेतनायांशयामि नित्यस्य तत्सत्याः तस्याः अयन्येवनाशयोयत

2 अन्वेषयान, the reading here given, is that of Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva. Vijnána has अन्वेषया. Ed.

Translating the Sánkhyá Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica, Dr. Ballantyne, adopting the lection anusahirá, inconsiderately rendered: 'You are to understand, that, successively,' instead of 'There is a continual following of one after the other.' Vijnána explains anusahirá by anusahíva; and Vedánti Mahádeva has, in definition of it, the synonymous anusaraya. Ed.

भवविभिष्टस्मितं तथापि भावामेव न दशोदीनादि: लात्याजाज्ञायवदिति
b. He states another argument:

The objections to the theory of manifestation retorted.

Aph. 123. Or, [at all events, our theory of 'manifestation' is as] blameless as [your theory of] 'production.'

a. Pray [let us ask], is production produced, or is it not? If it is produced, then of this [production of production] there must be production; so that there is a regressus in infinitum, [such as you allege against our theory, under § 121. c.]. If it be not produced, then, pray, is this because it is unreal, or because it is eternal? If because it is unreal, production never is at all; so that it would never be perceived, [as you allege that it is]. Again, if [production is not something produced], because it is eternal, then there would be at, all times, the production of [all possible] effects, [which you will scarcely pretend is the case]. Again, if you say, since 'production' itself consists of production, what need of supposing an exterior production [of production]? then, in like manner, [I ask,] since 'manifestation' itself consists of manifestation, what need of supposing an exterior manifestation [of manifestation]? The view which you hold on this point is ours, also; [and

thus every objection stated or hinted under § 121. c., is capable of being retorted].

b. He [now] states the community of properties [that exists] among the products of Nature, mutually:

The characters common to all products. Aph. 124. [A product of Nature is] caused, uneternal, not all-pervading, mutable, multitudinous, dependent, mergent.

a. 'Caused,' i.e., having a cause. 'Uneternal,' i.e., destructive. 'Not all-pervading,' i.e., not present everywhere. 'Mutable,' i.e., distinguished by the acts of leaving [one form], and assuming [another form], &c. It [the soul] leaves the body it has assumed, [and, probably, takes another]; and bodies, &c., move [and are mutable, as is notorious]. 'Multitudinous,' i.e., in consequence of the distinction of souls; [every man, e.g., having a separate body]. 'Dependent,' [i.e.,] on its cause. 'Mergent,' that is to say, it [i.e., every product, in due time] is resolved into that from which it originated.
b. [But, some one may say], if realities be the twenty-five [which the Sānkhyas enumerate (see § 61), and no more], pray, are such common operations as knowing, enjoying, &c., absolutely nothing; you accordingly giving up what you see, [in order to save an hypothesis with which what you see is irreconcilable]? To this he replies:¹

The qualities of the Nyāya are implied in the term Nature.

Aph. 125. There is the establishment of these [twenty-four ‘Qualities’ of the Nyāya, which you fancy that we do not recognize, because we do not explicitly enumerate them], either by reason that these ordinary qualities [as contradistinguished from the three Qualities of the Sāṅkhya], &c., are, in reality, nothing different; or [to put it in another point of view] because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, in which, like our own three Qualities, they are implied.

c. Either from their being nothing different from the twenty-four principles, ‘in reality,’ truly, quite evidently,—since the character of these [twenty-four] fits the ordinary qualities, &c., [which you fancy are neglected in our enumeration of things,—there is the establishment of these,] i.e., there is their establishment [as realities] through their being implied just in those¹ [twenty-four principles which are explicitly specified in the Sāṅkhya].

b. The word ‘or’ shows that there is another alternative [reply, in the aphorism, to the objection in question]. ‘Or because they are hinted by [the term] Nature,’ that is to say, the qualities, &c., [such as Knowledge], are established [as realities], just because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, by reason that [these qualities are, mediate], products of Nature; for there is no difference between product and cause. But the omission to mention them [explicitly] is not by reason of their not being at all.²

c. He [next] mentions the points in which Nature and [her] products agree:³

¹ स्वाच्छेदोऽवं चतुर्वल्ल शरीरमण्डलादीदिशा विभाग्यम्। सब्रिह्मण्डिलादीदिशा विभाग्यम्। उपाध्योच्च वज्राश्रित मिमांसाय वचनात्। श्रोतप्रवृत्त ब्रह्मज्ञानविवद्य ब्रह्मविवद्य अंतःकरणोपधारी। लिङ्गस्वारैण तरं गांधीति।²

² ज्ञानोऽवं श्राद्धमण्डलादीदिशा विभाग्यम्। सब्रिह्मण्डिलादीदिशा विभाग्यम्। उपाध्योच्च वज्राश्रित मिमांसाय वचनात्। श्रोतप्रवृत्त ब्रह्मज्ञानविवद्य ब्रह्मविवद्य अंतःकरणोपधारी। लिङ्गस्वारैण तरं गांधीति।³

³ प्रकृतिकायिनेऽवं स्वाच्छेदोऽवं चतुर्वल्ल शरीरमण्डलादीदिशा विभाग्यम्। सब्रिह्मण्डिलादीदिशा विभाग्यम्। उपाध्योच्च वज्राश्रित मिमांसाय वचनात्। श्रोतप्रवृत्त ब्रह्मज्ञानविवद्य ब्रह्मविवद्य अंतःकरणोपधारी। लिङ्गस्वारैण तरं गांधीति।
THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS.

Aph. 126. Of both [Nature and her products] the fact that they consist of the three Qualities [§ 61. a.], and that they are irrational, &c., [is the common property].

a. Consisting of the three qualities, and being irrational, [such in the meaning of the compound term with which the aphorism commences]. By the expression ' &c.' is meant [their] being intended for another, [see § 66]. 'Of both,' i.e., of the cause [viz., Nature], and of the effects [viz., all natural products]. Such is the meaning.¹

b. He [next] states the mutual differences of character among the three Qualities which [see § 61] are the [constituent] parts of Nature.²

Aph. 127. The Qualities [§ 62] differ in character, mutually, by pleasantness, unpleasantness, lassitude, &c., [in which forms, severally, the Qualities present themselves].

a. 'Pleasantness,' i.e., Pleasure. By the expression

¹ ' &c.' is meant Goodness (ṣattva), which is light [i.e., not heavy], and illuminating. 'Unpleasantness,' i.e., Pain. By the expression ' &c.' [in reference to this] is meant Passion (rajas), which is urgent and restless. 'Lassitude,' i.e., stupefaction. By the expression ' &c.' is meant Darkness (tamas), which is heavy and enveloping. It is by these habits that the Qualities, viz., Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, differ: such is the remainder, [required to complete the aphorism].

b. At the time of telling their differences, he tells in what respects they agree.³

In what respects the Qualities agree, as well as differ.

Aph. 128. Through Lightness and other habits the Qualities mutually agree and differ

a. The meaning is as follows: the enunciation [in the

¹ प्रीति: सुखम्। ादिश्चात्रार्थकं सत्त्वम्। ादिरितुप्रयोगं च। विदाहीमाहः। ादिश्चात्रार्थकं च। यत् एवं गुणानां सत्त्वेन नमः! विदाहीमाहः।

² तेषा वैधव्येच्यनासुरे साध्यमाहः।

³ So reads Aukraddha only. Vijnana, Nagaeva, and Vedanti Mahadeva have: ादिदिर्मायं साध्यमेवैधव्यं च गुणानाम्। Ed.
shape of the term laghu, 'light,' is not one intended to say attention to the concrete, viz., what things are light, but is one where the abstract [the nature of light things, viz., 'lightness' (laghitva)] is the prominent thing. 'Through Lightness and other habits,' i.e., through the character of Lightness, Restlessness, and Heaviness, the Qualities differ. Their agreement is through what is hinted by the expression 'and other.' And this consists in their mutually predominating [one over another, from time to time], producing one another, consorting together, and being reciprocally present, [one in another], for the sake of Soul.  

b. By [the expressions, in § 124,] 'caused,' &c., it is declared that the 'Great one' [or Mind], &c., are products. He states the proof of this:  

Aph. 129. Since they are other than both [Soul and Nature, the only two uncaused entities], Mind and the rest are products; as is the case with a jar, or the like.

a. That is to say: like a jar, or the like, Mind and the

1 नित्यम हैं भवमध्या निर्देश: I लघुदिश-मैत्रसंघ-पञ्चमण्डलगुणानां वैधम्म: I ईश्वरदू-शितिन साधम्में I तथा पुज्ञथेनायामिबव-जननमित्युष्कितलम् I  
2 ईशुमदियादिया महदादीनां कार्यमुक्तम I तत्र प्रमाणमाह I  

rest are products; because they are something other than the two which [alone] are eternal, viz., Nature and Soul.  

b. He states another reason:  

परिमाणात् II 930 II  

A second proof.  

Aph. 130. Because of [their] measure, [which is a limited one].  

a. That is to say: [Mind and the rest are products]; because they are limited in measure; 3 [whereas the only two that are uncaused, viz., Nature and Soul, are unlimited].  

b. He states another argument:  

सम्प्रत्यात् II 931 II  

A third proof  

Aph. 131. Because they conform [to Nature].  

a. [Mind and the rest are products]; because they well [follow and] correspond with Nature; i.e., because the Qualities of Nature [§ 61] are seen in all things: 4 [and it

1 नित्यम हैं भवमध्या निर्देश: I लघुदिश-मैत्रसंघ-पञ्चमण्डलगुणानां वैधम्म: I ईश्वरदू-शितिन साधम्में I तथा पुज्ञथेनायामिबव-जननमित्युष्कितलम् I  
2 ईशुमदियादिया महदादीनां कार्यमुक्तम I तत्र प्रमाणमाह I  
3 हैलतसमाह II  
4 परिमाणात्विद्वयेष: II  
5 ऋपाः युक्तिमाह II  
6 प्रभाबेन सह सम्यकमायमध्या गुणानस्ते-पदार्थयुद्धर्षेन दर्शनात् II
is a maxim, that what is in the effect was derived from the cause and implies the cause.

b. He states the same thing;[ in the next aphorism]:

शत्क्षपति || १३२ ||

Aph. 132. And, finally, because it is through the power [of the cause alone, that the product can do aught].

a. It is by the power of its cause, that a product energizes, [as a chain restrains an elephant, only by the force of the iron which it is made of]; so that Mind and the rest, being [except through the strength of Nature] powerless, produce their products in subservience to Nature. Otherwise, since it is their habit to energize, they would at all times produce their products, [which it will not be alleged that they do].

b. And the word is, in this place, is intended to notify the completion of the set of [positive] reasons [why Mind and the others should be regarded as products].

c. He [next] states [in support of the same assertion,] the argument from negatives, [i.e., the argument drawn from the consideration as to what becomes of Mind and the others, when they are not products]:

तादाने प्रकृति: पुरुष्वा वा || १३३ ||

Aph. 133. On the quitting thereof

Converse proof of the [quitting the condition of product], there is Nature, or Soul, [into one or other of which the product must needs have resolved itself].

a. Product and non-product; such is the pair or alternatives. 'On the quitting thereof;' i.e., when Mind and the rest quit the condition of product, Mind and the rest [of necessity] enter into Nature, or Soul; [these two alone being non-products].

b. [But perhaps some one may say, that] Mind and the rest may exist quite independently of the pair of alternatives [just mentioned]. In regard to this, he declares [as follows]:

त्योन्नर्थे तुत्कृतम् || १३४ ||

1 कार्यकार्ये चेति कार्यितमये । तादाने मह- दादेः कार्यताहाने प्रकृता पद्मे वा महादादीनां प्रवेश इति ||

2 उभयकार्तिचिन्मुक्त एव महादादयो भवि- चंद्रवाह ।

3 नूगेशा हस्त तुष्हता. Ed.
Aph. 134. If they were other than these two, they would be void; [seeing that there is nothing self-existent, besides Soul and Nature].

a. If Mind and the rest were 'other than these two,' i.e., than product or non-product [§ 133], they would be in the shape of what is 'void,' i.e., in the shape of nonentity.

b. Well now, [some one may say,] why should it be under the character of a product, that Mind and the rest are a sign of [there being such a principle as] Nature? They may be [more properly said to be] a sign, merely in virtue of their not occurring apart from it. To this he replies:

\[ \text{कायोक्षारः तत्तसहित्यात्} \] ॥ १३४ ॥

Aph. 135. The cause is inferred from the effect, [in the case of Nature and her products]; because it accompanies it.

a. That [other relation, other than that of material and product, which you would make out to exist between Nature and Mind,] exists, indeed, where the nature [or

\[ \text{बृहस्पत्यः चिन्तित्वात्} \] ॥ १३५ ॥

1 तथा: कायीकार्यायच्यां महददीनां तुच्छेऽपलमहानाशुपलम् ॥

2 अत् किमेघं महददयं: कार्यलेन प्रकृते-लिङ्गम। ओविनाभावादिव लिङ्गं भविष्यती-वचाह ॥

\[ \text{बृहस्पती चिन्तित्वात्} \] ॥ १३६ ॥

1 अवलोक्येन यथ तारगुणम् कायं न दृष्टवते यथा चन्द्रदेशार्थमृट्युवृत्तानाम। अत् तु प्रभाव-रूपस्य महददीर दर्शनालोकितं कार्यार्थादुनामेव।

tatsahihitamuktiliptasya mahaddhā deśnāta ॥

2 एवं चेम्हरतक्षमेव जगाकारणमस्तु किं प्रथानेतेऽथ झाह ॥

\[ \text{बृहस्पती चिन्तित्वात्} \] ॥ १३६ ॥

1. सेवकेक्यं च तारगुणम् कायं न दृष्टवते यथा चन्द्रदेशार्थमृट्युवृत्तानाम। अत् तु प्रभाव-रूपस्य महददीर दर्शनालोकितं कार्यार्थादुनामेव।

tatsahihitamuktiliptasya mahaddhā deśnāta ॥

2. एवं चेम्हरतक्षमेव जगाकारणमस्तु किं प्रथानेतेऽथ झाह ॥

11
Aph. 136. The indiscreet, [Nature, must be inferred] from its [discrete and resolvable] effect, [Mind], in which are the three Qualities, [which constitute Nature].

a. 'It is resolved,' such is the import of [the term] _linga, _[here rendered] 'effect.' From that [resolvable effect], viz., the 'Great principle' [or Mind], in which are the three Qualities, Nature must be inferred. And that the 'Great principle,' in the shape of ascertainmet [or distinct intellection], is discrete [or limited] and perishable, is established by direct observation. Therefore [i.e., since Mind, being perishable, must be resolvable into something else], we infer that into which it is resolvable, [in other words, its 'cause,' here analogously termed _linga, _since 'effect' has been termed _linga].

b. But then, [some one may say], still something quite different may be the cause [of all things]: what need of [this] Nature [of yours]? In regard to this, he remarks [as follows]:

2 ननु तथाप्रयम्येव कारणं भविष्यति किं प्रकृत्येवन्तहां

Aph. 137. There is no denying that it [Nature] is; because of its effects, [which will be in vain attributed to any other source].

a. Is the cause of this [world] a product, or not a product? If it were a product, then, the same being [with equal propriety to be assumed to be] the case with its cause, there would be a _regressus in infinitum_. If effects be from any root [to which there is nothing antecedent], then _this_ is that [to which we give the name of Nature] 'Because of its effects,' that is to say, because of the effects of Nature. There is no denying 'that it is,' i.e., that Nature is.

b. Be it so, [let us grant,] that Nature is; yet [the opponent may contend,] Soul positively cannot be; for [if the existence of causes is to be inferred from their products, Soul cannot be thus demonstrated to exist; seeing that] it has no products. In regard to this, he remarks [as follows]:

2 सामान्येन विवादात्माभावादमेभि साधनम्

2 भवतु प्रकृतिसिद्धिः पुनः खय सिद्धस्तु न स्वादेत्व नहि तत्थ कार्येनलीब्धाः

1 तत्कार्यं कार्यं कार्यं च च। कार्यके तत्कार-रण्यायिः तथाकं सल्लवभा। मूलकार्यं तदेव सेति। तत्कार्यं इति प्रकृतिकार्यं इत्यर्थः। त-सिद्ध: प्रकृतिसिद्धिनीपाल्य:।

1 तत्कार्यं कार्यं कार्यं च। कार्यके तत्कार-रण्यायिः तथाकं सल्लवभा। मूलकार्यं तदेव सेति। तत्कार्यं इति प्रकृतिकार्यं इत्यर्थः। त-सिद्ध: प्रकृतिसिद्धिनीपाल्य:।

1 तत्कार्यं कार्यं कार्यं च। कार्यके तत्कार-रण्यायिः तथाकं सल्लवभा। मूलकार्यं तदेव सेति। तत्कार्यं इति प्रकृतिकार्यं इत्यर्थः। त-सिद्ध: प्रकृतिसिद्धिनीपाल्य:।

1 तत्कार्यं कार्यं कार्यं च। कार्यके तत्कार-रण्यायिः तथाकं सल्लवभा। मूलकार्यं तदेव सेति। तत्कार्यं इति प्रकृतिकार्यं इत्यर्थः। त-सिद्ध: प्रकृतिसिद्धिनीपाल्य:।
Aph. 138. [The relation of cause and effect is not [alleged as] the means of establishing [the existence of Soul]; because, as is the case with [the disputed term] 'merit,' there is no dispute about there being such a kind of thing; [though what kind of thing is matter of dispute].

a. There is no dispute about 'there being such a kind of thing,' i.e., as to there being Soul, simply; [since everybody who does not talk stark nonsense must admit a Soul, or self, of some kind]; for the dispute is [not as to its being, but] as to its peculiarity [of being], as [whether it be] multitudinous, or sole, all-pervading, or not all-pervading, and so forth; just as, in every [philosophical system, or] theory, there is no dispute as to [there being something to which may be applied the term] 'merit' (dharma); for the difference of opinion has regard to the particular kind of [things,—such as sacrifices, according to the Mâna creed, or good works, according to the Nyâya,—which shall be held to involve] 'merit.'

b. 'Not the means of establishing' that [viz., the existence of soul]; i.e., the relation of cause and effect is not the means of establishing it. This intends, 'I will mention another means of establishing it.'

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1 सामान्यतः तावदात्मत्तमानि विविधादा नालि विशेषे हि विवादानेन एवो आपकोऽवधापक इत्यादि यथा सर्वसिद्धान्तमेऽर्थम् इत्यविविधादा धर्मः विशेषे हि विप्रतिपपति: ||

2 न तस्मात् न तच कार्येकारास्थायः साधनम् अन्यसाधनं वक्ष्यामीत्यस्मिनि: ||

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5. [But some one may say,] Souls are nothing else than the body, and its organs, &c.: what need of imagining anything else? To this he replies:—

शरीरादिक्यतरिकं पुनान् गृहदेवतां न वा || ९३० ||

Materialism reasserted. Aph. 139 Soul is something else than the body, &c.

a. [The meaning of the aphorism is] plain.

b. He propounds an argument in support of this:

ज्ञात पराभवात् सत्यः || ९४० ||

Aph. 140. Because that which is combined [and is, therefore, discerptible,] is for the sake of some other, [not discerptible].

a. That which is discerptible is intended for something else that is discerptible. If it were intended for something else that is discerptible, there would be a regress in infinitum.

b. And combinedness [involving (see § 67) discerptible—

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देहेन्द्रियांद्र वातामानः किंमयक्त्यनयेर्यत्स्वत्र ज्ञात: ||

aptic ||

व्यक्तम् ||

उवच व्यामानः ||

व्याहन्तं तदसंहतपरायमेऽत्स्तत्चिन्तमय: संहतपरायथे ज्ञाते स्वत्त: ||

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ness,] consists in the Qualities, making some product by their state of mutual commixture; or [to express it otherwise,] combinedness is the state of the soft and the hard, [which distinguishes matter from spirit]. And this exists occultly in Nature, as well as the rest; because, otherwise, discerptibleness would not prove discoverable in the products thereof, viz., the 'Great one,' &c.

c. He elucidates this same point:3

बिगुणादिविपयथाय ॥ ९४७ ॥

Aph. 141. [And Soul is something else than the body, &c.; because there is in Soul,] the reverse of the three Qualities, &c.

a. Because there is, in Soul, 'the reverse of the three Qualities,' &c., i.e., because they are not seen [in it]. By the expression ' &c.,' is meant, because the other characters of Nature, also, are not seen [in Soul].

b. He states another argument:4

1 संहततलं च गुणानामयोभिन्नमिथुनभावेन का- ्यकराम । अथ वा दूरकविठतात्संहततलस । तत्व प्रकृतासो निरेक्षतमसी । अन्यथा तत्तकार्येण मह- 

1 तदेव स्पष्टयति ॥

2 पुस्ते बिगुणादिविपयथायात्रादशनाति । झां-

2 न्यायभासेन ॥

3 चेततनो साधिताता भवति प्रकृतिभक्ष जड्डायथे:॥

3 युक्तस्थतामाः॥

4 भोग्या प्रकृतिभोज्य: पुरुषः । यथापि क्लोकस- 

4 मायामाण नाति तथापि बुद्धिस्वाध- 

4 न्यायत्वेनुसरम् ॥
The nature of the Soul.

Aph. 145. Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent, light; [which must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the Soul, which, self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is manifest].

a. It is a settled point, that the unintelligent is not light; [it is not self-manifesting]. If Soul, also, were unintelligent [as the Naiyāyikas hold it to be, in substance; knowledge being, by them, regarded not as its essence or substratum, but as one of its qualities], then there would need to be another light for it; and, as the simple theory, let Soul itself consist, essentially, of light.

b. And there is Scripture [in support of this view; for example, the two following texts from the Brihadāraṇyak Upaniṣad]: ‘Wherewith shall one distinguish that wherewith one distinguishes all this [world]?’ . ‘Wherewith shall one take cognizance of the cognizer?’

c. [But the Naiyāyika may urge,] let Soul be unintelligent [in its substance], but have Intelligence as its

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1. ज्ञनो न प्रकाशत इति सिद्धम् सब्जाध्वमिपम जड़: स्वाभाविक्षाणे प्रकाशिण भविषये साध्वाय-शास्त्रीय प्रकाशरक्षपि

2. II., 4, 14; or Šaṅkara-brāhmaṇa, xiv., 5, 4, 16. The two sentences quoted are continuous. Ed.

3. ज्ञातिष्ठ जोनेन्द्र सवं विज्ञानाति तं केन विज्ञानीयायात् विज्ञानास्ते केन विज्ञानीयायादिति

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[since Nature, in the shape of Mind, is, it seems, the experiencer]? To this he replies: 1

वैच्वस्याम् प्रवृत्तिः ॥ ९४५ ॥

Aph. 144. [It is for Soul, and not for Nature:] because the exertions are with a view to isolation [from all qualities; a condition to which Soul is competent, but Nature is not].

a. The very essence of Nature cannot depart from it [so as to leave it in the state of absolute, solitary isolation contemplated]; because the three Qualities are its very essence, [the departure of which from it would leave nothing behind], and because it would thus prove to be not eternal, [whereas, in reality, it is eternal]. The isolation (सत्त्वित्य) of that alone is possible of which the qualities are reflexional, [and not constitutive (see § 58. a.)]; and that is Soul.

b. Of what nature is this [Soul]? To this he replies:

1. मोगाध्वम प्रवृत्तिः। सा किमात्मन: प्रकृतेत्रेव- ज्ञत चाह॥

2. This lection is that of Aniruddha alone. Vijnana, Nagaśa, and Vedánti Mahádeva and the Aphorism with च, necessitating ‘and because,’ &c. Ed.

3. वैदिकप्रावहसिक्षान्ते सहभाष्यत्वोपयोगिन- व्यवहारक्षास्य। यथाप्राध्यकृतान्तस्य केवलं संभवति स चासेति।

4. संबिक्षुप इत्यत् चाह॥
attribute. Thereby it manifests all things; but it is not, essentially, Intelligence. To this he replies:  

अप्र 146. य [Soul] has not Intel
ligence as its attribute; because it is without quality.

a. If soul were associated with attributes, it would be [as we hold everything to be, that is associated with attributes,] liable to alteration; and, therefore, there would be no Liberation; [its attributes, or susceptibilities, always keeping it liable to be affected by something or other; or, the absolutely simple being the only unalterable].

b. He declares that there is a contradiction to Scripture in this, [i.e., in the view which he is contending against]:

अप्र 147. There is no denial [to be allowed] of what is established by Scripture; because the [supposed] evidence of intuition for this [i.e., for the existence of qualities in the Soul,] is confuted [by the Scriptural declaration of the contrary].

a. If soul were unintelligent, then, in deep sleep, &c., it would not be a witness, a knower. But that this is not

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1 Bhādrapānāya Upanishad, iv., 3, 16; or Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa, xiv., 7, 1, 17. Ed.

2 अक्षरोदयं पुनः इत्यदिश्यते वैदिकयायां सा जागिरता स्वात् ॥

3 अक्षरोदयस्य निर्देशानि निर्माणादनेयापलापः संभवति तत्प्रथाय गुणार्ट्याधक्षेत्रम् स्नेनाधिक व्रतम् ॥

सुप्रभागयथा साधिनस् । नागरेश. सुप्रभागयथा साधिनस् । वेदांति यहादेवा. Ed.
the case [may be inferred] from the phenomenon, that 'I slept pleasantly.' By the expression 'and,' [in the aphorism,] dreaming is included."

b. The Vedāntis say that 'soul is one only'; and so, again, 'For Soul is eternal, omnipresent, changeless, void of blemish.' 'Being one [only], it is divided [into a seeming multitude] by Nature (śakti), i.e., Illusion (māyā), but not through its own essence, [to which there does not belong multiplicity].' In regard to this, he says [as follows]:

1 ज्ञातिः वदः यानुप्रवचनावसारसिद्धां तृतीय यात् । न वैव सुव्याहतस्वासत्मिति प्रति भोगाधृत्। ज्ञातिः यानुप्रवचनावसिद्धां ॥
2 एव प्रवाहमेव व्यास्विद्धानः। तथा च। निय सक्षमात् यात्मा कृत्यो देशविधिः। एवः। किच्च्चेत॥ यथा मायया न रूपान्तः। यथात ॥
3 Vedānti Mahādeva has, agreesly to some copies of his work, युक्तस्व वा निद्रसन्धिम् Ed.
then it is true,] also on the hypothesis that there are many souls. [And it must be true:] otherwise, since Soul is eternal, [without beginning or end, as both parties agree], how could there be the appointment of birth and death? 

b. He states [what may serve for] the removal of doubt
[as to the point in question]:

उपाधिभिन्द्यते नन्तु तद्भवः || ९६५ ||

Aph. 151. The investment is different, [according to the Vedánta], but not that to which this belongs; [and the absurd consequences of such an opinion will be seen]

a. 'The investment is different,' [there are diverse bodies of John, Thomas, &c.]; 'that to which this belongs,' i.e. that [Soul] to which this investment [of body, in all its multiplicity] belongs, is not different, but [is one only]: such is the meaning. And, [now consider], in consequence of the destruction of one thing, we are not to speak as if there were the destruction of something else; because this [if it were evidence of a thing's being destroyed,] would present itself where it ought not; 

vādatta, e.g., presenting itself, as a fact, when we are considering the case of Vajradatta, who is not, for that reason, to be assumed to be dead]; and, on the hypothesis that Soul is one, the [fact that the Vedánta makes an] imputation of inconsistent conditions is quite evident; since Bondage and Liberation do not [and cannot] belong [simultaneously] to one. But the conjunction and [simultaneous] non-conjunction of the sky [or space] with smoke, &c., [of which the Vedánta may seek to avail himself, as an illustration] are not contradictory; for Conjunction is not pervasion; 

b. What may be [proved] by this? To this he replies:

एवमेकेन परिवर्तेनान्त्य न विद्वद्धकमेव
धारणः || ९६७ ||

Aph. 152. Thus, [i.e., by taking the Sánkhya], there is no imputation of contradictory conditions to a Soul

यथेकाश्च गताक्षुपौर्विधेयते नाह गताक्षुपौर्विधेयते
तथापरिपूर्वकाशी नाहिमित अधिपिन्न्यहौर्विधेयते
देहार्थचादरायमानस्य भास्कर्यं न इति अधिपिन्न्यहौर्विधेयते

१ उपाधिभिन्द्यते तदानुपाधिभिन्द्यतेन भवं इत्य
थः। न चाननात्मानवन्धन नास्त्यवर्णहरान्तिप्रसत
क्रिकाशीत्यहे च वधु एव विद्वद्धकमेव एका
बन्धमोक्षसाधवः। वाकापर्यं तु धूलादियोगः
योगाविद्रश्च संस्थाग्न्यायावृत्तिवातः

४ यतेन किं स्याद्विदं अत आह॥
supposed to be] everywhere present as one [infinitely extended monad].

a. 'Thus,' i.e., [if you regard the matter rightly,] according to the manner here set forth, there is no 'imputation,' or attribution, 'of incompatible conditions,' Bondage, Liberation, etc., to a soul 'existing everywhere,' throughout all, as one,' i.e., as a monad.

b. [But the Vedánti may contend.] we see the condition of another attributed even to one quite different; as, e.g., Nature's character as an agent [is attributed] to Soul, which is another [than Nature]. To this he replies:

अन्यथमेवदपि नारोकाशिसिसिरेकलात् || १५३ ||

Aph. 153. Even though there be [imputed to Soul] the possession of the condition of another, this [i.e., that it really possesses such] is not established by the imputation; because it [Soul] is one [absolutely simple, unqualified entity].

a. [The notion] that Soul is an agent is a mistake; because, that Soul is not an agent is true, and the imputation [of agency to Soul] is not true, and the combination of the true and the untrue is not real. Neither birth nor death or the like is compatible with Soul; because it is unaccompanied, [i.e., unattended either by qualities or by actions].

b. [But the Vedánti may say:] and thus there will be an opposition to the Scripture. For, according to that, Brahma is one without a second: 'There is nothing here diverse; death after death does he [deluded man] obtain, who here sees, as it were, a multiplicity.' To this he replies:

नाभैत्यस्याक्षरोऽज्ञतिपरवत् || १५४ ||

Aph. 154. There is no opposition to the Scriptures [declaratory] of the non-duality of Soul; because the reference [in such texts] is to the genus, [or to Soul in general].

a. But there is no opposition [in our Sánkhyas view of the matter.] to the Scriptures [which speak] of the oneness of Soul; because those [Scriptural texts] refer to the genus.

१ पुष्करंकौन्त्यमान् पुष्करंकौत्तैलस्य स्वाधारयो- पस्यस्यानवच च सत्याखलयोः: अत्साचिक्षा भवति || अससक्लादात्मनो न जन्मस्मादिद संभवति ||

२ Ckhádogyaa Upa‘ishad, vi., 1. But the word श्रद्धा does not occur there. Ed.

३ Katha Upa‘ishad, iv., 11. Instead of श्राप्रत्य, however, the correct reading is ग्रन्धा श्रद्धा Ed.

४ यथा च कृतिविरोधः स्यात् || तथा चैंसेवारा-
By *genus* we mean sameness, the fact of being of the same nature; and it is to this alone that the texts about the non-duality [of Soul] have reference. It is not the indivisibility [of Soul], meaning, by its indivisibility, the impossibility that there should be more souls than one, that is meant in such texts; because there is no motive [for viewing Soul as thus indivisible]: such is the meaning.¹

b. But then, [the Vedánti may join] Bondage and Liberation are just as incompatible in any single soul, on the theory of him who asserts that souls are many, [and that each is at once bound and free]. To this he replies:²

विदितवच्चारणार्थ तृष्णा तदूपम् ॥ १५५ ॥

ब्यक्ति भवन नानाति किं च चनाः स मूलभाषाय य इह नानेव पराति। सचाह ॥

1 सामायिक्षुयुनानि विरोधलु नानि तासां जातिपरतात। जाति सामायिक्षुरालं तववाय्तम्युतानां तास्यात्। नासकर्मं प्रथोजनाभावारिद्वये:।

2 नन्वनेकातिकार्याविशिक्ष्यात्मनो बल्मेक्ष्यो न विहाथावित:। सचाह॥

3 All the commentators but Aniruddha read तृष्णातदूपमः; and they differ widely from him, as they often do, in their elucidations of the Aphorism. Nágeśa’s explanation of it is as follows: विदितवच्चारणार्थ यथा तदूपशान्तपुस्तुः.

**Aph. 155.** Of him [i.e., of that soul,] by whom the cause of Bondage is known, there is that condition [of isolation, or entire liberation], by the perception [of the fact, that Nature and soul are distinct, and that he, really, was not bound, even when he seemed to be so].

a. By whom is known, ‘the cause of bondage,’ viz., the non-perception that Nature and soul are distinct, of him, ‘by the perception’ [of it], i.e., by cognizing the distinction, there is ‘that condition,’ viz., the condition of isolation, [the condition (see § 144) after which the soul aspires. The soul in Bondage which is no real bondage may be typified by Don Quixote, hanging, in the dark, from the ledge of a supposed enormous precipice, and holding on for life, as he thought, from not knowing that his toes were within six inches of the ground].¹
b. [Well, rejoins the Vedànti.] Bondage [as you justly observe] is dependent on non-perception [of the truth], and is not real. It is a maxim, that non-perception is removed by perception; and, on this showing, we recognize as correct the theory that Soul is one, but not that of Soul's being multitudinous. To this he replies: 1

नानात्माः च चक्षुभाष्मतामनुपलम्। १५६॥

Aph. 156. No: because the blind do not see, can those who have their eyesight not perceive?

a. What! because a blind man does not see, does also one who has his eyesight not perceive? There are many arguments [in support of the view] of those who assert that souls are many, [though you do not see them]: such is the meaning. 3

b. He declares, for the following reason, also, that souls are many. 3

1 विवेकाद्वैतनिनिनिमित्तो बन्धो न ताल्लिकः।
द्विनाद्वैतनिनिन्निनकं च युक्तं। एवं वैकाशिकमपक्ष एव नात्मां मत नानात्मान इति।
खवाह॥

2 अस्य न पश्चात्तत्त्वाच चक्षुभाष्मतामनुपलम्।
नानात्मानादिनमनेकं न्यायाः: सत्तित्वः॥

3 इतितत्त्वाद नानात्मान खवाह॥

Aph. 157. Vāmadeva, as well as others, has been liberated, [if we are to believe the Scriptures; therefore] non-duality is not [asserted, in the same Scriptures, in the Vedantic sense].

a. In the Purañas, &c., we hear, 'Vāmadeva has been liberated,' 'Śuka has been liberated,' and so on. If soul were one, since the liberation of all would take place, on the liberation of one, the scriptural mention of a diversity [of separate and successive liberations] would be self-contradictory. 1

b. [But the Vedanta may rejoin:] on the theory that souls are many, since the world has been from eternity, and from time to time some one or other is liberated, so, by degrees, all having been liberated, there would be a universal void. But, on the theory that soul is one, liberation is merely the departure of an adjunct, [which, the Vedanta flatters himself, does not involve the inconsistency which he objects to the Śāṅkhya]. To this he replies: 3

1 Aniruddha perhaps has वामदेवादिनमनुपलम्।

2 पुराणादिभूमानानानेका चक्षुभाष्मतामनुपलम्।
नानात्मानादिनमनेकं न्यायाः: सत्तित्वः॥

3 नानात्मानादिनमनेकं सन्तानं कथायि कार्यः
मुच्यत इति क्रियेन नानात्मानादिन खवाह॥

Ed.

2 पुराणादिभूमानानेका चक्षुभाष्मतामनुपलम्।
नानात्मानादिनमनेकं न्यायाः: सत्तित्वः॥

3 नानात्मानादिनमनेकं सन्तानं कथायि कार्यः
मुच्यत इति क्रियेन नानात्मानादिन खवाह॥

1 Aniruddha perhaps has वामदेवादिनमनुपलम्।
Ap. 158. Though it [the world] has been from eternity, since, up to this day, there has not been [an entire emptying of the world], the future, also, [may be inferentially expected to be] thus [as it has been heretofore].

a. Though the world has been from eternity, since, up to this day, we have not seen it become a void, there is no proof [in support] of the view that there will be Liberation\(^1\) of all Souls, so as to leave a void.

b. He states another solution [of the difficulty]:\(^3\)

Ap. 159. As now [things are, so], everywhere [will they continue to go on: hence there will be] no absolute cutting short [of the course of mundane things].

a. Since souls are [in number] without end, though Liberation successively take place, there will not be [as a necessary consequence] a cutting short of the world. As now, so everywhere,—i.e., in time to come, also,—there

\[\text{अननैरीमि सर्वं नायलोक्षेत्रं:} \text{ II 952 II} \]

\[\text{The stream of mundane things will flow on for ever.} \]

\[\text{अननैरीमि सर्वं नायलोक्षेत्रं:} \text{ II 952 II} \]

b. He states another solution [of the difficulty]:\(^3\)

\[\text{एकात्मस्थे तुपाधिविद्यम यष मोक्ष इति} \text{।} \]

\[\text{थानान्त्रे} \text{।} \]

\[\text{अननैरीमि सर्वं नायलोक्षेत्रं:} \text{ II 952 II} \]

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\[\text{थानान्त्रे} \text{।} \]

\[\text{अननैरीमि सर्वं नायलोक्षेत्रं:} \text{ II 952 II} \]

\[\text{एकात्मस्थे तुपाधिविद्यम यष मोक्ष इति} \text{।} \]

\[\text{थानान्त्रे} \text{।} \]

\[\text{अननैरीमि सर्वं नायलोक्षेत्रं:} \text{ II 952 II} \]

\[\text{एकात्मस्थे तुपाधिविद्यम यष मोक्ष इति} \text{।} \]

\[\text{थानान्त्रे} \text{।} \]

\[\text{अननैरीमि सर्वं नायलोक्षेत्रं:} \text{ II 952 II} \]

\[\text{एकात्मस्थे तुपाधिविद्यम यष मोक्ष इति} \text{।} \]

\[\text{थानान्त्रे} \text{।} \]

\[\text{अननैरीमि सर्वं नायलोक्षेत्रं:} \text{ II 952 II} \]

\[\text{एकात्मस्थे तुपाधिविद्यम यष मोक्ष इति} \text{।} \]

\[\text{थानान्त्रे} \text{।} \]

\[\text{अननैरीमि सर्वं नायलोक्षेत्रं:} \text{ II 952 II} \]

\[\text{एकात्मस्थे तुपाधिविद्यम यष मोक्ष इति} \text{।} \]

\[\text{थानान्त्रे} \text{।} \]

\[\text{अननैरीमि सर्वं नायलोक्षेत्रं:} \text{ II 952 II} \]

\[\text{एकात्मस्थे तुपाधिविद्यम य� मोक्ष इति} \text{।} \]

\[\text{थानान्त्रे} \text{।} \]

\[\text{अननैरीमि सर्वं नायलोक्षेत्रं:} \text{ II 952 II} \]

\[\text{एकात्मस्थे तुपाधिविद्यम यष मोक्ष इति} \text{।} \]

\[\text{थानान्त्रे} \text{।} \]

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\[\text{एकात्मस्थे तुपाधिविद्यम य� मोक्ष इति} \text{।} \]

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\[\text{एकात्मस्थे तुपाधिविद्यम य� मोक्ष इति} \text{।} \]

\[\text{थानान्त्रे} \text{।} \]

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\[\text{एकात्मस्थे तुपाधिविद्यम यष मोक्ष इति} \text{।} \]

\[\text{थानान्त्रे} \text{।} \]

\[\text{अननैरीमि सर्वं नायलोक्षेत्रं:} \text{ II 952 II} \]

\[\text{एकात्मस्थे तुपाधिविद्यम यष मोक्ष इति} \text{।} \]

\[\text{थानान्त्रे} \text{।} \]

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\[\text{एकात्मस्थे तुपाधिविद्यम यष मोक्ष इति} \text{।} \]

\[\text{थानान्त्रे} \text{।} \]

\[\text{अननैरीमि सर्वं नायलोक्षेत्रं:} \text{ II 952 II} \]

\[\text{एकात्मस्थे तुपाधिविद्यम यष मोक्ष इति} \text{।} \]

\[\text{थानान्त्रे} \text{।} \]

\[\text{अननैरीमि सर्वं नायलोक्षेत्रं:} \text{ II 952 II} \]

\[\text{एकात्मस्थे तुपाधिविद्यम यष मोक्ष इति} \text{।} \]

\[\text{थानान्त्रे} \text{।} \]
and Soul are different], are continually being liberated, there will not be a void, inasmuch as there is no end of multitudes of souls in the universe.\footnote{1}

d. Pray, [some one may ask,] is Soul [essentially] bound? Or free? If [essentially] bound, then, since its essence cannot depart, there is no Liberation; for, if it [the essence] departed, then it [Soul] would cease, with the cessation of its essence, and not be eternal. If [on the other hand, you reply that it is essentially] free, then meditation and the like [which you prescribe for the attainment of liberation] are meaningless. To this he replies:\footnote{2}

\textbf{वाच्योऽभ्यूतं} || \textbf{वैधूतं} ||

\footnote{1} स्योपाध्यायिनमन्तत्वम् शून्यता नानाद्व-पश्चे तुस्तमि। तथा च। अत एव हि विद्धमु मुखमानेशु सेततम्। ब्रह्माकृत्तिवलोकानन्त- तवाद् शून्यता।

\footnote{2} किमात्मा वचों मुखो व। बह्यो स्वयम्या- प्रच्छातिनिमात: प्रच्छातिनिमात। मुखे अष्ठोऽध्यातिनिरितिः। अत चाह।

\footnote{3} This reading I find nowhere, but, instead of it, वाच्योऽभ्यूतं: 'Clear of both conditions [i.e., that of being bound and that of being freed, is Soul, which is eternally free].'

\footnote{4} Mesara. Böhtlingk and Roth call Dr. Ballantyne's भ्यूतं: 'Fehlerschaft für भूतं.' Their substitute is, so far as I know, conjectural.

According to most interpreters, however, the preceding Aphorism has reference to the question whether it be only after Soul is

\textbf{Soul is ever free,} though it may seem bound in all sorts of ways.\footnote{1}

\textbf{Aph. 160.} It [Soul] is altogether free. [but seemingly] multiform, [or different, in appearance, from a free thing, through a delusive semblance of being bound].

\textbf{a.} It is not bound; nor is it liberated; but it is ever free, \textit{(see §19).} But the destruction of ignorance \textit{(as to its actual freedom,)} is effected by meditation, \&c.,\footnote{1} [which are, therefore, not meaningless, as alleged in §159. \textit{d.}}

\textbf{b.} It has been declared that Soul is a witness.\footnote{3} Since it is a witness \textit{(some one may object),} even when it has attained to discriminating \textit{(between Nature and Soul),} there

\textbf{liberated, or, on the other hand, at all times, that simplicity, or unchanging fixedness, of essential condition (ekarū̄pa eva) is predictable of it.}

\textbf{Introductions to the Aphorism, with expositions of it, here follow.} \textbf{Vedānti Mahādeva:} पुरुषस्य यदेकपत्यं तत्क्षो मोक्ष- काल उत्त संवेद्याकालायामाह। \textbf{Nagasa:} पुरुष- \textbf{णा चैकधपयं मोक्षकाल इत्य संवेद्याय।} \textbf{Vedānti Mahādeva:} श्रीतिष्कृतिकाश्चेऽध्वनिः वाच्यो नित्यनितृत: उभयपपे उन हूँ रूपमिति इति यावधमस्माताम! \textbf{Nagasa:} पुरुषो वाच्योऽभ्युते नित्यनितृतेऽध्वनि उभयपपेदै\ वस्मातङ्गत्यायः। Also see the commentaries on the \textit{Śaṅkhya-kārikā}, st. 19; and § 144. \textit{a.}, at p. 162, \textit{supra.} \textit{Ed.}

\footnote{1} न वहैते नायां मुखते किं तु नित्यनितृत:। अत्मा नात्ते स्थानं यावधमस्मात:। अविध ज्ञातं त्रिते।}

\footnote{3} \textit{Vide supra, p. 56, § 54. \textit{a.}, and p. 165, § 148.} \textit{Ed.}
THE SÁNKHYÁ APHORISMS.

is no Liberation; [Soul, on this showing, being not an absolutely simple entity, but something combined with the character of a spectator or witness]. To this he replies:

अश्वसंतव्यासासानिकम् II 969 II

Aph. 161. It [Soul,] is a witness, through its connexion with sense-organs, [which quit it, on liberation].

a. A sense-organ is an organ of sense. Through its connexion therewith, it [Soul,] is a witness. And where is [its] connexion with sense-organs, [these products of Nature (see § 61)], when discrimination [between Nature and Soul] has taken place?

b. [Well, some one may ask], at all times of what nature is Soul? To this he replies:

नित्यमुखालम् II 962 II

1 अत्म: साधिष्ठमुखम्। मात्रविवेकस्यापि साधिष्ठेविनिर्माणयति। अत्काह॥
2 Only Aniruddha recognizes this reading. Vijnána, Nágrá, and Vedánti Mákhevéra have साधिष्ठक। Ed.
3 अश्वसंतव्यासासानिकम्। तस्यव्यासासानिकम्। विवेके च क्रेबुण्यसंवस्थ इति॥
4 सत्तेदा किंतुष्ठासालिति। अताताह॥
5 Vijnána says that this Aphorism and that next following specify notes of Soul which establish that its essential condition is neither

BOOK 1., APH. 163.

The real condition of Soul. Aph. 162. [The nature of Soul is] constant freedom.

a. 'Constant freedom': that is to say; Soul is, positively, always devoid of the Bondage called Pain [see §§ 1 and 15]; because Pain and the rest are modifications of Understanding; [which (see § 61) is a modification of Nature, from which Soul is really distinct].

श्लोदकीमेवचेत्ति II 963 II

Aph. 163. And, finally, [the nature of Soul is] indifference [to Pain and Pleasure, alike].

a. By 'indifference' is meant non-agency. The word iti [rendered 'finally',] implies that the exposition of the Nature of Soul is completed.

b. [Some one may say, the fact of] Soul's being an agent is declared in Scripture. How is this, [if, as you say, it be not an agent]? To this he replies:

of those alluded to in Aph. 160: उभयवर्णवासविद्वेष्य पुरुस्तापोऽविवेकात्वात्म कृहराम्। Ed
1 नित्यमुखालं सदैव पुरुषस्य दुःखाधिक: परिवेक्षनम्। अश्वसंतव्यासासानिकम्। इतिषच:।
2 श्लोदकीमेवचेत्ति। अतिषुष्ठृत्य दृवक्षमैः। तत्कषिष्ठमति। अताताह॥
3 अत्म: कात्तेन भृतयते। तत्कषिष्ठमति। अताताह॥
BOOK I., APOL. 164.

So much, in this Commentary on the illustrious Kapila's Aphorisms declaratory of the Sāṅkhya, for the First Book, that on the [topics or] subject-matter [of the Sāṅkhya system].

न स पुनरावरोधः न स पुनरावरोधः। अवाचनः: व्रतः; इस one of my MSS. The words चेह बी: are obviously a gloss; and I have punctuated accordingly. They are preceded, I take it, by one text, and are followed by another. The source of the first has not been discovered. For what is very similar to the second, see the conclusion of the Chānda- 

स्मृती: चेह अनिरुध्दाः सत्तवर्तमानस्य शास्त्राध्यायः: प्रथमः।

END OF BOOK I.
BOOK II.

a. The subject-matter [of the Institute] has been set forth [in Book I]. Now, in order to prove that it is not the Soul that undergoes the alterations [observable in the course of things], he will tell, very diffusely, in the Second Book, how the creation is formed out of the Primal Principle. There, too, the nature of the products of Nature is to be declared fully, with a view to the very clear discrimination of Soul from these. Therefore, according to [the verses], 1

b. 'Whoso rightly knows its changes, and the Primal Agent [Nature], and Soul, the eternal, he, thirsting no more, is emancipated,'

c. we remark, that, with reference to the character, &c., of Emancipation, all the three [things mentioned in these verses] require to be known. And here, in the first place, with advertence to the consideration, that, if Nature, which is unintelligent, were to create without a motive, we should find even the emancipated one bound, he states the motive for the creation of the world: 2

1 Here add, 'in the Moksha-dharma, &c.;' and read, instead of 'we remark.... Emancipation,' 'there is the declaration that.'

The verses quoted are from the Mahabharata, xii., 7879, and occur in Chap. xxvii., in the Section entitled Moksha-dharma. Ed.

2 शास्त्री विषयं निर्देशित:। सामान्तं पुरुष-स्त्रापरिश्रामितापदात्य प्रकृतिः सृष्टिस्फक्तियामितिविरलेष हितियायाये वक्ष्यति। तथाय

BOOK II., APH. 1.

Aph. 1. Of Nature [the agency, or the being a maker, is] for the emancipation of what is [really, though not apparently] emancipated, or else for [the removal of] itself.

a. The expression 'the being a maker' is borrowed from the last aphorism of the preceding Book. Nature makes the world 'for the sake of removing the pain, which is [really] a shadow [Book I., § 58], belonging to the Soul, which is, in its very nature, free from the bonds of pain; or [to explain it otherwise,] for the sake of removing pain [connected] by means of but a shadowy link; or [on the other hand, it is] 'for the sake of itself,' that is to say, for the sake of removing the actually real pain [which consists] of itself. 1

प्रधानकार्यांतः स्वरूपं विलसरतो वक्तृत्य स्वीकारिण पुरुषस्त्रापरिश्रामितिस्फुटिवचनेषु | अहं एव |
विकारं प्रकृतिः वैव पुरुषं च सनातनम् | तदा यथाविधिजानानि स वितुष्णा विकृत्यते ॥
इति मौलिकमादिशु चयायागेव व्रयवचनम् | ततो चादायवचनायः प्रकृतिनिर्मात्रायाय \\nमुल्लभुपि वन्यप्रसादः इश्वर्येऽजगान्तं प्रयोग-\\
जनमाह ||

1 कार्तिके विश्वामिष्टाये पूर्वायं सृष्टिनालमन्यते। स्व-\\
भावते दुःस्तन्ताहिममूर्द्धयः पुरुषस्य प्रतिविषय-
b. Although experience [of good and ill], also, as well as Emancipation, is a motive for creation, yet Emancipation alone is mentioned, inasmuch as it is the principal one.1

c. But then, if creation were for the sake of Emancipation, then, since Emancipation might take place through creation once for all, there would not be creation again and again; to which he replies:2

विरक्तयो तत्सिद्धे: || 2 ||

Successive creation why.

Aph. 2. Because this [Emancipation] is [only] of him that is void of passion.

a. Emancipation does not take place through creation once for all; but it is [the lot only] of him that has been extremely tormented many times by the various pain of birth, death, sickness, &c.; and, therefore, [successive creation goes on] because Emancipation actually occurs in the case only of him in whom complete dispassion has arisen through the knowledge of the distinctness of Nature and Soul; such is the meaning.3

b. He tells the reason why dispassion does not take place through creation once for all:4

न अवशेषाभावसिद्धिन्दिवसानाय वचनप्रति
स्वभावत्: || 3 ||

Force of the foregoing reason.

Aph. 3. It is not effected by the mere hearing; because of the forcibleness of the impressions' from eternity.

a. Even the hearing [of Scripture, in which the distinctness of Nature from Soul is enounced,] comes [not to all alike, but only] through the merit of acts done in many births, [or successive lives]. Even then dispassion is not established through the mere hearing, but through direct cognition; and direct cognition does not take place suddenly, because of the forcibleness of false impressions that

1 नैकोदा सूदेमाअ्य: किं तु वह जनयमार्ग-यथायदिरिविविधुः त्रेते सत्त्वत्तत्त्व प्रतीत-पुरुषोऽखेदकालोत्तप्तपरेरायन्येव मायात्मिनिसिद्धियथे: ||

2 सकृतस्या चारामयसिद्धे हेतुमाह ||

3 This reading is peculiar to Vijnâna, but seems to have some countenance from Nâgâ. Aniruddha and Vedânti Mâlâkâya have -वासनापुनः च. Ed.

have existed from eternity, but [the required direct cog-
nition takes place] through the completion of Concentration; 
and there is an abundance of obstacles to Concentration 
[see Yoga Aphorisms, Book II]: therefore, only after 
many births do dispassion and Emancipation take place at 
y any time of any one at all: such is the meaning.¹

b. He states another reason for the continuous flow of 
creation:²

बधवृत्यवदा प्रसंसकः ॥ ७ ॥

Aph. 4. Or as people have, severally, 
continue creation.²

a. As householders have, severally, many who are de-
pendent upon them, according to the distinctions of wife, 
children, &c., so, also, the Qualities, viz., Goodness, &c., 
[Book I, § 61: b.] have to emancipate innumerable Souls, 
severally. Therefore, however many Souls may have been 
emanipated, the onflow of creation takes place for the 
emanipation of other Souls; for Souls are [in number] 
without end: such is the meaning. And so the Yoga 
aphorism [Book II, § 22] says: 'Though it have ceased

to be, in respect of him that has done the work, it has not 
[absolutely] ceased to be; because it is common to others 
besides him.'¹

b. But then why is it asserted that Nature alone creates, 
when, by the text, 'From that or this Soul proceeded the 
Ether,³ &c., it is proved that Soul, also, creates? To this 
he replies:³

प्रकृतिवाल्लेचे च पुन्यस्वायत्वाचानासिद्धि: ॥ ५ ॥

Aph. 5. And, since it [the character 
of creator,] belongs, really, to Nature, 
it follows that it is fictitiously attributed 
to Soul.

¹ यथा गृहस्तान्य प्रेयोगः वहते स्याहास्वायत्वाचानासिद्धि: भवति। तत्र
चापि अवश्यासाधच वैराग्यसिद्धि: किं तु साक्षात्कारासकारास्य भूति
तन्मयानां बलवचारिति तु योगानिधिया यथो च
प्रतिवन्धाइत्यसिद्धि। ज्ञोतवधमकिरेव वैराग्यः
राजस्य मानाय कदाचितस्पर्भिति सिद्धतिः। ॥

² दृष्टीपवर्गे हेतुरस्तः ॥

³ तदुपपिर्या उपनिषद्व, ii, 1. But read: 'From this, from 
this same Self,' &c. Ed.

¹ तदुपपिर्या उपनिषद्व, ii, 1. But read: 'From this, from 
this same Self,' &c. Ed.

² तदुपपिर्या उपनिषद्व, ii, 1. But read: 'From this, from 
this same Self,' &c. Ed.
God has given me assurance enough as to the existence of things without me; since, by their different application, I can produce, in myself, both pleasure and pain (artha), which is one great concernment of my present state. These existing products being admitted, the Sāṇkhya argues that they must have a cause; and, as this cause means neither more nor less than something creative, whatever proves the existence of the cause proves, at the same time, its creative character.

b. But then [it may be said], on the alternative [see § 1] that Nature works for herself, she must energize with reference to the emancipated Soul, also. To this he replies:

\[\text{चेतनेहसाधानिम् कर्षकमात्ररत्} II 9 II\]

Who escape nature.

Aph. 7. The rule is with reference to one knowing; just as escape from a thorn.

a. The word chetana here means 'one knowing;' because the derivation is from chid, 'to be conscious.' As one and the same thorn is not a cause of pain to him who, being 'one knowing,' i.e., aware of it, escapes from that same, but actually is so in respect of others; so Nature, also, is escaped by 'one knowing,' one aware, one who has accomplished the matter: to him it does not consist of pain; but to others, who are not knowing, it actually is a cause of pain: such is

\[\text{यैँत एव धार्मिकांक्रमणेऽन्त् प्रकृतवालस्यस्त्रृकतः} II 9 II\]

The last case in which the Prakṛti's activity is explained by the pravartanā as a cause of trouble to others: such is

1 ननु प्रकृते: स्वार्थस्य मुखपूर्वत्त्वात् प्रवृत्ति सा प्रवर्तित I तत्रात् II

1. Aniruddha alone has कार्यततलिङ्गः, which reading Dr. Baillantine at first accepted. Ed.
the 'rule,' meaning, the distribution. Hence, also, of Nature, which is, by its own nature, bound [inasmuch as it consists of bonds], the self-emancipation is possible; so that it does not energize with reference to the emancipated Soul.  

b. But then [suggests some one], what was said [at § 5], that, in respect of Soul, the creative character is only fictitiously attributed, this is not proper; because it is fitting, that, by the conjunction of Nature, Soul, also, should be modified into Mind, &c.; for a modification of wood, &c., resembling earth, &c., through the conjunction of earth, &c., is seen: to which he replies:  

1 चित्रिता संज्ञान दत्त अस्मित्वा चेतनास्वाभावं।
वैशिष्ठण्ड कालं वैशिष्ठिनास्मित्वानाश्च मुच्यते
ते प्रवेयु दु:खात्मकं न भवत्यत्वायत्वमेव
तथा प्रकृतिरीत्य चेतनादिभिक्कृतार्थार्थो चुच्यते
ते प्रवेयु दु:खात्मिका न भवत्यत्वानाभिक्कृतायत्वायत्वमेव
तु दु:खात्मिका भवत्यज्जनित्वे नियमेऽद्वेष्यं।
एतत् स्वभावते ब्रह्मची आपि प्रकृतः स्वाभावः
गलत इति। अतो न मुक्तपुरुषं प्रति प्रवेदत
इति॥

2 ननु पुरुषं सत्त्वमयस्तम्यायत्यति चतुष्कं
तत्र प्रकृतिसंस्यानं पुरुषस्वापि महादिपपरिश्रामणं
मात्रायाहृति हि पृथ्वीदिपायोग्योऽकास्ते:
पृथ्वी-व्याप्तिस्तृष्णः परिश्राम इति। तत्तथा॥

Aph. 8. Even though there be conjunction [of Soul] with the other [viz., Nature], this [power of giving rise to products] does not exist in it immediately; just like the burning action of iron.

a. Even though there be conjunction with Nature, there belongs to Soul no creativeness, 'immediately,' i.e., directly. An illustration of this is, 'like the burning action of iron,' as iron does not possess, directly, a burning power; but this is only fictitiously attributed to it, being through the fire conjoined with it: such is the meaning. But, in the example just mentioned, it is admitted that there is an alteration of both; for this is proved by sense-evidence: but, in the instance under doubt, since the case is accounted for by the modification of one only, there is cumbersomeness in postulating the modification of both; because, otherwise, by the conjunction of the China-rose, it might be held that the colour of the crystal was changed.
b. It has already been stated [§ 1] that the fruit of creation is emancipation. Now he states the principal occasional cause of creation:  

रागचिरागयोयें: सृष्टि: || ९ ||  

Creation when.  
Aph. 9. When there is passion, or dispassion, there is concentration, [in the latter case, and] creation, [in the former].

a. When there is passion, there is creation; and, when there is dispassion, there is 'concentration,' i.e., the abiding [of Soul] in its own nature [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 3]; in short, emancipation, or the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle [Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 2]; such is the meaning. And so the import is, that Passion is the cause of creation; because of their being simultaneously present or absent.

b. After this he begins to state the manner of creation:

1 सृष्टिः फलं माया इति प्रागुक्तम || इदारी सृष्टिमयेऽनिमित्तकरणामाह ||  

2 Ibid infra, p. 211, note 6. Ed.

3 'Simultaneously,' &c., is to render anwayanyatirekau, on which vide supra, p. 43, note 2. Ed.

'रागे सृष्टिवैराग्येच योगः स्वप्नेऽवस्थानां मुक्तिविरिति यावदभवति चिन्तितमनोरेन इत्यथात् तथा चापमयशायरिकावायां रागे सृष्टिकालानिधाया: ||  

'इतः एवं सृष्टिप्रक्षिपं बन्धउसारमथे ||  

Aph. 11. Since creation is for the sake of Soul, the origination of these [products of Nature] is not for their own sake.

a. 'Of these,' i.e., of Mind, &c., since the creativeness is 'for the sake of Soul,' i.e., for the sake of the emancipation of Soul, the 'origination,' i.e., the creativeness, is not for the sake of themselves; since, inasmuch as they are perishable, they [unlike Nature, (see § 1)] are not susceptible of emancipation: such is the meaning.

b. He declares the creation of limited space and time:

1 Nagarsa has, instead of पहचः, च. Ed.

2 सृष्टिरिति पूर्बसूचनादन्तंते ||  

3 विप्रेषमाह ||  

'एवं महदादिना ग्रहणस्यामर्थानस्यस्मार्थान विनाशितेन मायायोगाधिशये: ||  

'खण्डदिक्षालये: सृष्टिसः ||  

'बन्धविनाशात्मानाभिषेक्यां समाधिस्याह ||
peculiar modification: such is the meaning. But they are set forth as identical, because a property and that of which it is the property are indivisible. And it is to be understood, that this Intellect is 'Great,' because it pervades all effects other than itself, and because it is of great power.

b. He mentions other properties, also, of the Great Principle:

Tatkāle paścāt: || 98 ||


a. The meaning is, that Merit, Knowledge, Dispassion, and Supernatural Power, moreover, are formed out of intellect, not formed of self-consciousness (ahankāra), &c.; because intellect alone [and not self-consciousness] is a product of superlative Purity, [without admixture of Passion and Darkness].

1 See, for a different rendering, the Rational Rejutation, &c., p. 46. Ed.

2 Mahattātma prabhavayā bhūṣṇitaḥ. Adbhutāstvat niruddhāstvaśādārāni viniścayaśā: āksharaṁ bhūṣṇitaṁ  
svetāsmin kartāyaṃ bhūṣṇitaṁ mohenaṁ.  

3 Mahattātma parādhyā dharmāt.  

4 From copying a typographical error, Dr. Ballantyne had, in both his editions, dharmādhi. Ed.
b. But then, if it be thus, how can the prevalence of
demersit, in the portions of intellect lodged in men, cattle,
&c., be accounted for? To this he replies:

Mahaparagadhiritaam  || 15 ||

Aph. 15. The Great one [intellect,]
becomes reversed through tincture.

a. That same 'Great one,' i.e., the Great Principle [or
intellect], through being tinged with Passion and Dark-
ness, also becomes reversed [see § 14. a.], i.e., vile, with
the properties of Demerit, Ignorance, Non-dispassion, and
want of Supernatural Power: such is the meaning.

b. Having characterised the Great Principle, he defines
its product, Self-consciousness:

Bhimaalodhushkar:  ||  96  ||

Self-consciousness.

Aph. 16. Self-consciousness is a
conceit.

a. 'Self-consciousness' is what makes the Ego, as a
potter [makes a pot]; the thing [called] the internal
instrument (antah-karana): and this, inasmuch as a pro-
erty and that of which it is the property are indivisible,
is spoken of as 'a conceit,' [viz., of personality], in order
to acquaint us that this is its peculiar modification. Only
when a thing has been determined by intellect [i.e., by an
act of judgment (see § 13. a.)], do the making of an Ego
and the making of a Meum take place.

b. He mentions the product of Self-consciousness, which
has arrived in order:

Akadashapatanam  ||  99  ||

Product of Self-con-
csciousness.

Aph. 17. The product of it [viz., of
Self-consciousness,] is the eleven [or-
gans], and the five Subtile Elements.

a. The meaning is, that the eleven organs, with the

1 For another version, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 45.

Ed.

2 Yeh kartotheeya: kumakaravat: karek-
dhrtya: c dharmapriyamadadabhimana. spyakurisahara-
kaubhurita souchanay. Buda nishchit evaamah.

3 Skamagatamaharsivam karya mahah  ||
five Subtile Elements, viz., Sound, &c., are the product of Self-consciousness.¹

b. Among these, moreover, he mentions a distinction:²

The Mind whence.

Aph. 18. The eleventh, consisting of [the principle of] Purity, proceeds from modified Self-consciousness.

a. The 'eleventh,' i.e., the completer of the eleven, viz., Mind, [or the 'internal organ,'—which is not to be confounded with 'the Great one,' called also Intellect and Mind,—alone,] among the set consisting of sixteen [§ 17], consists of Purity; therefore it is produced from Self-consciousness 'modified,' i.e., pure: such is the meaning. And hence, too, it is to be reckoned that the ten organs are from the Passionate Self-consciousness; and the Subtile Elements, from the Dark Self-consciousness.³

b. He exhibits the eleven organs:⁴

1. संयमकल्याणी बश्रायतवत्तमां चाहीं-कारस्य कार्येित्वर्ये: ॥
2. अन्तगति विग्रहसाथ् ॥
3. एकादशान्मथ पूर्वमेक्कादशाम मन: घोड़स्मेक्कादशाम शतात्मलुक शतात्मलुकाकारान्त इत्यतः: ॥ अतः राजसांहकारां श्रद्धेयार्थी तामसांहकारार्थवात्तकल्यम् ॥
4. एकादशशिवापूर्व दश्ययति ॥

Of the Organs.

Aph. 19. Along with the organs of action and the organs of understanding another is the eleventh.

a. The organs of action are five, viz., the vocal organ, the hands, the feet, the anus, and the generative organ; and, the organs of understanding are five, those called the organs of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. Along with these ten, 'another,' viz., Mind, is 'the eleventh,' i.e., is the eleventh organ: such is the meaning.

b. He refutes the opinion that the Organs are formed of the Elements:²

एतेन राज्यसम्मति मन्तनासामकोकल्याणीमित्रवे: ॥
2. टक्कूकातिस्मत निराकरिति ॥
3. शाश्वेतानुप ॥
4. एतेन राज्यसम्मति मन्तनासामकोकल्याणीमित्रवे: ॥
5. टक्कूकातिस्मत निराकरिति ॥
6. शाश्वेतानुप ॥
Aph. 21. The Scripture regarding absorption into deities is not declaratory of an originator.

a. That Scripture which there is about absorption into deities is not of an originator; that is to say, it does not refer to an originator; because although a thing, e.g., a jar, when it ceases to be a jar, is usually spoken of as being resolved into its originator, viz., into earth, yet we see the absorption of a drop of water into what, nevertheless, is not its originator, viz., the ground; [and such is the absorption into a deity from whom the Mind absorbed did not originally emanate].

b. Some say that the Mind, included among the organs, is eternal. He repels this.

Aph. 22. [None of the organs is eternal, as some hold the Mind to be:] because we have Scripture for their beginning to be, and because we see their destruction.

a. All these organs, without exception, have a beginning; for the Scripture says, “From this are produced the vital air, the mind, and all the organs;” &c., and because we are certified of their destruction by the fact that, in the conditions of being aged, &c., the mind, also, like the sight and the rest, decays, &c.: such is the meaning.

b. He rebuts the atheistical opinion that the sense [for example] is merely the set of eye-balls, &c.: 1

1 Aniruddha has, instead of भूति: भूतेत विनाश। His comment is as follows: कारणों कार्यार्थक इति स्वितम्भ शाक-दिल्लाम च चाचुरा खा-मक्खनामन्त्री भूतस्वरुण्य भार-त्तनित तितिति। Ed.

2 देवतासु या लयभूति: सा नारम्भकम्य ना-रमकावितायैगुणायीयांनामकस्य भूतस्व जल-विवेदोलंदशय्यां।

3 इति भाषायां भूते नियमिति बहिच्छ। तत्साधिकर्ता।

4 तंत्रगोरुपेभ्यर्द्यस्मान्तिन्तात्सिन्तात्ममपि

5 This is taken from my edition, where, however, it is corrected in the corrigenda. See the next two notes. Ed.
Aph. 23. The Sense is supersensuous; it being the notion of mistaken persons [that the sense exists] in [identity with] its site.

a. Every Sense is supersensuous, and not perceptible; but only in the opinion of mistaken persons does the Sense exist 'in its site,' e.g., [Sight] in the eye-ball, in the condition of identity [with the eye-ball]: such is the meaning. The correct reading is: ['The sense is something supersensuous; to confound it with] the site,'¹

b. He rebuts the opinion that one single Sense, through diversity of powers, performs various offices.²

Aph. 24. Moreover, a difference being established if a difference of powers be [conceded], there is not a oneness [of the organs].

a. Even by the admission that a diversity of powers belongs to one single organ, the diversity of organs is established; because the powers are, assuredly, organs; therefore, there is not a singleness of organ: such is the meaning.¹

b. But then [it may be said], there is something unphilosophical in supposing various kinds of organs to arise from one single Self-consciousness. To this he replies:²

न कल्याणविरोधः प्रमाणाद्विद्ययः ॥ २५ ॥

Aph. 25. A theoretical discordance is not [of any weight] in the case of what is matter of ocular evidence.

a. This is simple.³

b. He tells us that, of the single leading organ, the Mind, the other ten are kinds of powers.⁴

¹ इद्द्रयं सबमतीद्रयं नतु प्रत्यक्षं भाल्मयं नामेव लघुधानं गोलकं तादाद्वेतन्द्रयर्मितवर्म्यं।
संधिक्ष्यगतेऽन्तस्माथियः ॥

² The original of this shows that Vijnana emphasizes अधिःक्षण in the true reading. He seems to point to अधिःक्षण, which Aniruddha Lua, and, after him, Vedant Mahadeva. Ed.

³ एकाचेविद्रयं शक्तिपद्गः अल्पकायेयंकायांक्ति मतमपकारोति ॥

⁴ The theoretical consideration here cannot upset facts.

⁵ एकाचेव मुख्यद्विद्ययं मनोव्यये दश शक्ति

⁶ नवेद्वयं कारानाविद्ययोत्पदायतिक्तया नायां ज्ञायिकः ॥ तत्राह ॥

⁷ Nagesis is peculiar in having प्रमाणाद्विद्ययः Ed.

⁸ सुगमः ॥

⁹ एकाचेव मुख्यद्विद्ययं मनोव्यये दश शक्ति

¹⁰ एकाचेव इत्यह ॥
b. He mentions the object of the organs ofintellection and of action: 1

b. By reason of the varieties oftransformation of [which] the Qualities [are susceptible], there is a diversity of [their product, the Mind,] according to circumstances.

a. As one single man supports a variety of characters, through the force of association,—being, through association with his beloved, a lover; through association with one indifferent, indifferent; and, through association with some other, something other,—so the Mind, also, through association with the organ of vision, or any other, becomes various, from its becoming one with the organ of vision, or any other; by its being thereby distinguished by the modification of seeing, or the like. The argument in support of this is, 'of the Qualities,' &c.; the meaning being, because of the adaptability of the Qualities, Goodness, &c., to varieties of transformation. 4

1 All the commentators but Vijnana insert च. Ed.

2 Aniruddha reads, in lieu of -मस्त, -वगो Ed

3 शरस्तान मल: पुरुषार्द्ध: ॥

4 विश्रेत्वे येनापकारिण्यमीत्येदिन्याशिस्वयम: ॥

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b. He mentions the object of the organs ofintellection and of action: 1

न्यायदरम्यमल: उमया: ॥ २५ ॥

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4 विश्रेत्वे येनापकारिण्यमीत्येदिन्याशिस्वयम: ॥

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BOOK II, APH. 31.

a. The aspect of Intelect is attention; of Self-consciousness, conceit [of personality]; of the Mind, decision and doubt.

b. He mentions, also, a common aspect of the three:

सामान्यकर्मावृत्ति: प्राणायां वायुः पञ्च पञ्च || 31 ||

Aph. 31. The five airs, viz., Breath, &c., are the modification, in common, of the [three internal] instruments.

a. That is to say: the five, in the shape of Breath, &c., which are familiarly known as 'airs', because of their circulating as the air does, these [animal spirits] are the joint or common 'modification,' or kinds of altered form, 'of the instruments,' i.e., of the triad of internal instruments.

b. The opinion is not ours, as it is that of the Vaiseski-
kas, that the modifications of the organs take place successively only, and not simultaneously. So he says: 1

अभ्यास-सहित्य-विद्युति: || 32 ||

Aph. 32. The modifications of the organs take place both successively and simultaneously.

a. This is simple. 2

b. Lumping the modifications of the understanding, with a view to showing how they are the cause of the world, he, in the first place, exhibits [them]. 3

चतुर्भ: पञ्चतय: िन्द्राक्षिण: || 33 ||

The ideas which constitute the world.

Aph. 33. The modifications [of the understanding, which are to be shown to be the cause of the world, and which are of five kinds, are [some of them,] painful and [others] not painful.

1 देशिकारामास्मां नाये नियमो यदिनिर्युवृति: अमेरिक भवति नैकेद्यह ||

2 सुगमम ||

3 पिसीकूलवर्जनूर्णी: संसारनिदानतात्रत्रिय-पाद्यार्थमादि दश्य्यति ||

a. That the modifications are of five sorts is declared by Patanjali's aphorism, 1 [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 6 7]

b. He acquaints [us] with the nature of Soul. 2

तत्वविद्विद्यवायायाचार: स्वर्य: || 38 ||

Aph. 34. On the cessation thereof [viz., of mundane influences], its tincture ceasing, it [Soul] abides in itself.

a. That is to say: during the state of repose of these modifications, it [the Soul], the reflexion of these having ceased, is abiding in itself; being, at other times, also, as it were, in isolation, [though seemingly not so]. And to this effect there is a triad of Aphorisms of the Yoga, 1 [viz., Book I., §§ 2, 3, and 4].

1 वृत्तिनां पञ्चप्रकार यात्र निदानो यदि-निर्युवृति: 1

2 Namely: प्रमाणविवर्त्यविकल्पननिदानस्तत्त्त्यः ।

3 पुरुषस्य स्वर्यः परिचायति ॥

4 I. e., 'influence', as in Aph. 15, at p. 198, supra. Ed.

5 तासो वृत्तिनां विरामश्चायां शालतप्रतिविभवक: स्वर्यः भवति कैवल्य इवान्यद्याविच: ।

6 योगशिवविवृत्तिनिरोधः । 'Concentration (yoga) is the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle.' तदा

7 दृष्ट: स्वर्येष्वत्स्यनाम । 'Then [i.e., at the time of Con-
b. He explains this by an illustration: 1

कुमुमवच भिष्ण: ॥ ३५ ॥

This illustrated.

Aph. 35. And as [by] a flower, the gem.

a. The ‘and’ implies that this is the reason [of what was asserted in the preceding aphorism]; the meaning being, as the gem [is tinged, apparently,] by a flower. As the gem called rock-crystal, by reason of a flower of the Hibiscus, becomes red, not abiding in its own state, and, on the removal thereof, becomes colourless, abiding in its own state, in like manner 2 [is the Soul apparently tinged by the adjunction of the Qualities].

b. But then [it may be asked], by whose effort does the aggregate of the organs come into operation; since Soul is motionless, and since it is denied 3 that there is any Lord [or Demiurgus]? To this he replies: 4

|cen|tration,] it [the Soul,] abides in the form of the spectator [without a spectator]. 5 वृत्तिसाधनमिति । \[At other times [than that of Concentration] it [the Soul,] is in the same form as the modifications [of the internal organ].\] Dr. Ballantyne’s translation is here quoted.  Ed.

1 एतदेव दृष्टान्तेन विवेद्यो ॥
2 चकारो हेता कुमुमेन्व मणिसिंहः । यथा जपाकृमेन स्फाटिकमण्डी रक्तोस्वस्यः भवति तद्वृत्तौ च रागशुमः स्वतः भवति तद्वृत्तिदेव ॥
3 * Demurred to ‘is preferable. Vide supra, p. 112. Ed.
4 ननु कस्य प्रयत्न स्कर्षान्तं प्रवत्तितां पुरुषार्थस्य प्रतिपन्नादिदित ॥

b. He mentions an instance of a thing’s spontaneously energizing for the sake of another: 6

धनुकविकाय ॥ ३९ ॥

An illustration.

Aph. 37. As the cow for the calf.

a. As the cow, for the sake of the calf, quite spontaneously secretes milk, and awaits no other effort, just so, for the sake of the master, Soul, the Organs energize quite spontaneously: such is the meaning. And it is said, that:

प्य कृत्य वादादीवर्त्तय च प्रतिपन्नादिदित ॥

1 प्रधान प्रवृत्तिस्वस्य कर्षोद्भव: कर्षानां प्रवृत्तिरिपुष्पस्याधारिष्यकर्षं भवती वर्त्तयः ॥
2 चापसः चापसः ॥
3 परार्थ चतुष्ट: द्वृत्ती दृष्टान्तमाह ॥
out of profound sleep, the understanding of its own accord wakes up.\(^1\)

\(\delta\). With reference to the question, how many Organs there are, external and internal combined, he says: \(^4\)

\text{करणं च योदशविधमवाल्लर्मेदात्} || 38 ||

The number of the Organs. \(\text{Aph. 38. Organ is of thirteen sorts, through division of the subordinates.}\)

\(\alpha\). The triad of internal organs, and the ten external organs, combined, are thirteen. He says 'sorts,' in order to declare that, of these, moreover, there is an infinity, through [their] distinction into individuals. He says 'through division of the subordinates,' with a reference to the fact, that it is understanding which is the principal organ; the meaning being, because the organs [or functions, of the single organ, called understanding, are more than one.\(^4\)

\text{इदिर्ययुः साधकतमकुर्मगीयोगाधारवत्} || 39 ||

Efficiency of the Organs whence. \(\text{Aph. 39. Because the quality of being most efficient is conjoined with the organs; as in the case of an axe.}\)

\(\alpha\). The quality of the [principal] organ, the understanding, in the shape of being most efficient on behalf of soul, exists, derivatively, in the [other derivative] organs. Therefore it is made out that an organ is of thirteen kinds: such is the connexion with the preceding aphorism.\(^1\)

\text{चयोदश्} तेष्विपि व्यक्तिमेतदेनानन्यं प्रतिपादयितु विधिमित्रुक्तम् बुधिरिव मुख्यं कारणमितातिशेष वेनानीकाल्लर्मेदाति द्वितियस्युक्तिः कारणानामसंकेतवादित्ययेः. ||

\(^1\) Instead of 'in this case,' &c., read, 'what is the character of these [i.e., organs]?' \textit{Ed.}

\(^2\) नन्तु बुधिरिव पुष्पवासमथवाकवानमुख्यं कारणानामसंकेतवादित्ययेऽब खः खः तथा को गुणं इत्याकाव्यामामः. ||

\(^3\) इदिर्ययुः पुष्पवाससाधकतमविवृध्यं करणस्य
b. ‘As in the case of an axe.’ As, although the blow itself, since it is this that puts an end to our non-possession of the result, is the principal efficient in the cutting, yet the axe, also, is an efficient, because of its close proximity to the quality of being the principal efficient, so [here, also]: such is the meaning. He does not here say that Self-consciousness is secondarily efficient, meaning to imply that it is one with the internal organ.  

c. Specifying the precise state of the case in regard to the condition of secondary and principal, he says:  

Aph. 40. Among the two [the external and the internal organs], the principal is Mind; just as, in the world, among troops of dependants.

a. ‘Among the two,’ viz., the external and the internal, Mind,’ i.e., understanding, simply, is ‘the principal,’ i.e.,

Aph. 41. [And Intellect is the principal, or immediate and direct, efficient in Soul’s emancipation;] because there is no wandering away.

a. That is to say: because it [understanding] per-
vades all the organs; or because there is no result apart from it.  

**तथाशिशसस्मकाराधारतः** || 82 ||

Another reason. **Aph. 42.** So, too, because it [the understanding] is the depository of all self-continuant impressions.

a. Understanding alone is the depository of all self-continuant impressions, and not the Sight, &c., or Self-consciousness, or the Mind; else it could not happen that things formerly seen, and heard, &c., would be remembered by the blind, and deaf, &c.  

**स्मृतानुमानान्तः** || 83 ||

Another reason. **Aph. 43.** And because we infer this [its preeminence] by reason of its meditating.

a. That is to say: and because we infer its preeminence, 'by reason of its meditating,' i.e., its modification in the shape of meditation. For the modification of thought called 'meditation' is the noblest of all the modifications [incident to Soul, or pure Thought, whose blessedness, or state of emancipation, it is to have no modification at all]; and the Understanding itself, which, as being the depository thereof, is, further, named Thought [chitta, from the

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1. The two words are, respectively, from *chit* and *chintā*, which are cognates. *Ed.*

2. स्मृताचित्ताः चित्ताच्युत्ताः क्रमांकः प्रधानाः स्मृतलीकरणासः पूर्वव्यवस्थाः स्मृताभिधिरि: स्मरणानुपत्ति:।

3. नन्यः चित्ताच्युत्तः पुरुषशेषवातः। ततः।

'स्त्र्य: पुरुषस्य स्मृतिनं सम्भवेत्तर्भनिः।' ||

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Book II, Aph. 44. It cannot be of its own nature.

b. But then, suppose that the modification 'meditation' belongs only to the Soul, [suggests some one]. To this he replies:  

**संभवेऽस्तः** || 88 ||

*Meditation not essential to Soul.* **Aph. 44.** It cannot be of its own nature.

a. That is to say: meditation cannot belong to Soul essentially; because of the immobility* [of Soul]; whereas 'meditation' is an effort.

b. But then, if thus the preeminence belongs to understanding alone, how was it said before [at §26.] that it is the Mind that takes the nature of both [sets of organs, in
apparent contradiction to the view propounded at § 36? To this he replies:

Aph. 46. The condition [as regards Soul's instruments,] of secondary and principal is relative; because of the difference of function.

a. In respect to the difference of function, the condition, as secondary, or principal, of the instruments [of Soul] is relative. In the operations of the Sight, &c., the Mind is principal; and, in the operation of the Mind, Self-consciousness, and, in the operation of Self-consciousness, Intellect, is principal [or precedent].

b. But then, what is the cause of this arrangement; viz., that of this [or that] Soul, this [or that] Intellect, alone, and not another Intellect, is the instrument? With reference to this, he says:

Aph. 46. The energizing [of this or that Intellect] is for the sake of this [or that] Soul; because of [its] having been purchased by the works [or deserts] of this [or that] Soul; just as in the world.

a. The meaning is, that, 'the energizing,' i.e., all operation, of the instrument is for the sake of this [or that] Soul; because of [its] having been purchased by this [or that] Soul's works [or deserts]; just as in the world. As, in the world [or in ordinary affairs], whatever axe, or the like, has been purchased by the act, e.g., of buying, by whatever man, the operation of that [axe, or the like], such as cleaving, is only for the sake of that man [who purchased it]: such is the meaning. The import is, that therefore from is the distributive allotment of instruments [inquired about under § 45. b.]

b. Although there is no act in Soul, because it is im-

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1. Nāgėśa differs from all the other commentators in reading एक्षमपि चेष्टा. Ed.

"तत् pervasive सिखराक्षरस्त तत् प्रेयवेशभवित साधनारं भवित लोकविद्ययथयः। उष्म लोक्य येन पुलश्त्र कयादिकप्रमयिताः यः कुडारशीश्चिदुवशिष्येतेऽवज्ज्ञस्तहि तस्य चिदाधिशापि इत्यः। ऋषति: कर्मण्यवस्तेति भवः।"
movable, still, since it is the means of Soul's experience, it is called the act of Soul; just like the victories, &c., of a king [which are, really, the acts of his servants]; because of Soul's being the owner [of the results of acts; as the king is of the results of the actions of his troops].

c. In order to make clear the chiefship of Intellect, he sums up, [as follows]:

समानकर्म्यं बुधं प्राधान्यं लोकवल्लो-क्वत्।

SUMMING UP.

Aph. 47. Admitting that they [the various instruments of Soul, all] equally act, the preeminence belongs to Intellect; just as in the world, just as in the world.

a. Although the action of all the instruments is the same, in being for the sake of Soul, still the preeminence belongs to Intellect alone; just as in the world. The meaning is, because it is just as the preeminence, in the world, belongs to the prime minister, among the rulers of towns, and the rest, even although there be no difference so far as regards their being [all alike workers] for the sake of the king. Therefore, in all the Institutes, Intellect alone is celebrated as 'the Great One.' The repetition

1 यथैष पुरुषार्थं समान एव सर्वेणान्तः कर-शानां स्वायर्थार्थं बुधं एव प्राधान्यं लोकवल्लो-क्वत्।

2 बुधं प्राधान्यं प्रकटत्तेऽपि उपसंहृति॥
BOOK III.

a. In the next place, the gross product of Nature, viz., the great elements and the dyad of bodies, is to be described; and, after that, the going to various wombs, and the like; [this description being given] with a view to that less perfect degree of dispassionateness which is the cause of one's engaging upon the means of knowledge; and, after that, with a view to perfect freedom from passion, all the means of knowledge are to be told: so the Third [Book] commences: ¹

श्रविशेषायिषयारम्भः || ७ ||

The elements whence.

The origin of the diversified [world of sense] is from that which has no difference.

a. 'Which has no difference,' i.e., that in which there exists not a distinction, in the shape of calmness, fierceness, dulness, &c., viz., the Subtile Elements, called 'the five somethings, simply;' from this [set of five] is the origina-

¹ नासित विशेषः शास्त्रधारामुद्वादिकृतृपय वर्ण-व्यावहारः शतरूपाना पञ्चत्तन्त्राय महाभूतनामारम् इत्यादि: || सूचित गात्रमका हि शान्तिदिकृता शून्यबोधितेन तारत्मादिकित्वत्वम् न सूचितेन तथा शान्तिदिक्पतितेन योगिक्षित-शोभित: ||

² तदेव पूवाध्यायायथ चयोनिविषितत्वानामुल्यत्िमुक्ता तस्माच्छरीर्वैयोत्तिमाह ||
there is the origination of the pair of Bodies, the Gross [Body] and the Subtile: such is the meaning. 1

b. Now he proves that mundane existence could not be accounted for otherwise than on the ground of the twenty-three Principles. 2

तदीजासस्तृति: || 3 ||

Aph. 3. From the seed thereof is mundane existence.

a. 'Thereof,' i.e., of the Body; 'from the seed,' i.e., from the Subtile one, as its cause, in the shape of the twenty-three Principles, is 'mundane existence,' i.e., the going and coming of Soul take place; for it is impossible that, of itself, there should be a going, &c., of that which, in virtue of [its] all-pervadingness, is immovable: such is the meaning. For Soul, being conditioned by the twenty-three Principles, only by means of that investment migrates from Body to Body, with a view to experiencing the fruits of previous works. 3

b. He states the reason of this. 4

उपेन्द्रादितरस्य || 5 ||

The reason of this. 5

Aph. 5. Because of [the necessity of] the other's experiencing.

a. The meaning is: because of the necessity that the

b. He states, also, the limit of mundane existence. 1

मन्दौन्तमविषेषाष्टम॥ ८ ॥

Aph. 4. And, till there is discrimination, there is the energizing of these, which have no difference.

a. The meaning is, that, of all Souls whatsoever, void of the differences of being Lord, or not Lord, &c., [though, seemingly, possessed of such differences.] 'energizing,' i.e., mundane existence, is inevitable, even till there is discrimination [of Soul from its seeming investments]; and it does not continue after that. 3

b. He states the reason of this. 3

चयोविषितात्रदेविश्रयो हि प्रहसनेौपाधिना पुरुषकृतकर्मभागार्थे देहांहें ससरति ||

Aph. 6. Because of the necessity of the other's experiencing.

a. The meaning is: because of the necessity that the

b. He states, also, the limit of mundane existence. 1

श्वसनीवक्षानामात्रविश्रयत्रानां सर्वसामेव पुषां विशिष्टपर्यंतमेव प्रवर्तनं संस्मृतिराच्छायी

b. He states the reason of this. 3

तत्र हृतमाह ||
other, i.e., that that very [Soul], which does not discriminate, should experience the fruit of its own [reputed] acts.¹

b. He states, that, even while there is a Body, during the time of mundane existence, fruition [really] is not.²

a. The Gross one arises from father and mother, 'usually,' i.e., for the most part; for there is mention also of a Gross Body not born of a womb: and 'the other,' i.e., the Subtle Body, is 'not so,' i.e., does not arise from a father and mother; because it arises from creation, &c.: such is the meaning.¹

b. He decides [the question], through disguise by which one of the Bodies, Gross and Subtle, the conjunction of the pairs [pleasure and pain, &c.] with Soul takes place.³

**Aph. 6.** It [Soul] is now quite free from both.

a. 'Now,' i.e., during the time of mundane existence, Soul is quite free from both, i.e., from the pairs, viz., cold and heat, pleasure and pain, &c.: such is the meaning.¹

b. He next proceeds to describe, separately, the dyad of Bodies.⁴

**Aph. 7.** The Gross [Body] usually arises from father and mother; the other one is not so.

**Aph. 8.** To that which arose antecedently it belongs to be that whose result is this; because it is to the one that there belongs fruition, not to the other.

a. 'To be that whose result is this,' i.e., to have pleasure and pain as its effect [reflected in Soul], belongs to that Subtle Body alone whose origin was 'antecedent,' i.e., at the commencement of the creation [or annus magnus]. Why? Because the fruition of what is called pleasure and pain belongs only to 'the one,' i.e., the Subtle Body, but not to 'the other,' i.e., the Gross Body; because all are

¹ समर्थवाचेकिक्यं एव स्त्रीयक्षरोभेगाव-प्रभवावादित्वयं: ॥
² देहस्वरुपं समस्ततिकलाये सोगो नातसीयवः ॥
³ Aniruddha has परिष्करन्त, and comments accordingly. Ed.
⁴ संस्मर्थसंस्मृतिकलायेपुष्पो दाम्यां शीतांश-मुखाद्विन्दृत्व: परिशुक्लो भवतीत्वः ॥
⁵ शतं: परं शरीरं विशिष्यं वच्छमुपक्रमते ॥

**Sanskrit**

"स्मातपितृं ग्राम्यशा वाङ्के निद्धे समनि-वस्मायिन्यं स्माःशरीररूप समस्माधिततरं सुस्मशरीरं न तथा न स्मातपितृं समाश्रयं समाश्रयादित्वं: ॥

"स्मातस्मार्गशिरे मंडायेक्षिमपाधिक्यं पुष्पस्म इतः गात्रद्वारादिशयति।"
agreed that there is neither pleasure nor pain, &c., in a body of earth: such is the meaning.1

b. He tells the nature of the Subtile Body just mentioned:2

सप्तशास्त्रं लिङ्गम || ॥

The Subtile Body composed of the seventeen, as one, are the Subtile Body.

a. The Subtile Body, further, through its being container and contained, is twofold. Here the seventeen, [presently mentioned,] mingled, are the Subtile Body; and that, at the beginning of a creation, is but one; in the shape of an aggregate; [as the forest, the aggregate of many trees, is but one]: such is the meaning. The seventeen are the eleven organs, the five Subtile Elements, and Understanding. Self-consciousness is included under Understanding.3

b. But [one may ask,] if the Subtile Body be one, how can there be diverse experiences accordingly as Souls are [numerically] distinct, [one from another]? To this he replies:4

यथितत्त्वं कर्मविशेषात् || ॥

How there come to be individuals.

Aph. 10. There is distinction of individuals, through diversity of desert.

a. Although, at the beginning of the creation [or annus magnus], there was but one Subtile Body, in the shape of that investment [of Soul (see Vedānta-vāna, § 62, named) Hiranyagarbha, still, subsequently, moreover, there becomes a division of it into individuals,—a plurality, partitively, in the shape of individuals;—as, at present, there is, of the one Subtile Body of a father, a plurality, partitively, in the shape of the Subtile Body of son, daughter, &c. He tells the cause of this, saying, 'through diversity of desert;' meaning, through actions, &c., which are causes of the experiences of other animal souls.5

1 नन्दलिङ्गचेदेतेन तह्यं कष पुष्पन्वेदन विल-वध्यात भोगां स्मुः || तचाह ||

2 यदापि समादी हिरण्यमोहाधिकामेकेव लिङ्गव तथापि तथं पुष्पान्वेदात् कर्मविशेषां-शतानालम्य भवति यथानामकम्य पितृ-लिङ्गादेहस्य नानालम्यस्तो भवति पुष्पान्वित-लिङ्गादेहस्य || तचा कारणामाह कर्मविशेषार्थं जीवानार्थां भेदाभिहृदार्थः ||

3 See, for another rendering, the Rational Refutation, &c., p.36. Ed.
b. But then, on this showing, since the Subtile one alone, from its being the site of fruition, is [what ought to be denoted by the term] Body, how is the term Body applied to the Gross one? To this he replies:¹

तदपित्रकारणे देहे तटात्तत्त्वाधूऽः ॥ ५७ ॥

Aph. 11. From its being applied to it, [viz., to the Subtile one], it is applied to the Body, which is the tabernacle of the abiding thereof.

a. But then, what proof is there of another body,—other than the one consisting of the six sheaths,—serving as a tabernacle for the Subtile Body? With reference to this, he says:²

न स्वतःस्वादृढ़तः ज्ञायविशिष्टवच्च ॥ ५७ ॥

Aph. 12. Not independently [can the Subtile Body exist], without that [Gross Body]; just like a shadow and a picture.

a. That is to say: the Subtile Body does not stand independently, 'without that,' i.e., without a support; as a shadow, or as a picture, does not stand without a support. And so, having abandoned a Gross Body, in order to go

to another world, it is settled that the Subtile Body takes another body, to serve as its tabernacle: such is the import.¹

b. But then [it may be said], of the Subtile Body, since it is limited substance, as the Air, or the like, let the Ether [or Space], without [its] being attached [to anything], be the site: it is purposeless to suppose [its] attachment to anything else. To this he replies:³

मूर्त्तिभूति न स्वात्योगास्तरिषितव् ॥ ५८ ॥

Aph. 13. No, even though it be limited; because of [its] association with masses; just like the sun.

a. Though it be limited, it does not abide independently, without association; for, since, just like the sun, it consists of light, it is inferred to be associated with a mass: such is the meaning. All lights, the sun and the rest, are seen only under the circumstances of association [of the luminiferous imponderable] with earthy substances; and the Subtile Body

¹ तदविश्रायम् तद्वेदधिश्यां विना स्वातः मथ तिष्ठति यथा हाया निराधारा न तिष्ठति यथा वा निराधिन्ययः । तथा च स्थूलस्य तिष्ठति देहा लोकातिरिक्त रत्नादिक्षमयाश्वासर्वते शरारत्नार्थिः सिद्धार्थी भवेः ॥

² ननु मूर्त्तिभूतिः वायुदेविः लिङ्गयोक्ष्मानं स्मितां शरारत्नार्थिः सिद्धार्थी । तच्छहः ॥
consists of 'Purity,' which is Light; therefore it must be associated with the Elements.\footnote{1}

b. He determines the magnitude of the Subtile Body:\footnote{3}

\begin{quote}
\textit{तद्भवमयनमुखः} \hspace{1cm} \textit{श्री} \hspace{1cm} \textit{मुनि} \hspace{1cm} \textit{न} \hspace{1cm} \textit{साताक्ष्यादस्त्रमश्वार्यां} \hspace{1cm} \textit{प्र-}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{कष्टमत्तमानू} \hspace{1cm} \textit{सुभस्यै} \hspace{1cm} \textit{सद्धतस्मातुमानादिदिताथ्यपे} \hspace{1cm} \textit{रूपान्तरमामिनि} \hspace{1cm} \textit{तेजस्ते} \hspace{1cm} \textit{लिङ्गः} \hspace{1cm} \textit{सत्रढारसमयम्} \hspace{1cm} \textit{अथ} \hspace{1cm} \textit{मूतसक्रमतनिति} \hspace{1cm} \textit{॥}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{लिङ्गः परिमाणमिहारवति} \hspace{1cm} \textit{॥}
\end{quote}

\footnote{1} The reading \textit{तस्तितथं} in which Vijnana remarks, is accepted by Nagesa.

\footnote{3} Aniruddha is singular in here inserting, as an Aphorism: \textit{व्याप्तचार्य्य प्रपल्लित इति} \hspace{1cm} \textit{।\textit{\textit{Ed.}}}

\footnote{3} Aniruddha and Nagesa omit the word \textit{च}. \hspace{1cm} \textit{।\textit{\textit{Ed.}}}

\footnote{1} That is to say: it, viz., the Subtile Body, cannot be all-pervading; because there is Scripture for its being partially formed of food; for, if it were all-pervading, it would be eternal. Although Mind, &c., are not formed of the Elements, still it is to be understood that they are spoken of as formed of food, &c.; because they are filled with homogeneous particles, through contact with food;\footnote{4} as the light of a lamp is supplied by contact with the oil.

b. For what purpose is the mundane existence, the migrating from one body to another [Gross] body, of Sub-
tile Bodies, which are unintelligent? With reference to this, he says:1

पुस्पवार्षिकसंस्तितिलिङ्गानां सूपकारवद्राज्ञः || ९६ ||

Aph. 16. The mundane existence of Subtle Bodies is for the sake of Soul; just like a king's cooks.

a. That is to say: as the cooks of a king frequent the kitchens for the sake of the king, so the Subtle Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul.2

b. The Subtle Body has been discussed in respect of all its peculiarities. He now likewise discusses the Gross Body, also:3

पाशभूतिको देहः || ९७ ||

The Gross Body

Aph. 17. The Body consists of the five elements.

a. That is to say: the Body is a modification of the five elements mingled.1

b. He mentions another opinion:2

चातुरंतितिकालिः के || ९८ ||

Another opinion. Aph. 18. Some say it consists of four elements.

a. This is alleged with the import that the Ether does not originate3 [anything].

एकभूतिकालिः के || ९९ ||

Another opinion. Aph. 19. Others say that it consists of one element.

a. The import is, that the body is of Earth only, and the other elements are merely supporters. Or 'of one element' means, of one or other element.4 [see the Rosicrucian doctrine in the Tarka-sangraha, § 13., &c.].

1 अचेतनानां लिङ्गानां किम्बथं संस्तितिद्वाद-हानरसः चार इयास्वायामाहे ||

2 यथा राज्ञः सूपकाराध्यां पाकशालामु संचारो राजाथे तथा लिङ्गश्रीराध्यां संस्ति: पुरस्वार्ष-मित्यर्थः. ||

3 लिङ्गश्रीराध्यादेशवेशवेशहि विचारितम् इ-दानीं स्तुलश्रीराध्यां तथा विचारितम्. ||

4 One of my MSS. of Aniruddha omits the word इति. Ed.
b. He tells us what is proved by the fact that the Body consists of the Elements: 1

अभिज्ञन चतुर्दशप्रत्यक्षः || २० इ

Aph. 20. Intelllect is not natural [a natural result of organization]; because it is not found in them severally.

a. That is to say: since we do not find intellect in the separated Elements, intellect is not natural to the Body,—which consists of the Elements,—but is adventitious.

b. He states another refutation: [of the notion that Intellect is a property of the Body]:

प्रशासनरत्नभावना || २१ इ

A further argument.

Aph. 21. And [if the Body had intellect natural to it,] there would not be the death, &c., of anything.

a. That is to say: and, if the Body had intellect natural to it, there would not be the death, the profound sleep, &c., of anything; for death, profound sleep, &c., imply the body's being non-intelligent; and this, if it were, by its own nature, intelligent, would not take place; because the essential nature of a thing remains as long as the thing remains.

b. Pondering a doubt, as to the assertion [in § 20], viz., 'because it is not found in them severally,' he repels it:

मदशक्तिविवेकानिपितृष्ट सांख्य || २२ इ

Aph. 22. If [you say that Intellect results from organization, and that] it is like the power of something intoxicating, [the ingredients of which, separately, have no intoxicating power, we reply, that] this might arise, on conjunction, if we had seen, in each [element, something conducive to the result].

a. But then, as an intoxicating power, though not residing in the substances severally, resides in the mixed substance, so may Intellect, also, be; if any one say this, it is not so. If it had been seen in each [constituent], its appearance in the compound might have had place; but, in the case in question, it is not the case that it is seen in each.

1 प्रशासन सर्वेऽशीव मरणमृत्युमयित्रभावव देहस्य स्त्राभिविक्षेत्यो सति नापपयते स्त्राभवस्य यावध्यक्षय भविनादिति ||

2 भृत्यु प्रागःकृत्यं चतुर्दशचन्द्रानात्रिकस्य देहस्य न स्त्राभावविक्षेत्यं चतुर्दशम नापपयते स्त्राभावस्य यावध्यक्षयाभम विनादिति ||

3 वाधकान्तरामह ||

3 Aniruddha and Vedanti Mahadeva read सांख्यान्तरामहे

Ed.
Therefore, in the illustration [of something intoxicating resulting from mixture], it being established, by the Institutes, &c., that there is, in each ingredient, a subtle tendency to intoxicate, it is settled only that, at the time when these combine, there will be a manifestation of the [latent] power of intoxicating; but, in the thing illustrated, it is not established, by any proof whatsoever, that there is intelligence, in a subtle [or undeveloped] state, in the elements separately: such is the meaning.\(^1\)

It was stated [§ 16,] that the Subtile Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul. In regard to this, he tells, in two aphorisms, by what operation, dependent on the birth of the Subtile Bodies, which means their transmigrations into Gross Bodies, what aims of Soul are accomplished:\(^1\)

\[1 \text{ननु यथा मादकात्या शक्ति: प्रयोक्तया वृक्षतिः निषिद्धहृदे वर्तत एवं चैतन्यमपि स्वादिति चेव। प्रयोक्तया तीति सति सांहल्ये तदन्वः संबंधप्रकृते तु प्रयोक्तया तीति नासि। अत्यं दृष्टान्ते प्रयोक्तया शास्त्राचिन्मी: मूद्यतंतया मादकाने संबंधभाव- कल्यादनम् मादकानीविभाबां सिध्यति दर्शानि: तु प्रयोक्तया तीति मूद्यतंतया न केनापि प्रमाणं चेतन्यं सिद्धिमयः।}]

\[2 \text{पुर्वाङ्ग संस्कृतिलिङ्कानामित्युक्तम्। तत्र तिक-}]

\[\text{वर्तनस्य स्फूटे सचारामघ्नम्} \text{ये:} \text{पुर्वाङ्गि} \text{चेतन यथा सिध्यति तदाह दृष्टास्याम्} \text{॥} \]

\[\text{णान्यान्यायाया} \text{सुकविमथाबुधी। तत्रदी} \text{णान्यान्याया} \text{विचारायत।}\]
Knowledge has neither companion nor relative, i.e., in liberating Soul.

\[ \text{Aph. 25.} \] Since this [i.e., knowledge,] is the precise cause [of liberation], there is neither association [of anything else with it, e.g., good works] nor alternativeness, [e.g., of good works, in its stead].

\[ a. \] In respect of there being neither association nor alternativeness, he states an illustration:

This illustrated.

\[ \text{Aph. 26.} \] The emancipation of Soul does not depend on both [knowledge and works, or the like]; as [any end that one aims at is not obtained] from dreams and from the waking state, [together, or alternatively, which are, severally,] illusory and not illusory.

\[ a. \] But, even if it be so, [some one may say,] there may be association, or alternativeness, of knowledge of the truth with that knowledge which is termed Worship of [the One, all-constitutive, divine] Soul; since there is no illusoriness in this object of Worship. To this he replies:

\[ \text{Aph. 27.} \] Even of that other it is not complete.

\[ a. \] Even of 'that other,' i.e., of the [just-mentioned] object of worship, the non-illusoriness is not complete; because imaginary things, also, enter into [our conception of, and overlie, and disguise,] the object of worship, the [One, all-constitutive] Soul: such is the meaning.

\[ b. \] He states in what part [of it] is the illusoriness of the [object of] Worship, [just referred to]:

Where the fault applies.

\[ \text{Aph. 28.} \] Moreover, it is in what is fancied that it is thus [illusory].

\[ a. \] That is to say: 'moreover, it is thus,' i.e., moreover, there is illusoriness, in that portion of the thing meditated which [portion of it] is fancied by the Mind, [while it does not exist in reality]; for, the object of worship having been declared in such texts as, 'All this, indeed, is Brahma,' the illusoriness belongs entirely to that portion [of the impure conception of 'the All' which presents itself, to the undiscriminating, under the aspect] of the world.

\[ 1 \] \[2 \] \[3 \] \[4 \]
b. Then what profit is there in Worship? With reference to this, he declares [as follows]:

**भाषनरथ्याशङ्कुक्मण सर्वप्रकृतित् इति** ॥ २५ ॥

*The fruit of Worship.* Aph. 29. From the achievement of [the worship termed] meditation there is, to the pure [Soul], all [power]; like Nature.

a. Through the effecting of the worship which is termed meditation, there becomes, to the ‘pure,’ i.e. the sinless, Soul, all power; as belongs to Nature: such is the meaning. That is to say: as Nature creates, sustains, and destroys, so also the Purity of the understanding of the worshipper, by instigating Nature, creates, &c. [But this is not Liberation, or Soul’s chief end.]

b. It has been settled that Knowledge alone is the means of Liberation. Now he mentions the means of Knowledge:

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**मौध्ययङ्ग: सर्वप्रभुत्वयान्तत्रुत्तेहुप्रेष्येक्षस्य प्रत्यक्ष्यार्थ्ययामिलनमश्चेति** ॥

1 तदेकालोकस्य किं फलस्यकालायामाह ॥
2 भाषनाश्यापासानन्त्यनिधियस्य प्रथम निधिय-पस्य पुस्तकवर्तिका सर्वमेत्यं भवतीयनः: ॥
3 प्रकृतियथा सुस्तिष्टतिसंहारं करोत्येवमुपासकस्य वृद्धिसंप्रमिपि प्रकृतिप्रेरणान सृष्टियासिक्तिः भव-\textit{तीतिः} ॥
4 ज्ञानमेव माक्यसाधननिमित्त स्थापितम् इदानी ज्ञानसाधनायामह ॥

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**रागोपक्ष्यानिधीयानम्** ॥ ३० ॥

*Removal of obstacles to knowledge.* Aph. 30. Meditation is [the cause of] the removal of Desire.

a. That is to say: Meditation is the cause of the removal of that affection of the mind by objects, which is a hinderer of knowledge.

b. With aversion to the fact that knowledge arises from the effectuation of Meditation, and not from merely commencing upon it, he characterizes the effectuation of Meditation:

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**वृत्तिनिराधारामस्य तस्सि: ॥ ३१ ॥**

*Meditation at what point perfected.* Aph. 31. It [Meditation,] is perfected by the repelling of the modifications [of the Mind, which ought to be abstracted from all thoughts of anything].

a. He mentions also the means of Meditation:

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**धारणासनस्यकारणश्च तस्सि: ॥ ३२ ॥**

*Practices conducive to meditation.* Aph. 32. This [Meditation,] is perfected by Restraint, Postures, and one’s Duties.

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1 ज्ञानप्रतिच्छेद्यो विषयोपागावत्रिकस्य तदुपयोगाधेतुधियामिलनमश्चेति ॥
2 भाषनाश्यापासानन्त्यनिधियस्य प्रथम निधियप्रेरणार्थमायेष्याके श्यायेन भाषनाश्यापासानन्त्यनिधिय: ॥
3 ज्ञानस्यापि साधनायामह ॥
a. That is to say: Meditation results from the triad, which shall be mentioned, viz., Restraint, &c.\textsuperscript{1}

b. By means of a triad of aphorisms he characterizes, in order, Restraint, &c.\textsuperscript{2}

निरामाश्चर्चिधाराधारणयाम् || 33 ||

Restraint of the breath.


a. That it is ‘of the breath’ is gathered from the notoriousness\textsuperscript{4} [of its being so].

b. He characterizes Postures, which come next in order.\textsuperscript{5}

स्विरसुनमासनम् || 38 ||

Postures.

Aph. 34. Steady and [promoting] ease is a [suitable] Posture.

a. That is to say: that is a Posture which, being steady, is a cause of pleasure; such as the crossing of the arms.\textsuperscript{6}

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\textsuperscript{1} बद्धमावेषे धारणादिनियेष ध्यानं भव-तीर्थयः.

\textsuperscript{2} धारणादिनियेष कामालूच्चचर्येष लक्षयति.

\textsuperscript{3} Aniruddha and Vedanti Mahâdeva transpose Aphorisms 33 and 34. \textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{4} प्रायस्येति प्रसिद्धा लक्ष्यते.

\textsuperscript{5} कामप्राप्तमासनं लक्ष्ययति.

\textsuperscript{6} यतिस्यं सत्तुष्कसाधनं भवति स्वतिष्कृदि तदासनमित्यः.

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b. He characterizes one's Duty:\textsuperscript{1}

स्वकम्म स्वायामविहितकमोत्साहनम् || 35 ||

One's duty.

Aph. 35. One's Duty is the performance of the actions prescribed for one's religious order.

a. Simple.\textsuperscript{2}

वैराग्यसासासं || 36 ||

Knowledge by Concentration how obtained. Practice.

Aph. 36. Through Dispassion and Practice.

a. Simply through mere Practice, in the shape of Meditation, accompanied by Dispassion, Knowledge, with its instrument, Concentration, takes place in the case of those who are most competent [to engage in the matter]: such is the meaning. Thus has liberation through knowledge been expounded.\textsuperscript{3}

b. After this, the cause of Bondage, viz., Misconception, declared in [the assertion] ‘Bondage is from Misconception,’ [§ 24], is to be expounded. Here he first states the nature of Misconception.\textsuperscript{4}

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\textsuperscript{1} स्वकम्म लक्षयति.

\textsuperscript{2} सुगमः.

\textsuperscript{3} केर्लावासाचार्यानंनुपादेय वैराग्यसहितानं तत्साधनयेषां भवतुप्रमाधिकारिणां भवति. तद्विर्भवतः ब्राह्मणो भाव्यति.

\textsuperscript{4} श्रद्धां परं वन्यं वीर्ययाद्वियुक्तं वन्यकारं.
b. In a couple of aphorisms he mentions [those] two, Acquiescence and Perfection, on the prevention of which come two sorts of Disability of the Understanding:¹

तुषिन्द्रव्या ॥ ३२ ॥

Acquiescence.

Aph. 39. Acquiescence is of nine sorts.

a. He will, himself, explain how it is of nine sorts.¹

सिद्धिरत्या ॥ ३० ॥

Perfections.

Aph. 40. Perfection is of eight sorts.

a. This, also, he will, himself, explain.³

b. Of the aforesaid, viz., Misconception, Disability, Acquiescence, and Perfection, since there may be a desire to know the particulars, there is, in order, a quaternion of aphorisms:⁴

खच्छात्स्रवेद: पूर्ववत् ॥ ४९ ॥

¹ यथा, अर्थमित्रो बुद्धशक्ति ते तुषिन्द्रशक्ति शून्य-विद्वेद्याह ॥
² श्वयमेव नवधात ्तवमयात् ॥
³ एतद्धि श्वयं बल्यात् ॥
⁴ उज्ज्वला विशेषयाशक्तिहितिस्थितीनां विशेषज्ञां ज्ञाताय रूपं सूचीतं भक्ति तद्भवते ॥
THE SĀNKHYA APHORISMS.

Aph. 41. The subdivisions [of Mis-conception] are as [declared] aforetime.

a. The subdivisions of Misconception, which, in a general way, have been stated as five, are to be understood to be particularized 'as aforetime,' i.e., just as they have been declared by preceding teachers; they are not explained here, for fear of prolixity: such is the meaning.¹

एवर्तितरस्यः || ॥ ८२ ॥

Of this further. Aph. 42. So of the other [viz., Disability].

a. That is to say: 'so,' i.e., just as aforetime [§ 41], the divisions 'of the other,' viz., of Disability, also, which are twenty-eight, are to be understood, as regards their particularities.²

ञ्ज्ञातिमकार्येण द्वारा तुपि: || ॥ ८३ ॥

Acquiescence divided. Aph. 43. Acquiescence is ninefold, through the distinctions of 'the internal and the rest.'

१ विषयंस्यावातरंदेयं वे सामाज्यं प्रमो-कालं पूर्वस्वरूपाचर्येंमहाजातिकृत विशिष्टव- धायः विश्वराष्ट्राः विश्वासराष्ट्राः इत्यर्थं: ॥

२ एवं पूर्वस्वरूपेऽतरस्य अश्रेष्ठवातरंदेयं अश्चार्थितिविशेषत्वः इत्यर्थं: ॥

BOOK III., APH. 44.

a. This aphorism is explained by a memorial verse,' [No. 50*].

ञ्ज्ञातिमकिरुपादानमकाल-भाष्याः: ॥

वाक्य विष्योपरपालस्य नव तुधोभिम- मता: ॥

Aph. 44. Through Reasoning, &c., [which are its subdivisions] Perfection [is eightfold].

a. That is to say: Perfection is of eight kinds, through its divisions, viz., Reasoning, &c. This aphorism, also, has been explained in a memorial verse,' [No 51*].

१ इदं सूचं कारिकाय व्याख्यातम् ॥

२ Quoted below, from the Sānkhya-kārikā. with Mr. John Davies’s translation:

ञ्ज्ञातिमकार्येण प्रकृतियुपादानकाल-भाष्याः: ॥

वाक्य विष्योपरमालस्य नव तुधोभिम- मता: ॥

'Nine varieties of acquiescence are set forth; four internal, named from Nature, means, time, and fortune; five external, relating to abstinence from objects of sense.' Ed.

३ जाहरिदेवे सिद्धास्यां भवतील्यः: ॥ इद- नापि सूचं कारिकाय व्याख्यातम् ॥

४ Here appended, with Mr. Davies’s translation:

ञ्ज्ञ: चांश्रेष्ठाय दुःखविश्वासतः: सुहोभामिः ॥

दानं च सिद्धस्य च सिद्धे: पूर्वोद्धशुकसिद्धिः: ॥

'The eight perfections (or means of acquiring perfection) are reasoning (śās), word or oral instruction (śabda), study or reading (śākya-

17
But then, how is it said that Perfection consists only of 'Reasoning, &c.', seeing that it is determined, in all the Institutes, that the eight Perfections, viz., [the capacity of assuming] atomic bulk, &c., result from recitations, austerity, meditation, &c.? To this he replies: ́

नेतरादिरत्यानविना ॥ ५४ ॥

Aph. 45. Not from any other (than what we have just stated) does real Perfection arise; because what does arise therefrom, e.g., from austerities, is without abandonment of something else, [viz., Misconception].

a. 'From any other,' i.e., from anything different from the pentad, 'Reasoning, &c.,' e.g., from Austerity, &c., there is no real Perfection. Why? 'Without abandonment of something else;' i.e., because that Perfection [which you choose to call such] takes place positively without abandonment of something else, i.e., of Misconception: therefore [that Perfection], since it is no antagonist to mundane existence, is only a semblance of a Perfection, and not a real Perfection: such is the meaning. ́

yana), the suppression of the three kinds of pain, acquisition of friends, and liberality (dha). The three fore-mentioned (conditions) are checks to perfection.' Ed.

¹ नन्द्रादिरिवेत वर्ष रिद्दहत्यात वह नमायरिणिर्मित्यां द्वारकासिद्धवाक्यितिः सर्वशमासिद्धवाक्यितिः तत्रात् ॥

² उत्तरादिरिवेत्यां किं भक्तिरात्मकाय भूसा द्वारकासिद्धवाक्यितिः न सिद्धिः । कु! उत्तरादिरिवेत विना यतः सा

b. Now the individuated creation, which was mentioned concisely in the assertion, 'There is distinction of individuals through diversity of desert,' [§ 10], is set forth diffusely: ́

देवादिरिवेत ॥ ५६ ॥

Aph. 46. [The creation is that] of which the subdivisions are the demons, &c.

a. Supply, such is that creation, of which 'the subdivisions,' the included divisions, are the demons, &c. This is explained in a memorial verse,' [No. 58].

सिद्धिरत्यानविना हानि विना भवतः संसारार्तिपिरिपिनासा सिद्धांसां एव नन्तु भवतः विनि सिद्धिरत्याः ॥

¹ साम्प्रतः भाविकान्वतः कमीनत्वादिति संकेष्यः- दुस्तु काव्यिकाधिकारस्तः प्रतिपाद्यते ॥

² देवादिः प्रभुदासवान्नरमेदि यथा: मा तथा बुद्धिरिति शेषः । तदेतत्कारिकयाब्यायात्मः ॥

3 It here follows, with the translation of Mr. Davies:

'प्राचीनयो दैवत्यज्ञोनाद् यज्ञधा भवति ।

मानुषैवार्थिः संसारीति नमायिः ॥

4 The divine class has eight varieties; the animal, five. Mankind is single in its class. This is, in summary, the world (sarga, sensation,) of living things.' Ed.
b. He states that the aforesaid subdivided creation, also, is for the sake of Soul: 

Aph. 47. From Brahmā down to 8 post, for its [Soul’s] sake is creation, till there be discrimination [between Soul and Nature].

a. He mentions, further, the division of the subdivided creation, in three aphorisms:

Aph. 48. Aloft, it [the creation.] abounds in [the quality of] Purity.

a. That is to say: ‘aloft,’ above the world of mortals, the creation has chiefly [the Quality of] Purity.

Aph. 49. Beneath, it [the creation.] abounds in Darkness.

a. ‘Beneath,’ that is to say, under the world of mortals.

1. अवात्सारसृष्टतुश्चेतायाः पुष्पार्जनकमाह ||
2. अधिष्ठातारिप विभागासुरचेत्यः ||
3. अभ्यं भूलोकादपि सृष्टिः सत्तादिका भवतीयः ||
4. मूलतः भूलोकादपि इत्यचः ||
6. But then, if the creation aloft is abundant in Purity [the element of joy], since Soul's object is really thereby effected, what need is there of Liberation? To this he replies:

Why Heaven is to be shunned.

Aph. 52. Even there there is return [to miserable states of existence]; it is to be shunned, by reason of the successive subjections to birth, [from which the inhabitants of Heaven enjoy no immunity].

6. Moreover:

Aph. 53. Allike [belongs to all]: the sorrow produced by decay and death.

Aph. 55. Aliki [belonging to all]: the sorrow produced by decay and death.

a. Common to all alike, those that are aloft and those beneath, beginning with Brahmā and ending with a stock, is the 'sorrow produced by decay and death': therefore, moreover, it [heaven] is to be shunned: such is the meaning.

b. What need of more? The end is not effected by absorption into the cause, either; as he tells us:

Absorption into Nature ineffectual.

Aph. 54. Not by absorption into the cause is there accomplishment of the end; because, as in the case of one who has dived, there is a rising again.

a. In the absence of knowledge of the distinction [between Soul and Nature], when indifference towards Mind, &c., has resulted from worship of Nature, then absorption into Nature takes place; for it is declared: 'Through Dispassion there is absorption into Nature.' Even through this, i.e., the absorption into the cause, the end is not gained; 'because there is a rising again; as in the case of one who has dived.' As a man who has dived under water rises again, exactly so do Souls which have been absorbed into Nature reappear, [at the commencement of a new annusmagnus], in the condition of Lords; because it is
impossible that one's faults should be consumed, without a familiarity with the distinction [between Soul and Nature], in consequence of the reappearance of Passion, by reason of the non-destruction of habits, &c.: such is the meaning. 3

b. But then, the cause is not by any one caused to act. Being independent, then, why does she [Nature] make that grief-occasioning resurrection of her own worshipper? To this he replies: 4

अकार्यंतिम पत्थम्: पारवम्यात् || पप ||

Aph. 55. Though she be not constrained to act, yet this is fitting; because of her being devoted to another.

1 To render sanskāra. Ed.

2 विवेकाभ्यासै यदा महादानि वेरार्यं प्रकृतिपापसंयासं भवति तदा प्रकृत लयेऽ भवति वेरार्याप्रकृतिलय इति वचनात्। तस्मात्कर्षितानि न कृतकृत्तानि मनवपुन्यानात्।

यथा जले मन: पुलस्य पुनलक्षेपवेदन्त: प्रकृतीलीपि: पलस्य इश्वरांभवन पुनराविभेदन्त सक्षारादेशका: पुना रागाभिभाष्यकीर्त्यस्य विना देशहालनुपपत्तियोऽः।

'ननु कार्यं करिन्य न खार्तो। खतं: सा चतुर्था कथा स्वाप्तस्तत दु:खनिदानम्युषान्य पुनं: करौति। तथाः॥

1 प्रकृत्याकार्यंतिमप्रमेयंतिमपक्ष्याथानधीतिनेत्रयि

तथाः: पुनस्यानाचितं तल्लनस्य कुत्। पारवर्यालस्यार्थतः विवेकाभ्यासै

पुरुषार्थपुरुषप्रकृत्य अनुपत्त स्वतंत्रस्य प्रकृते पुरुषायते स्वतंत्रात् इतः। पुरुषार्थस्य प्रकृतेन प्रेतक्षे: किं तु प्रवृत्तिस्माताया: प्रवृत्तिः स्विभावनिति न स्वतंत्वात्यतिः:॥

3 प्रकृतित्वालस्यत्स्वात्मानाने प्रमाणवं मध्याः॥
a. For 'he,' viz., he who, in a previous creation, was absorbed into the Cause, in a subsequent creation becomes 'omniscient and omnipotent;' the Lord, the First Spirit.

b. But then, if that be so, it is impossible to deny a Lord, [which, nevertheless, the Sāṅkhya seem to do]. To this he replies:"

In what sense then Aph. 57. The existence of such a Lord is a settled point.

a. It is quite agreed, by all, that there is an emergent Lord, he who had been absorbed into Nature; for the ground of dispute [between Sāṅkhya and the rest] is altogether about an eternal Lord: such is the meaning.

b. He expounds diffusely the motive for Nature's creating, which was mentioned only indicatory in the first aphorism of the Second Book:

1 स हि पूर्वसूर्ये समालिणेऽ समीत्रे सर्ववेदे सर्वविदेक्तेष्वर आदिपूर्वे भवति
2 Pratishedha, on which vide supra, p. 112, note 3. Ed.
3 नन्दे प्रकृतिश्चरस्यतिवधान परमपरा
4 यथा शीरं पुनिष्ठ्रायणमेव श्रवस्य दिशिये परिष्ठात्ल एवमेवतेव पुनिष्ठ्रायणमेव

Aph. 58. Nature's creating is for the sake of another, though it be spontaneous;—for she is not the experiencer;—like a cart's carrying assfrou [for the sake of its master].

a. But then, it is quite impossible that Nature, being unintelligent, should be, spontaneously, a creator; for we see that a cart, or the like, operates only by reason of the efforts of another. To this he replies:

Aph. 59. Though she be unintelligent, yet Nature acts; as is the case with milk.

a. That is to say: as milk, without reference to men's efforts, quite of itself changes into the form of curd, so Nature, although she be unintelligent, changes into the form of Mind, &c., even without the efforts of any other.

1 नन्दः प्रधानहाचेतानाय स्त्रे स्रोतस्मे नन्दः पदमे राधादेष प्रायम्यलेव चषुतिदशणादिति
2 यथा शीरं पुनिष्ठ्रायणमेव श्रवस्य दिशिये परिष्ठात्ल एवमेवतेव पुनिष्ठ्रायणमेव
b. This is not rendered tautological by this aphorism, "As the cow for the calf," [Book II., § 37]; because there the question was only of the operation of instruments, and because cows are intelligent.¹

c. By means of the exhibition of another illustration, he mentions the cause of the thing asserted as aforesaid:²

Aph. 60. Or as is the case with the acts [or on-goings]—for we see them—of Time, &c.³

Aph. 61. From her own nature she acts, not from thought; like a servant.⁴

a. That is to say: as, in the case of an excellent servant, naturally, just from habit,⁵ the appointed and necessary service of the master is engaged in, and not with a view to his own enjoyment, just so does Nature energize from habit alone.⁶

¹ But, still, a senseless Nature would never energize, or would energize the wrong way; because of there being (in her case) no such comming as, "This is my means of producing experience, &c." To this he replies: ¹

² Swabhāvadiśkritamāṁś ṣaṁkṣepadhānāduḥṣrayat ॥ 66 ॥

³ Adhyāya Ⅰ, Aph. 61. Ed.

⁴ Nature acts from habit.

⁵ That is to say: as, in the case of an excellent servant.

⁶ This is the case with the acts [or on-goings] of Time, &c., the spontaneous action of Nature is proved from what is seen. The action of Time, for example, takes place quite spontaneously, in the shape of one season's now departing and another's coming on: let the behaviour of Nature, also, be thus; for the supposition conforms to observed facts: such is the meaning.⁴
THE SÄKYAYA APHORISMS.

Or through the influence of Desert.

a. Here the word ‘or’ is for connecting [this aphorism with the preceding one]. Since Desert has been from eternity, therefore, moreover, through attraction by Deserts, the energizing of Nature is necessary and rightly distributed.\(^1\) such is the meaning.\(^2\)

b. It being thus settled, then, that Nature is creative for the sake of another, he tells us, in the following section,\(^4\) that, on the completion of that other’s purpose, Liberation takes place through Nature’s quite spontaneously ceasing to act.\(^3\)

\[\text{विविक्रमेश्वराणिन्तुति: प्रधानस्य सूदव-}\
\[\text{त्याभ्} \] ॥ ए न ॥

**MOOK III., APH. 64.**

*Aph. 63. From discriminative knowledge there is a cessation of Nature’s creating; as is the case with a cook, when the cooking has been performed.

a. When Soul’s aim has been accomplished, by means of indifference to all else, through discriminative knowledge of Soul, Nature’s creating ceases; as, when the cooking is completed, the labour of the cook ceases: such is the meaning.\(^1\)

b. But, at that rate, since Nature’s creating ceases through the production of discriminative knowledge in the case of a single Soul, we should find all liberated. To this he replies: ॥

\[\text{दत्तर इतरत्रहृदयात्} \] ॥ ए न ॥

Liberation of one involves not that of all. .AP.H. 64. Another remains like another, through her fault.

a. But ‘another,’ i.e., one devoid of discriminative knowledge, remains ‘like another,’ i.e., just like one bound by

\[\text{विविक्रमस्यकरणानान्तरायग्येश पूर्वपूर्व् माणान्तरित्वं प्रधानस्य सूदविनिर्वते यथा पाणिन्य}\
\[\text{पाचकः आपत्ति निर्वतं इत्यः} \] ॥

1 \[\text{नन्वेदेनकु दशीन्यायधी विवेकानन्दस्या}\
\[\text{प्रकृति सूदविनिर्वते सर्वमुक्तिः। इति। तत्राह!} \] ॥

3 Aniruddha’s lection of this Aphorism is: दत्तर इतरतहृ-\
\[\text{दयात्} \] ॥ Ed.
THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

Nature. Why? 'Through her fault,' i.e., through the fault which may be described as her not accomplishing that soul's aim: such is the meaning.1

6. He mentions the fruit of Nature's ceasing to act:2

बेयोरित्तथस वैदासीन्यमभवगः: || द० ||

Liberation consists of what.

Aph. 65. [The fruit of Nature's ceasing to act], the solitariness of both [Nature and Soul], or [which comes to the same thing], of either, is liberation.

a. 'Of both,' i.e., of Nature and Soul, the 'solitariness,' i.e., the being alone, the mutual disjunction, in short, this is liberation.3

6. But then, how would Nature, having attained indifference, through the mood in the shape of discrimination, on the liberation of a single Soul, again engage in creation, for the sake of another Soul? And you are not to say that this is no objection, because Nature consists of different portions, [it is not another Nature, but the same]; because we see, that, even out of the [mortal] constituents of the

1 इतरतु विविधब्योपरिहित इतरचब्बदेव प्रकृत्या तिष्ठिति । कुन्त: || तत्तेषात्रायुण्मधान्तिष्वक तथुष्मार्यःसमापनायस्यद्विषादिविष्यः: ||

2 मृत्विनिष्कृत्य: फलमाह ॥

3 इत्योऽध्यानपुष्कृतोर्विदासीन्यमेकाभिः परस्परिवियोग इति यात्रासप्तवगः: ||

liberated person, viz., his dust, &c., things are created for the experience of another. To this he replies:4

अन्यसृष्टियार्गरागि न विरज्ञेयं प्रचुढ़रज्ञतास्य: ।

'स्वीयोगः' || द० ||

1 नान्यसृष्टिप्रवुष्क्षविवेकेकाराणस्य विरज्ञ: प्रकृति: कथमन्यपुष्क्षवां पुन: सृष्टिः परतेनवात: ।

न च प्रकृतरज्ञेवदेश दौष इति बायां मुक्तपुष्केरकाराणिर पृष्ठियानिविन्दुस्मस्मेकात्रेयस्य भोगः

सृष्टिदर्शनादिति । तत्राह ॥

3 नागेसा अन्यसृष्टियार्गरागान्त। Ed.

3 Vijnana's genuine reading seems to be विरज्ञतेः. His comment, however, recognizes also विरज्ञेतेः, the reading of Anuruddha. One MS. of his work which has been consulted has, like Vedanti Mahadeva, विरज्ञतेः. Nageya has निवज्ञतेः. Ed.

4 -स्वीयो, instead of स्वीयो, appears to have very little good warrant; and Dr. Bellantyne, indeed, translates स्वाय, not प्राय। Ed.

6 Of this Aphorism, and of the comment on it, MSS. of Vijnana's treatise afford a much better text than that here reprinted. In one of its more approved forms, that which Vijnana seems to select, the original enunciation runs thus: अन्यसृष्टियार्गरागि न विद्योत्तरज्ञतालश्चेदिति ॥

Furthermore, the [Nature,] does not give over effecting creation, with reference to another, [i.e., another soul than that of the spiritual sage, though she creates for such a sage no longer; and she acts, in so doing,] analogously to a snake, with reference to him who is unenlightened as to the real
Apâ. 66. Moreover, [when Nature has left off distressing the emancipated,]

she does not desist, in regard to her creative influence on another; as is the case with the snake, [which ceases to be a terror,] in respect of him who is aware of the truth, in regard to the rope [which another mistakes for a snake].

a. Nature, though, in respect of one Soul, she has desisted, in consequence of discriminative knowledge, does not desist as regards her creative influence on another Soul, but does create in respect of that one; as the snake [so to speak] does not produce fear, &c., in the case of him who is aware of the truth in regard to the rope, but does produce it, in respect of him who is ignorant [that what

character of the rope] [which is mistaken for it; this illusory snake keeping him constantly in a state of alarm, though it ceases to affect him who has discovered that it is nothing more formidable than a yard or two of twisted hemp; More closely, so far as regards the construction of the original: Furthermore, in like manner as a snake goes on influencing him who . . . . . [Nature persists] in affecting creation; &c.

That upapāya, as embodied in the expression sākhya-prāptāya, signifies "causing," "effecting," is the view of both Aniruddha and Vaiśānī Mahādeva, who define it by karanā.

The Aphorism in question, mainly as just exhibited, together with preferable deviations from the comment as given by Dr. Ballantyne, will be found at p. 13 of the variants appended to my edition of the Sānkhyā-pravachana-bhāshya. Nāgadeva, following Viśnāna very closely, explains the Aphorism as follows: यथा प्रबुद्धर्मज्ञात्वम् प्रति निबृतेऽविपि प्रबुद्धर्मज्ञात्वम् सभाहिष्ठिष्ठ्या परागायन निवर्तते तथा ज्ञातिं प्रति निवृत्ताय प्रभृतितर्म्य प्रति सूक्ष्म प्रवर्तते इत्यथा: । Ed.
Another consideration why Nature should act.

_Aph. 67._ And from connexion with Desert, which is the cause.

a. Desert, which is the cause of creation, in consequence of the conjunction of this, also, she creates, for the sake of another Soul [than the emancipated one]: such is the meaning.

b. But then, since all Souls are alike indifferent, inasmuch as they do not desire, [Nature's interference], what is it that here determines Nature to act only in regard to this one, and to desist in regard to that one? And Desert is not the determiner; because here, too, there is nothing to determine of which Soul what is the Desert; [Desert being inferentially only from, and, therefore, not cognizable antecedently to, its fruit]. To this he replies:

> नीरपेश्वेदिप प्रवृत्तपकारोऽद्विवेदिका निमित्तम || ६५ ||

_Nature's selection how determined._

_Aph. 68._ Though there is [on Soul's part, this] indifference, yet want of discrimination is the cause of Nature's service.

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1. सृष्टि निमित्तं याकमे तस्य संबन्धात्वनान्-पुर्वार्थः सुत्तवतियः: ||

2. नून सर्वम् पुरुषाशास्त्रमृत्यूः मेव नीरपेश्वा-विशेषेष्वम् काजितुः प्रधानं प्रवर्तते काजितुः

a. That is to say: although Souls are indifferent, yet Nature, just through [her own] non-discrimination, saying, 'This is my master;' 'This is my self,' serves Souls, [towards their eventual emancipation], by creation, &c. And so, to what Soul, not having discriminated herself [therefrom], she has the habit of showing herself, in respect just of that one does Nature energize; and this it is that determines her: such is the import.

b. Since it is her nature to energize, how can she desist, even when discrimination has taken place? To this he replies:

> नरत्नश्रीवमवृत्तस्थापि निवृत्तिश्वारिताध्यायः || ६६ ||

_Nature energizes only till the end is attained._

_Aph. 69._ Like a dancer does she, though she had been energizing, desist; because of the end's having been attained.

a. Nature's disposition to energize is only for the sake of Soul, and not universally. Therefore is it fitting that

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1. _Vāsānt._ _Ibid supra_, p. 29, note 2. _Ed._

2. पुरुषाशास्त्रमेवाद्विवेदिकादिविषयिनित्यिनिगारात्मा: पुक्तिः सूक्ष्यादिमिथिः पुरुषाशास्त्र-कारोतिस्यायः:। तथा च यथेष्ठ पुरुषाशास्त्रमेव-चित्तुर्दशिं वासना वर्तितं तं प्रवेश प्रधानं प्रवर्तते इत्येव नित्यिनिगारात्मां भावः: ||

3. _प्रवृत्तिष्ठाध्यायः विवेदिपिनां निवृत्तिष्ठाध्यायः_ पद्यात्रां। तत्राः ||
Nature should desist, though she has been energizing, when the end has been attained, in the shape of the effectuation of Soul’s aim; as a dancer, who has been performing, with the view of exhibiting a dance to the spectators, desists, on the accomplishment of this; such is the meaning.  

b. He states another reason for the cessation:

\[ \text{दृष्टबोधिदप नोयपर्याप्रधानस्य कुलचक्षु-} \]
\[ \text{वत्} \| 50 \|

This illustrates: Aph. 70. Moreover, when her fault is known, Nature does not approach [Soul]; like a woman of good family.

a. That is to say: Nature, moreover, ashamed at Soul’s having seen her fault,—in her transformations, and her taking the shape of pain, &c., does not again approach Soul; ‘like a woman of good family,’ i.e.; as a [frail] woman of good family, ashamed at ascertaining that her fault

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1 पुष्यार्थस्य प्रमाणस्य प्रवृत्तिस्वभावे नतु सामायेऽः। अतः प्रवृत्तिस्य प्रमाणस्य पुष्यार्थस्वभावेऽपि चरिताऽथे सति निवृत्तिर्युक्ता यथा परिष्कृते नूत्यदेशनार्थे प्रवृत्ताया नरत्त्वा स्वाभाविकसिद्धान्निवृत्तिरिस्वर्यः।

2 निवृत्ति हेतुतरसाह।

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BOOK III., APH. 71. 273

has been seen by her husband, does not approach her husband.¹

b. But then, if Nature’s energizing be for the sake of Soul, Soul must be altered by Bondage and Liberation, [and not remain the unalterable entity which you allege it to be]. To this he replies:²

नैकालते वन्मोक्षी पुष्यस्वाच्छिन्नवते || 91 ||

Aph. 71. Bondage and Liberation do not actually belong to Soul, [and would not even appear to do so,] but for non-discrimination.

a. Bondage and Liberation, consisting in the conjunction of Pain, and its disjunction, do not ‘actually,’ i.e., really, belong to Soul; but, in the way mentioned in the fourth aphorism, they result only from non-discrimination: such is the meaning.³

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¹ पुष्यार्थस्य परिष्कृतमिवदुःखात्मकादिदादिदेशस्वभू-नादिपलविद्या: प्रकृते: पुनर्न पुष्यप्रत्यु-सर्वेऽपि कुलचक्षुब्धाऽस्व नवमिना मेव दृष्ट दृष्टवधारणेऽलविद्या कुलवृप्तेऽन्नवमिनस्मप-सर्वेऽपि तत्तत्त्वद: ||

² See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 61.

³ नतु पुष्यार्थस्य चायप्रमाणप्रवृत्तिस्वव्यतिज्ञस्वाभावयुप्परिष्कृतामात्स्वरिति। तत्पादः ||

⁴ हु: स्योगविषिद्याहै वन्मङ्कृतो पुष्यस्य नै-
b. But, in reality, Bondage and Liberation, as declared, belong to Nature alone: so he asserts: ¹

\[\text{प्रकृतिराश्रयान्तसन्तुचालितं} \quad ॥ ७२ ॥

\text{Bondage is really Nature's.}

\text{Aph. 72. They really belong to Nature, through consociation; like a beast.}

a. Bondage and Liberation, through Pain, really belong to Nature,² 'through consociation,' i.e., through her being hampered by the habits, &c., which are the causes of Pain; as a beast, through its being hampered by a rope, experiences Bondage and Liberation: such is the meaning.

b. Here, by what causes is there Bondage? Or by what is there Liberation? To this he replies: ³

\[\text{काव्यतस्मीति: किं तु चतुर्थसूचकवास्तवमायान् प्रकृतिराष्ट्रिवेच्चेद्वेत्युः} \quad ॥

\[\text{परमार्ध्यत्तत्त्वयुक्तासा विभेद्यो प्रकृतिरेव}-

\[\text{याह्} \quad ॥

¹ Nagesa has कौशिकारवन्मी\text{ Ed.}

² Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva have -मोचयथोकेन कूड़े। \text{Ed.}

³ दृष्टिराश्रयायामोऽकाराद्वितीयां: सम्य-प्रकृतिरहितमेव साधनार्थमोदितिनिरंतर्यथा पशु रज्ज्वा लिप्रत्यया विभेद्यो तद्रुप्तवः। \text{Ed.}
quoted nor assumed, and because, in the world, Pain, and its negative, Pleasure, &c., can, themselves, be neither quoted nor assumed: otherwise, [if you still insist on retaining the opinion objected to], there is disparagement of sense-evidence. Having pondered this, he himself [not leaving it to a commentator,] explains what was asserted in the fourth aphorism:

निमित्ततमविवेकः क दृश्यानि: \( \text{II 78 II} \)

An objection met. \( \text{Aph. 74. Non-discrimination is the cause [not the thing itself]; [so that] there is no disparagement of sense-evidence.} \)

\( a. \) What was asserted before was this, that Non-discrimination is only the occasion of Bondage and Liberation in souls, and not that Non-discrimination itself is these two; therefore 'there is no disparagement of sense-evidence;' [for, though we see that Pain and Pleasure cannot be directly assumed or quoted, yet we also see that causes of them can be assumed or quoted]: such is the meaning.\( ^{3} \)

\( ^{1} \) ननु वचनमुक्ती एवविवेकार्थिति यदुः तदस्य-स्राविकविवेकयोगानुपादित्वारूपेन दृष्टेऽक्षण तद-भावसुभावदेव स्तृतो हेयोपादेत्रादयमाः दृष्ट-हारिनिर्दार्शणाः चतुष्प्येष्वराः स्वयं विच्योति।

\( ^{3} \) एवविवेकायु पुरुषेण वन्धनमुक्तीनिरिभावमेव पुरुषां न नविवेक एव तापिति नातो दृष्टानिर-रिलयः।

\( ^{1} \) विवेकायु निश्पत्तमुपायेशु सार्थकत्वम्यास-माह।

\( ^{2} \) प्रकृतियथेऽशु ज्ञेयु नेति नेतील्यनिमाण-स्वाजहानसाधवित्वमामश्च निमित्तीपूर्ववेत्रम्।

\( ^{3} \) वेदान्तमहावर रूपेन्द्रमाह।

\( ^{4} \) Vedānti Mahādeva has अधिकारप्रभेदाच। Ed.
Aph. 76. Through the difference of those competent [to engage in the matter at all], there is no necessity [that each and every one should at once be successful].

1. Since there is a division, among those competent, into the sluggish, &c., though study be made, there is no certainty that, in this very birth, Discrimination will be accomplished: such is the meaning. Therefore, every one should, by strenuousness in study, acquire for himself the highest degree of competency: such is the import.¹

2. He states that Liberation takes place solely through the effecting of Discrimination, and not otherwise:²

1बाधितानुवृत्ता मध्यविवेकतात्तपमभोगः ॥ ३५ ॥
2 बाधितानुवृत्ता मध्यविवेकतात्तपमभोगः ॥ ३५ ॥

Aph. 77. Since what [Pain] has been repelled returns again, there comes, even from medium [but imperfect] Discrimination, experience, [which it is desired to get entirely rid of].

1. But sluggish Discrimination [lower even than the

2. बाधितानुवृत्ता मध्यविवेकतात्तपमभोगः ॥ ३५ ॥

Of Liberation in Aph. 78. And he who, living, is liberated.

1. That is to say: he, also, who, while living, is liberated is just in the condition of medium Discrimination.³

2. He adduces evidence for there being some one liberated, though still living:⁴

उपदेशोपदेशात्मात्सिद्धः ॥ ३५ ॥

Proof that this may be. Aph. 79. It is proved by the fact of instructed and instructor.

1. That is to say: it is proved that there are such as are liberated during life, by the mention, in the Institutes, on the subject of Discrimination,⁵ of the relation of preceptors

1 मद्विवेकतु साक्षात्कारार्थवृन्द अवशयमनान्यामाः पूर्व विभागः ॥
2 The च is omitted by Vaidnti Mahâdeva. Ed.
3 जीवन्मुक्तािपि मध्यविवेकतावस्तु एव भवति-लयणः ॥
4 जीवन्मुक्ते प्रमाःस्वामः ॥
5 This I have substituted for 'Liberation,' a mere oversight. Ed.
and pupil; i.e., because it is only one liberated during life that can be an instructor \cite in this matter].

Further proof. Ap. 90. And there is Scripture.

a. There is also Scripture for there being persons liberated during life. \footnote{None of the commentators but Vijn\'\'ana recognizes an Aphorism in these words; and it is very doubtful whether even he does so. Ed.}

b. But then, merely through hearing, too, one might become [qualified to be] an instructor. To this he replies: \footnote{If two or more persons were to be replaced, there would be a blind tradition.}

\begin{quote}
\textit{अपि गुरुः सेवाये सति कथं जीवनं स्वात्। तत्।}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{ततः न अवश्यमेव शुद्धत्वं तथैह।}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{इतरथा तद्विवेकशुद्धिप्रदेशं भारतर्पण परिवर्त्ययें।}
\end{quote}

3. But then, when, through Knowledge, one's works [which are the cause of mundane existence] have perished, how can there [still] be life? To this he replies: \footnote{For another rendering, see the \textit{Rational Refutation}, &c., p. 31. Ed.}

\begin{quote}
\textit{चक्रवाचस्यस्वरूपार्थः।}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{मृत्युव्रूढः प्राप्तेऽक्षये मृत्युर्चेर्वः स्वरूपं विन्यासं}
\end{quote}

a. Even on the cessation of the action of the potter, the wheel, of itself, revolves for some time, in consequence of the vital inertia resulting from the previous action. So, after knowledge, though actions do not arise, yet, through the [self-continuant] action of antecedent acts, possessing an energizing body, he remains living, yet liberated; \footnote{If two or more persons were to be replaced, there would be a blind tradition. Kapila, probably, did not contemplate books, or did not think these a secure depository of the doctrine; such is the meaning.}

\begin{quote}
\textit{पर्यः सति कथं जीवनं स्वात्।}
\end{quote}
b. But then, since the continuance of experience, &c., is put an end to by that 'Meditation with distinct recognition of the object,' which [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 17,] is the cause of knowledge, how can one retain a body? To this he replies:

Aph. 83. This [retention of a body] is occasioned by the least vestige of impression.

a. That is to say: the retention of a body is caused by even the least remains of those impressions of objects which are the causes of having a body.

b. He recapitulates the sense of the declarations of the Institute:

1 
V. rims. Vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.

2 Which here follows, with Dr. Ballantyne's translation: वितक्तिकि विचारान्तदासितानुगमालांसम्ब्रजाति। 'Meditation, of the kind called' that in which there is distinct recognition [arises, in its fourfold shape, from the attendance of (1) argumentation (dikirta), (2) deliberation (vijikra), (3) beatitude (dhanda), and (4) egotism (asmidra).' Ed.

3 नन्तु ज्ञानहेतुसंभ्राजात्यागेन भेगादिवासनायद्य कथं शरीराधारणम्। तत्तथा॥

4 This is to render the technicality sanskāra. Ed.

5 शरीराधारणात्येव विषयसंस्कारान्तलेश्वाम-स्थायिश्वास्याय परस्पराधारणम् सिङ्ग्रित्यव:॥

6 शास्त्रवाच्याः गुप्तसंहरति॥

Recapitulation.

Aph. 84. That which was to be done has been done, when entire Cessation of Pain has resulted from Discrimination; not otherwise, not otherwise.

a. So much for the Third Book, on Dispassion.

1 Vijnana, according to some copies of his work, has शृंगकुणयो; the preferable reading, and that of all the other commentators known to me. Ed.

2 इतिवैराग्याधाय्यस्तुतीयम्॥

END OF BOOK III.
BOOK IV.

Now, by means of a collection of narratives, recognized in the Institutes, the means of discriminative knowledge are to be displayed: so, for this purpose the Fourth Book is commenced.\(^1\)

\[\text{राजपुपचाचत्त्रोपदेशात्} II 9 II\]

\(\text{Aph. 1. As in the case of the king's son, from instruction as to the truth} \)

\[\text{comes discrimination between Soul and Nature}.\]

\(\text{a. 'Discrimination' is supplied from the concluding aphorism of the preceding section. The meaning is: as, in the case of the king's son, discrimination is produced by instruction as to the truth. The story, here, is as follows: A certain king's son, in consequence of his being born under the [unlucky] star of the tenth portion}^{2} \text{of the twenty-seven portions into which the ecliptic is divided], having been expelled from his city, and reared by a certain forester, remains under the idea, that 'I am a forester.' Having learned that he is alive, a certain minister informs him: 'Thou art not a forester; thou art a king's son.'\]

\(\text{As he, immediately, having abandoned the idea of his being an outcast, betakes himself to his true royal state, saying, 'I am a king,' so, too, it [the Soul], in consequence of the instruction of some kind person, to the effect that 'Thou, who didst originate from the First Soul, which manifests itself merely as pure Thought, art [thyself], a portion thereof,' having abandoned the idea of its being Nature [or of being something material or phenomenal], rests simply upon its own nature, saying, 'Since I am the son of Brahmá, I am, myself, Brahmá, and not something mundane, different therefrom: 'such is the meaning.'\}

\(\text{δ. He exhibits another story, to prove that even women,}\)

\[\text{पूर्वपादेशार्यवृत्तिविवेकोननुवत्ते। राजपुपचाचत्त्रोपदेशार्यवृत्तिविवेको जायत इत्यें। अक्षेमायायिका। कविद्राजपुचो गुणक्षणेजन्मापुराणिः सारितः शबरेण शेतन्त्रिप्रियोषतिः शबर इत्यमिन्थमान झालिः। तैं जीवनं ज्यावा कविद्राजपुचो इसाः प्रेमोधयति न तं शहरे राजपुचोस्मीति। स यथा कविद्राजपुचो चायादलामिहामान त्यक्ता नासिकं राजभाववेलास्ते राजाहमसीत्वेतिदिपुषन्तिपपुरयोगिकालिवेताभिमानिष्ठयान्त्रय-बलं तस्यांश इति कारहिकोपदेशामप्रकृतिमिहामान त्यक्ता तस्मुश्यान्तदाहस्य बशीव नतु तविलक्ष्यः संसारितेष्वं लक्ष्यस्मामिवालस्तं इत्यें।} \]

\(1\) शास्त्रसिद्धार्थविवेकात्मकम्बेचेदान्वी विच्चक्षानसाधनानि प्रदर्शनायायात्त्वदं चतुर्थ पृथ्वी-ध्याय ऋषभ्यते।\]

\(2\) The Sanskrit yields 'under the star [named] Ganda.' Ed.
Sudras, &c., may gain the [one desirable] end, through a Brahmān, by hearing the instructions of a Brahmān:  

**Aph. 2.** As in the case of the goblin, even when the instruction was for the sake of another, [the chance hearer may be benefited].

a. That is to say: though the instruction in regard to the truth was being delivered, by the venerable Krishna, for Arjuna’s benefit, knowledge of the distinction [between Soul and Nature] was produced in the case of a goblin standing near [and overhearing the discourse]: and so it may happen in the case of others, too.

b. And, if knowledge is not produced from once instructing, then a repetition of the instruction is to be made; to which effect he adduces another story:

**BOOK IV., APH. 4.**

**Aph. 3.** Repetition [is to be made], if not, from once instructing, [the end be gained].

a. That is to say: a repetition of instruction, also, is to be made; because, in the Chhāndogya [Upanishad], 1 and the like, there is mention of Aruṇi, and others, as having more than once instructed Śvetaketu and others. 2

b. With a view to the removal of desire, he sets forth, with an illustration, the fragility, &c., of Soul’s accompaniments: 3

**Aph. 4.** As in the case of father and son; since both are seen; [the one, to die, and the other, to be born].

a. That is to say: Discrimination takes place, through dispassion, in consequence of its being inferred, in respect of one’s own self, also, that there is death and birth; since these are seen in the case of father and son. This has

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1 श्रीकृष्णदेवाय भ्रात्राय भ्रात्रायायेऽपादेशं चुन ज्ञाताय: सुरितयादयंमाव्यायिन्यात्मे दर्शयति ।
2 अरुणार्थं श्रीकृष्णेन तत्सहोदरस्त्रोपदेशे क्रियाविशेषार्थं समीपस्य स्विचाच्यथं विवेकच्चां जातेवेदावश्यामपि भवेदित्यथ: ।
3 यदि च सक्तूपदेशाग्रजानं न ज्ञाते तत्सहोदेशावृत्तिपि कार्येतीतिहासान्तरमाह ।

1 VI., i., &c. Ed.
2 उपदेशावृत्तिपि कर्त्यवया चाद्यगयादी चेतनेन चेतनेन चेतनेन प्रवृत्तिपिरभृत्तिनामसक्तूपदेशार्थिहासान्तनं धिन्यथे ।
3 ब्रह्मायार्थं नदर्शनपूवकमात्रसंघातस्य भवेदित्यथ: सादिक्षे प्रतिपादयति ।
been stated as follows: 'The coming into being, and the departure, of Soul [entangled in Nature], may be inferred from [the case of] father and son."

b. He next explains, by illustrative stories, the subordinates to the perfecting of knowledge in him in whom knowledge has arisen, and who is devoid of passion:

श्येनवस्वाधू: सत्यार्थायोगायाम् II 11

Aph. 5. One experiences pleasure or pain [alternatively], from [voluntary] abandonment or [forcible] separation; as in the case of a hawk.

a. That is to say: since people become happy by the abandonment of things, and unhappy by [forcible] separation from them, acceptance of them ought not to be made; 'as in the case of a hawk.' For a hawk, when he has food [before him], if he be driven away by any one, is grieved out in the corrigenda to my edition of the Sākhya-pravachana-bhāṣya. Ed.

1 परियोगो न करित्वा रतो द्वाराणां त्यागः सुखी वियोगेन च दुःखी भवति श्रेयः विद्यार्थः। श्रेयो नि सार्थिष्ठ: केनापुष्पयामिनि-वियोज्य दुःखी किलोत्स्वयं चेताज्जित तदा दुःखः-हितमुखते॥

2 Two of my MSS. have -निल्लिंगन; the rest, -निल्लेन्नी। I have restored the etymological form of the word. Ed

3 यथासहस्राणां तत्च परिवर्जनानासने हेम-चन्द्रस्वरुपमुस्मु: प्रवृत्ति च हुदाकालोपहृत्या बृहोऽहेम-चन्द्रस्वरूपमु: चेताज्जित। तदुर्लक्षम। जीर्णों तत्तत्तव मित्वारे इति॥

at being separated from the food; [but] if, of his own accord, he leaves it, then he is free from grief.
b. And, when abandoned, he should not again accept Nature and the rest. So, in regard to this, he says:

**Aph. 7. Or as an amputated hand.**

As no one takes back again an amputated hand, just so this [Nature], when abandoned, he should not readmit: such is the meaning. The word ‘Or’ is used in the sense of ‘moreover;’ [the import of the conjunction being superadditive, not alternative].

**Aph. 8. What is not a means [of liberation is] not to be thought about, [as this conduces only] to bondage; as in the case of Bharata.

That which is not an immediate cause of Discrimination, even though it may be a duty, still is ‘not to be thought about;’ i.e., intention of the mind towards the performance thereof is not to be made; since it tends to Bondage, from its making us forget Discrimination, ‘As in the case of Bharata:’ that is to say, as was the case

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1 त्यहं च प्रकृत्यादिः पुनर्न्यस्तीयिेदिनमेवाहि
2 यथा विद्वस्तं हस्तं पुनः कौशिकी कामी तत्ववेव
tयत्वां पुनर्न्यस्तिमेवतःयाः वा यास्त्रोपयाः

with the royal sage Bharata’s cherishing Dinanatha’s fawn, though [this was] in accordance with duty.

**Aph. 9.** From association with many there is obstruction to concentration, through passion, &c.; as in the case of a girl’s shell.

a. Association is not to be made with many; because, when there is association with many, there is disturbance, through the manifestation of Passion, &c., which destroys concentration; as a jingling is produced by the mutual

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1 The original, disanadhī, compounded of dina and anātha, ‘miserable and having no master,’ is an epithet of ‘fawn.’

For the story of Bharata and the fawn, see the Vishnu-purana, Book ii. Chap. xiii. Ed.

2 विवेक्र्य यदनासाधाननं न भवति स वेदनाणांकी स्वात्मार्थार्थी स्वात्मार्थार्थी तदनुचित्तं तहतपिः चि
तत्स्य तालय्यं न कर्मयं यत्तल्लभाय भवति वि
वेकविसमार्कतया भरतवत् । यथा भरतस्य
राजस्यस्यमिष्यं दीनानायहिराश्राकस्य पोषणां
मित्वयाः

3 वामाभिनिगविरोधं is the reading of Aniruddha. Ed.

4 See the Mahabharata, xii., 6652. Ed.
contact of the shells on a girl's wrist: such is the meaning.1

हाथ्यामपि तथेऽव || ९० ||

Even that of one. Aph. 10. Just so, from [the company of] two, also.

a. Just so, even from two there is obstruction to concentration; therefore one ought to abide quite alone: such is the meaning.2

तिराञ्च: सुखि पिन्कलावत || ९१ ||

Borendness of those who expect nothing. Aph. 11. He who is without hope is happy; like Pingalá.3

a. Having abandoned hope, let a man become possessed of the happiness called contentment; 'like Pingalá;' that is to say, as the courtesan called Pingalá, desiring a lover, having found no lover, being despondent, became happy, when she had left off hoping.4

1 चहुँबि: सहः न कार्यं चहुँबि: सहः हि रागावशमिभव्यं कलहो भवति योगार्दशको प्रका कुमारीहस्तश्वन्तनामसंग्राह्यसंग्रहं भुक्ताकारो भवतीवर्यम्: ||

2 द्वार्यं योगार्दशिपि तथैव विरोधो भवलयत एकाकिनेन स्थायितमित्यः: ||

3 See the Mahābhārata, xiii., 6447. Ed.

4 श्राणं श्यामा पुष्पं संतोषायसुलब्बाहुयाः—

8. But then, granting that Pain may cease, on the cessation of hope, yet how can there be happiness, in the absence of causes thereof? It is replied: That natural happiness, resulting from the predominance of Purity in the mind, which remains obscured by hope, itself resumes its influence, on the departure of hope; as is the case with the coolness of water which [supposed natural coolness] had been hindered [from manifesting itself] by heat: there is not, in this case, any need of means. And it is laid down that precisely this is happiness of Soul.1

c. Since it is an obstructer of Concentration, exertion with a view to experience is not to be made, since this will be effected quite otherwise; as he states: 4

पिन्कलावधाणा पिन्कला नाम वेयथा कान्तार्यिनी
काल्मलस्वरूपन निर्विशेषा सति विह्यायां सुषिनी
भूवूमधु तहदिवर्यः: ||

1 नवाशानिवृत्या दुःखेरितः स्वात्मस्तु
कुतः साधनाभावादिति। उच्चते। चित्रस सत्वप्राथापेन स्वाभाविकं यतमुखमाया पिंहितं
तिष्ठति तदन्वादाविग्रहल लम्बूर्विकं भवति तेजः
प्रतिवंदजलशीतवर्दिति न तत्र साधनापेक्षा।
एतदेव चात् सुखसंहितुस्यतुदिति: ||

2 योगप्रतिवंदजलशीतवर्दिति भोगार्दशं
न कर्तेऽयत्वस्यः तदुपपचरित्याः॥
Aph. 13. Though he devote himself to many Institutes and teachers, a taking of the essence [is to be made]; as is the case with the bee.

a. Supply 'is to be made.' The rest is simple. Thus it has been said: 'From small Institutes, and from great, the intelligent man should take, from all quarters, the essence; as the bee does from the flowers.'

b. Be the other means what they may, the direct possession of Discrimination is to be effected only by intentness, through maintaining Meditation; as he tells us:

Aph. 14. The Meditation is not interrupted of him whose mind is intent on one object; like the maker of arrows.

a. As, in the case of a maker of arrows, with his mind intent solely on the making of an arrow, the exclusion of

1. Quoted from the Mahâbhdârâta, xiii., 6649. Ed.

2. Sudhí bhâvadhitâ shêshâḥ | shêshà sughamam | tadu-kramâ | ghrârambhi hi du:kkhâya n sughâya kârnya chana | sarpâ: parâkramâ vêgam pravîryâ sughâyatehâ ||

3. Abhyupagama, 'acceptings' (of positions, &c.). Ed.

4. Shâle-Sahâ yugabhâya sara eva yâhokhyâyâ-

5. See the Mahâbhdârâta, xiii., 6651. Ed.
other thoughts is not interrupted even by a king's passing at his side, so, too, of him whose mind is intent on one point there is in no way an 'interruption of meditation,' i.e., a failure to exclude other thoughts.  

2. कृतनियमलक्षणादाने लोकवत् ॥ ९४ ॥

Rules not to be transgressed with impunity.

Aph. 15. Through transgression of the enjoined rules there is failure in the aim; as in the world.

a. Whatever rule, for the practitioners of Concentration, has been laid down in the Institutes, if it be transgressed, then the end, viz., the effecting of knowledge, is not attained. 'As in the world.' That is to say: just as, in ordinary life, if the enjoined procedures, &c., in regard to a medicine, or the like, be neglected, this or that effect thereof will not be obtained.

1 यथा शरणनीमायानिहत्वंस्वायुक्तार्य पार्ष्ठ राजस्ती गम्यनारिष्या न क्षयुतिरानि रो धीवत
एवमेकायात्मक्यस्य सवेयाप्रति न समाधीहानिक्युः
क्षयुतिरोधकात्मकानित्वमिति ॥

Aph. 16. Moreover, if they be forgotten; as in the case of the female frog.

a. This is plain. And the story of the female frog is this: A certain king, having gone to hunt, saw a beautiful damsel in the forest. And she, being solicited in marriage by the king, made this stipulation: 'When water shall be shown to me by thee, then I must depart.' But, on one occasion, when wearied with sport, she asked the king, 'Where is water?' The king, too, forgetting his agreement, showed her the water. Then she, having become the she-frog Kānarūpīniḥ, daughter of the king of the frogs, entered the water. And then the king, though he sought her with nets, &c., did not regain her.

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b. He mentions a story with reference to the necessity of reflecting on the words of the teacher, as well as hearing them.\(^1\)

\[\text{नोपदेशश्रवणेऽपं कृतकृत्यता विरोचनवत्} \text{Ⅱ ९९Ⅱ} \]

Aph. 17. Not even though instruction be heard is the end gained, without reflection; as in the case of Virochana.\(^4\)

\(a.\) By 'reflection' is meant such consideration as determines the import of the teacher's words. Without this, though the instruction be heard, knowledge of the truth does not necessarily follow; for it is written, that, though hearing the instruction of Prajāpati, Virochana, as

\[\text{मिति एकदा तु कृडया परिश्रान्ता राजानं प्रमख कृत ज्ञातित। राजापि समय विस्मृत जलमदर्शयत्। तत: सा भेकाराजदुहिता क्षामहन-पिण्यं मेकी भूसा जलं विवेष। ततथ राजा जालादिनिरन्विषापि न तामविन्दर्दित।} \]

\[\text{श्रवणवदुःवाच्यमीमांसाया अष्टावधयक्कं इतिहासमाह} \]

\[\text{Ⅰ परमशेषौ गुरुव्यवहारस्तत्त्वं निश्चितयो विबचारं। तं विनोपदेशाश्रवणेऽपियं तत्त्वार्थनियमो नास्ति प्रजापतेश्वरस्तत्वं श्रीमृद्विरोचनो-चन्योमेष्यं विरोचनस्य परमशेषभावेन विचि-भार्युत्तित्यथाः।} \]

\[\text{Ⅱ तत्त्वार्थो निदमन्यस्य: परामर्शः। तद्विरूः विरोचनोमेष्यं परामर्शं इदंस्य उत्तेष्यथः।} \]

\[\text{सम्प्रदानार्थिना च गुरुत्वा वहकालं कर्ते-वीत्याह।} \]

\[\text{Ⅲ एकदा तु कृडया परिश्रान्ता राजानं प्रमख कृत ज्ञातित। राजापि समय विस्मृत जलमदर्शयत्। तत: सा भेकाराजदुहिता क्षामहन-पिण्यं मेकी भूसा जलं विवेष। ततथ राजा जालादिनिरन्विषापि न तामविन्दर्दित।} \]

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\[\text{१ Vedánti Mahádeva has simply नोपदेशश्रवणं. \textit{Ed.}}\]

\[\text{२ The reading of Aniruddha is कृतकृत्य। \textit{Ed.}}\]

\[\text{३ See the \textit{Chhádáguna Upanishad}, viii., viii., 4. \textit{Ed.}}\]

\[\text{४ Of this further. \textit{Aph. 18. Of those two, it \textit{reflection.}} was seen in the case of Indra \textit{only}.} \]

\[\text{५ And he tells us, that, by him who desires to understand thoroughly, attendance on the teacher should be practised for a long time.} \]
The process requires

Aph. 19. Having performed reverence, the duties of a student, and attendance, one has success after a long time; as in his case.

a. 'As in his case.' That is to say: as in the case of Indra, so in the case of another, too, only after having practised, under a preceptor, reverence, study of the Vedas, service, &c., is there 'success,' i.e., the revelation of truth; not otherwise.

Aph. 20. There is no determination of the time; as in the case of Vāmadeva.

a. In the arising of knowledge, there is 'no determination of the time,' as, for instance, in its taking place only from causes dependent on the senses. 'As in the case of Vāmadeva.' That is to say: as, in consequence of causes pertaining to a previous life, knowledge arose, in the case of Vāmadeva, even when in embryo, so it may in the case of another.

Aph. 21. Through devotion to something under a superinduced form, [attainment to, or approach towards, knowledge takes place] by degrees; as in the case of those who devote themselves to sacrifices.

a. Supply 'there is attainment.' Through devotion to Souls, e.g., Brahmā, Vishnu, Śiva, under the forms superinduced on them, the effecting of knowledge takes place 'by degrees;' i.e., by the successive attainment of

\[\text{अनिमित्तं व्रतः, अविवर्त्तितकम्} \]

\[\text{भवतीत्वा} \]

1 तत्तत । इत्येकान्यासायिष्ठु गुरु प्रश्नतिवेदाध्यायसे वैवधर्मोक्षं सिद्धिस्वरूपितं भूतत्त्वं नात् ॥

2 Aniruddha seems to intend, as an aphorism, after No. 20, these words: वामदेवस्य तत्त्वद्वानालिनिं मुक्तिददैनात् ।. But perhaps there has been tampering with the text, on the part of copyists. Ed.

3 See the Aitareya Upanishad, ii., iv., 6. Ed.

4 ऐतिहासिकाणाथान्नव भवतीत्वा विद्वानविद्वानोदये का-
the worlds of Brahmá, &c., or else through the purification of the Good principle, &c., but not directly; as is the case with sacrificers [whose slaughter of animals, requiring to be expiated, throws them back, so far, in the road to emancipation]: such is the meaning. 1

b. He tells us, that, moreover, there is no certainty that successive rise to the worlds of Brahmá, &c., would effect knowledge: 3

Aph. 22. Moreover, after the attainment of what [like the world of Brahmá.] is other [than the state of emancipated soul], there is return [to mundane existence]; because it is written [in the 5th Prapáthaka of the Chhándogya Upanishad 4]: ‘From conjunction with the five fires there is birth,’ &c.

a. He exhibits an illustration, to the effect that the effecting of knowledge takes place only in the case of him who is free from passion: 1

विरञ्ज्येव हेयहानमुपादृयोपादान 2 इंसधीरवत्

|| 23 ||

Discrimination illustrated.

Aph. 23. By him who is free from passion what is to be left is left, and what is to be taken is taken; as in the case of the swan and the milk.

a. That is to say: only by him who is free from passion is there a quitting ‘of what is to be left,’ i.e., of Nature, &c., and a taking ‘of what is to be taken,’ i.e., of Soul; as it is only the swan,—and not the crow, or the like,—that, out of milk and water mingled, by means of leaving the unimportant water, takes the valuable milk,” [as the Hindus insist that it does].

represent that the original of the words ‘From conjunction,’ &c., is found, literally, in the Chhándogya Upanishad. Ed.

1 ज्ञानिनिर्विचारं विरञ्ज्येव सन्धिनिर्ज्ञे निर्ध्यैनकां

2 Vijnána, according to some MSS, has, peculiarly, हेयहान-मुपादृयोपादान; and his comment, in those MSS., follows, this reading. Ed.

3 विरञ्ज्येव हेयानां प्रकृतानां हानमुपः

One of my copies of Aniruddha omits छाप after इतरलाभ. Ed.

This reference is taken from Vijnána, who, however, does not
6. He tells us that both of these also take place in consequence of association with a perfect\(^1\) man:\(^2\)

\[\text{लम्बातिशमयोगाराष्टर्} \text{ तर्क} \parallel २४ \parallel\]

Benefit of good society. *Aph. 24. Or through association with one who has obtained excellence,\(^4\) as in the case thereof.*

\(\text{a. That is to say: moreover, from association with him by whom ‘excellence,’ i.e., excellence in knowledge, has been obtained, the aforesaid [discrimination] takes place; just as in the case of the swan, [§ 23]; as, in the case of Alarka,\(^4\) Discrimination manifested itself spontaneously, merely through simple association with Dattātreya.}\(^4\)

\(\text{b. He tells us that we ought not to associate with those who are infected with desire.}\(^4\)

\[\text{न बान्धवारितं रागोपहते} \text{ शुक्वत} \parallel २५ \parallel\]


\(3\) Nāgadesa utita चा. Ed.

\(4\) See the विक्रमंडलपुरंद्वा, ch. xvi. Ed.

\[\text{श्रव्यपुष्कड़ायत्तमेऽभवतीत्वा} \parallel\]

\[\text{सिद्धपुष्कड़ायत्तमेऽभवतीत्वा} \parallel\]

\(\text{Of this further.} \text{ *Aph. 26. [Else he may become] bound, by conjunction with the cords; as in the case of the parrot.}\)

\(\text{a. And, in the case of associating with those persons, he may become bound, ‘by conjunction with the cords,’ i.e., by conjunction with their Desire, &c., [the Qualities, cunningly compared to cords]; just ‘as in the case of the}\)

\[\text{रागोपहते} \text{ पुष्क्रमे कामतः} \text{ सज्जन न कर्त्याम्} \parallel\]

\[\text{शुक्वत} \text{ यथा} \text{ शुक्कपरी महाराज} \text{ इति} \text{ कृत्या} \allowbreak \text{ कामचारां} \text{ न करोति} \text{ रुपजातो वर्षनन्यायेण} \allowbreak \text{दिःप्तयेऽ} \parallel\]

\(3\) रागित्सङ्गे तु दोषनामः \parallel

\(3\) All the commentators but Vijnāna read बच्यः, instead of नृतः. Ed.
parrot; that is to say, just as the bird [called a] parrot becomes bound by the cords, i.e., the ropes, of the hunter.

6. He determines, by two [aphorisms], the means of [effecting] dispassion.4

न भोगाद्रागशान्तिमुनिवत् II २७ II

 Means of dispassion. Aph. 27. Not by enjoyment is desire appeased; as in the case of the saint.

a. That is to say: as, in the case of the saint, Saubhari, desire was not appeased by enjoyment, so, also in the case of others, it is not.

b. But, further: 5

दोषद्रेणादुभयो: II २८ II

Of this further. Aph. 28. From seeing the fault of both.

1 तेषां सङ्गे तु गुणोगणेरागादियोगाः स्वामुक्तवदन्व यथा मुक्कपमी आयस्य गुणे रक्षुभिंवेः भवति तदा प्रदेशः II

2 वैग्राम्यस्वाध्यायमेवत्वदायित्वम भाष्याम् II

3 See the Vijnana-purana, Book iv., Ch. ii. and iii. Ed.

4 यथा मुने सिम्बेरेंगांच ग्रामस्थानिर्मूदेव मेघेसामायो न भवतीत:य: II

5 ऋषि तु II

a. That is to say: only 'from seeing the fault,' e.g., of being changeable, of consisting of pain, &c., 'of both,' i.e., of Nature and her productions, does the appeasing of desire take place; just as in the case of the saint [§ 27]. For it is written, that Saubhari, just from seeing the evil of society, was afterwards dispassionate.

b. He tells us that incompetency even to accept instruction attaches to him who is infected with the fault of desire, &c.: 6

न मलिनचेतांस्यपदेश्वरीज्ञानोद्देशावत् II २९ II

Agitation excludes instruction. Aph. 29. Not in the case of him whose mind is disturbed does the seed of instruction sprout; as in the case of Aja.

a. In him whose mind is disturbed by desire, &c., not even does a sprout spring up from that seed of the tree of knowledge which is in the shape of instruction. 'As in the case of Aja.' That is to say: as not a sprout from

1 उभयो: प्रकृतिकार्योऽऽ: परिशास्मिदुः स्व-लक्ष्याद्रागशान्तिमुनिवति मुनि-वदेश्वरीज्ञानोद्देशावत् सङ्गे भवति। सभृदिहो स्वाद्रागशान्तिमुनि-वदेश्वरीज्ञानो न भवति। II

2 रागाद्रागशान्तिमुपत्स्योपदेश्वरीज्ञानोद्देशावत् सङ्गे भवति। II

3 Vijnana, according to some MSS., has मलिनचेतांस्यपदेश्वरीज्ञानोद्देशावत्. One of my MSS. of Amiruddha has मलिने. Ed.
the seed of instruction, though delivered to him by Va-
sishtha, sprung up in the king named Aja, whose mind
was disturbed by grief for his wife.\(^1\)

\(b\). What need of more?\(^2\)

\(\text{nābhāṣāsāṁvāyām mālinānārayaḥ} \|| 30 ||

\(\text{Of this further.} \) \(\text{Aph. 30.} \) Not even a mere semblance
[of this true knowledge arises in him
whose mind is disturbed]; as in the case of a foul mirror.

\(a\). Even superficial knowledge does not arise, from
instruction, in one whose mind is disturbed, through the
obstruction caused by its wandering away, e.g., to other
objects; as an object is not reflected in a foul mirror,
through the obstruction caused by the impurities: such is
the meaning.\(^3\)

\(1\) \text{उपदेशक्रमं यज्ञानवृत्तस्य चीर्जः तस्मात्रहरो}-
\text{दपिर रागादिमनिविषिष नोतथाते} \| \text{अजवत्} \|
\text{ययाजनाभि नूपे भोगिनोकम्मलिनविषि} \|
\text{वसिष्टनोक्ष्याऽपदेशवीरस्य नाक्षुर उपच संयरु} \|
\(2\) \text{See Kālidāsa's \textit{Rājaviṃśa}, Book viii.} \(\text{Ed.}\)
\(3\) \text{किं च बहुः} \|

\(\text{खापात्ज्ञानमयि मलिनचेतस्यपदेशवाच जायते विषयान्तरसङ्करारादिमः प्रति भवाध्या मलिनां} \|
\text{प्रतिभासाम्मलिनान्नपदेशवाचो न प्रतिनियति तत्र-} \|
\text{दिक्षायः} \|

\(\text{5. Or, if knowledge should spring up in any kind of} \)
\text{way, still it may not, he tells us, be in accordance with}
\text{the instruction:} \(^1\)

\(\text{n तस्मादशास्त्रायु तथूपनं पद्यवत्त} \|| 31 ||

\(\text{Aph. 31.} \) Not, even though sprung
therefrom, is that \([\text{knowledge, necessarily,}]\) in accordance therewith; like
the lotus.

\(a\). Though sprung \('\text{therefrom,'}\) i.e., \text{from instruction,}
\text{knowledge is not [necessarily,]} \text{in accordance with}
\text{the instruction, in case this has not been entirely under-
stood. 'Like the lotus.' That is to say: just as the}
\text{lotus, though the seed be of the best, is not in accordance}
\text{with the seed, when the mud is faulty. The mind of the}
\text{student is compared to the mud }\(4\) \text{[in which the lotus-seed}
\text{was sown].} \)

\(1\) \text{यदि का यज्ञाक्रमं विष्णू जायते तत्साध्य-}
\text{पदेशानुस्य} \| \text{न भवे दिक्षाय}\|
\(3\) \text{Vedānti Mahādeva reads तस्मादशास्त्रायु.} \(\text{Ed.}\)
\(5\) \text{Aniruddha has पद्यज्ञादिवत्त.} \(\text{Ed.}\)

\(\text{‘तस्मादरुपदेशात्शाश्चात्शास्त्रायु ज्ञानोपदेशानु-} \)
\text{रुप्तनं न भवति सामध्यानवोधात} \| \text{पद्य-} \|
\text{वत्त} \| \text{यथा नीयोऽपयुपश्चायिष्यानु-} \|
\text{रुप्तापपहजाम} \| \text{न भवति ततदिक्षायः} \| \text{पद्य-} \|
\text{शानीमेव विषयविषयम्} \|
6. But then, since the Soul's end is, indeed, gained by [the attainment of] supernatural power in the worlds [§ 21. a.] of Brahmā, &c., to what purpose is the effecting of knowledge, with so much toil, for liberation? To this he replies:—

न "मृत्युयोगेर्गिर्" कृतकृयतोपास्यसिद्धिवद्युपास्य-सिद्धिवत्॥ ३२॥

Aph. 32. Not even on the attainment of glorification has that been done which was to be done; as is the case with the perfection of the objects worshipped, as is the case with the perfection of the objects worshipped.

a. Even though one attain to supernatural power, 'that has not been done which was to be done,' i.e., the end has not been gained; because it is attended by the grief of deficiency and excess. 'As is the case with the perfection of the objects worshipped.' That is to say: as, though the possession of perfection [so called], belongs to 'the objects

1 एपेर्योगेर्गिर् कृतकृयता कृतार्थता नास्ति क्षयात्वशुद्धितुसैनुमाणि। उपास्यसिद्धिवत्।
यापस्यानां ब्रह्मादृश्यं सिद्धियोगेर्गिर्न कृतकृय-तत्तात्त्विनामिनिमयοगानिर्द्वादी योगायाचार्यमन्वितात्।
तथेत तदुपासनाय प्राप्ताः देश्येवेश्यायपूर्वः।

2 इति विद्वानभिभूतितिर्मृत्तिः ब्राह्मचर्यम-चन्द्रस्य भाष्य आङ्ग्याविभाष्यायन्त्॥

END OF BOOK IV.
BOOK V.

The tenets of his Institute are completed. Next is begun a Fifth Book, in order to set aside the prima facie notions of others in regard to his Institute. Among those, in the first place he disposes of the objection that the Benediction implied by the expression ‘Well,’ in the first Aphorism [of Book I.], is purposeless:

The [use of a] Benediction, which we made, is proved to be proper to be made, by these proofs: such is the Benediction implied by the expression ‘Well,’ in the first Aphorism [of Book I.], is purposeless.

a. That is to say: it is not proper [to suppose] the effectuation of the change [of the elements] into the shape of the [appropriate] fruit of works, on the ground that the cause is ‘governed by a Lord;’ because it is possible for

1 अनिरुच्दा has, instead of चुनितो, भूनितो. Vide supra.

2 For another rendering, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 78. Ed.

3 Aniruddha’s reading is परास्परिपक्व, and Velânti Mahadeva has सदाप्रभुसंपर्कितम्. Ed.
the fruit to be effected by the works [i.e., the merit and
demerit.] alone, which are indispensable; [and, if we do
make the additional and cumulus supposition of a Lord,
he cannot reward a man otherwise than according to
his works].

b. He declares, further, in [several] aphorisms, that it
is not the case that the Lord is the giver of fruit:

स्तोपकारादिधिः लोकवत् ॥ ३ ॥

The supposed Lord [Ed.]

Aph. 3. [If a Lord were governor,
then] from intending his own benefit,
his government [would be selfish], as is the case [with or-
dinary governors] in the world.

a. If the Lord were the governor, then his government
would be only for his own benefit; as is the case [with or-
dinary rulers] in the world: such is the meaning.

b. In reply to the doubt, ‘grant that the Lord, also, be
benefited: what harm? ’ he says:

लोकीकोषवदितरथा ॥ ४ ॥

And, therefore, not the Lord spoken of:

Aph. 4. [He must, then, be] just
like a worldly lord, [and] otherwise
[than you desire that we should conceive of him].

a. If we agree that the Lord, also, is benefited, he, also,
must be something mundane, ’just like a worldly lord;’
because, since his desires are [on that supposition,] not
[previously] satisfied, he must be liable to grief, &c.: such
is the meaning.

b. In reply to the doubt, ‘be it even so,’ he says:

पारिवारिको वा ॥ ५ ॥

The difficulty perhaps originates in a mistaken
expression.

Aph. 5. Or [let the name of Lord
be] technical.

a. If, whilst there exists also a world, there be a Lord,
then let yours, like ours, be merely a technical term for

Ⅰ भवतिवर्षापुपुकार: का क्षतिरिव्याश-
झाल ॥

Ⅱ ईशरस्य फलदातृत्वं न घटतेपित्याग सूक्त: ॥

Ⅲ ईशरस्य धिष्ठातृत्वे स्तोपकारार्थेव लोकव-
दिधिः लोकितोत्यः ॥

Ⅳ तत्तैव भवतिव्याशझाल ॥
that soul which emerged at the commencement of the creation; since there cannot be an eternal lordship, because of the contradiction between mundaneness and the having an unobstructed will: such is the meaning.¹

b. He states another objection to the Lord’s being the governor:²

न रागौर्ते ³तत्तिद्व: प्रतिनियतकारणावत् ।

Objection to there being a Lord. ⁴

Aph. 6. This [position, viz., that there is a Lord,] cannot be established without [assuming that he is affected by] Passion; because that is the determinate cause [of all energizing].

a. That is to say: moreover, it cannot be proved that he is a governor, unless there be Passion; because Passion is the determinate cause of activity.⁵

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¹ संसारस्वतो वेदीश्वरस्तहि सगोर्युच्छन्नपुष्ये
परिभाषामाधुरमस्सकामिव भवतामपि स्यास्सारी
रिनात्मात्त्वातत्स्ययोगविधात्रीश्चालिः।

² इश्वरस्वयभिषात्वे बाधकालस्तमह।

³ जगलिद्व: is the lection of Vedánti Mahádeva, in the text, and also in the comment. Ed.

⁴ कि च रागं विना नाधिकालिते सिद्धिति
प्रवृत्ती रागस्य प्रतिनियतकारणावत्यथः।

⁵ तथापि परिवर्तना नित्यावर्ते ॥ तथापि ॥

b. But then, be it so, that there is Passion in the Lord, even. To this he replies:⁶

तद्योगोकथा न नित्यावर्ते: ॥ ७ ॥

This objection, further.

Aph. 7. Moreover, were that [Passion] conjoined with him, he could not be eternally free.

a. That is to say: moreover, if it be agreed that there is conjunction [of the Lord] with Passion, he cannot be eternally free; and, therefore, thy tenet [of his eternal freedom] is invalidated.²

b. Pray [let us ask], does lordship arise from the immediate union, with Soul, of the wishes, &c., which we hold to be properties of Nature, [not properties of Soul]? Or from an influence by reason of the mere existence of proximity, as in the case of the magnet? Of these he condemns the former alternative:⁷

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¹ नन्देवमतु रागोपिष्टे ॥ तथापि ॥

² रागोपिष्टे स्वीकारमात्रे स नित्यावर्ते न
स्यात्तवथ ते सिद्धान्तहानिर्विश्यः ॥

³ एस्येव किं प्रधानार्थवेदनासम्बिनमतानामि
छादीनां साक्षादिव चेतनस्वभावत। किं चाय
कालमात्त्वनिधिनिधित्वाय, प्रेक्षान्तरिति।

तथापि परिवर्तना ॥

⁶ तथापि परिवर्तना ॥

⁷ तथापि परिवर्तना ॥
2. That is to say: if lordship is by reason of the mere existence of proximity, as in the case of the magnet [which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron], then it is settled, as we quite intend it should be, that even all men, indifferently, experience it in this or that [cycle of] creation, [may] have lordship; because it is only by conjunction with all experiencers, that Nature produces Mind, &c. And, therefore, your tenet of there being only one Lord is invalidated.¹

5. Be it as you allege; yet these are false reasonings; because they contradict the evidence which establishes [the existence of] a Lord. Otherwise, Nature, also, could be disproved by thousands of false reasonings of the like sort. He therefore says:²

1. योगाविद्यासङ्गम्यन्ति: is the reading of Vijñāna, in some MSS., and, in some, that of Nāgīra, who, however, in others, omits चेत. Ed.

2. प्राबन्धकाविचारानि: पुल्ले योगाविद्यसङ्गम्यन्ति

3. सत्ये वा यह

4. Some MSS. of Vijñāna exhibit, instead of सत्याविचार, सत्याविचार या, Ed.
a. Its establishment, i.e., the establishing that there is an eternal Lord. Of the Lord, in the first place, there is not sense-evidence; so that only the evidences of inference and of testimony can be offered; and these are inapplicable: such is the meaning.

b. The inapplicability he sets forth in two aphorisms.

**शुल्कभाष्य प्रधानकार्यकल्पः || १२ ||**

Denial that there is Scripture for it.

**Aph. 11. There is no inferential proof [of there being a Lord]; because there is [here] no [case of invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken].**

a. 'Association,' i.e., invariable concomitancy. 'There is none;' i.e., none exists, [in this case]. And so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord; because, in such arguments as, 'Mind, or the like, has a maker, because it is a product,' [the fact of] invariable concomitancy is not established; since there is no compulsion [that every product should have had an intelligent maker]. Such is the meaning.

b. He refutes, diffusely, by a cluster [of seven aphorisms], the opinion of an opponent in regard to that which was established in the first Section, viz., 'Bondage does not arise from Ignorance,' [conjoined with Soul].

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1. तस्सिद्धिनिर्वापितसिद्धः || ईश्वरे तात्तत्काल्यं नासिृथनुमानाचार्यं प्रमाधे वल्लभे ते च न सम्भवतः इयथः ||

2. असंवर्तवेत्त प्रतिपाद्यति मूच्छायाम् ||

3. व्याधित्वम्, here rendered, is regarded as a synonym of व्यव्धित्व, by which संबंधित, 'association,' is interpreted just above. Hence I have bracketed the words 'the fact of.' Ed.

4. नाविष्टो बन्ध इति मल्लिद्वारित्तं प्रथम-पादे तत्र परमतं विस्तरतः प्रधानकार्यवचनोद्ययति ||

5. Read, instead of 'by a cluster,' &c., 'by enunciations.' Vide p. 254, note 4, supra. Ed.

6. Padā, here used for adhyāga, which the translator renders by 'Book.' For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, vide supra, p. 24. Ed.
Aph. 13. With that which is solitary there cannot be conjunction of the property of Ignorance.

a. Since Soul has no association [with anything whatever], it is plainly impossible for it to be united with the property of Ignorance.  

b. But then, [it may be replied,] what is to be asserted is, that the conjunction of Ignorance is simply through force of Ignorance [which is a negation, or nonentity]; and so, since this is no reality, there is no association occasioned thereby. To this he replies:  

Aph. 14. Since the existence of this [alleged negative Ignorance] is established [only] on the ground of its [pretended] conjunction, there is a vicious circle.  

a. And, if it is by the conjunction of Ignorance that Ignorance is established, there is a vicious circle, [literally, a resting of each on the other, alternately], a resting a thing on itself, or, in short, a regressus in infinitum.  

b. In reply to the doubt [suggested by the Naiyāyika], ‘but then, as in the case of seed and sprout, the regressus in infinitum is no objection,’ he replies:  

The world has a beginning.

a. There cannot belong to it such a regressus in infinitum as that of seed and sprout; because there is Scripture for the fact that the mundane state of souls, consisting of all undesirable things, viz., Ignorance, &c., had a beginning. For we hear, in Scripture, that these cease to exist at the dissolution of all things, in profound sleep, &c. Such is the meaning.  

b. But then, [you Vedanta will say], according to us, Ignorance is technically so termed, and is not, e.g., in 

1 अविद्यायोगादिविद्यस्मृतिः चात्मकोश्यापन alma-tradgitya,  
2 नतृतं चिकित्सेऽवज्ञात्वेतर्भूतविद्या न दौरातेऽस्य- 
3 बीजाक्षुरवदन्तिः  
4 चात्मकोश्यापन सर्वविद्याधिकलिङ्गाय:  
5 प्रलयस्यप्रकाशेऽविद्याधिलक्ष्यादित्वनु:  
6 चात्मकोश्यापन सर्वविद्याधिकलिङ्गाय::
the shape, specified by the *Yoga*, of supposing what is not soul to be soul; and so, just like your *Nature*, since this [Ignorance] of ours has an unbroken eternity, though it be lodged in Soul, there is no disarrangement of the solitari-ness thereof: in regard to this doubt, having deliberated on this artificial sense of the word 'Ignorance,' he objects to it:¹

विद्यातोभ्यः बलवधप्रससः ॥ ७७ ॥

Soul and knowledge.  *Aph. 16.* Then Brahma would be found to be excluded [from existence]; because he is something else than knowledge.

1. If the meaning of the word 'Ignorance' (*avidya*) be only 'otherness than knowledge,' then *Brahma*, so it itself, would be found to be excluded, to perish, through his being annihilable by knowledge; since he is other than knowledge: such is the meaning.² [Further]:

² One of my MSS. of Nagasa has विद्यात्म. *Ed.*

³ मस्खोः: found in some MSS. of Vijnana, is the reading of Aniruddha and of Nagasa. *Ed.*

⁴ यदि विद्यामलेवाविद्याश्यायं तस्मि ।

BOOK V., *Aph. 18.*

अध्याद्वेदग्निष्ठलयः ॥ ७८ ॥

Knowledge, not excluding ignorance, would be resitless.

*Aph. 17.* Were there not exclusion, then there would be resitlessness.

a. But, if the existence of ignorance were really not excluded by knowledge, then there would be resitlessness of knowledge, because of its not debarring Ignorance, [which is the only result competent to knowledge]: such is the meaning.¹

b. He censures the other alternative,² [viz., that knowledge might exclude Soul]:

विद्याधान्यः जगातोप्लेवः ॥ ७८ ॥

On the Vedanta theory, the world ought to vanish.

*Aph. 18.* If it [Ignorance.] meant the being excludible by Knowledge, it would be [predictable], in like manner, of the world, also.

a. If, on the other hand, the being excludible by Knowledge, in the case of the soul, which possesses properties,

ज्ञानविर्योजतया च बाहुः ज्ञात्मान्तः स्थायो नानाशः प्रसज्यते विद्यविधिवादिर्यः ॥

¹ यदि लविद्यामलेवाविद्याश्चार्यं तस्मि ।

² पङ्क्तिनां दृष्टिष्ठित ॥
be, indeed, what is meant by the being Ignorance, in that case 'the world,' the whole mundane system, viz., Nature, Mind, &c., would, also, in like manner, be Ignorance. And so, the whole mundane system being merely Ignorance, since the Ignorance would be annihilated by one man's knowledge, the mundane system would become invisible to others, also. Such is the import.¹

Aph. 19. If it [Ignorance], were of that nature, it would be something that had a commencement.

a. Or suppose it to be the case, that to be Ignorance means simply the being excludible by Knowledge, still such a thing could not have had an eternal existence in souls [as held by Vedánta (see § 15, b.),] but must have had a commencement. For it is proved, by such re-

¹ यदि पुनर्विद्या चेतने धम्मिद्रि वाध्यन्मे-चाविद्यालमुच्यते तथा सति जगतः प्रकृतिम-
हदायासिलप्रज्ञाश्चार्यविद्याल्य स्यात। तथा
चात्मानप्रज्ञासैवविद्याल्य सत्येकत्य झानेना-
विद्यानायायाद्वियोऽपि प्रपञ्चो न दृष्येति तत्त्वः।

² Owing to a clerical defect, both my MSS. of Nāgāra's work omit this Aphorism, and also much of the comment preceding and following it. Ed.

BOOK, V. APH. 19.

cited texts as, 'Consisting of knowledge alone,'¹¹ &c., that, at the time of the universal dissolution, &c., the soul consists of Knowledge alone. Such is the meaning. Therefore, it is settled that there is no other Ignorance, annihilable by Knowledge, than that stated in the Yoga system; and this is a property of the understanding only, not a property of the soul.²

b. By a cluster of [six] aphorisms,³ he clears up the prima facie view of an opponent, in regard to that which was stated in the same Book [Book V., § 2], that Nature's energizing is due to Merit:

¹ Brihadāranyaka Upanishad, ii. 4, 12; or Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa, xiv., 6, 4, 12. Ed.

² Professor Gosgh has, 'a pure indifference of thought.' Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 153. Ed.

³ भवतु वा यथा कर्षचिद्विद्यावाध्यन्मे-विद्यां तथापि तद्भवत्वतुः सातिसेव पुरुषसि
नानादित्वं संवज्जित। विन्याग्नम एवेकमा
सूक्ष्मतिभि: प्रलयदी पुरुषसिविष्कालसिवि
धियः। तस्मात्त्रोद्धिनोद्दुःद्या नास्तिविद्या
झानाद्वियोऽपि प्रपञ्चो न दृष्येति तत्त्वः॥

⁴ Read, instead of 'by a cluster,' &c., 'by enunciations.' Ed.

⁵ अन्यवायाये कर्षीनिमित्ता प्रधानमवृत्तिरीति
यदृः तत् परपूर्वस्य समाचारे प्रस्तुतेन॥

⁶ Owing to a clerical defect, both my MSS. of Nāgāra's work omit this Aphorism, and also much of the comment preceding and following it. Ed.
Aph. 20. There is no denying Merit; because of the diversity in the operations of Nature.

a. Merit is not to be denied on the ground of its being no object of sense; because it is inferred; since, otherwise, the diversity in the operations of Nature [accommodating one person, and inconveniencing another] would be unaccounted for: such is the meaning.

b. He states further proof, also:

Aph. 21. It [the existence of Merit] is established by Scripture, by tokens, &c.

a. He shows to be a fallacy the argument of the opponent, that Merit exists not, because of there being no sense-evidence of it:

Aph. 22. There is, here, no necessity; for there is room for other proofs.

a. That is to say: there is no necessity that a thing of which there is no mundane sense-evidence must be non-existent; because things are subject to other proofs.

b. He proves that there exists Demerit, as well as Merit:

Aph. 23. It is thus, moreover, in both cases.

a. That is to say: the proofs apply to Demerit, just as they do to Merit.

Aph. 24. If the existence [of Merit]

be as of course, [because, otherwise, something would be unaccounted for], the same is the case in respect of both.

a. But then, merit is proved to exist by a natural consequence in this shape, viz., that, otherwise, an injunction
would be unaccounted for; but there is none such in respect of demerit: so how can Scriptural or logical argument be extended to demerit? If any one says this, it is not so; since there is proof, in the shape of natural consequence, 'it is alike, in respect of both,' i.e., of both merit and demerit; because, otherwise, a prohibitory injunction, such as, 'He should not approach another's wife,' would be unaccounted for. Such is the meaning. 1

b. He repels the doubt, that, if Merit, &c., be acknowledged [to exist], then, in consequence of souls' having properties, &c., they must be liable to modification, &c.: 3

अन्तःकरणधर्मवधमानदीनाम् ॥ २५ ॥

Merit, &c., here is what.

Apâ. 25. It is of the internal organ [not of soul] that Merit, &c., are the properties.

1 नन्दुनिधिनयानुपपस्विशृष्ट्यापस्या धम्म- सिद्धि: सा च नास्त्यधम्म्र: शित अथ चित्तविशेष- तिदेशयथं शित चेघ यत्: समानमश्रोधीम- धर्मेऽयोगशाखिः प्रमाणमति परदनार गंधे- दिति निषेधपिवध्यशाखुपपस्विशेषयः ॥

2 नन्दु धम्मादिहं चेस्वीकृतं तत्ततं पुह्वादा धम्मादिहत्रोणं परिशास्त्रायपस्विर्भावश्च परिहृतं ॥

3 The 'great internal organ' (mahaś), called also baddhī, is here referred to. See Book I, Aph. 64, a. Aniruddha's comment runs:

a. In the expression ' &c. ' are included all those that are stated, in the Pâñâbâka Institute, as peculiar qualities of soul. 1

b. In the objection, that the existence of an internal organ, as well as of the Qualities from which such might arise, is debarred by Scripture, he replies:

गुणादीनां च नास्त्यधम्मव: ॥ २६ ॥

Apâ. 26. And of the Qualities, &c.,

The Qualities exist, there is not absolute debarment.

a. The Qualities, viz., Purity, &c., and their properties, viz., happiness, &c., and their products, also, viz., Mind, &c., are not denied essentially, but are denied only adjunctively in respect of soul; just as we deny that heat [in red-hot iron] belongs to the iron. 3

b. In regard to the doubt, 4 Why, again, do we not deny
them an essence, as we do to what is meant by the words sleep, wish, &c. He says: 1

"पञ्जाभवयोगाल्कसंविििः" II 27 II

The above thesis arises. Aph. 27. By a conjunction of the five members [of an argumentative statement] we discern [that] Happiness [exists].

a. Here, in order to get a particular subject of his assertion, he takes happiness alone, one portion of the matter in dispute, as a representative of the entire matter. But the better reading is, 'we discern [that] Happiness &c., [exist].' The five members of an argumentative statement are the Proposition, Reason, Example, Synthesis [of the two premises], and Conclusion; and, by the 'conjunction,' i.e., the combination, of these, all things viz., Happiness, &c., are proved to exist. Such is the meaning. 4

1 बुतः पुनः स्वस्तपत एव बाधो न भवति स्प्यमाणोरशादिपदार्शीवद्वित्याख्यायामाह ||

3 One of my MSS. of Asiruddha has संयोगात् Ed.

3 Nagesa has सुखादिसंवििििः, the lection which, according to Vijnâna, is to be preferred. Ed.

4 ऋष विशिष्ठ पश्चीकरणाय विवादविभूषयकादशास्त्रयुक्तम् सुखमादतस्वयं सर्वविष्ण्योपलक्षकम् सुखादिसंवििििः पाणसमृये भवते। पञ्जाभवयोगाल्कसंविििः प्रतिशाहुतदाहरणोपष्पनयिन्ध-
The Sāṃkhyā Aphorisms.

Aph. 28. Not from once apprehending is a connexion established.

1. That is to say: from once apprehending concomitance [of a supposed token and the thing betokened], a ‘connexion,’ i.e., a pervadedness [or invariable attendedness of the token by the betokened] is not established; and frequency [of the same apprehension] follows [the rule of the single apprehension; just as a thousand times nothing amount to nothing]. Therefore [argues the sceptic,] since the apprehending of an invariable attendedness is impossible, nothing can be established by Inference. [This] he clears up:*

"नियतथमसाहिह्यसुभयोरेकतर्स्य वा भाषि:"

II 29 II

Aph. 29. Pervadedness is a constant consoication of characters, in the case of both, or of one of them.

1. ‘Consoication of characters,’ i.e., consoication in the fact of being characters [or properties of something]; in short, concomitance. And so we mean, that that concomitance is ‘pervadedness,’ [furnishing solid ground for inference...]

1 As suggestive of the correction here required, see Professor Cowell's Aphorisms of Śāṅkara, &c., p. 8, text and footnote. Ed.

2 सक्तसाहित्यान्तरिक्तत्त्वो भाषिणि सिद्धिति भृश्वं चाचान्तुगतम्। इतिषो भाषिपहस्तसहायत्वभाषामानसाहित्यमितिर्ययेः। समाचारे॥

3 Nagesha has, instead of नियते, निष्ठत्. Ed.

The validity of inference questioned.

ence], which is invariably non-errant, whether in the case of ‘both,’ the predicate and the reason, or in the case of ‘one of them,’ the reason only. ‘Of both’ is mentioned with reference to the case of ‘equal pervadedness’: [e.g., every equilateral triangle is equiangular, and, conversely, every equiangular triangle is equilateral]. And the invariableness may be apprehended through an appropriate confusion [or redemption ad absurdum of the denial of it]; so that there is no impossibility in apprehending ‘pervadedness,’ [and of inferring on the strength of it]. Such is the import.1

5. He declares that Pervadedness is not an additional principle, consisting, e.g., of some such power as is to be mentioned* [in § 31]:

न तथातरं वेस्तुकस्यनामस्यहँः॥ ३०॥

Aph. 30. It [Pervadedness] is not as some think (see § 31), an additional principle [over and above the twenty-five (Book I., § 61)]; for it is unsuitable to postulate entities [praeterea rationem].

1 धर्मसाहित्यं धर्मतः साहित्यं सहचार इति यावत्। तथा चोभयो साध्यायान्योरेकतरस्य साधनमानस्य वा नियतोभ्यार्यिते यः सहचार: स भाषिपरिक्षः। उभ्योरिति सम्मन्तीसिद्धि प्रोक्तम्। नियमभासुकलत्तेऽया इति न भाषिपहस्तसंहार इति भाष:॥

2 भाषिपहस्तसंहाराः भाषिपरिक्षः पदार्थात्तरं न भवतीलाह॥

Book V., Aph. 30.
a. 'Pervadedness' is not an entity other than a fixed con-

sociation of characters; because it is unsuitable to suppose,

further, some entity as the residence of what constitutes

'pervadedness.' But we consider that what constitutes

'pervadedness' belongs to extant things simply. Such is

the meaning.¹

b. He states the opinion of others:¹


A heterodox opinion

regarding 'Pervade-

ness.'

Aph. 31. [But certain] teachers say that it [Pervadedness,] is [another prin-

ciple, in addition to the twenty-five,]

resulting from the power of the thing itself.

c. But other teachers assert that 'Pervadedness' is, posi-

tively, a separate principle, in the shape of a species of

power, generated by the native power of the 'pervaded.'

But [they continue,] 'Pervadedness' is not simply a power

of the [pervaded] thing itself; else it would exist wherever

the thing is, [which 'pervadedness' does not do]. For

smoke, when it has gone to another place [than the point

of its origination], is not attended by fire; and, by going

into another place, that power is put an end to. Therefore

[contend these teachers,] there is no over-extension in the


¹ नित्यतर्मसाहित्याविदयतिः वत्तित्व शास्त्रविने भावति शास्त्रविनायकम् वल्लोडायित्वात्तित्त्वानसे-क्षतत्। अभासाभ्यतुति सत्त्वस्तुतन् एव शास्त्रविनायां काल्पितस्वतत्वात्।

² परस्मतत्त्वः

³ The translator’s ‘the Panchasikha’ I have everywhere cor-

rected. Ed.

⁴ This is to render vyāpyata, on which vide supra, p. 320,

note 3. Ed.

¹ अधिपरे वाचकोऽवध्येन्न्वशस्त्रविनायायकम् वल्लोडाविदयतिः नोस्तितानां वण्णविदयात्। अभासाभ्यिताविनायां काल्पितस्वतत्वात्।

२ स्मर्तवर्तीतिकालाविविख्यच्छन्नां धृतो विशेषायेषु इति भावः।
b. He himself explains the 'Tautology':

बिशेषधार्मिकार्थप्रसंस्तः II 38 II

The reason why.

Aph. 34. Because we should find the distinction unmeaning; [as Intellect does not differ from Nature at all, except as does the sustained from the sustainer]

a. This is almost explained by the preceding aphorism.4

b. He [Panchāsikha,] mentions another objection:

प्रज्ञानिद्धनुपपत्तेऽः II 34 II

A further reason.

Aph. 35. And because it [Pervadedness,] would not be reconcilable in shoots, &c.

a. Because shoots, &c., are invariably attended [at their origination,] by trees, &c. But this cannot be called simply an essential power [in the shoot]; because, since the essential power [that which belongs to the shoot as being a shoot,] does not depart, even in the case of an amputated shoot, we should, even then, find it attended [by the tree, which, however, no longer accompanies it]. Such is the sense. But the power [(see § 32), which consists in having the

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1 Pīnasthānāya svarāvitā varūyopātī
2 PurvaśŪcā eva Vikāyātāyaśayamānud
3 Tārakāntarāh
4 Aniruddha omits ċ. Ed.
character] of the ‘sustained’ is destroyed at the time of amputation; so that there is no ‘Pervadedness’ then. Such is the import.\footnote{1}

\textit{b.} But then what? Panchasikha says that ‘Pervadedness’ is not a result of any essential power. Then, since smoke is not sustained by fire [see § 32, where he contends that ‘sustainedness’ is what really expresses pervasion], it would turn out that it [viz., smoke] is not [as token of something that is betokened] accompanied by fire. To this he says:\footnote{2}

\textbf{Aph. 36.} Were it [thus] settled that it is a power of the ‘sustained,’ then, by the like argument, its dependence on an essential power, [as pretended by the heterodox teachers referred to in § 31, might be proved, also; and thus the argument proves nothing, since it proves too much].

\textit{a.} That is to say: ‘were it settled’ that ‘a power of the sustained’ constitutes the fact of ‘Pervadedness,’ it would be really settled ‘by the like argument,’ i.e., by parity of reasoning, that the fact of ‘Pervadedness’ results from essential power, also, [§ 31, \textit{a}.].\footnote{1}

\textit{b.} It was with a view to substantiate what was stated [in § 27], viz., that the Qualities, and the rest, are established [as realities,] by the employment of the five-membered [form of argumentative exposition], that he has repelled, by an exposition of ‘Pervadedness,’ the objection to Inference as evidence, [or as a means of attaining right notions].\footnote{1}

\textit{c.} Now, in order to establish the fact that \textit{words}, of which the five-membered [exposition] consists, are generators of knowledge, the objection of others to a \textit{word’s} being a means of right knowledge,\footnote{3} in the shape of [the objection

\footnote{1} अधिप्रक्षेपिक्षितिः

\footnote{2} न तु किं पञ्चशिलेन नित्यशक्तिकः आप्रियेय

\footnote{3} 'Being a means of right knowledge' here renders \textit{pramanya}, represented, just before, by 'as evidence.' \textit{Ed.}
of its being inadequate, is disposed of, by means of an exposition of the powers, &c., of words: 1

Aph. 37. The connexion between word and meaning is the relation of expressed and expresser.

a. To the ‘meaning’ belongs the power termed expressibility; to the ‘word,’ the power termed expression: simply this is their ‘connexion,’ their interrelation, as it were.

1 इत्यादिनि पञ्चाव्यक्तम् एव ज्ञातज्ञानकोविषयं शब्दाधिनिर्वचनं तदनुपासित्य शब्दप्रमाणे परेः वाक्यपापयाते ॥

Aph. 38. The connexion between a word and its sense is determined by three [means]

a. That is to say: the connexion [just] mentioned [in § 37] is apprehended by means of these three, viz., information from one competent [to tell us the meaning], the usage of the old man [whose orders to his sons we hear, and then observe what actions ensue, in consequence (see the Sāhītya-darpara, § 11)], and application to the same thing which has a familiar name, 4 [whence we gather the sense of the less familiar synonym].

or ‘anesthetic,’ of ghatahhāva, ‘non-existence of a jar,’ is ghatahhāva itself, and the pratiyogin, or ‘antithetic,’ of ghatahhāva is ghata, ‘jar.’  Ed.

1 अर्थां वाच्यस्य प्रक्षणः शब्दो वाचकात्मका शक्तिः सौंभूतिः सौंभूतिः संबंधो स्यायोगिताविद्यात् ॥ तत्तवान्नुण्योगिताविद्याविद्योपनिषद्वितिरित्वा ॥

2 Aniruddha has संबंधसिद्धि: .  Ed.

3 Aniruddha has संबंधसिद्धि: .  Ed.

4 आश्रयपदशो वृद्धश्चाय: प्रसिद्धपदसामान्यादिकर्षणमिल्लिका संबंधो गृहात इत्यादि ॥

Anuṣṭögaṇa and anuṣṭögaṇa, as Professor Cowell informs me, are the opposites of pratiyogin and pratiyogin, which latter I would represent, provisionally, by ‘antithetic’ and ‘antitheticity.’

Pratiyogin, a very much commoner technicality than anuṣṭögaṇa, occurs in the comment on Aph. 96 of this Book. It must suffice, here, to add, that, as I learn from Professor Cowell, the anuṣṭögaṇa,
Aph. 40. He who is accomplished in the secular [connexion of words with meanings] can understand the sense of the Veda.

Aph. 41. Not by the three [means mentioned in § 38, objects some one, i.e., the sense of the Veda be gathered]; because the Veda is superhuman, and what it means transcends the senses.

Aph. 42. Not so [i.e., what is meant by the Veda is not something transcending the senses]; because sacrifices, &c., are, in themselves, what constitutes merit, preeminently.

1 Aniruddha exhibits the reading तद्भस्मातारती विराम-नान्तः. Ed.
2 तत्त्वतीत्रिक्रियाष्टलमादि निराकरोति. Ed.
things, &c., whence what is enjoined in the Veda must be beyond intuition. Such is the meaning:

b. He repels also what was asserted [in § 41], viz., that, inasmuch as it [the Veda] is superhuman, there can be no instruction by any competent person, [in regard to its import]:

निजशक्तियेव व्यक्तव्य अवश्चिन्त्यते || ४३ ॥

Aph. 43. The natural force [of the terms in the Veda] is ascertained through the conversancy [therewith of those who successively transmit the knowledge].

a. But then, still, how can there be apprehension of the sense of Vaidic terms, in the case of gods, fruits [of actions], &c., which transcend sense? To this he replies:

1 यदृर्क तन्द्रावतो देववाक्यन्तरायामानुषीये प्रवचन एव धर्मावत || प्रवचनादश्च वै देवतावत्तीर्थितताः प्राणि ॥

2 यदृक्षमपीतेवतेनानायपेदमाभाव इति तदेक्ति निराकरते इति

3 ननु तथायतीतिन्द्रायदेवताभाव श्राविति वै देवकपदानां स्मृति ॥ तथाः

Aph. 44. This really takes place; because they [viz., the words] give rise to knowledge, in the case both of things adapted [to sense] and of things not [so] adapted.

a. He defines the peculiarities which belong to words, just because this matter is connected with the question of the power of words to cause right knowledge:

न नित्यवते वेदानां कार्यवेचुते ॥ ४५ ॥

Aph. 45. The Vedas are not from eternity; for there is Scripture for their being a production.

a. Then are the Vedas the work of [the Supreme] Man? To this he replies, 'No':

न पौर्णमिश्र तकल्लूः पुद्धस्ताभावात् ॥ ४६ ॥

1 Aniruddha, according to one of my MSS., has तस्मिन्. Ed.

2 श्रव्यामासुखस्थिनिवश्नः वधार्यति.

'Power to cause-right knowledge' is to render prāmāṇya. Ed.

* One of my MSS., of Aniruddha originally had वधार्यते.

'तथां किं पौर्णमिश्र वेदाः । नेतृवाहाः ॥

23
THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

Aph. 46. They [the Vedas] are not the work of [the Supreme] Man; because there is no such thing as the [Supreme] Man, [whom you allude to as being, possibly,]
their maker.

a. Suppose, 'because we deny that there is a Lord.'
[This is] simple.

b. Adverting to the anticipation that there may be some other author, he says:

Aph. 47. Since the liberated is un-suited [to the work, by his indifference], and the unliberated is so,
[by his want of power, neither of these can be author
of the Vedas].

a. But then, in that case, since they are not the work of [the Supreme] Man, it follows that they are eternal. To this he replies:

Aph. 48. As in the case of sprouts, &c., their eternity does not follow from their not being the work of [any Supreme] Man.

a. [This is] plain.

b. But then, since sprouts, &c., also, just like jars, &c., are productions, we must infer that they are the work of [the Supreme] Man. To this he replies:

तेषांपि तद्यथे दृष्टवाधादिप्रियः: ॥ ६५ ॥

Aph. 49. Were this the case with these, also, [i.e., if it were the case that vegetables were works], we should find a contradiction to experience, &c.

a. It is seen, in the world, as an invariable fact,* that whatever is the work of Man is produced by a body. This would be debarred, &c., were the case as you contend; [for we see no embodied Supreme Man to whose handiwork the sprouts of the earth can be referred]. Such is the meaning.

b. But then, since they were uttered by the Primal
marked that a thing is not Man's work merely through its having been uttered by Man; for no one speaks of the respiration during profound sleep as being Man's work, [or voluntary act]. But what need to speak of auccouse of Understanding? The Vedas, just like an expiration, proceed, of themselves, from the Self-existent, through the force of fate, wholly unprecedented by thought. Therefore, they are not [a Supreme] Man's work.\footnote{1}

\footnote{1} Dr. Ballantyne was misled by the ruin stop mistakenly put, in my edition of the Sādhaka-pravachana-bhāṣya, before विः तु. Ed.

\footnote{3} Instead of 'a thing is not Man's work,' &c., I have translated, in the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 65: 'Not from the mere fact of [its] being uttered by a person [can one say there is] producedness [of a thing] by [that] person; since it is not the wont to speak of the respiration of deep sleep as the production of a person: but, by [reason of its] production consciously, [a thing is said to be produced by a person.] The Vedas, however, just like an expiration, and by virtue of desert [of souls], issues, spontaneously, from Brahmā, without ever being consciously produced [by him]. Hence they are not productions of a person.'

\footnote{2} Instead of Vijñāna's expression, 'the idea of [its] being preceded by consciousness,' Nāgāra has: चुंबिपुर्वेक्षनात्मकम, 'the idea that [its] being made was preceded by consciousness,' i.e., the notion that it was produced aforethought.

\footnote{3} Instead of Vijnána's expression, 'the idea of [its] being preceded by consciousness,' Nāgāra has: चुंबिपुर्वेक्षनात्मकम, 'the idea that [its] being made was preceded by consciousness,' i.e., the notion that it was produced aforethought.

\footnote{4} Instead of Vijnána's expression, 'the idea of [its] being preceded by consciousness,' Nāgāra has: चुंबिपुर्वेक्षनात्मकम, 'the idea that [its] being made was preceded by consciousness,' i.e., the notion that it was produced aforethought.

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\footnote{6} Instead of Vijnána's expression, 'the idea of [its] being preceded by consciousness,' Nāgāra has: चुंबिपुर्वेक्षनात्मकम, 'the idea that [its] being made was preceded by consciousness,' i.e., the notion that it was produced aforethought.
6. But then, in that case, since they are not preceded by a correct knowledge of the sense of the sentences, the Vedas, moreover, like the speech of a parrot, can convey no right knowledge. To this he replies:

निजशक्याभिव्यक्तः स्तत्तः प्रामाण्यम् || 57 ||

The Vedas their own evidence.

Aph. 51. They are, spontaneously, conveyers of right knowledge, from the paternity of their own power [to instruct rightly].

a. That is to say: the authoritativeness of the very whole of the Vedas is established, not by such a thing as its being based on the enouncer’s knowledge of the truth, but quite ‘spontaneously;’ because, as for the Vedas’ ‘own,’ i.e., natural, power of generating right knowledge, thereof we perceive the manifestation in the invocations [which produce the result promised], and in the Medical Scripture, [the following of which leads to cures], &c.

b. And so there is the aphorism of the Nyaya [Book III., § 88]: ‘And [the fact of] its being a cause of right knowledge, like the validity of invocations, and the Medical Scripture;’ &c.

d. In regard to the proposition [laid down in § 26, viz.], ‘And of the [existence of the] Qualities, &c., there is not absolute debarment,’ there was duly alleged, and developed [under § 27], one argument, viz., by the establishing the existence of Happiness, &c. Now he states another argument in respect of that [same proposition]:

नासत: ख्यातं नृषुक्षवः || 58 ||

Cognition is evidence

Aph. 52. There is no Cognition of what is no entity, as a man’s horn.

1. The correct reading of the aphorism is मन्त्रायुवद्वच तत्प्रामाण्यमात्रप्रामाण्यमात्र। Ed.

2. वेदानां निजा स्वाभाविकी या वेदांश्व ज्ञानान्वितत्तस्या मन्त्रायुवद्वादाविभिन्नसःहल्यादिलवेदानामेव सत्त्वं यव प्रामाण्यं सिद्धिति न वेदांश्व ज्ञानान्वितत्तसःहल्यादिलवेदानामेव सत्त्वं यव प्रामाण्यं सिद्धिति। तथा च न्यायसूचनम्। मन्त्रायुवद्वादाविभिन्नसःहल्यादिलवेदानामेव सत्त्वं यव प्रामाण्यं सिद्धिति।

3. गुरुदानां च तत्त्वन्वाद इति प्रतिच्छायां न्यायेन सुभादिसिद्धितिलो हेतुप्रयत्न: प्रप- च्छित्वा। साम्यात तत्त्वाये वेदानामेव हेतुप्रयत्न:\

Ed.
a. Be it, moreover, that the existence of pleasure, &c., is proved by the reasoning [under § 27]; it is proved by mere consciousness, also. Of pleasure, &c., were they absolutely nonentities, even the consciousness could not be accounted for; because there is no cognition of a man's horn, and the like. Such is the meaning.¹

b. But then, [interposes the Naiyāyika,] if such be the case, let the Qualities, &c., be quite absolutely real; and then, in the expression 'not absolute debarment' [in § 26], the word 'absolute' is [superfluous, and, hence,] unmeaning. To this he replies:²

接入性理論家 總結書 53

Aph. 53. It is not of the real [that there is no discrimination]; because exclusion is seen [of the Qualities].

a. It is not proper [to say], moreover, that the cognizance of the Qualities, &c., is that of the absolutely real; because we see that they are excluded [and not admitted

¹ अत्यन्तसारस्य गुणादेभानं न युक्तं विनाशादिकालं वायुदेशनात् ||

² नवेकसमपि सदस्यं भवमेव जगज्ञवतु तथायथावत्सात्ताव्यंपराविति तत्राह ||

³ सत्यनासक्षेत्र चार्यविनेती तादेश्यस्मापि भानं न घटते तद्भवातितःस्मार्बस्तमसरसिद्धिः रितवः। वृद्धानुसारेश्च कल्पनाया चौितिष्ठित्वा भावः।
The Sanksarya Aphorisms.

But then, on that showing, do you really approve of [the Nyaya notion of] ‘cognizing otherwise,’ [or our fancying that nature to belong to one, which belongs to another]? He replies, ‘No’:

नायाध्यायति स्वखोज्यातात् । ॥ ॥

Aph. 55. There is no such thing as cognizing otherwise [or cognizing that as belonging to one, which belongs to another]; because your own proposition is self-destructive.

A Nyaya view rejected.

a. This, also, is not proper [to be said], viz., that one thing appears under the character of another thing [e.g., a rope, under the character of a serpent, for which it may be mistaken, in the dusk]; because your own proposition is self-destructive. Of another nature [e.g., snakehood], in a different thing [e.g., a rope], equivalence to a man's horn, is [what is virtually] expressed by the word ‘otherwise’ [than the truth; both a man’s horn, and the presence of snakehood in a rope mistaken for a snake, being, alike, otherwise than real]; and [yet] its cognition [thus] otherwise is asserted, [as if that could be cognized which is equivalent to what can not be cognized]: hence your own

6. नायाध्यायति स्वखोज्यातात् । नेत्याह ॥

Dr. Goldstücker, in his Saksit Dictionary, erroneously speaks of anyathā-khyāti as if it were a technicality of the Sanksarya philosophy, and quotes, by way of proof, the aphorism to which this note is appended. Ed.

3. In one of my MSS. of Aniruddha was, originally, -वाधात्, instead of -वाधात्. Ed.

4. See Book III., Aphorism 65, at p. 267, supra. Ed.

Proposition is self-destructive. For even those who contend for ‘cognizing otherwise’ [as one mode of cognition] declare that the cognition of what does not exist is impossible. Such is the meaning.

b. Expounding what he had said above, [in § 26, ‘not absolute debarment,’ he sums up his doctrine:]

सदसत्यातिर्भिप्रधायात् ॥ ॥

Summing up.

Aph. 56. They [the Qualities] are cognized rightly or wrongly, through their being denied and not denied [appropriately or otherwise].

a. All the Qualities, &c., ‘are cognized rightly and

1 अन्यत्यथाभोपेत भासत द्विपि न युृत्त स्व- 

वधायतात् । अन्यत्यथाभोपेत नृृृत्ततुल्य- 

नमस्त्यायाश्चतेतिद्याः च तस्य भानमुखत 

इति स्वतः एव आत्मस । इस्तो भानसभ- 

स्वच्छायायातिवादिनिर्विवनादिनिर्विवन ॥

The text followed, in this paragraph, is, throughout, very inferior; and the rendering of it also calls for some alteration. Especially, as to the original, अन्यत्यथा can copy an error of the press, my correction of which to अन्यथा was not heeded. See, for the purer text, pp. 23, 24, of the Appendix to my edition of the Sanksya-pravachana-bhashya. Ed.

3 नायाध्याय इति वृद्धि चिव्रृक्ष: स्वतिक- 

शालमुखसंहतिः॥
wrongly.' How? 'Through their being denied and not denied.' There is non-denial, as far as regards their existence at all; because all things [and things are made up of the Qualities] are eternal. But there is denial, relatively, in Soul, of all things; just as is the case with the imaginary silver, for example, in a pearl-oyster, &c., or with the redness, &c., in crystal, &c., [which has no redness, without its following that redness, altogether and everywhere, is non-existent].

6. This investigation is concluded. Now the consideration of Words, it having presented itself in this connexion, is taken in hand incidentally, at the end. [the Sāṅkhya not allowing to Testimony a coordinate rank with Sense and Inference]:

The Sāṅkhya theory of

Aph. 57. A word does not consist of [what the Yogas call] the 'expresser' (ekpoṣṭa); by reason both of cognizance [which would disprove the existence of such imaginary

1 सदसभयाति सर्वेऽगुष्यादिनाम्। कुतः।

2 वाभिभाभायतः। तत्र स्नायुयायायाय: सवेवलुनां

विवाहत। संस्कृतिस्व नाग: सवस्वलाना चैतन्ये-शिल्प

यथा शुक्षाद्विन्द्रे तु जित्वस्क्रेतादेः: स्फटिका-

रिव वा लोहियंदितियत।

3 खं विचारः यथोः। इदानी भवविचारः

यथोः स्फटिकार्गव ब्राह्मणस्कृतवायान्ते प्रत्ययते।

thing] and of non-cognizance, [which would, in like manner, disprove it].

a. It is held, by the followers of the Yoga, that there exists, in distinction from the several letters, an indivisible [unit, the] word, such as 'jar,' &c., [which they call] the 'expression,' just as there is a jar, or the like, possessing parts, which is something else than the parts, viz., the shell-shaped neck, &c.; and that particular sound, termed a word, is called the 'expresser,' because of its making apparent the meaning: such a word [we Sāṅkhya assert, in opposition to the Yogas] is without evidence [of its existence]. Why? 'By reason both of cognizance and of non-cognizance,' [as thus]: Pray, is that word [which you choose to call the 'expression,'] cognized, or not? On the former alternative, what need of that idle thing, [the supposed 'expression'? For,] by what collection of letters, distinguished by a particular succession, this ['expression'] is manifested, let that be what acquaints us with the meaning. But, on the latter alternative, [viz., that it is not cognized], the power of acquainting us with a meaning does not belong to an 'expression' which is not cognized. Therefore, the hypothesis of an 'expresser' is useless. Such is the meaning. 3

1 For ekpoṣṭa, 'eternal word,' which the translator renders by 'expresser,' and also by 'expression,' see Professor Cowell's edition of Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i., p. 331, foot-notes 2 and 3; and the translation of the Sarva-darsana-sangraha by Professor Cowell and Gough, pp. 209, et seq.

It is likewise observable that, in what precedes and follows, sabda is variously rendered, besides that sabda and pada are not discriminated. Ed.

2 प्रदेशलयोऽपिततितिं कलश इत्यादिकमस-वागमेतापरं स्फोट इति गोगीतम्बुयग्याने कबुयी-
b. The eternity of the Vedas was contradicted before, under § 45. Now he contradicts also the eternity of letters.

a. It is not proper [to say, as the Mimamsakas say], that letters are eternal, on the strength of our recognizing, e.g., that 'This is that same G'; for they are proved to be non-eternal, by the cognition, e.g., that '[the sound of] G has been produced': such is the meaning. And the recognition has reference to the homogeneousness with that [one which had been previously heard]; for, otherwise, it would turn out that a jar, or the like, is eternal, inasmuch as it is recognized.

b. He ponders a doubt.

Aph. 59. [Suppose that] there is [in the case of sounds,] the manifestation of something whose existence was previously settled; as [the manifestation] of a [preexistent] jar by a lamp.

a. But then [some one may say], of Sound, whose existence was 'previously settled,' the manifestation, through noise, etc., that alone is the object in the cognition of its production, [which you speak of in § 58]. An example of manifestation [of a thing previously existing] is, 'as of a jar by a lamp.'

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1 Pratishkhetta, 'demurred to.' Ed.
2 पूर्व वेदान्त नित्यांि प्रतिषिद्धम्। इदानीं व्याकरणमन्त्यपि प्रतिषेधाति॥
3 Nāgasa has वशीनित्यां। Ed.
b. He repels this.

Sakararya-siddhanta-siddhanta-paddhati II 60

The doubt disposed of being real [is accepted by you], then this is a proving of the already proved.

a. If you say that 'manifestation' means the taking of a present condition by means of rejecting an unarrived [or future] condition, then this is our dogma of the reality of products [Book I, § 115]; and such an eternity belongs to all products, [not specially to Sound]; so that you are proving the already proved [or conceded]: such is the meaning. And, if 'manifestation' is asserted to be just in the shape of the cognition of what is presently real, then we should find [on your theory], that jars, &c., also, are eternal; because it would be proper [on that theory] that the object in the perception of production, by the operation of the causes [the potter, &c.], should be that of knowledge only, as in the case of words, &c., and also in the case of jars, &c.; [for the jar is shown by the lamp, not made by it]. Such is the import. 3

1. Para-heerati II

2. Sakararya-siddhanta-siddhanta-paddhati II 60

b. An objection to the non-duality of Soul, not previously mentioned, is to be adduced; therefore the refutation of the non-duality of Soul is recommended, 1 [having been already handled under Book I, § 149].

Narahitamata nika-prakshabhashadtraniti II 67

Non-duality of Soul is not; for its distinctions are cognized through signs.

a. That is to say: because it is proved to be really different [in different persons], by the sign that one quits Nature [or escapes from the mundane condition], while another net does quit it, &c. 2

b. But, he tells us, there is even sense-evidence destructive of the non-distinction of Soul from things [that are] non-Soul, asserted in the Scriptural texts, 'All this is Soul only; All this is Brahma only.' 3

2. Narahitamata prakshabhashadtraniti II 67

1.加热麦塞特巴德克穆詹普尔纳尼-米利亚德普玛玛哈提那拉: 普那拉雅蒂

2. Narasimha, as also some copies of Vijnana's work, has Narahitamata. 1 non-duality of Souls. Ed.

3. Prakrti-ganapya-ganamudravipreckhita-siddhantiyam II


5.加热麦塞特巴德克穆詹普尔纳尼-米利亚德普玛玛哈提那拉: 普那拉雅蒂

6. For a very similar passage, vide supra, p. 243, near the foot. Ed.
THE SĀNKHYA APHORISMS.

Non-duality denied on grounds of Sense. [non-distinction of Soul] from non-Soul; because this is disproved by sense-evidence.

a. That is to say: moreover, there is not a non-distinction between the non-Soul, i.e., the aggregate of the experienceable, and Soul; because this is excluded also by sense-evidence [as well as by signs, (§ 61)]; because, if Soul were not other than the whole perceptible, it would also not be different from a jar and a web; since the jar, e.g., would not be other than the web, which [by hypothesis] is not other than the Soul: and this is excluded by sense-evidence, which constrains us to apprehend a distinction [between a jar and a web].

b. In order to clear the minds of learners, he illustrates this point, though already established.

नोभायं नेवेव || ई3 ||

The reasons combined. Aph. 63. Not between the two [Soul and non-Soul] is there non-difference; for that same [couple of reasons].

a. 'Between the two,' i.e., between Soul and non-Soul, the two together, also, there is not an absolute non-difference.

1 अनात्मनाय भोगप्रपरमेतात्मनो नाहीं प्रलक्षेणाय वारात। अनात्मा सवेतोग्यामेवे परस्परोपन्मेवे: स्वात। घटाते: पताभिषात: तमभेदात। स तथापाहयक्यव्यावहारित इत्यर्थ।

2 शिशुवृद्धवेषारुप्यं प्रमस्थर्षं विशदयति।

for the couple of reasons [given in § 61 and § 62]: such is the meaning.

b. But then, in that case, what is the drift of such Scriptural texts as, ' [All] this is Soul only?' To this he replies:

अन्यपरमविवेकानात् || ई3 ||

Scripture accommodates itself to human frailty of understanding.

Aph. 64. There it is for the sake of something else, in respect of the undiscriminating.

a. That is to say: 'in respect of the undiscriminating,' with reference to undiscriminating persons, in the case of non-difference [between Soul and non-Soul, apparently asserted in Scripture], it is 'there for the sake of something else,' i.e., the observation is [designed to be] provocative of worship. For, in the secular world, through want of discrimination, body and the embodied, the experienced and the experiencer, are regarded as indifferent.

1 उभायं समुखितायामापायानात्मायां नायनामेवदस्येव हेतुहवेतेवयथ।

2 नन्वेवनालिकेदिस्मिवादिस्पृशयतीं कामोतिरिति। जराह।

3 To render anuvāda, which, as defined by Professor Cowell, signifies 'the repetition or reiteration of an injunction, it may be with further details, but without dwelling on the purpose of the injunction itself.' Aphorisms of Sāṅkhyā, &c., p. 75, footnote. At pp. 24 and 25, he translates anuvāda by 'confirmatory repetition' and 'illustrative repetition.' Ed.

4 अदिवेदवानानामविवेकिपुरुषान्मति तंतदिन-
which is called ‘association;’ hence the [ever] solitary Soul, without a second, since it is not associated, cannot serve as a material cause. Nor can it do so by means of [association with] Ignorance, either; because the conjunction of Ignorance has been already excluded by the fact of solitariness. Moreover, that the two together should be the material is impossible, even as it is that either, severally, should be the material; simply ‘because of the solitariness.’ Such is the meaning. And, if you choose that Ignorance should subsist as a substance located in the soul, as the air in the heavens, then there is an abandonment of the non-duality of Soul," [for which you Vedantists contend].

b. He himself [in Book I, § 145] decided that the soul consists of light, [or knowledge]. In regard to this, he repels the prima facie view, founded on the text, ‘Brahma

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1 केपुल ज्ञात्मात्माक्षिता वाविच्य सम्बन्धिते व जपालब्धयादभुवये न जगद्युदानां संबन्धवत्मनोक्तकादिति। सझायो हि यः संयोगवाशेतीवत द्रष्टायां विकारो भवति। अतोपुस्तकावलिस्तात्मनोखितकादिति। नासिकानाधारिणी संबन्धवत्मानाधारिणी-योगवाशेति निरस्ताति। प्रेमकौटहादबधेवोभेयोपादानान्यसंबन्धावसंबन्धविशुचियथ। यदि वाविच्य तथ्यवपुष्पाक्षिताः गायने वायव-दिष्टे तदात्मासितहानि।

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2 According to Nagesa's reading, नात्मानाधिविध, Ignorance is qualified as 'beginningless,' or 'eternal a parte ante.' Vedanti Mahadeva reads, as do some MSS. of Vijnana, नात्मानाधिविध. Ed.
is reality, knowledge, and joy,¹ that the essence of the soul is joy, also:²

Aph. 68. The two natures, joy and knowledge, do not belong to one; because the two are different.

a. A single subject has not the nature both of joy and of intelligence; because, since pleasure is not experienced at the time of knowing pain, pleasure and knowledge are different: such is the meaning.³

b. But then, in that case, what becomes of the Scripture, that it [Soul] consists of joy? To this he replies:⁴

Aph. 67. Metaphorical [is the word joy, in the sense] of the cessation of pain.

a. That is to say: the word ‘joy,’ in the Scriptural expression which means, really, the cessation of pain, is metaphorical. This is stated in [the maxim], ‘Pleasure is the departure of both pain and pleasure.’¹

b. He states the cause of this metaphorical employment:²

Aph. 68. It is [as] a laudation of emancipation, for the sake of the dull.

a. That is to say: the Scripture, as an incitement to ‘the dull,’ i.e., the ignorant, lauds, as if it were joy, the emancipation consisting in the cessation of pain, which [cessation] is the essence of the soul;⁴ for the soul is such joy as consists of the absence of pain.

b. In order to manifest immediately the origin, already

¹ The passage thus rendered looks as if it were taken, with the addition of its opening word, from the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, iii., 9, 29; or Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa, xiv., 6, 9, 34. Ed.

² प्रकाशिकर्षेऽकामेति स्वयं सिद्धितितम्। तत सत्यं Bhavakamanandadhyayatitah śatāntarāntadhyayatitah: स्वाध्यायिनः पूर्वपयं निराकर्तितम्।

³ एकथर्मिष्टं आनन्दचैत्योभवकर्षेऽ न भवति दुःखानानकृतं सुखानुभवेन सुखानन्योभवमतदिवयं।

⁴ नन्वेवमानुष्यप्राप्तास्तु: का गाति:। तथाह।
declared,\(^1\) of the internal organ, he repels the prima facie view, that the Mind is all-pervading.\(^2\)

\[\text{न व्यापकर्तन मनस्: करणाबाधित्यध्यातं.} \]

\(\text{Aph. 69. The Mind is not all-pervading; because it is an instrument, and because it is, moreover, an organ.}\)

\(\text{a. The Mind, meaning the totality of the internal instruments, is not all-pervading; for it is an instrument, as an axe, or the like, is. The word 'and' [literally, 'or,' in the Aphorism] implies a distributive alternative, [not an optional one]. The meaning is this, that, [while the whole of the internal instruments are instruments,] the particular internal instrument, the third [the Mind, manas],}\)

\(\text{is not all-pervading; because it is, moreover, an organ.}\)

\(\text{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}} \text{ Dr. Ballantyne, under the misapprehension that 'the subtile body' was pointed to, here added, in brackets, 'in B. III, §§ 14, 15, &c.' } \text{Ed.}\)

\(\text{\text{\textsuperscript{2}}} \text{ ऋषिकोऽक्षेत्रस्वप्नोक्षेत्रयोगपत्रे भास्वेतिवर्षैः। आस्तिदेविक्षयुद्धार्य। } \text{See the passage immediately following the aphorism. Ed.}\)

\(\text{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}} \text{ Aniruddha and Vedânti Makadeva seem to add the words वास्तिदेविक्षयुद्धार्य। See the passage immediately following the aphorism. Ed.}\)

\(\text{\text{\textsuperscript{4}}} \text{ The term manas, the translator's 'Mind,' denotes not only one of the three internal organs, but, sometimes, as here, all three taken together. See the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 45, 46, text and foot-notes. Ed.}\)

\(\text{\text{\textsuperscript{5}}} \text{ See Book II, Aph. 30, at p. 208, infra. Ed.}\)

\(\text{\text{\textsuperscript{6}}} \text{ The words here bracketed I have substituted for 'the subtile body, mentioned under B. III, § 12, a.' Ed.}\)

\(\text{\text{\textsuperscript{7}}} \text{ is not all-pervading; because it is, moreover, an organ.}\)

\(\text{\text{\textsuperscript{8}}} \text{ But knowledge, &c., pervading the body, are demonstrable as only of medium extent, [neither infinite nor atomic].}\)

\(\text{\text{\textsuperscript{9}}} \text{ b. Here, there being a doubt whether this be convincing, he propounds an appropriate confusion.}\)

\[\text{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}} \text{ See Book II, Aph. 26, at p. 206, supra. Ed.}\]

\[\text{\text{\textsuperscript{2}}} \text{ मानसणित्व: करणासामान्यतः न विभूत कर-}\]

\[\text{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}} \text{ शाक्यावास्मादिवत्। वाश्चर्यो व्यक्तित्वति करे।}\)

\[\text{\text{\textsuperscript{4}}} \text{ एव सर्वाव्याधिकारच्च करणास्त्यं सिद्धिः न विभूतं संज्ञाते।}\]

\[\text{\text{\textsuperscript{5}}} \text{ मानसणित्व: करणासामान्यतः न विभूत कर-}\]

\[\text{\text{\textsuperscript{6}}} \text{ सामस्तविश्वास्त्यं सिद्धिः न विभूतं संज्ञाते।}\]

\[\text{\text{\textsuperscript{7}}} \text{ ऋषिकोऽक्षेत्रस्वप्नोक्षेत्रयोगपत्रे भास्वेतिवर्षैः। आस्तिदेविक्षयुद्धार्य।}\]

\[\text{\text{\textsuperscript{8}}} \text{ ऋषिकोऽक्षेत्रस्वप्नोक्षेत्रयोगपत्रे भास्वेतिवर्षैः। आस्तिदेविक्षयुद्धार्य।}\]
b. He denies to the eternity of Mind, Time, &c. 1

Prakritisuparshrtryansvarmanityam \[92\]

Eternity belongs to what.

Aph. 72. Everything except Nature and Soul is uneternal.

a. [This is] plain. And the Mind, the Ether, &c., when in the state of cause, [not developed into product], are called Nature, and not Intellect, &c., by reason of the absence of the special properties, viz., judgment, &c.

b. But then, according to such Scriptural texts as, 'He should know Illusion to be Nature, and him in whom is Illusion to be the great Lord, and this whole world to be pervaded by portions of him,' 2 since Soul and Nature,

1 मनःकालादियां नित्यां प्रतियोगितां ।

2 Intended to represent antalkarana, 'internal organ.' Vide supra, p. 370, note 4. Ed.

3 The very inferior, because ambiguous, reading, in the original, manas, I have changed to buddhi, and have displaced Dr. Ballantyne's corresponding 'Mind.' Ed.

4 Vyavasaya. For its synonym, adhyavasaya, vide supra, p. 209, note 1. Ed.

5 सुगमस्य कार्यानवं चालतः कर्माणां कार्यानां कार्यानां प्रकृतिरक्षेत्रे नतु बुधादिन्य अवसायाः।

6 Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, iv. 10. Professor Gough translates, differently: 'Let the sage know that Prakriti is Māyā, and that Mahēśvara is the Māyā, or arch-illusionist. All this shifting world is filled with portions of him.' A note-note explains 'Mahēśvara' as intending 'Isvara, Rudra, Hara, or Śiva.' Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 234. Ed.
also, are made up of parts, they must be uneternal. To this he replies: 

न भागलाभो भोगिनो निजेगाः श्रुते: || ७३ ||

\[1\] ननु। माया तु प्रकृति विद्वान्मायितं तु महेष्वरम्। तस्यायब्यवसूतैः याप्त सर्वसिद्धं जगत्। इत्यादिश्यति: पुभृक्तीर्पिधि साध्वचवा- 

विद्विषाधिकैः हतन्त्रितमिति। तथाच। 

\[2\] This reading is peculiar; many MSS. of Vijnana, with which agree Aniruddha, Nagasa, and Vedant Mahadeva, having भागिनः.

Their elucidations of the aphorism here follow. Aniruddha: न कार्यलाभो भोगिनो जगालाभस्य प्रधानस्य। निजितागाः श्रुते। मलकालाभवाभस्य कारालाभस्य- 

रामित्त श्रुते। Nagasa: पुभृक्तीर्पिधि भोगिनो भागलाभो नेवा विद्विषाधिकैः न जगत्ते। Then follows the quotation as in Vijnana. Vedant Mahadeva: भागिनः कारालाभ बस्य कार्यलाभे न सति तत्स्य प्रधानस्य 

न कार्यलाभो निजितागाः श्रुते। Some MSS. of Vijnana have precisely the words of Nagasa, transcribed above, barring the quite immaterial substitution of पुभृतिपुस्तिनिर्णितमिति at the beginning.

पुर्विको प्रधानस्य चार्यज्वले न जगत्ते निर्राजस्वं श्रुते। निर्देशां निर्दिशायेँ शाल्यं निर्धारित स्त्रदा निर्धारित स्त्रदा 

इत्यादिश्यते: || ७४ ||

Aph. 73. No parts [from the presence of which in the disappearable, one might infer destructibility] are found in the Experience; for there is Scripture for its being without parts.

\(a\). Parts are not appropriate to 'the Experience,' i.e., to Soul, or to Nature; for there is Scripture for their being without parts; that is to say, because of such [texts] as, 'Without parts, motionless, quiescent, unobjectionable, passionless.'

\(b\). It has been stated [in Book I., § 1.] that Emancipation is the cessation of pain. In order to corroborate this, he then repels the doctrines of others, in regard to Emancipation: 

नानान्दानिमाणिकृतिमाणिकृतिनिर्दिशनात् || ७५ ||

Aph. 74. Emancipation is not a manifestation of joy; because there

\[1\] भोगिनः पुस्तस्य प्रधानस्य चार्यज्वले न जगत्ते निर्राजस्वायः श्रुते। निर्देशां निर्देशायें शाल्यं निर्धारित स्त्रदा निर्धारित स्त्रदा 

इत्यादिश्यते: || ७५ ||

\[2\] Gouge, "Upanishads," vii. 19. Professor Gough renders as follows: 'Without parts, without action, and without change; blameless and unmixed.' Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 232, 233. Ed.

\[3\] Aniruddha Upanishad, vi., 19. Professor Gough renders as follows: 'Without parts, without action, and without change; blameless and unmixed.' Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 232, 233. Ed.

\[4\] Vedant Mahadeva omits मुक्तिः, according to my sole MS. Most probably, however, there is, here, a mistake of the copiest. Ed.
are no properties [in Soul, as, e.g., in the shape of joy].

a. There belongs to Soul no property in the shape of joy, or in the shape of manifestation; and the essence [of Soul] is quite eternal, and, therefore, not something to be produced by means: therefore, Emancipation is not a manifestation of joy: such is the meaning.¹

न विशेषांस्त्रंति निनिःष्ट्यस्य ॥ ५५ ॥

Aph. 75. Nor, in like manner, is it [Emancipation] the destruction of special qualities.

a. Emancipation is, moreover, not the destruction of all special qualities, 'In like manner.' Because there are absolutely no properties [in Soul, (see § 74)]. Such is the meaning.¹

न विशेषतिनिनिःष्ट्यस्य ॥ ५६ ॥

Aph. 76. Nor is it [Emancipation] any particular going of that [Soul] which is motionless.

a. Moreover, emancipation is not a going to the world

¹ See Book IV., Aph. 21, a., and Aph. 31, b., at pp. 301 and 310, supra. Ed.

² ब्रह्माज्ञानविनिःष्ट्यान्तिस्मात् न मोक्षात्मनो निनिःष्ट्यान्तिस्मात् गत्यभवान।

³ वासुच; for which vide supra. p. 29, note 2. Ed.

⁴ नालिकायानुयोगिताः तत्त्व विषयशास्त्रम् च नालिकायानुयोगिताः तत्त्व विषयशास्त्रम् च।

⁵ नालिकायानुयोगिताः तत्त्व विषयशास्त्रम् ।
BOOK V., APH. 81.

a. From its perishableness, possessorship is not Emancipation.¹

एवं शून्यमिति।

A sixth view disputed. Apb. 79. So, too, the Void.

a. Likewise, the entire destruction of the Soul, which consists of knowledge, is not Emancipation; because, among other things, we do not see, in the world, that the annihilation of the soul is the soul's aim: such is the meaning.²

संयोगायेऽवियोगात्मकप्रमाणा शून्यमिति न देशादिलाभो श्रेरी।

A seventh view disputed. Apb. 80. And conjunctions terminate in separations; therefore, it [Emancipation] is not the acquisition of lands, &c., either.

¹ विमानस्वास्थ्यस्य न मुक्तिरितिः।

² Aniruddha writes as follows, in his elucidation of the eighty-first Aphorism: 'न ब्रह्मो भागो जीवात्मा ब्रह्मो भागाभाबात्। योगस्य वियोगात्मकल्पनानुभवस्मस्ते।' His introduction to the Aphorism runs: 'भागस्य जीवात्माने भागिनि अश्रयिः योगो मुक्तिरिति तदुपूर्वपि। Ed.

'भागस्य जीवस्य भागिनिः वियोगात्मकल्पनानुभवस्मस्ते।' श्रेरिः।

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5. He repels the objection of an opponent to what has been stated [in Book I, § 61], that the Organs are products of Self-consciousness; ¹

न भूतसम्बूतिविनिर्वाणाशास्त्राशास्त्रिकलात्तुष्टः ॥ २ ॥ ।

The organs whence. A ph. 84. The Organs are not formed of the Elements [as the Naiyagikas assert]; because there is Scripture for their being derived from Self-consciousness.

a. With advertence to the opinion that Power, &c., also, are principles, he repels the determination of categories [insisted upon by the various sects] of his opponents, and the notion that Emancipation comes through a knowledge of these [categories] merely; ²

न षट्टक्षरिन्यमनलोधयानुलितः ॥ ३ ॥

¹ Both my MSS. of Aniruddha exhibit the questionable reading "वियोगवत्". Ed.

² अणिलापिण्यनाब्यसंवधीकोपि न मुक्तितिष्ठत्त-संबंधावशेष तत्स्वायत्थेदनुद्धनामदित्ययः: ॥

³ इद्रयाशास्त्राशास्त्रिकलात्तुष्टं न मुक्तितिष्ठत्तिष्ठत्त-विष्णुदानिदित्ययः: ॥

⁴ Nagesa and Vedânti Mahâdeva add च, as does Vijnana, according to the best MSS. Ed.
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THE SÁNHYA APHORISMS.

Aph. 85. The rule of six categories is not [the correct one]; nor does Emancipation result from acquaintance therewith, [as the Vaiśevkas maintain].

And those of the Nyāya, &c.

Aph. 86. So, too, is it in the case of the sixteen [categories of the Nyāya], &c.

a. In order to establish, what has been already stated [in Book I., § 62], that the five Elements are products, he rejects the eternity of the Earthy and other Atoms, which is held by the Vaiśevkas and others.1

Aph. 87. [The five Elements being products, as declared in Book I., § 61], Atoms are not eternal, [as alleged in the Nyāya]; for there is Scripture for their being products.

a. Although that text of Scripture is not seen by us, because it has disappeared, in the lapse of time, &c., yet it is to be inferred from the words of teachers, and from the tradition of Manu,2 [Ch. I., v. 27].

b. But then, how can an Atom, which is without parts, be a product? To this he replies:1

The Scripture decides of the question.

Aph. 88. Since it is a product, it is not without parts.

a. That is to say: since the fact, established by Scripture, of their being products, cannot be otherwise accounted for, the [so-called] Atoms of Earth, &c., are not without parts.3

b. He repels the objection of the Nihilist, that direct cognition of Nature, or of Soul, is impossible; because [forsooth,] the cause of a thing's being directly cognizable is colour:4

1 पञ्चभूतानां पुर्वीतकार्यवादोपस्थष्यं वैशेषिक- कायाभुयान्त पार्थिवाद्यद्यनियतमपाकरते।

2 यद्यपेशामि: सा चुतिनेन दूसरते कालनु-
Aph. 90. There are not four varieties of dimension; because those can be accounted for by two.

a. There are not four kinds of dimension, viz., small, great, long, and short; but there are only two sorts. Because those can be accounted for by two: that is to say, the four varieties can be accounted for by merely two, the atomic [or positively small] and the great. Such is the meaning. For the short and the long are merely subordinate kinds of the dimension called great; else we should have, e.g., no end of dimensions, in the shape of the crooked, &c.

b. He rebuts the Nihilist’s denial of genera,² as follows:

- Neti tattvabhidanya atma
dharmadhyamam saman

Aph. 91. Though these [individuals] be uneternal, recognition, as being associated with constancy, is of genus.
a. Hence, he says, it is not proper to deny [the existence of] genus:\(^1\)

न तत्तपलापत्समात् || ५२ ||

And not to be denied. \(\text{Aph. 92. Therefore it [genus] is not to be denied.}\

a. But then [it may be said], recognition is to be accounted for simply by a non-existence, in the shape of the exclusion of what is not the thing [recognized]: and let this be what is meant by the word ‘genus.’ To this he replies:\(^5\)

नामनिमित्तम् भावप्रतितत: || ५३ ||

\(\text{Genus posits, not negative.} \) \(\text{Aph. 93. It [genus] does not consist in exclusion of something else; because it is cognized as an entity.}\

a. That is to say: genus does not consist in exclusion [of something else]; because ‘This is that same’ is the cognition of something \(\text{positive} \); for, otherwise, the only thing cognized would be \(\text{“This is not a non-jar.”} \)

b. But still, recognition may be caused by likeness. To this he replies:\(^4\)

न तत्त्वालयां सादृश्यं प्रवृत्तयोपलब्धेः || ५४ ||

\(\text{Likeness not a distinct principle.} \) \(\text{Aph. 94. Likeness is not a separate principle; for it is directly apprehended, [as one manifestation of Community].}\

a. That is to say: likeness is nothing other than sameness in many parts, &c.; for it is directly apprehended as consisting in sameness,\(^3\) [the likeness of a fair face to the moon, e.g., consisting in the sameness of the pleasurable feeling, &c., occasioned by the sight of either].

b. The conjecture, ‘But then, let likeness be really an inherent power, and not [a modified aspect of] Community,’ he repels:\(4\)

निजशक्तिभिधितीवै वैशिष्ट्याः तदुपलब्धेः || ५५ ||

\(\text{Ed.}\)

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\(^1\) तस्माच सामान्यापलापो युक्तं इत्यादि

\(^2\) नवतद्वाविचिन्तााएवाभावेन्द्र प्रवृत्तयोपपादतीयसेवच सामान्यशङ्काऽस्मि \

\(^3\) एकायान्तिर भावप्रवृत्तात्विचिन्त्यप्रतीतिः न सामान्यकेल्यं: \\ अन्यया हि नायमगठ इथे \n
\(^4\) एकायान्तिर भावप्रवृत्तात्विचिन्त्यप्रतीतिः न सामान्यकेल्यं: \\ अन्यया हि नायमगठ इथे \n
\(^5\) स एवायान्तिर भावप्रवृत्तात्विचिन्त्यप्रतीतिः न सामान्यकेल्यं: \\ अन्यया हि नायमगठ इथे \n
\(^4\) एकायान्तिर भावप्रवृत्तात्विचिन्त्यप्रतीतिः न सामान्यकेल्यं: \\ अन्यया हि नायमगठ इथे \n
\(^4\) एकायान्तिर भावप्रवृत्तात्विचिन्त्यप्रतीतिः न सामान्यकेल्यं: \\ अन्यया हि नायमगठ इथे \n
\(^4\) एकायान्तिर भावप्रवृत्तात्विचिन्त्यप्रतीतिः न सामान्यकेल्यं: \\ अन्यया हि नायमगठ इथे \n
\(^4\) एकायान्तिर भावप्रवृत्तात्विचिन्त्यप्रतीतिः न सामान्यकेल्यं: \\ अन्यया हि नायमगठ इथे \

\(^4\) एकायान्तिर भावप्रवृत्तात्विचिन्त्यप्रतीतिः न सामान्यकेल्यं: \\ अन्यया हि नायमगठ इथे
Nor a peculiar power. Aph. 95. Nor is it [likeness,] a manifestation of [something’s] own power; because the apprehension of it is different.

a. Moreover, likeness is not the manifestation of a particular natural power of a thing; because the apprehension of likeness is different from the apprehension of power. For the cognition of a power is not dependent on the cognition of another thing; the cognition of likeness, on the other hand, is dependent on the cognition of a correlative, i.e. as is the case with the cognition of a non-existence; so that the two conceptions are heterogeneous. Such is the meaning.1

b. But still, let the likeness among individual jars, &c., be merely that they have [all alike,] the name, e.g., of jar. To this he replies:2

न संज्ञासंज्ञिः समयोऽधिपि ॥ ५६ ॥

1 Pratiyoga; on which vide supra, p. 342, note 3. Ed.

2 बलुनः स्थापाविकशक्तिशेरिशेषादौर; न साध्यशं शक्तिप्रलम्बितः साद्योपल्बिरविलिक्षः धनः। शक्तिजान हि नायथमिश्रितानस्मिति। साध्यश्च स्तुतः प्रत्योगित्रित्यक्ष्मसे द्वन्द्वश्रं वेदवस्विति। ज्ञानयोगििन्यसमिलयः ॥

3 ननु तथापि घटादीसंज्ञानवेशं घटादिशं कोनां साद्यवस्तुः । तथाहः ॥

4 The reading of Nagesa is न संज्ञासंज्ञिः संवसोऽधिपः. Ed.

Nor the relation between names and things.

Aph. 96. Nor, moreover, is it [likeness,] the connexion between name and named.

a. Because even he who does not know the connexion between a name and the thing named may cognize a likeness, i.e. between two: ८

b. Moreover:3

रत्न रत्नि रत्ना रत्नादौर; न निन्यता। रत्न: कर्षं तेनातीतवोपरिः वर्तमानकशलुः स्वादिशः ॥

1 नसंज्ञासंज्ञिमात्रान्तौरपि साद्यव्यावहिनि दितिः ॥

2 छपि च ॥

3 संज्ञासंज्ञिमात्रान्तवात्संज्ञिनिन्यते मनि-निन्यता। छपि: कर्षं तेनातीतवोपरिः वर्तमानकशलुः स्वादिशः ॥
the relation be eternal. What is to hinder this? To this he replies:

नात: संबन्धो ध्रुवियाहकभावाधारत् ॥ ५५ ॥

Aph. 98. The connexion is not so [not eternal], for this reason, viz., because this is debarred by the evidence which acquaints us with the thing; [i.e., the supposition is inconsistent with the definition of the term].

Another suggestion repeated.

a. Connexion is proved only where disjunction incidentally subsists; because, otherwise, there is no room for the supposition of connexion; the case being accounted for,—as will be explained,—simply by the natural state of the matter. And this incidental disjunction is impossible, if connexion be eternal. Therefore, connexion is not eternal; for this is debarred by the very evidence that acquaints us with Connexion. Such is the meaning.

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1 ननु संबन्धन्यन्ते संबन्धो नित्य: स्वात ।
किम क बायकम् । तत्थाह ॥

2 नातः 'not unoriginated,' i.e., 'not eternal,' qualifying 'connexion.' For this reason 'readers नातः. The reading नातः, the manuscript authority for which is of the slightest, is treated as if no better than a typographical error, in the corrigenda to my edition of Viṣṇūkṛta's work. Ed.

3 Aniruddha has, instead of -मानः -प्रमाणः. In the margin of one of my MSS. of his commentary is the variant -साधारणाधि: । तत्थाह ॥

4 कादातिकविभागः सत्येव संबन्धः सिद्धिः ।

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b. But, on this showing, there could be no such thing as the eternal [connexion called] Coinherence between those two eternals, a Quality and the thing qualified; [which Coinherence, or intimate relation, is one of the categories of the Nyāya]. To this he replies:

3 न समवायोपशिवः प्रमाणमात्रेऽवात् ॥ ५५ ॥

Aph. 99. There is no [such thing as] Coinherence, [such as the Naiyāyikas insist upon]; for there is no evidence [for it].

a. But then [it may be said], the evidence of it is, the perception that something is qualified [or conjoined with a quality which inheres in it], and the unaccountableness, otherwise, of the cognition of something as qualified. To this he replies:

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3 नवें गृह्यथा गुणोपेक्षा गुणोनिनित्यः समवायो नोपपवेत । तत्थाह ॥

3 समवाये प्रमाणमात्रेऽवातः । तत्थाह ॥

3 ननु वैचित्त्यप्रत्ययं विशिष्टीक्ष्यानुपपवेत ।

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it arises, even there it perishes; therefore, no motion is proved to be inerrible from conjunction [of anything] with another place; [the fruit, for instance, which appears to reach the ground not being that fruit, any longer existent, which appeared to drop from the tree]. To this he replies:\(^1\)

नायुगमयायं कियायं नैदिक्यं तत्तत्ततत्तेतः भीतर्भर्ष्टिते: \(\text{॥} १०१ \text{॥}

Motion is matter of perception. \(\text{ Apocalypse } 101.\) Motion is not a matter of inference; for he who stands very near has, indeed, direct cognition both of it and of what it belongs to.

\(a.\) In Book Second the different opinions were merely mentioned, that the Body is formed of five elements, and so forth; but no particular one was considered. In regard to this question, he denies the view of an opponent:\(^4\)

\(1\) प्रकृति: भोभामा प्रकृतिपूष्यसंयोगस्मासां बृहदी- 
रिति सिद्धान्तः। तत्तवे नालिकानामाक्षणो 
नालिका प्रभातम् किया सवं वल्लु छाकं 
कर्षकं योगस्थ तत्तवेव विनाश्यति। 
तत्तार्थस्य गोभिराम् किया सिद्धाति। 
तत्ताप \(\text{॥} १०२ \text{॥}

\(2\) Some MSS. of Vijnana omit एव, as does Nagasa. \(\text{Ed.}\)

\(3\) Nagasa omits एव, \(\text{Ed.}\)

\(4\) One of my MSS. of Aniruddha simply omits न; while the other has उभयशापासिद्धे: \(\text{Ed.}\)

\(2\) Nagasa gives प्रवृत्तानुमाने. \(\text{Ed.}\)

\(3\) Read, instead of 'the case is otherwise disposed of,' 'the establishment [which they lead to] is otherwise.' \(\text{Ed.}\)

\(4\) See the preceding note. \(\text{Ed.}\)

\(5\) उभयशापी वैशिष्ठप्रम्प्रय: तदनुमा श
स्ववैविवायायायायानेन तदनुमां समवाये प्रमाधे-
मिलयः। \(\text{॥} ३९२ \text{॥}

\(1\) दिनियायाये शरीरस्म प्रामोल्लितानि- 
हृदिमेति। एवोज्ज नतु विशेषोवधृतः। \(\text{अध्या}-
परप्रकर्ण प्रतिष्ठितः। \(\text{॥} ३९३ \text{॥}
The senses do not reveal what they do not reach to; because of their not reaching, or because [else] they might reach everything.

a. The senses do not reveal things unconnected with them. 'Because of their not reaching.' For we do not see that lamps, or the like, reveal what they do not reach to; and because, if they were to reveal what they do not reach to, we should find them revealing all things, viz., those intercepted, and the like. Such is the meaning. Therefore there is an organ, other than the eye-ball, for the sake of connexion with the distant sun, &c. Such is the import. And the instruments reveal the objects simply by delivering the object to the soul,—for they are, themselves, unintelligent:—as a mirror reveals the face. Or [in other words], their revealing an object is simply their taking up an image of the object.¹

b. He repels the conjecture: But then, in that case, the opinion [of the Naiyāyikas] that the sight is luminous

¹ स्वासंचाराध्यानीन्द्रियायणि न प्रकाशयति।
स्मायः। प्रदीपादिनामामस्यप्रकाशवाचर्यानां—
प्रामायणां वच्चहितादिस्वर्यस्यप्रकाशकप्रस्फुटोऽस्यः। छत्रो दूरसूय्या ददिस्चवथा गो-
लकातितिकन्द्रिययमिति भवेत्। करणानां चा-
थ्यकामाणि पुष्पेणसमपेर्यार्थेन स्तोते जडमा-
ढ़वास्य मलप्रकाशकल्यात्। अथ वार्षितिकी—
कोणक्षमेवार्षिकाशकाभिविषयिति॥
is quite right; for we see Light alone glide rapidly to a
distance, in the form of rays: 1

न तेजोपपसप्तिज्ञानं चक्षुवृत्तितस्मां

The Sight not formed 

Aph. 105. Not because Light glides
and the Sight does so, too, is the
Sight luminous [or formed of Light]; because the thing
is accounted for by [the theory of] modifications, [to be
now explained].

a. The Sight is not to be asserted to be luminous, on
the ground that light is seen to glide. Why? Because,
just as in the case of the vital air, where there is no
luminosity, the gliding forth can be accounted for through
a kind of modification. Such is the meaning. For, as
the vital air, without having at all parted from the body,
glides out ever so far from the end of the nose, under the
modification called breathing, [and thus smells a distant
flower], just so the Sight, though a non-luminous sub-
stance, without, indeed, quitting [connexion with] the
body, all in a moment will dart off [like the protruded
feeler of a polyp] to a distant object, such as the sun, by
means of the species of change called modification. 2

1 नन्येर्म चक्षुपलिस्तिज्ञानं युक्ते तेजस एव
बिरुशाकुपेशवरुपसप्तिज्ञानानादि शास्त्रं निर
रास्त्रेनिति इति

2 तेजसपपसप्तिज्ञानं द्विपतिमितु कृपा तेजसं चक्षुर्वृत्तिः
कुःः स्वैतज्ज्वेदग्राम प्रायमत्रदेव चर्च-
a quality, [of the Sight, or other sense]; because it is for the sake of connexion that it glides forth.

a. The modification is not a fragment of the Sight, or other sense, [serving as] the cause of the revealing of objects,—a part disjoined like a spark,—or a quality, like, e.g., Colour; but the modification, whilst a portion thereof, is something else than a fragment, or a quality. For, if there were disruption, connexion of the sun, &c., with the Sight would not, through it, take place; and, if it were a quality, the motion called 'gliding forth' would be unaccountable; [for a quality cannot move by itself]. Such is the meaning.¹

b. But, if, thus, the 'modifications' are substances,—how is [the term] 'modification' applied to the qualities of intellect, in the shape of Desire, &c.? To this he replies:²


¹ अर्जेन्द्रायायां ऋषिविद्यायारोऽयूयो विद्युनिर्लिङ्ग-विभिन्नांशो क्लादिविन्दुश्च न वृत्तिः किं तु तदक-देयरूपर्न भागगुणाःभां मिना व्यौतिः। विभागे कि सति तदारा चक्षुः सूर्योदिसंकम्पो न गतते गुणां च सप्तशताक्षियानुपातप्रीत्यवः।

² सन्तेज्ञ वृत्तिः दृष्टि लक्ष्मेदारिधिहुपुस्ति-गुणेष्वू वृत्तिवबहारः। तपाह ॥

³ Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva have the reading दृष्टि, Ed.
view to indicating its importance; just as fire is [spoken of as arising] from fuel, [which fuel is a necessary concomitant of, though not really the substance of, the fire]. Hence are they [the organs] spoken of as being formed of the Elements. Such is the meaning. For, only in reliance on the support of Light, or other Element, do the Organs, viz., the Sight, &c., [formed] from the accompanying Self-consciousness, come to exist; as fire, in reliance on the support of earthly fuel, results from the attendant Light, [or Heat, which cannot manifest itself alone].

b. As the subject presents itself, he determines the variety that belongs to Gross Body: 3

भव्याकुंडः जरायुजोऽधिकर्ष्याः इत्यत्तखिकर्मांसिद्धिः चेति न नियमः II 979 II

Aph. 111. The heat-born, egg-born, womb-born, vegetable, thought-born, and spell-born; such is not an exhaustive division [of Gross Body, though a rough and customary one].

1 निमित्तेद्वैय प्राधान्यविषयोपादानतत्तवे भवति यथेक्ष्यानादिनिरतिः। ज्ञो भूतोपादानलष्यपदेः इत्यम्। तेज्ज्याद्भूतोपादेश्वत्रे हि तदनुगतात्ताङ्गाराक्ष्याक्षारंत्येष्विषयं भवति यष्ठं पार्थिवोपज्याधें तदनुगताङ्गेश्वोपज्याधें भूतितत्वेहि।

2 खुलशरीरं विशेष प्रस्तादवधारयति।

1 - 3 [Footnotes and annotations]

a. There is designation as the material cause, in the case even where the cause is [but] concomitant, with a

1 Probably from mere oversight, my MS. of Vedânti Mahâdeva's work omits तत्. Ed.

2 Nimitta, 'instrumental cause.' Nimitta-kārana is rendered 'occasional cause' at p. 194, supra. Colebrooke's representatives are 'chief or especial cause' and 'efficient cause.' Ed.
the Body, let the vital air itself be the originant of the Body. To this he replies:

न देहारम्भकम् प्रायश्चिनिद्रियशक्तितत्त्विति; ॥ १९३ ॥

Aph. 113. The vital air is not [on the allegation that it is the principal thing in the Body, to be considered] the originant of the Body; because it [the vital air, or spirit] subsists through the power of the organs.

a. The vital air, consisting in the function of the organs, does not subsist in the absence of the organs. Therefore, since, in a dead Body, in consequence of the absence of the organs, there is the absence of the vital air, the vital air is not the originant of the Body.

b. But then, in that case, since the vital air is not the cause of the Body, the Body might come into existence even without the vital air. To this he replies:

3. Instead of तत्त्विति, Vedánti Mahádeva has तत्त्विति.

2. नतु प्रायश्चिन शरीरे प्राधान्यात्मानां एव देहारम्भकोऽस्तु ॥ तत्ताह ॥

1. शरीरस्यक्मात्माभीतोदानकां पूर्वार्की म । अनेनेव प्रसंजने विशिष्यन्ति ॥

3. सत्वं शरीरस्य पूर्वाघातानस् । अधाकायित्वादिर्मृत्तिरातृक्षरं पत्तंतु-राज्यदीर्घायामस्य भीतिकाव्यपुरुषविद्विद्वियां । नवेंव पूर्वविद्वियां भीति काव्यपुपुषमकालमात्सर: ॥

4. नतु प्रायश्चिन शरीरे प्राधान्यात्मानां एव देहारम्भकोऽस्तु ॥ तत्ताह ॥

2. शरीरस्यक्मात्माभीतोदानकां पूर्वार्की म । अनेनेव प्रसंजने विशिष्यन्ति ॥

3. सत्वं शरीरस्य पूर्वाघातानस् । अधाकायित्वादिर्मृत्तिरातृक्षरं पत्तंतु-राज्यदीर्घायामस्य भीतिकाव्यपुरुषविद्विद्वियां । नवेंव पूर्वविद्वियां भीति काव्यपुपुषमकालमात्सर: ॥
The site of experience, "viz., the Body," is constructed [only] through the superintendence of the experiencer [Soul]; otherwise, we should find putrefaction.

a. 'Through the superintendence,' i.e., only through the operation, 'of the experiences,' i.e., Soul [literally, that which has the vital airs], is 'the construction of the site of experience,' i.e., the Body; because, 'otherwise,' i.e., if the operation of the vital airs were absent, we should find putrefaction in the semen and blood, just as in a dead body. Such is the meaning. And thus, by the several operations of circulating the juices, &c., the vital air is a concomitant cause of the Body, through the sustaining of it: such is the import.

b. But then [it may be said], it is only the vital air, itself, that can be the superintender; because it is this which operates, not the Soul, since it is motionless, and since there is no use in the superintendence of what does not operate. To this he replies:

...}

BOOK V., APH. 115.

Aph. 114. The site of experience
living Daily.

Aph. 115. Through a servant, not
directly, is superintendence [exercised]
by the master.

'a. In the construction of the Body, 'superintendence,' in the shape of energizing, is not 'directly,' i.e., immediately, [exercised] 'by the master,' i.e., by Soul, but 'through its servant,' in the shape of the vital airs; as in the case of a king's building a city: such is the meaning."

b. It was stated before [Book II., § 1.] that Nature's [agency] is 'for the emancipation of what is [really, though not apparently,] emancipated.' In reference to the objection of opponents in regard to this, viz., 'How can the

1 Aniruddha reads -प्रसक्तः; Vedasati Mahādva. -प्रसक्तः


3 भोजुः: प्राणिनोहिद्धिखण्डेयापारितो भोगापि यत्नस्ति शरीरस्य निमोन्यं भवति। ऋषि प्राण- खाद्यादेव गुहकोणिति: पुर्वीनामाप्रसक्तस्ति- न्यंतरवन्द्रित्वम्। तथा च रससंचारादितिपार- विंशेष्य: प्राणी देहस्य निमोन्यं भावाप्र- धिति भावः॥

1 ननु प्राणीविधिखण्डेयान् संस्कर्थविधिखण्डेयान् प्राणिनाम: कृत्याणामविद्यादिखण्डेयान् प्रयोजनानाभवादिति। तथासः॥

2 According to one of my MSS., the lection of Aniruddha is भूमिकारः. Ed.

3 देहनिमोने आपार्थुपथिधिखण्डान्तस्मिन्ने- तन्तस्मिन्ने प्राप्तान्तस्मि विं तु प्रायध्युपविद्यारा गणः राष्ट्रः परिनिमोने इत्यादः॥
soul be eternally free, when we see it bound? with a view
to demonstrating its eternal freedom, he says:

समाधिमयुग्मलोक्षेप वशस्त्रयता ॥ ११६ ॥

Aph. 116. In Concentration, profound sleep, and emancipation, it [Soul],
consists of Brāhma.  

a. Then what is the difference of emancipation from
profound sleep and concentration? To this he replies:

इति: सवोजनन्दिः तत्तति: ॥ ११७ ॥

Aph. 117. In the case of the two, it
is with a seed; in the case of the other,
this is wanting.

a. 'In the case of the two,' viz., concentration and pro-
found sleep, the identity with Brāhma is 'with a seed,'
i.e., associated with some cause of Bondage, [or reappearance
in the mundane state]; 'in the case of the other,' i.e.,

विवृत्तमोक्षः प्रामाण्यस्यः प्राक् । 
तथा
कथमात्रा निजभुख्य कथयते नासिकिते परेषामोक्षेपे नित्यभूतमयुग्मपादधिनतुमाह॥

See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 34. Ed.

7 तथिः कः सुप्रभृतमाधिष्ठया मोक्षस्य विशेषः।
तत्ताह॥

Aniruddha has सवोजनन्दिस्य; and so has Vedānti
Mahādeva, according to some copies. Ed.

4 Brāhmaṇa, the abstract of Brāhma. Ed.

in emancipation, this cause is absent: this is the distinc-
tion. Such is the meaning.  

a. But then, Concentration and profound sleep are
evident: but what evidence is there of Emancipation? This
objection of the atheist he repels:

इयोर्व च अम्बृवायि दृष्टां बाबुः ॥ ११८ ॥

Aph. 118. But there are not the two
[only]; because the triad, also [Eman-
cipation inclusive], is evident, as are
the two.

a. The meaning is, that, since Emancipation, also, is
'evident,' i.e., is inferrible, through the example of Con-
centration and profound sleep, there are not the two, viz.,
profound sleep and Concentration, only; but Emancipation,
also, really is. And the argument is thus. The quitting
of that identity with Brāhma, which [identity] exists
during profound sleep, &c., takes place only through a
fault, viz., Desire, or the like, lodged in the mind; and, if
this fault be annihilated by knowledge, then there results

इति: समाधिमयुग्मः सत्वो वचनोज्जालिन्ति
ब्रह्माण्यस्य मोक्षः वीजन्यान्याव इति विशेष
इत्यत्र: ॥

3 ननु समाधिमयुग्मे द्रव्यो तो मोक्षे तु 
किं प्र-
माचार्यमिति नासिकाचार्ये परिहर्ति ॥

4 Veddanti Mahādeva omits इत्यत्र: । Ed.
5 Brahmacārī, the same as brahmācārī. Ed.
a permanent condition, quite similar to profound sleep, &c.; and it is precisely this that is Emancipation.  

b. But then [suggests some one, with reference to § 117], granting, that, even notwithstanding the existence of the 'seed' [or source of return to the mundane state] called Memory, a mental modification after the form of any object does not arise during concentration, inasmuch as Memory is [then] dulled [or deadened] by apathy, &c., yet, in the case of a person in profound sleep, since Memory prevails, there will really be cognition of objects; consequently, it is not proper to say that there is identity with Brahma during profound sleep. To this he replies:

1 समाधि मोक्षायापि दृष्टान्तुमितलाबद्दलोऽसुपुरुषसमाधिः सुपुरुषसमाधिः सुपुरुषसमाधिः।

2 This I find nowhere; and I believe it to be without warrant. I have printed, agreeably to the reading of Aniruddha, Vedānti Mahādeva, and the best MSS. of Vijnāna, वासनायात्मकाकारानि, and have noticed, in some copies of the last-named commentator, the variant वासनायां न स्वयंकारानि. Nagāśa has the latter reading, followed by दौष्ट्रोगति, with omission of भान. The Śrīvarṇa edition of the Sāṅkhyā-pravaccana-bhāṣya has वासनायां न स्वयंकारानि, for which I find no authority.

Ed.

3 Here and below, this renders edandas, on which vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.

4 नन्तु वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसं�ुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वा वासनायात्मकाकारार्थसंयुक्ते सवेदायित्वা...
more potent fault of sleep: such is the meaning. For the really more potent fault makes the memory powerless, insufficient to produce its effects; [and so there is nothing, in this, to prevent identification of Soul with Brahma, during profound sleep, any more than during apathetic Concentration]: such is the import. 

6. It was stated, in the Third Book [§ 83], that the retention of a Body by him who is emancipated while still living, is 'in consequence of a mere vestige of impression.' To this it is objected as follows. Experience is observed, in the case of the [alleged person] emancipated during life, just as in the case of the like of us, [and this experience continuous,] even though it may be constantly in respect of a single object: now, this is unaccountable [on the hypothesis of his really being emancipated], because the antecedent impression is annihilated, exactly on its having produced the first [instant of] experience, and because no subsequent impression arises, insomuch as knowledge debarrs i.; just as is the case with Merit. To this he replies:

1 भशा बैराग्ये तथा निम्नादेशोगौरीय सति वासनया न स्नायुत्पाद्यां स्नायुत्पादायां भव- ति यतो न निमित्तम् गुष्णिष्ठतत्संस्कारम् बल्लवृक्षाः निम्नदेशोगुरुवाकां संभवत्तिक्षण:। वज- न्यगृहेऽव वि दीयो वासनां दु:ऽधौऽन्त स्नायुपादातां भविष्यति भावः॥

3 इति, और तथा देशाये, ‘impression’ is to render samadhiya. Ed.

3 संस्कारे सति जीवमुक्तस्य शरीरपराशर-मिति तुसीयाध्याये प्रक्षम्। नाथवकाद्यः।

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BOO:K V., AP. 190. 411

एकं संस्कारं विपन्नित्वं नतु मृतज्ञयं
संस्कारमेत्ति चोहक्तनामसय। ॥ १२० ॥

Ap. 120. A single impression [sufficient to generate, and] lasts out; the experience: but there are not different impressions, one to each [instant of] experience; also, we should have a postulation of many, [where a single one may suffice].

a. In like manner, in the case of the whirl of the potter's wheel, the self-continuant principle, called mental inertia, is to be regarded as only one, continuing till the completion of the whirl.

b. It has been stated [§ 111.] that there are vegetable Bodies. He repels the objection of the atheist, that, in the case in question, there is not a Body, inasmuch as there is no knowledge of the external.
The Sāṅkhya Aphorisms.

Aph. 121. Knowledge of the external is not indispensable [to constitute a Body]: trees, shrubs, climbers, annuals, trees with invisible flowers, grasses, creepers, &c., [which have internal consciousness], are, also, sites of experience and experience; as in the former case.

a. There is no necessity that that only should be a Body, in which there is knowledge of the external; but it is to be held that the being a Body, in the form of being the site of experience and experience, belongs also to trees, &c., which have internal consciousness; because, as in the former case, meaning the putrescence already mentioned [see § 114], of the Bodies of men, &c., [which takes place] in the absence of the superintendence of an experiencer [the living soul], even in the same way do withering, &c., take place in the Bodies of trees, &c., also: such is the meaning. And to this effect there is Scripture.¹

¹ Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva here end one aphorism, and treat what follows as a second. Vijnána formally defends the reading to which he gives the preference. Ed.

The vegetable organism really is a Body.

Aph. 122. And from the Legal Institutestitutes [the same fact may be inferred, viz., that vegetables have bodies and are conscious].

a. But then, from the fact that trees, &c., also, are thus conscious, we should find merit and demerit accruing to them. To this he replies:²

The vegetable organism is a Body.

Aph. 123. Not merely through a Body the susceptibility of Merit and Demerit; for Scripture tells us the distinction.

a. The vital spirit is not liable to the production of Merit and Demerit through a Body merely. Why? 'For Scripture tells us the distinction:' because we are told, in Scripture, that the liability results just from the being

¹ Nūgēśa pretty clearly does not regard these words as an aphorism. Ed.

² Nānu vṛddha-drṣṭaṁ chanṭaṁ ca vṛddhaṁ pārtarisyāṁ sthānuṣṭhānaṁ sthānagāyathramaṁ
tatāh. Ed.
distinguished by a Brahmanical Body, or the like [animal body, not vegetable]. Such is the meaning.'

b. Showing that the liability to Merit and Demerit is solely through the kind of Body, he mentions how Body is of three kinds:*

िया प्रयास्य अवस्था कर्मदेहिकोषोगदेहिकमयः
देहः \| 924 \|

Body of three principal kinds.

Ap. 124. Among the three there is a threefold distribution; the Body of merit, the Body of experience, and the Body of both.

a. There is a threefold distribution of Body ‘among the three,’ i.e., among those highest, lowest, and intermediate—all living beings,—viz., the Body of merit, the Body of experience, and the Body of both: such is the meaning. Of these, a Body of merit belongs to the preeminent sages; a Body of experience, to Indra and others, and to things immovable, &c.; and a Body of both, to the royal sages. Here the division is [not exhaustive, but] into three, because of the preeminence [of these]; for,

otherwise, we should have all alike possessed of a Body of experience;\*[like Indra].

b. He mentions also a fourth Body:*

न च चिद्दृष्टनुसारिनः \| 925 \|

A fourth kind of Body.

Ap. 125. Not any one [of these], moreover, is that of the apathetic.

a. That is to say: the Body which belongs to the ascetics is different from all these three; such as was that of Dattātreya, Jádebhárata, and others; for they possessed bodies consisting of mere knowledge.*

b In order to establish the non-existence of a Lord, which was stated before, he disproves the eternity of

1 चिद्यासाण्डमवधमवधमवधम्नान्तर्माकनां चि-
प्रकारो देहविभागः कर्मदेहिकोषोगदेहिकमयः इति-
वर्त्यः। तत् कर्मदेहः परम्परायैः भोगदेह इद्रादी-
दीयान न्यायवादीयान चोहवितः राजविधायानिति।
छ च प्राध्यायेन बिधा विभागोद्वया स्‌रेब्दिवव
भोगदेहिकायः॥

2 चरितवत्तानिष्पि शरीरमाणः॥

3 विरञ्जनानि शरीरमेतैविधिल्लण्मितः॥

रष्य द्राक्षयजस्वरतादिनां तेषां ज्ञानसाधनः
नदेहित्वादिति॥

---

* Veditārī Mahādāra, if my single copy of his work may be relied on, omits these words. Ed.
knowledge, desire, action, &c., which is accepted by others [as existing in the case of the Lord]:

न बुद्धिदिनिमायविशेषैथि वहितः।। १२६।।

Argument against the existence of a Lord.

Aph. 126. Eternity does not [as is alleged by those who wish to establish the existence of a Lord,] belong to knowledge, &c., even in the case of the particular site, [viz., that of the supposed Lord]; as is the case with fire.

a. That is to say: just as we infer, from the example of ordinary fire, that the empyrean fire, also, is not eternal.

Aph. 127. And, because the site [viz., the supposed Lord,] is unreal, [it matters not, in the present instance, whether knowledge, &c., may be eternal, or not].

2. But then, in that case, how can it, indeed, be possible that there should arise Omniscience, &c., adequate to the creation of the universe; since we do not behold, in mundane life, such superhuman powers [though we do see some,] arising from penance and the rest [of the alleged means of acquiring superhuman powers]?

Aph. 128. The superhuman powers of concentration, just like the effects of drugs, &c., are not to be gainsaid.

a. That is to say: by the example of the effects of drugs, &c., even the superhuman powers of assuming atomic magnitude, &c., which result from concentration, and are adapted to the work of creation, &c., are established.

1 अक्षयभावाय स्थापनाय पराभुपाटं ज्ञानेऽप्रकृतिदिनित्यन्तं प्रतिमयिति।।

2 Buddhi, rendered 'intellect' at pp. 196, &c., supra. Much as at p. 209, supra, Vijnana hereupon remarks: बुद्धिर्ज्ञ्ञायस्यायं याया वृत्ति।। Ed.

3 The world, viewed as Brahmas egg, is fabled to be surrounded by seven envelopes. One of these is the dvaraka-tejas. Dr. Ballantyne's 'empyrean fire.' See Professor Wilson's translation of the Vihsnu-pana (ed. 1864, &c.), vol. i., p. 40. I have to thank Prof. Cowell for this reference. Ed.

4 यथा लोकज्ञक्षृष्टद्वान्वनेवरुक्त्वेतसोप्य-निद्धित्वादनुमानसिद्धिः।।
§ 6. He refutes him who asserts that Thought belongs to the Elements; since this is hostile to the establishment [of the existence] of Soul.

अ भूतचैतन्य प्रत्येकार्थः। सांह्येदिन च सांह्ये: च चयः। ॥ १२५ ॥

Aph. 120. Thought does not belong to the Elements; for it is not found in them separately, or, moreover, in the state of combination,—or, moreover, in the state of combination.

a. That is to say: Thought does not exist in the five Elements, even when in the state of combination; because we do not find Thought in them, separately, at the time of disjunction; and there can be nothing in the product which does not preexist in the cause.

\[1\] पुष्पसिद्धिमतिकृत्तत्त्ववृत्ति मूलचैतन्यवादित्वम् प्रक्षार्थः।

\[2\] Aniruddhaḥ, pratyekārthāḥ. \(\text{Ed.}\)

\[3\] Both here and just before, Nāgāraṇya reads स्वसां, as does Vijnāna, also, according to some MSS. \(\text{Ed.}\)

\[4\] संहतभावस्वाभावायिय प्रचभूतेऽशैलय नारिति विभागकाले प्रथेकं वैत्यार्तृतिर्यथः। ॥

END OF BOOK V.

BOOK VI.

HAVING explained, in four Books, all the matter of the Institute, and having, in the Fifth Book, thoroughly established it, by refuting the opinions of opponents, now, in a Sixth Book, he recapitulates the same matter, which is the essence of the Institute, while condensing it. For, in addition [to what has preceded], an enumeration of the matters before mentioned, namely, a summary, having been composed, learners acquire an undoubting, accurate, and more solid knowledge; so that, therefore, reiteration is not here to be imputed as a fault; because the method is that of fixing a stake, [viz., by repeated blows], and because arguments, &c., not previously stated, are added.

ङ्ग्यालम् २ नारितिनासाधनामाधारित् ॥ ७ ॥

\[1\] अध्यायचतुर्वेष समस्ताध्यायाय प्रतिहार्यायं परपञ्चनिरार्ज करे प्रसाधायायी तमेव सारभूताध्यायायं वहाध्याये यो संकल्पवृत्तमहृत्तियत। उक्तार्थानां हि पुनःसाध्याये किरे विलये कृत्वा विश्वासासारसाधनादिगृद्धार्थावेषसा तृत्तियार्थो वों उस्मत्तित देयत: स्वसाधनन्यायांत्रिक: पुण्यालास्त्यांनात् पौराण्यकु ष्ठायनुसारः ॥

\[2\] Vṛddhānti Mahādeva, in my single accessible MS., reads नारितिन्य, \(\text{Ed.}\)

\[3\] साधकाभावर्त, agreeably to Nāgāraṇya. \(\text{Ed.}\)
such examples as, 'This [is] my body,' 'This [is] my understanding;' for the possessive case would be unaccountable, if there were absolute non-difference [between the Body, or the like, and the Soul, to which it is thus attributed as a possession].

6. But then, suppose that this, also, is like the expressions, 'The Soul's Thought' [Soul and Thought being identical], 'Rābu's head' [the trunkless Rābu being all head], 'The statue's body,' &c. To this he replies:

न शिलापुच्छविन्यायामानवाभायात् || 8 ||

Aph. 4. It is not as in the case of the statue,  4 because there is [there] a contradiction to the evidence which acquaints us with the thing:

a. This expression by means of the possessive case,

1 ममेदं शरीरं मनों बुद्धियादिविदिनुष्ठ वही-व्यपदेशादिपि देवादिव् चात्मा भिन्नत्वत्वा-भेदे बहचनुपणरिन्यथः ||

2 नन्न पुत्रस्य चैतन्यं राहेश तिर्यः शिलापुच्छविन्यायामानवाभायात् चतवाः ||

3 Anyrddha and Vedānti Mahādeva have शिलापुच्छविन्यायामानवाभायात्.

Śīlpātra is 'grindstone,' according to the dictionaries; śīlpātra, in the few places where I have seen it, may well signify 'tomo.'  

4 With reference to the word thus rendered, see the preceding note. 

1] जानामीश्वरे प्रतीयमानत्वम् पुच्छं साधारणतः सिद्ध एवान्ति वाधकप्रमाणाभावतः साधारणतः हिन्यायामानवाभायात् ||

दत्तविवेकव्रतम् करत्वं भिन्नतव ||

5 Two copies of Vedānti Mahādeva's work omit अस्तीति.  

Ed.
b. Having settled that Soul is different from Body, &c., he settles its emancipation:

अश्यतदुःशिनियत्या कृतकृयता || ||

Ap. 5. Through the entire cessation of pain, there is done what was to be done.

a. But then, since there is an equality of gain and loss, inasmuch as, through the cessation of Pain there is the

\begin{quote}
\text{शिलापुष्प्य शरीरनियादिवन्तं धार्मिक-देशों न भवति। शिलापुष्प्यविद्वाने धर्माधिक- प्रमाणेन बाधाविक्षमाचन्। सम शरीरिनिति ब्यप्तिमेव तु प्रमाणे चाह नालि देहांमतिता एव ब्रुवादिप्रमाणधीकाधिकत्वय: ||}
\text{देहादिप्रतिरक्ष्यतः पुष्पवधायं तन्तुल्क- मचार्यत:}\
\end{quote}

Instead of कृṣ्ण, some MSS. of Vijnana's commentary, as also Negră and Vedânti Mahâdeva, have दृष्ण; and a margin note in one of my copies of Aniruddha states this to be the true reading. Ed.

\begin{quote}
\text{तथा च मुखामिलां बाधिष्ठायुं दुःखदेशों दुःखावृत्तात् आचार्यों जनमीति न तुपायमयक- सित्वति ||}
\text{मुखापापया दुःखस्य चढ़र्ज्जलायां दुःखितनु- बिरे अधस्थर्याः द्वाराः}\
\end{quote}
Aph. 7. For [only] some one, somewhere, is happy.

Aph. 8. It [Pleasure,] is also mixed with Pain; therefore the discriminating throw it to the side of [and reckon it as so much,] Pain.

Aph. 9. If you say that this [cessation of suffering] is a joy.

Aph. 10. The Soul [some one may suggest,] has no quality, for there is Scripture for its being unaccompanied, &c.

\[
\text{निगुणशक्तिः}
\]

A doubt.

\[
\text{शोचनादेहं त्वप्रेण भवति}
\]

b. He ponders a doubt.

\[
\text{निगुणशक्ति सबुद्धिः}
\]

b. He clears up this [doubt]:

\[
\text{सूची स्म शुभे न स्माहिति हि पृथ्वी लोकानां प्रार्थना दृष्टिः इति}
\]

\[
\text{अनिरूढः}
\]

a. Therefore the cessation of Pain, indeed, [a property which does not belong to it,] cannot be Soul's aim; such is the meaning.

\[
\text{अनिरूढः}
\]

a. For we see, amongst men, quite a distinct aspiration: [the first,] 'May I be happy;' [the second,] 'May I not be miserable;' [and the latter is our conception of beatitude].

\[
\text{सतिदिवार्तिः}
\]

b. Among innumerable grasses, trees, brutes, birds, men, &c., very few,—a man, a god, or the like,—are happy: such is the meaning.

\[
\text{सुखस्माकान्तादपूर्णार्थमिति चेत्त दैविकभाषा}
\]
and, if [secondly.] it were produced by Desert, &c., there
would be a regressus in infinitum, inasmuch as we should
have to search for another [previous instance of] non-
discrimination, to stand as the cause of [that] Desert,
&c., also : such is the meaning.¹

b. And then, if it be without beginning, it must be
everlasting. To this he replies:

न निन्यः स्वातांत्ववर्तन्यानुप्रक्षिप्ति। || 93 ||

Non-discrimination, though from eternity,
cannot be everlasting [in the same
manner] as the soul is ; else, it could
not be cut short, [as we affirm that it can be].

a. It is not everlasting, indivisible, and beginningless,
in the same way as the soul is; but it is beginningless,
in the shape of an on-flow [which may be stopped]. For,
otherwise, the cutting short of a beginningless entity
would, as is established by Scripture, be unfeasible,
[though the beginningless antecedent non-entity of a given
jar may be readily understood to terminate, on the pro-
duction of the jar]. Such is the meaning.⁴

¹ सार्तिशहि सत्त एवोपाधे मुक्तस्वात्यि वन्या-
पतिः: कामदित्तवादे च कामदित्तवाद वन्याचरण-
स्तनविवेकान्तान्तापि वन्याचरणवेचार्याः। ||

2 ननु चेदनादिरिति नित्यं स्वार्तिशि ति-
वाह। ||

3 नंत्यसहि स्तनविवेकान्तान्तापि वन्याचरणवेचार्याः। ||

4 NaNia has स्वातांत्ववर्तन्यानुप्रक्षिप्ति: Ed.

श्रीमचिंबिलोक्षणदानानि। भवति किं तु

28
b. Having stated the cause of [Soul's] Bondage, he states the cause of Liberation:

प्रतिनियतकारणायां यत्स्वतः ॥ १८ ॥

Aph. 14. It [Bondage] is annihilable by the allotted cause, [viz., discrimination of Soul from Nature]; as darkness is [annihilable by the allotted cause, viz., Light].

ऋषिप्र स्माणित्वमोन्नयम्यते रात्रेषां ॥ १५ ॥

This enforced.

Aph. 15. Here, also, [viz., in the case of Bondage and Discrimination, as in the case of Darkness and Light], there is allotment, [as is proved] both by positive and negative consociation. [Liberation taking place where Discrimination is, and not where it is not].

a. He reminds [us] of what was mentioned in the first Book, viz., that Bondage cannot be innate, &c.:

बलभाभेश्वानादिः सः भविष्यानिधाि मण्यि-सिकः सत्यदातुपपतिरितिः ॥

बन्धकारणमुक्ता मोक्षकारणमाह ॥


2. चर्चायम् ठुःक्षेयतः यथाकर्षेरकारणस्त ॥ शेषें लयमम् ॥

3. नन्तु मुहुर्दित्वः कार्यत्वः विनायात्नम् पुन-वेन्यः स्यादिति ॥ तत्तवः ॥

Aph. 16. Since it cannot be [accounted for] in any other way, it is non-discrimination alone that is [the cause of] Bondage, [which cannot be innate].

a. ‘Bondage’ here means the cause of Bondage, named the conjunction of pain. The rest is plain.

b. But then, since liberation, also, from its being a product, is liable to destruction, Bondage should take place over again. To this he replies:

न भुस्त्रे पुनवेन्यः योगनावतितिः ॥ १९ ॥

Bondage does not recur.

Aph. 17. Further, Bondage does not again attach to the liberated; because there is Scripture for its non-recurrence.

1. Vedânti Mahâdeva has प्रकारान्तराभावाद ॥ Ed.

2. चर्चायम् ठुःक्षेयतः यथाकर्षेरकारणस्त ॥ शेषें लयमम् ॥

3. नन्तु मुहुर्दित्वः कार्यत्वः विनायात्नम् पुन-वेन्यः स्यादिति ॥ तत्तवः ॥

* Vijnâna and Nâgâ quote the text: न स पुनारावण्ते नानु मुहुर्दित्वः कार्यत्वः विनायात्नम् पुन-वेन्यः स्यादिति ॥

Aniruddha and Vedânt Mahâdeva cite the longer passage: ज्ञातवः ज्ञातवः प्रकृततो विवेकायो न पुनारावण्ते ॥

See note 4, at p. 182, supra. Since that note was written, I have observed the words ज्ञातवः वा ज्ञातवः in the Brihad-
that you have asserted [Book I, § 19.] the eternal freedom [of all souls alike]? To this he replies:

Mukti rathayabhavana pari: || 20 ||

The nature of liberation.

Aph. 20. Liberation is nothing other than the removal of the obstacle [to the Soul’s recognition of itself as free].

a. But then, in that case, since Bondage and Liberation are unreal, Liberation must be contradictory to the texts, &c., which set forth what is Soul’s aim, [as some positive and real acquisition, not merely the removal of a screen]; to which he replies:

Tatabhivrodh: || 21 ||

An objection repelled.

Aph. 21. Even in that case, there is no contradiction.

a. That is to say: ‘even in that case,’ i.e., even if Liberation consists [only] in the removal of an obstacle, there is no contradiction in its being Soul’s aim.

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1 Nāgara reads परात. Ed.
2 The rare word dhauasti, thus rendered, Vijnāna and Vedānti Mahādeva explain by dhvansati. Ed.
3 नवन्वेब वन्धमोक्षयोगिष्ठाध्यायम सन्तिभक्ति तथािह ||
4 तत्तात्त्याययायंस्य मोक्षवेदी पुनःवर्त्ति विवेधिरोध इत्यत्थ: ||
But then, if Liberation be merely the removal of an obstacle, then it should be accomplished through mere hearing [of the error which stands in the way]; just as a piece of gold on one’s neck, [which one has sought for in vain, while it was] withheld from one by ignorance [of the fact that it has been tied round one’s neck with a string], is attained, [on one’s hearing where it is]. To this he replies:1

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Another objection repelled.

Aph. 22. This [attainment of Liberation, on the mere hearing of the truth,] is no necessity; for there are three sorts of those competent [to apprehend the truth; but not all are qualified to appropriate it, on merely hearing it].

a. He mentions that not mere hearing alone is seen to be the cause of knowledge, but that there are others, also.4

Aph. 23. Of others [viz., other means besides hearing], for the sake of confirmation, [there is need].

a. He speaks of these same other means:1

स्थिरसत्तुकासात्मनाकमि न नियमः || २४ ||

Aph. 24. There is no [absolute] necessity that what is steady and promoting ease should be a [particular] posture, [such as any of those referred to in Book III., §34].

a. That is to say; there is no necessity that a ‘posture’ should be the ‘lotus-posture,’ or the like; because whatever is steady and promotes ease is a [suitable] ‘posture’.2

b. He states the principal means [of Concentration]

ध्यान निर्विभयं मनः || २५ ||

The efficient means of Concentration.

Aph. 25. Mind without an object is Meditation.

c. That is to say: what Internal Organ is void of any modification, that is ‘Meditation,’ i.e., Concentration, in the shape of exclusion of the modifications of Intellect: by reason of the identity [here,] of effect and cause, the word ‘cause’ is employed for ‘effect.’ For it will be

1 तन्मात्रायथायां साधनानाहें ||
2 जाने प्यातासात्मनालिनि नासि यतः
3 मुख्यं साधनमाह ||
declared how Meditation effects this [exclusion of the modifications of Intellect].

6. But then, since Soul is alike, whether there be Concentration or Non-concentration, what have we to do with Concentration? Having pondered this doubt, he clears it up. 3

Aph. 26. If you say that even both ways there is no difference, it is not so: there is a difference, through the exclusion [in the one case,] of the tinge [of reflected pain which exists in the other case].

a. But how can there exist a tinge in that which is unassociated [with anything whatever, as Soul is alleged to be]? To this he replies: 3

Aph. 27. Though it [Soul,] be un-associated, still there is a tingeing [reflectionally] through Non-discrimination.

a. That is to say: though there is not a real tinge in that which is unassociated [with tincture, or anything else], still there is, as it were, a tinge; hence the tinge is treated as simply a reflexion, by those who discriminate the tinge 1 [from the Soul, which it delusively seems to belong to].

6. He explains this same. 3

Aph. 28. As is the case with the Hibiscus and the crystal [Book I, § 19, c.], there is not a tinge, but a fancy [that there is such].

a. He states the means of excluding the aforesaid tinge. 3

How to be got rid of. Aph. 29. It [viz., the aforesaid tinge.] is debarred by Meditation, Restraint, Practice, Apathy, &c.
a. He shows the means settled by the ancient teachers, in regard to the exclusion—through Meditation, &c., lodged in the Mind,—of the tingeing of Soul:1

**नयेवध्यानसंवृत्तेऽवृत्तेऽत्तथा**; || 30 ||

**Aph. 30.** It is by the exclusion of dissolution and distraction, say the teachers.

a. That is to say: through the removal, by means of Meditation, &c., of the Mind’s condition of [being dissolved in] Sleep, and condition of [waking] Certainty, &c., there takes place also the exclusion of the tingeing of Soul by the condition; because, on the exclusion of any [real] object, there is the exclusion also of its reflexion: so say the ancient teachers.3

b. He states that there is no compulsion that Meditation, &c., should take place in caves and such places:4

**न स्यायनियमविषिक्षसादात**; || 39 ||

\[1\] चित्रितीह्यानादिना पुस्त्वस्यपरागनिरोधे पूर्वाचार्येऽसिद्ध चारं दशैयति।

\[2\] Inertness [of mind] is a better rendering of laya. Ed.

\[3\] ध्यानादिना चित्रिती निद्रावृत्ते: प्रमाणादि-वृत्तेऽवृत्तेऽवृत्ते पुस्तवस्यापि वृत्तपरागनिरोधे भवति चित्रितीर्थे प्रतिविक्ष्यापि निरोधादिति पूर्वाचार्येऽचारं चविरिवर्थे।

\[4\] ध्यानादी गुहादिश्यानिनमो नातीवाह॥

\[5\] Aniruddha has, to a very different effect, प्रसादामाति

**Aph. 31.** There is no rule about localities; for it is from tranquillity of Mind.

a. That is to say: Meditation, or the like, results simply ‘from tranquillity of Mind.’ Therefore, such a place as a cave is not indispensable for it:1

b. The discussion of Liberation is completed. Now, with an eye to the unchangeableness of Soul, he handles copiously the cause of the world:1

**प्रकृतोद्योदानान्तनयेऽद्यवस्तु: द्वारं ध्यानमुख्य:**; || 32 ||

**Aph. 32.** Nature is the primal material; for there is Scripture [to the effect] that the others are products.

a. That is to say: since we learn, from Scripture, that Mind, &c., are products, Nature is established under the character of the radical cause of these.

b. But then, let Soul be the material. To this he replies:4

\[1\] चित्रित्यसादात ध्यानादिकम्। अतस्य न गुहादिश्यानिनिषमि इत्यथः॥

\[2\] समायो मोक्षविवरः। इदानी पुस्तवपरिश्चाल्यिताऽजगकारार्यसुपरिहर्षति।

\[3\] महादत्तानां कार्यविवर्णेऽस्मिन मूलकारार्य-तथा प्रकृति: सत्तितिवर्षः॥

\[4\] ननु पुस्तव एवोपादानं भवतु। तत्राह॥

*His comment runs:* ये चित्रित्यसादात न भवति तत्त्व न जातयमनवानम्॥ Ed.
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a. That is to say: the various views, in regard to Soul's being a cause, which are conceivable are, all, opposed to Scripture; therefore, the lowest of the bad reasoners, and others, who are accepters thereof,1 have no knowledge of the nature of Soul. Hence it is to be understood that those, also, [e.g., the Naiyāyikas,] who assert that Soul is the substance of the qualities Pleasure, Pain, &c., are quite illogical; these, also, have no correct knowledge of Soul. And, if it be asserted that Soul is a cause [of the world], just as the sky is the recipient cause of the clouds, &c., [and stands, towards it, in the relation of a cause, in so far as, without the room afforded by it, these could not exist], then we do not object to that; for, what we deny is only that there is transformation2 [of Soul, as material, into the world, as product].

b. Since we see, that, in the case of things motionless, locomotive, &c., the material cause is nothing else than

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1. 'Lowest . . . thereof' I have put instead of 'base illogical holders of these.' Ed.

2. पुरुषकारणतं प्रेम ये व पश्चायथं संभवतिले सबं नुतिविस्फा इत्यतस्तृणुमन्नूराः कुताक्षिका-खाद्याभासास्वीकृतज्ञानं न भवतीतयथर्थः: | एतेनात्मनि सुब्भूखिण्यापास्तवन्ताविदो- | पि कुताक्षिका एव तत्त्वसामायपर्यायथार्थानां नाक्षत्रसूक्ष्मफलम्। यति चाकारकाश्याभासास्वी- | परिशास्यवेद प्रतिशालादीति।

---

1. Gupalvam sankhaṃ chopadanaṃ yogātā tāmār- | bhavāt-luṣṭakṣaḥ niyāvāpi noopādanaṃ bhājeyah: |


3. Here I have offered a substitute for 'illogical outcasts.' Ed.
earth, &c., how can Nature be the material of all? To this he replies:\(^1\)

\textit{पारम्पर्येऽस्य प्रभावानुमोदितरूपम्} \(\text{॥ ३५ ॥}

\textit{Aph. 35. Though but mediately [the cause of products], Nature is inferred [as the ultimate cause of the intermediate causes]; just as are Atoms, [by the \textit{Vaiśeṣikas}].}

\textit{सयं कार्यस्यानुभवम्} \(\text{॥ ३६ ॥}

\textit{Aph. 36. It [Nature,] is all-pervading; because [its] products are seen everywhere.}

\textit{a. But then, only if it be limited, can it be said that, ‘Wherever a product arises, there does it [Nature,] go [or act];’ [for what is unlimited, and fills all space, can find no other space to move into]. To this he replies:}^{2}

\textit{गतियोगेश्वारकार्यानिरक्षानिरपेक्षतः} \(\text{॥ ३७ ॥}

\textit{Aph. 37. Though motion may attach to it, this does not destroy its character as ultimate cause; just as is the case with Atoms.}

\textit{a. ‘Motion’ means action. Though it be present, this does not prevent its [Nature’s,] being the radical cause; just as is the case with the earthy and other}

\textit{र्थाय जीवा न वृष्टियानुनिमित्त: परमिस्त्रियानुमोदिततः} \(\text{॥ ३८ ॥}

\textit{Aph. 38. Nature is something in addition to the notorious [nine Substances of the \textit{Nyāya} list]; it is no matter of necessity [that there should be precisely nine].}

\textit{a. And the argument, here, is the Scriptural declaration, that eight [of the pretended primitive substances] are products: such is the import.}^{3}

\textit{सच्चादीनामसंपद्वतं तदुपवात्} \(\text{॥ ३९ ॥}

\textit{Aph. 39. Purity and the others are not properties of it [viz., Nature]; because they are its essence.}

\textit{a. That is to say: Purity and the other Qualities are not properties of Nature; because they are what constitutes Nature.}^{4}

\textit{b. He determines the motive of Nature’s energizing;}

\textit{गति: क्रिया तस्सैदेष्टिक तीव्रताय शाहनिर्वा वैशेषिकते पारिवर्त्याद्यत्तमिन-}\n
\textit{लय्य:} \(\text{॥}

\textit{अध्यानावेत्तान्त चाच तं कै तत्त्वात्} \(\text{॥}

\textit{सच्चादीनां प्रकृतिधर्मसं नाति प्रकृ-}\n
\textit{तित्सन्नवार्तानित्यः} \(\text{॥}

\(^1\) स्यावरजीवीमज्जेदेदिनेष्वर्ण कार्य-\n
\textit{लद्विनाशत्} \(\text{॥ तत्त्वाह ॥}

\(^2\) नन्तु परिक्षीलीपित्त यथ कार्यमुखावते तथ \n
\textit{गौतिकीतिवृक्षम्} \(\text{॥ तत्त्वाह ॥}

\(^3\) नन्तु परिक्षीलीपित्त यथ कार्यमुखावते तथ \n
\textit{गौतिकीतिवृक्षम्} \(\text{॥ तत्त्वाह ॥}

\(^4\) नन्तु परिक्षीलीपित्त यथ कार्यमुखावते तथ \n
\textit{गौतिकीतिवृक्षम्} \(\text{॥ तत्त्वाह ॥}
since, if we held the energizing to be without a motive, 
Emancipation would be inexplicable: 1

अनुपमोगोधि पुमधे सूक्ष्ण: प्रधान्योर्त्रकुकुम- 
वाकवत् ॥ ८० ॥

Nature's disinterested - ness.

Aph. 40. Nature, though it does not 
enjoy [the results of its own ener-
gizing], creates for the sake of Soul;
like a cart's carrying saffron, [for the use of its master.
See Book III., § 58].

a. He states the concomitant* cause of diversified 
creation: 4

कर्मचालिताल्पिप्रेक्षितम् ॥ ८९ ॥

Aph. 41. The diversity of creation 
is in consequence of the diversity of 
Desert.

1 प्रधानपूर्तः प्रयोजनमवायर्यति निष्प्रो- 
जनप्रृक्षामपमे मोक्षानुपपातिः ॥

Nâgâsa is peculiar in giving, as an Aphorism, in substitution for 
these words, the cause from the introduction to it, printed just 
avove, viz., निष्प्रेक्षित, &c., but ending with the nominative case 
-अनुपपातिः. The Sânapore edition of the Sânkhya-pravac-
chânâ-ôdâghya has, as the Aphorism, very corruptly, in part:
प्रयोजनपूर्तः मोक्षानुपपातः ॥ Ed.

2 Nîmisita, on which vide supra, p. 400, note &. Ed.

3 विचिन्ठित्वरी निम्पत्तारामामाह ॥

a. But then, granting that creation is due to Nature, 
yet whence is destruction? For a couple of opposite results 
cannot belong to one and the same cause. To this he 
replies: 1

साम्यवचनं भाष्यम् ॥ ८२ ॥

Aph. 42. The two results are through 
equipoise and the reverse of equi-
poise.

a. Nature is the triad of Qualities, viz., Purity, &c.; 
and their 'reverse of equipoise' is their aggregation in 
excess or defect; the absence of this [reverse of equipoise] 
is 'equipoise'; 2 through these two causes two opposite 
results, in the shape of creation and destruction, arise from 
one and the same: such is the meaning. 2

b. But then, since it is Nature's attribute to create, there 
should be the mundane state, even after [the discrimina-
tive] knowledge, [which, it is alleged, puts an end to it]. 
To this he replies: 4

1 ननु भवतु प्रधानाल्पिः प्रलयस्य कस्मात् ।

न बोक्ष्मानाल्पिः यातिरूक्तवचनं घटते । तत्साहि ॥

Compare Book I., Aph. 61, a, at p. 71, supra. Ed.

2 सत्यादिगुणां प्रधानं तेषां च वैषयम् ज्ञूनार्थीः 
तिरीक्षाभवेन संहनं तद्भवः: सम्यं तत्त्वं वहन- 
हुनायामेक्षाकारं सुषिदधिमयोः विष्टार्यते 
भवतीतवरः: ॥

3 ननु प्रधानस्य सृष्टिवाभाष्यस्यानाशः संसारः स्वातः । तत्साहि ॥

29
Aph. 43. Since [or when] the emancipated has understood [thatis never was really otherwise], Nature does not create; just as, in the world, a minister does not toil, when the king’s purpose has been accomplished.¹

a. But then, Nature does not rest from creating; for we see the mundane condition of the ignorant: and so, since Nature goes on creating, to the emancipated, also, Bondage may come again. To this he replies:²

Aph. 44. Even though it [Nature,] may invade others [with its creative influences], the emancipated does not experience, in consequence of the absence of a concurrent cause,³ [e.g., Non-discrimination, in the absence of which there is no reason why the emancipated should be subjected to Nature’s invasion].

1 Compare Aph. 66 of Book III, at p. 287, supra. Ed.
2 ननु प्रवधास्य सृष्टिपरमो नास्त्यज्ञानां सं-सारद्वैनञ्ज्ञया च प्रवधासृष्टाय मुक्तस्यापि पुन-बेंच्यः: स्थात्। तत्राह ||
3 Some copies of Vijnana here introduce भवति; and Nageia has the lection विमुक्तनेगो भवति. Ed.
4 Nimitta, on which vide supra, p. 400, note 4. Ed.
5 पुरुषस्य व्यवस्थानां वो भवति पुरुषस्य तदेव नालवाचित्विविधित्विवस्थानास्रज्ञाष्ट्राः।
6 यद तदुद्दार्मात्स्ततः भवन्येतरे दुःसंयोगस्ततःत्वादित्युतदुक्तव्यस्तिनोऽवस्थात् त्र बुद्धस्य वहृतं सत्यविवस्थानां सिद्धितीवर्षयः।
7 सत्पाद्धर्मव्रतस्य मृत्योष्णस्य स्वात्। त-चाहृ॥
8 नन्यपाधिमेदाभिमोक्षयवस्य स्वात। त-चाहृ॥
Aph. 48. The prima facie view [of the Vedánta] is not [to be allowed any force, as an objection]; because, by [admitting] two, [viz., Soul and Ignorance], there is no opposition [to our own dualistic theory of Soul and Nature]; and the subsequent [dogma, viz., that one single Soul is the only reality, is not to be allowed]; because of the non-existence of a proof, [which, if it did exist, would, along with Soul, constitute a duality].

a. But then, Soul will be demonstrated by its self-manifestation. To this he replies:

Aph. 49. [And,] in its [Soul's] being demonstrated by the light [of itself, as you Vedánta say it is], there is the [unreconciled] opposition of patient and agent [in one, which is a contradiction].

a. That is to say: if Soul be demonstrated by the light which Soul consists of, there is the ‘opposition of patient and agent’ [in one].

b. But then, there is no contradiction [here] between patient and agent; because it [the Soul], through the property of light which is lodged in it, can, itself, furnish

1. Nágésha has उपाधिषिष्ठेश्वरसिद्धेनाति. Ed.
2. ननूपधिषिष्ठेश्वरविधा इति न तैयैततथा
3. इत्याधिषिष्ठेश्वरविधा
4. पुरुषोपधिषिष्ठेश्वरविधा इति नैरैततथा
5. भुतानन्दविद्यामेव स्वार्थस्य अपरमायपुष्प हयमाहाम
6. चेतन्यमूर्तानन्दुप्प्रकाशैर्विद्यामेव कर्मकार्यविदीर्भेन इत्यपि
the relation to itself; just as the Vaiśeṣikas declare, that, through the intelligence lodged in it, it is, itself, an object to itself. To this he replies:

Illuminating function of Soul.

Aph. 50. This [Soul], in the shape of Thought, discrepant from the non-intelligent, reveals the non-intelligent.

a. But then, in that case, if duality be established in accordance with proofs, &c., what becomes of the Scriptural text declaring non-duality? To this he replies:

A note for the Vaidik view.

Aph. 51. There is no contradiction to Scripture [in our view]; because that [text of Scripture which seems to

assert absolute non-duality] is [intended] to produce apathy in those who have desires, [and who would be better for believing in 'the nothingness of the things of time'].

a. He tells us that the assertors of non-duality are to be shunned, not only for the reason above mentioned, but, also, because of the non-existence of evidence to convince us that the world is unreal:

The world's reality is irrefragable.

Aph. 52. The world is real; because it results from an unobjectionable cause, and because there is [in Scripture,] no debarrer [of this view of the matter].

a. We see, in the world, that no reality belongs to dream-objects, or to the [sancied] yellowness of [invariably white] conch-shells, and the like; inasmuch as these are result of the internal organ, &c., when [not normal, but] injured by [i.e., under the injurious influence of] Sleep, &c.: and this is not [the state of things] in the [waking] Universe, in which Mind is the first,4 [according to Book I., § 71].

1 नन्तु नालि कर्मकार्तृत्विरोधः स्वनिष्ठप्रकाशः
धर्मेऽद्वा स्वाय स्ववस्थसमभावत्। यथा वैशेषिकानां स्वनिष्ठज्ञानही च स्वाय विषय इति।
तत्रताह॥

2 Aniruddha has -वृत्ति। Ed.
3 From this point, Védánti Mahádeva, according to my one poor MS. of his work, has a very different reading, which, however, owing to the carelessness of the copyist, I am unable to reproduce. Ed.
4 नन्तुभव प्रमाणाय यन्तुरोधेन वैतसिद्धिवैतस्वतुः: का गाति! तत्रताह॥

1 न जेवलमुखुमावृत्वादित्वादित्वोहेऽया अभिल
जगद्यतमताय:हक्षणामध्याविनापीयत:॥

2 For 'injured,' &c., read, 'impeded by the obstruction [offered] by Sleep.' Ed.
3 Instead of 'in which,' &c., read, 'consisting of' the Great One, &c.' Ed.
4 निद्राविद्यन्तुशास्त्र: कर्मादिद्वेश्वरे स्वाय-विषयस्वरुपीतानामानसत्त्वः लोके द्वेष तथ
सहदिद्यप्रथव्य नालि॥

2 g
b. He declares that the Universe is real, not merely in its existent state [at any given instant]; but, also, always.

Aph. 53. Since it cannot be [accounted for] in any other way, manifestation [of whatever is manifested] is of what is real, [i.e., of what previously existed].

a. That is to say: since, through the aforesaid reasons, it is impossible that the unreal should come into existence, what does come into existence, or is manifested, is what really existed [previously,] in a subtle form.

b. Though [it is declared that] the being the agent and the being the experimenter belong to diverse subjects, he asserts the distribution [of agency to Self-consciousness, and of experience to Soul,] by two aphorisms:

The real agent who.

Aph. 54. Self-consciousness, not Soul, is the agent.

Aph. 55. Experience ceases at [discrimination of] Soul, [as being quite distinct from Nature]; since it arises from its [Soul's,] Desert, [which is not, really, Soul's, but which, while Non-discrimination lasts, is made over to Soul; just as the fruits of the acts of a king's ministers are made over to the king].

a. He shows the reason for what was stated before, viz., that cessation of action does not result from enterings into the world of Brahman:

Aph. 56. Even in the world of the moon, &c., there is return [to mundane existence]; because of there really being a cause [of such return].

a. 'A cause,' viz., Non-discrimination, Desert, &c.3

b. But then, through the counsels of the persons dwelling in these various [supermundane] worlds, there ought to be no return [to mundane existence]. To this he replies:

1 बललोकान्तर्गतिभिन्नाति निन्युक्तिरिति पूर्वाकोऽस्मात् यथार्थात्

रूपाक्षिकभिन्नतिभिन्नाति निन्युक्तिरिति पूर्वाकोऽस्मात् यथार्थात्

2 न नृत्तत्वादिकान्तर्गतिभिविभिन्नाति

3 नत्तैहेतुविधः अस्मात्स्मात्

4 नत्तैहेतुविधः अस्मात्स्मात्

5 नत्तैहेतुविधः अस्मात्स्मात्
BOOK VI, APH. 60.

is all-pervading, yet, in time, it reaches its place of experience [or body], through conjunction with an adjunct; as in the case of Space.

a. For, as Space, though it is all-pervading, is spoken of as moving to some particular place, in consequence of its conjunction with an adjunct, such as a jar, [when we say 'the space occupied by the jar is moved to the place to which the jar is carried'], just so is it [here].

b. He expounds the statement, that the site of experience [the body] is formed through the superintendence of the experiencer, [Soul]:

The Body's existence [resides on Soul.]

Aph. 60. This [constitution of a body] is not accomplished in the case of what is [organic matter] not superintended [by Soul]; because we find putrefaction [in organic matter where Soul is absent].

a. But then, let the construction of a site of experience [or a body] for Experiencers [i.e., Souls] take place.
without any superintendence at all, through Desert. To this he replies: 1

चतुर्दशारा चेदसंविष्या तद्वभवावाज्ञातवर्का द्रुकार ॥ ६७ ॥

Aph. 61. If you say that [independently of any superintendence,] it is through Desert [that a Body is formed, it is not so]; since what is unconnected [with the matter to be operated upon] is incompetent thereto; as is the case with [unapplied] water, &c., in respect of a plant.

a. That is to say: because it is impossible that Desert, which is not directly conjoined with the semen and other [elements of the Body], should operate through Soul, in the construction of the Body, &c.; just as it is for water, &c., unconnected with the seed, to operate through tillsage, &c., in the production of a plant. 2

b. According to the system of the Vaikeshikas and others, it is settled that Soul is the superintendent, [in the construction of the Body], in virtue of its being conjoined with Desert. But he tells us, that, in his own doc-

trine, since Desert, &c., are not properties of Soul, the Soul cannot, through these, be the cause) of the Body:

निगुणतात्वसंविष्याद्रुकारः कोरे ॥ ६८ ॥

Aph. 62. For this is impossible [viz., that the Soul should, through its Desert, &c., be the cause of Body]; because it has no qualities for these [viz., Desert, &c.,] are properties of Self-consciousness, [not of Soul].

a. And so, in our opinion, it is settled that Soul superintends [in the causing of the Body] quite directly, by conjunction simply, without reference to anything intermediate: such is the import. 3

b. But, if Soul be all-pervading, then the limitedness of the living soul, which is set forth in Scripture, is unfounded. To repel this doubt, he says: 4

[quoted text in Sanskrit]

1 नन्दविपां विवेबायुर्गाड़ार भोक्ष्यो भो-
गायतननिन्जार भकतु ॥ तत्माह ॥
2 Nāgāraja reads चेदसंविष्यः. Ed.
3 युक्तारि साहासंबंद्वावार्तृत्स्य शरीरादिनी-
मांचे भोक्ष्यार्जावाबाजसम्बंद्वार्य जलादी-
दीनामुखोपल्लिकृष्ठ दिद्रार्वालविशयः ॥
4 वैष्णविचारादिनियोगाधिकारम् संवन्धकारं दातम- 
नोदिशावतृत्वम् स्वापितम्। स्बिन्दानि लटृषारी- 
नामात्मधर्मिताभवाबाजारा भोक्ष्याततुलमेव न सं- 
भवलिऴाह ॥
5 तथा चासम्मते दातीप्रेमेयं संयोगमाणेषया 
साधारि भोक्ष्यार्यं स्वाधीती भावः ॥
6 नन्द चेदसंविष्यो ज्याप्कल्पिते चुतिप्रतिपितं 
विनविदर्शनवलयव्यथापम् ॥ तामिलमाश्रितां 
परिप्रेक्ष्यां परिहुतमाह ॥
The Sánkhyá Aphorisms. 

Aph. 63. The nature of a living soul belongs to that which is qualified, [not to Soul devoid of qualities, as is proved] by direct and indirect arguments. 

a. To be a living soul is the being possessed of the vital airs; and this is the character of the soul distinguished by personality, not of pure Soul, [which is unlimited].

b. Desiring, now, to set forth the difference between the products of Mind [or the Great Principle] and of Self-consciousness, he first states the products of Self-consciousness.

Aph. 64. The effectuation of works is dependent on the agent Self-consciousness, not dependent on a Lord, [such as is feigned by the Vaiseshikas]; because there is no proof [of the reality of such].

a. By this aphorism are set forth, as are also established

1 On anaya-vyatireka, vide supra, p. 438, note 2. Ed.
2 जीवलं प्रारितं तवाहारविशिष्ट्युपस्तस्य धर्मं नतु केवलपुरुषस्य
   इदानी महाहाराष्ट्रोऽयः कार्यं इति प्रतिपद्य द्राम्युरादवह्माराष्ट्रायेमाह॥
3 See Book I., Aph. 92, at p. 112, supra. Ed.

1 This is an appellation of Siva. Ed.
2 जनेन सूचारवारोपाराधिवं व्रहस्त्रयोऽयः सूचारस्तहारकतृत्वेऽविकृतिस्वरूपस्य प्रतिपद्य दिततम्॥
3 ननु भवलहारकोऽव्ययस भवहारकस्य तु कः कर्ता। त्राह॥
4 यथा सर्वदृश्य सूचारस्तहारवनक्षयान्यत्वेऽविकृतिस्वरूपस्य कालविशेषानां ज्ञाति ततुद्वैकारार्थस्य कः

Book VI., Aph. 65. 

by Scripture and the Legal Institutes, the creative and the destructive agencies of Brahmá and Rudra [respectively], owing to their adjunct, Self-consciousness, [or personality].

b. But then, grant that Self-consciousness is the maker of the others, still who is the maker of Self-consciousness? To this he replies:

The real agent alone.

Aph. 65. It is the same as in the arising of Desert.

a. Just as, at the creations, &c., the manifestation of Desert, which sets Nature energizing, results solely from the particular time,—since, if we were to suppose other Desert as the instigator of this, we should have an infinite regress,—just so Self-consciousness arises from time alone, as the cause; but there is not another maker thereof, also: thus, the two [cases] are alike: such is the meaning.
With reference to this doubt, he states that all philosophers reject, in common, the doubt whether we should have an infinite regress, on the supposition of a stream of Non-discrimination; because this [regress] is valid: [since an infinite regress which is in conformity with the truth is no sound cause of objection]:

कल्पनित्वम: प्रकृते: स्तस्वाभिभावोख्यनादिविः
जक्करत् ॥ ६८ ॥

Aph. 66. The rest is from Mind, [the Great Principle].

A theory which may be acquiesced in without detriment to the argument.

Aph. 67. The relation of possession and possessor, also, if attributed [as it is by some] to Desert, in the case of Nature [and Soul], like [the relation of] seed and plant, [which takes the shape of an infinite regress of alternates], is beginningless.

आविवेकनिमित्तः वा पञ्चाशिश: ॥ ६८ ॥

A second.

Aph. 68. Or [the case is, likewise, one of an infinite regress], if it [the relation between Nature and Soul] be attributed to Non-discrimination [of Soul from Nature], as Panchasikha [holds].

1. आविवेकनिमित्तः प्रकृतिपूर्वोभागभी
क्रृत्वा इति प्रागुकम्। तताविवेक एव विनिमित्तः
स्याकारांभावोविचारक्योनेनव
स्याप्रतिपित्वः श्रव्यायः प्रामाणिकतेन विचारः
सर्वधादिसाधारण इत्यादः ॥

2. -निमित्तः: is the reading of Aniruddha. Ed.
Aph. 69. [The case is the same,] if, as the teacher Sanandana does, we attribute it [the relation between Nature and Soul,] to the Subtile Body, [which, in the shape of its elemental causes, attends Soul, even during the periodical annihilations of the world].

a. He sums up the import of the declarations of the Institute:--

Aph. 70. Be that the one way, or the other, the cutting short thereof [viz., of the relation between Nature and Soul,] is Soul's aim; the cutting short thereof is Soul's aim.

शास्त्रवाक्यार्थः मुखस्वरूपं हरिति ||

CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS.

IN THE BODY OF THE PAGE.

P. 12, l. 19. Instead of 'indestructible,' read 'impracticable.'
P. 23, l. 7. 'That is to say,' &c. See, for a more correct rendering, the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 53.

P. 25, l. 2. Read, instead of 'your own implied dogmas,' 'the dogmas which you accept.'

P. 32, l. 8. The reference to the second note is omitted.

P. 35, l. 14. एक ज्ञातम् is the reading of Aniruddha and Nágára. एकातम्, that of Vijnána and Vedánti Mahádeva.

P. 44, l. 3. Aniruddha has एकावस्थाविवाचने.


P. 52, l. 10. 'That is to say,' &c. For another version, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 119.

P. 56, l. 7. Read निगुष्ठः.

P. 58, l. 12. Almost certainly, this interpolation was taken from the Sáṃspore edition of the Śākhya-pravacana-bhāsa. My copy of that work was lent, in 1851, to Pandit Hírânanda Chatterji, who prepared, for Dr. Ballantyne, the Sanskrit portion of what corresponds to pp. 1—183, supra, in which, additions, compressions, interpolations, and other alterations hitherto made by him, and scholia of his own devising, were introduced with regrettable frequency.

P. 59, l. 16—p. 61, l. 13. For another rendering, from a text here and there somewhat different, see the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 12, 18.

P. 69, l. 10. Read वेदः.

P. 85, l. 13. 'This ignorance,' &c. The original of this is i., v., 4, of the Pitaka-pútra.

P. 143, l. 4. Read -कुरसति.

P. 149, l. 1. Read 'is meant.'
P. 199, l. 5. 'An internal' is better.

P. 216, l. 8. Instead of 'it is one with the internal organ,' read the internal organ is really one.' The implication is, that buddhi, šankara, and manas really make one whole, called manas, in the wider sense of that term.

P. 233, l. 5. Read सूतविस्फित.

P. 246, l. 12. Remove the brackets which enclose 'promoting.' Compare p. 453, l. 7.

P. 272, l. 16. Read 'family;' i.e., an.

P. 299, l. 9. Read विफ़ुललायत.

P. 437, l. 10. Read कार्यविस्फितेनु.

IN THE NOTES.

P. 13, l. 1. Read स्वामिनिवायायायो, and remove, in p. 12, a, the brackets enclosing the words 'the positive destruction of.' Dr. Ballantine's maimed expression I find nowhere but in the Serampore edition of the Sāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāṣya.

P. 18, l. 2. Read विलस्वेदात.

P. 30, l. 1. Nāgosa has निस्मित्त, which Vijnana and Vedānti Mahādeva recognize as a reading.

P. 35, l. 5. Read 'Anuuddha and Nāgosa have.'

P. 39, l. 5, 6. See, for the true reading of what is here given corruptly, the Chāndogya Upanishad, vii., ii., 1, 2.

P. 47, l. 5. Read विस्तत्वायायेन.

P. 54, l. 3. In the Serampore edition of the Sāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāṣya, the reading is घटतस्वृत अविचार, which obviates the anacolouthism spoken of in p. 53, note 4.

P. 54, l. 4. From the Indische Studien, where referred to at the foot of p. 53, it appears that Professor Weber found, in the Amrita-bindu Upanishad, v. 13, here quoted, घोरोपमः, instead of नम्पे. Compare, further, Gaudapāda's Māṇḍukyopanishat-kārikā, iii., 4, and seq.

P. 55, l. 4. Read, instead of 'Vedānti Mahādeva,' Nāgosa.

In the foregoing pages, reference has been made, again and again, to the Serampore edition of the Śāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāṣya published in 1821. Of the imperfections of that edition some notion may be formed from the facts, that it gives, as if they were controversial, no fewer than twenty-six of the Aphorisms, that it wholly omits six others, repeats two, curtails or mangles several, and, more than once, represents, as Aphorisms, fragments of Vijnana's exposition. Still, if great liberties have not been taken with his materials by the pandit who prepared it for the press, it may be considered as possessing the value of an inferior manuscript. Hence it has been thought worth while to extract from it, as below, its principal peculiar readings of the Aphorisms, over and above those already remarked on. The pages and notes referred to are those of the present work.
यन्नभावायेक्षणलिन्यः. । Aph. 43. तत् । is omitted.
Aph. 67. As in the MSS. spoken of in p. 53, note 3. Aph. 73.
अभिश्लोकः. Aph. 81. न अभिपादानायोगते । Aph. 97.
विशेषतः ।

BOOK II. Aph. 3. Only न अवपणानायातिनिश्चितः।

विरूक्षसेः. See p. 267, note 3.


वेशयोक्तः, instead of वेशयोक्तुः.