like beasts, birds, and so forth—called because it arises from the bhutas or created beings. (iii) Adhditaivika—suffering caused by supernatural forces, like the ill effect of stars and planets, evil spirits and the like, arising from dásis or deás, i.e., the gods.

What is sought to be removed is not only the sorrows of the moment, but future sorrows as well. That is why the aphorism uses the words ‘permanent prevention’. The four puritaartha or aims of life, according to Hindu philosophy, are artha, the acquisition of wealth; dharma, the acquisition of merit; kama, the attainment of pleasure; and moksha, liberation. Of these, the first three are momentary and perishable, and only moksha is lasting and therefore worthwhile. The aim of Saankhya, as of all other schools in the Six Systems, is to achieve liberation. This is what the aphorism calls ‘the supreme purpose of life’.

Though the soul (puruسا) is beyond suffering, it appears to suffer by association with the mind, just as if we put a piece of transparent glass over a red cloth, the glass will appear red even though it isn’t so. Thus a man will say ‘Let me not suffer pain’. It is his Self which is speaking, and the Self feels itself bound by pain only because of its mental involvement.

2. Na drishtaat tatstidbhah nivritte anuvritte darshanaat.

Suffering cannot be permanently ended by ordinary means (such as money and sensual enjoyments) because it may be prevented by these for the time being, but it returns again.

The aphorism admits that pain can be put off by material things for some time, but this does not provide a solution because it is not eliminated for good. For example, one may cure an illness by medicine, or one may find momentary solace in women, family and material things, and thus feel that he has destroyed adhyatmaivanikat sorrow. He may protect himself against wild beasts, insect pests, and so forth, and think he has got rid of adhditaivika pain. Or he may wear a stone and consider it protection against adhditaivika sorrows. But really all these devices are futile because they do not root out
suffering for ever. When the effects of the medicines go, when
wealth wanes, when love ceases, and the 'lucky' stone no longer
brings luck, sorrow makes its re-appearance.

3. Pratyanikha-kshut-pratikaara-vat tat-pratikaara-cheshtamaat
purusha-artha-tvar.

One may think that purusha also desires relief from pain
by ordinary means which give momentary satisfaction, just
as a hungry person appeases his hunger every day by food.

This aphorism considers whether it is logical for the purusha
to be content with the ordinary means of eliminating pain—
like acquisition of wealth and so forth. It concludes that this
is not possible, because such relief has to be repeated again and
again like a man taking food each day to satisfy his hunger.
Besides, the repetition of such remedies creates a desire for
them, which too is not conducive to the purpose of purusha.

Even so, while the cessation of pain by worldly objects is
not the ultimate desire or objective of purusha, it is justified
because it gives temporary relief at least.

Here again in this aphorism we see the broadmindedness of
Indian philosophy. Even while asserting that objects of the
world and worldly pleasures are useless for getting rid of pain
completely, it does not castigate or condemn the being who
strives for them, recognising it as a natural tendency of the
mind.

4. Sarva-asambhavaat tat-samkhaye api atyaanta-asambhavaad
heyah pramaana-kushalak.

The method of temporary riddance of pain (see aphorism 3)
should be rejected by all reasonable persons, because it is
not possible at all places and times, and also even where
possible it is insufficient.

The latter part of this aphorism, i.e., 'even where possible
it is insufficient' is interpreted differently by Aniruddha
and Vijnana Bhikshu. According to the former, 'insufficient'
means that the palliative is not permanent while according to
Vijnana Bhikshu it implies that even if one gets rid of one
kind of pain there are others which keep on existing and
plaguing him.

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To the discriminating person everything without exception
is painful, as the Yoga Sutra says. 1 If a thing causes pleasure
it is accompanied by the fear of losing it and the resultant sor-
row when it is lost. Besides, one develops animosity towards
everything which interferes with such pleasure. For example, if
one finds joy in the love of a woman, he is pained when the
woman ceases to care for him. He is grieved and frustrated by
everything and every person who comes in between his
woman and his.

Thus if one sets out to annihilate pain by visible means, he
is trying to accomplish what is not possible. Even these visible
means are most uncertain. If one is pained with disease he
may not readily find a doctor. If one has wealth, he is troubled
by the fear of thieves and robbers. Even if bodily pain goes,
the mental remains. For these reasons temporary and
material remedies for pain must be rejected by the wise man.

5. Utkarshoohapi mokshaayo sarva-atkarsho-shrutah.
The inferior ways of removing pain ought to be rejected in
favour of the superior goal of liberation, the pre-eminence of
which is also declared by the Scriptures.

Liberation is eternal, transcendent, and the supreme remo-
ver of pain. It is not realizable by worldly objects of pleasure.
It is also extolled by the Scriptures. Therefore it is to be pre-
ferred to all other means of removal of sorrow.

6. Avihesayaa cha ubhayaah

And there is no difference between the two—the visible means,
and the injunctions of the Scriptures.

The attainment of liberation is the highest ideal beyond
which there is nothing more. But some critics may say, liber-
ation from what? The reply would be, from 'bondage'. This
bondage can be believed to be either, unavoidable and essen-
tial, or adventitious. If it is the former, the critic can say, it
can't be got rid of anyway, and if it is the latter it will be
destroyed of itself and go the way of all perishable things.

1. Pauñiñāla, Yoga Sutra, II.15 (Parinanna taap soma-kar dhu-kh
argu vriti-virodha-chak vikara vikara sar-vam vivekais).
Therefore what is the need of acquiring liberation? The answer is provided in this aphorism, viz., whichever of these two views of bondage we take, there is no denying the need for liberation.

Kapila goes on to prove in the next aphorism that bondage cannot be an essential condition of the soul.


If the soul's essential nature was to be bound, there would be no provision for the attainment of liberation.

Liberation means complete cessation of pain, and obviously pain is not what one would consider the essential quality of the soul. If it were so, the Scriptures would never prescribe a way out of it. That which is essential exists so long as the substance exists, e.g., fire cannot be liberated from its heat, which is essential to it. Therefore bondage is not the soul's real nature. This is also reiterated in the Koorma Purana, which says "If the soul was by nature impure, unclean, or mutable, it could not obtain liberation despite hundreds of rebirths."


If we take the soul by nature to be confined, and liberation for it not possible, then the Scriptures, which enjoine the means of its liberation, would be falsified.

This aphorism only strengthens the one before. The soul must be nature free. If one believes it to be otherwise, it would mean that the Scriptures are false, and that is an impossible position. Thus the soul cannot be thought to be bound.

2. Koorma Purana, I, ii, 12.


The Scriptures cannot be imagined to impart instruction for what is not possible, and if they contained it, one couldn't call it 'instruction'.

The aphorism carries forward the sense of the previous one. If one supposed that the Scriptures enjoined what is impossible that would be absurd. Therefore there must be a possibility of the soul's liberation, and one just can't think otherwise.

10. Shukla-pata-vat beejaa-vat cher.

One may argue that the essential nature of a thing can be changed as white cloth can be dyed, or a seed burnt, and that therefore bondage is the soul's natural state.

The author anticipates an objection. It is possible that an objector may argue: Well, it is not enough to say that because liberation is possible, bondage is not the soul's natural state. For example, when one sees a dyed cloth, how does he presume that its natural state and therefore it must have been white? Similarly with burnt seed. So just because the Scriptures promise liberation, we can't presume that the soul is unbound. (See aphorism 7)


Because both the seen and the unseen belong to the one power which is indestructible, what is enjoined is not impracticable.

Reverting to the example of the white cloth given in aphorism 10—the whiteness of the cloth is not destroyed by bleaching or washing. Thus when the cloth is dyed, the whiteness is not destroyed, it is only hidden. (When it was white the whiteness was manifested, when it was dyed the whiteness was hidden). Similarly the germinating power of the seed is not annihilated by roasting it. The burnt seed can sprout again by the will power of the yogi. Similarly the soul is ever free. It is not
that it is in pain or bondage and this is removed on liberation. If it was so, the pain or bondage could again reappear as the whiteness of the dyed cloth. No, the very nature of the soul is unbound. There is nothing like bondage and liberation for the soul. When we consider the soul as being in ‘bondage’ it means only that its true liberated nature is not manifest.


The soul is not in bondage from the connection with time because time is all-pervading and eternally associated with all souls, not merely with the ones in bondage.

Pain is not occasional for the soul. On the other hand, as we have seen, it is constant, and in fact liberation implies getting completely rid of it. If it was occasional it could not be removed by knowledge, for the potentiality of pain would still linger.

Nor is the bondage of the soul conditioned by time, because time is eternal and encompasses all things and all men. It would not permit the simultaneous existence of liberated and unliberated souls. If at all, it would bring all into bondage. But since we know that at a particular time there do not exist both souls which are in bondage and those liberated, it follows that the soul’s bondage is not caused by time.


Not, for the same reason, does bondage arise from the connection with space.

In the previous aphorism we were told that bondage is independent of time. In this one the author says it is also independent of space, for the same reasons as given in the previous aphorism. Since space is connected with all souls, whether liberated or not, if we consider space responsible for bondage it would follow as a conclusion that the liberated souls are also bound, which would be absurd. Therefore, bondage does not depend on space.


Nor does the soul’s bondage arise from its being enmeshed by worldly circumstances or environment because this is the body’s property not the soul’s.

The soul cannot be limited by its association with worldly things, because being limited can be said of the body, not of the soul. If we consider the limiting quality to belong to the soul, the conclusion would be that even the liberated soul is bound.

15. Asanuh ayam purusha.

Because the soul is free from all worldly association, it cannot be embodied.

The idea contained in the previous aphorism is continued. The Scriptures depict the soul as free from all attachment. The Brihadaranya Upanishad says ‘Whatever he experiences in the world cannot affect the soul, for it is free from all attachment.’ Thus the soul being untouched by association or attachment must be a quality of the body.


The soul is also not bound by works, because works are the property of the mind, and also because if one thought the soul to be bound by works, the bondage would be eternal.

Saankhya believes purusha (the soul) to be free from the three qualities—purity, activity and dullness. Therefore it is not the soul which is active, but the mind. If we consider the soul bound, even though its activity lies not in it but in the mind, then we would have to say that even the liberated soul is bound.

But some objector may say that bondage does not arise in the soul, because of its association with the mental organs. To this the author replies that if one supposes this, it would mean that such bondage in the form of pain is eternal, and exists even during the universal dissolution (pralaya). But this can’t be so, for in pralaya the mental organs are destroyed but not
the soul. We also know that in **prajnya** pain cannot continue to exist. Thus such an objection would not have any force.

**17. Vichitra-bhoga-an-upatirth anya-dharma-tve**

If it were the property of another, diverse experience would not be possible.

In this aphorism the author again answers a possible objection, viz., if one considered the soul absolutely unaffected by pain, how could one explain diversity of experience, i.e., some persons experiencing pleasure and others pain? (Saankhya believes in plurality of souls). If pain were not associated with the soul, no one would experience pain at all. To explain this the author says that the association of pain with the soul is only a kind of reflection. The soul does not experience pain. It is mental functions which experience it. But this experience is reflected in the soul.

**18. Prakriti nibhandhanaat chet na tasyaah api paaratantryam.**

Nor can **prakriti** be the cause of the soul's bondage, because it too cannot act by itself.

Saankhya conceives of **prakriti** as a state of equilibrium of **gunas**. It is only when this equilibrium is disturbed by the proximity of **purusha** that the chain of creation is set in motion. **Prakriti** cannot act of itself. If one supposes **prakriti** to be responsible for the soul's bondage, such bondage would occur in the universal dissolution also, in which the soul is entirely disconnected from the phenomenal.

Saankhya believes that in the state of universal dissolution, **Prakriti** returns to its quiescent state. The argument in this aphorism is that if we suppose **prakriti** itself to be responsible for the soul's bondage, it would cause such bondage even during the state of universal dissolution. Therefore, concludes the author, the soul's bondage cannot proceed from **prakriti**.

**19. Na nitya-shuddha-buddha-mukta-sa tad-yogah tad-yogad-rite.**

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The soul is eternal, pure and free. It cannot be allied with pain without the conjunction of **prakriti**.

Here again the reference is to the relation between **purusha** (the soul) and **prakriti** (nature). The knower is **purusha**, the known **prakriti**. **Purusha** is consciousness, **prakriti** is non-conscious. **Purusha** is inactive, **prakriti** active. **Purusha** is unchangeable, **prakriti** changeable. **Purusha** is devoid of the three qualities, **prakriti** is characterised by them. **Purusha** is object, **prakriti** subject.

The so-called bondage of the soul is explained in this aphorism to be seeming or apparent, not essential or real. When a jar of black clay is baked in the fire, it takes on a red hue, which remains even after the fire is removed. The redness is therefore real in this case. But if we place a transparent crystal on red cloth, it will appear red only so long as the two are imposed on each other. The moment the cloth is removed, the 'redness' disappears. So too is it with the soul. Its bondage, when affected by **prakriti**, is only apparent, and ceases when it is again disjoined.

Pain cannot arise spontaneously in the soul, just as redness cannot come of itself in the crystal. It comes by the union of **prakriti**, and ceases with disunion. As the Saura Purana says it: 'As the pure crystal is seen to be red because of the super-imposition of some red material on it, so it is with -purusha.'

**20. Na avidhya-tah api avastunaa bandha-ayogaat.**

Nor does the soul’s bondage arise from ignorance because that which is not real cannot bind.

The Vedantist’s assertion that by the removal of ignorance the soul is liberated, is denied here. The ignorance which the Vedantists conceive of, is not real, says the author, and how can a thing which is not real, like a rope seen in a dream, ever bind?

**21. Tattvive siddhanta-haamit.**

If ignorance is asserted to be a reality, then the tenet which is professed is itself negated.
22. *Vijayatiya-dvaita-aapattiḥ cha.*

If ignorance is assumed to be a reality, one would be admitting duality, because of there being an entity parallel to the soul, and this would be in conflict with the (Vedantist's) doctrine of non-duality.

If ignorance is real, eternal and beginningless, then we are faced with two such entities, namely ignorance, and the soul. But this would again contradict the Vedantic belief of non-duality, according to which there cannot exist any such entity apart from the soul, either of the same kind as the soul, or of a different kind. Thus the Vedantic theory of soul alone would be set at nought.

23. *Vipraddha-ubhaya-roopam ceter.*

If it be said (by the Vedantist) that ignorance is both real and unreal:

The author anticipates an objection. For fear of postulating a duality in admitting something real, different from the soul, the Vedantist might say that ignorance is not real. At the same time he may affirm that ignorance is not unreal too because its effects are experienced. Thus he may think of ignorance as something at once real as well as unreal. The answer to this possible objection of the Vedantist is given in the next aphorism.


Ignorance cannot be at once real and unreal, because no such thing is known which can be real and unreal at one and the same time.

The meaning is clear. Moreover, if ignorance was the direct cause of bondage, then after the destruction of ignorance by knowledge, there would be no possibility of the working out of *karma* resulting in the present birth of the person.


We (the followers of Saankhya) do not admit the theory of the six categories, as is the belief of the Vaisheshikas and other thinkers.

In this aphorism the same idea that there cannot exist anything both real and unreal, is continued. The author says: 'It is possible the Vedantist may retort, “We do not arrange everything into watertight compartments as the followers of Vaisheshikas and others. Therefore we hold that there is something which is both real and unreal. People may generally not know of such a thing, but we are satisfied by the testimony of the Scriptures that it exists, even though it can’t be established by proof.”' If the Vedantist puts forth this argument, we reply as in the next aphorism.

According to Vaisheshika all things which exist and which can be known and named, i.e., all objects of experience, are classified into six categories. The first three—substance, quality and activity—are those which are real and objective; and the next three—generality, particularity and inherence—are products of intellectual discrimination. According to Nyaya such categories are sixteen in number. These are—means of right knowledge, object of right knowledge, doubt, purpose, familiar example, established tenet, members of a syllogism, confusion, ascertainment, discussion, controversy, cavil, fallacy, equivocation, futility and disagreement in principle. Saankhya rejects this pigeon-holing of things into different compartments.


4. (i) *dravya*—substance; (ii) *guna*—quality; (iii) *karma*—activity; (iv) *samanvya*—generality; (v) *vishesha*—particularity; (vi) *samanvaya*—inherence.
Whatever one may assume the number of the categories to be, we surely can't accept what is inconsistent (i.e. something real and yet unreal), or else we degenerate to the level of children or madmen.

The meaning is clear. The aphorism is a continuation of the refutation of the avidya concept of the Vedantists.


The bondage of the soul is not caused by any influence of objects which operates from all eternity.

In this aphorism the author repudiates the Baudhāya view that bondage of the Self is caused by vāsana, i.e. the longing for objects from all eternity which plagues the human being. The Buddhist system of philosophy does not admit of a permanent soul. Hence the question of its bondage does not arise. Others, like the Nihilists, conceive of external objects of momentary duration which bind the soul. Such thinking, too, is condemned by the author.


Also between the external and the internal there is not the relation of the one who influences and the influenced, because there is separation of space between them—as there is between a person who lives in the city of Shrughna and one who lives in Pantaliputra (Patna).

The soul lies within the body, and is therefore separated from it as two persons living in different towns. Therefore the relation between the soul and the body cannot be said to be like that of the influenced and the influencer. Vāsanas or desires cannot be the connection between the soul and the body and thus a cause for the soul’s bondage, as the Buddhists hold. Vāsanas could be a link only if there would be conjunction between the dye and the cloth, or like flowers perfuming the basket in which they are carried. But since soul and body are separated by space and not in conjunction, the Buddhist belief is erroneous.


The soul’s bondage cannot arise from an influence received in the same place where the object is, because that there wouldn’t be any distinction between the bound and the free.

The Buddhists may say that there is contact between the soul and external objects, because the soul goes to the object as the senses do. But if it were admitted that the soul goes out thus to external objects and is consequently in bondage, the same would be the case with the liberated soul, and we would have to draw the absurd conclusion that the liberated soul, too, is bound.

30. *Adrishta-vasaat chet.*

If the Baudhāya suggests that a difference between the two cases does exist because of the unseen force which confers merit or demerit, then he will find the reply in the next aphorism.

The author anticipates a possible objection of the Buddhists namely that if the free soul and the bound are alike in respect of their coming into contact with external objects, the relationship of the influencer and the influenced may result from the unseen force of adrishta. If this is the argument of the Buddhists, it is met in the next aphorism.


They cannot be in the relation of deserver and bestower because the two do not belong to the same point of time.

The Buddhist belief is that just like objects come into existence and then perish, so is the soul constantly changing. The author says that being so, there can be no interaction of the unseen force, adrishta, between these momentary souls, i.e., the merit or demerit of the soul of the past moment can have no influence on the soul of the present moment.
32. Putra-karma-vat iti chet.

If it is suggested that the case is like the ceremonies preceding the birth of a son, the reply is that this illustration does not apply (because of the reason given in the next aphorism).

The Buddhists may argue that just as a son about to be born, benefits by the ceremonies which his father performs, even so the merits or demerits of the soul of past moment may affect the soul of the present moment. (This illustration is refuted by the author in the next aphorism).

33. Na asti hi tatra shirah eka-aatmo yah garbha-aadhoana aadi-naa svan-kriyate.

The illustration given by the Buddhists (see previous aphorism) proves nothing, for if we assume so, there is no permanent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies preceding conception.

There can accrue no benefit to the soul by performing the pre-natal ceremonies if, as the Buddhists assume, the soul is not permanent. If the soul at birth is different from that at conception, how can any benefit accrue to the latter by ceremonies performed previous to birth? And if such ceremonies are valueless, the later ones, like the one of the sacred thread, too are meaningless.

And if the permanency of the soul is admitted (as Saankhya opines), then the unseen force, adrishta, arising from the soul at conception, can certainly influence the soul at birth. Hence the falsity of illustration, which is a natural concomitant of the Buddhist theory of a changing soul, does not arise in case the soul is conceived of as permanent.

34. Shira-kaarya asiddheh kshamakatram.

Since the heretical schools of thought do not believe in anything permanent, it follows that bondage, too, cannot be permanent.

The meaning is clear. The argument can be split up as follows:

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Bondage etc. is momentary.
Because it exists
(Whatever exists is momentary; as the flame of a lamp.

35. Na pratyabhirnaa-baadhaat.

No. things are not momentary in their duration, for if they were so, how could we recognise them?

Nothing is momentary because we cannot see and touch things, as for example a jar, and have the capacity to distinguish them from each other. The absurdity of the view that things are momentary follows from the argument which is contrary to the one taken in the previous aphorism, viz.,

Bondage etc. is permanent
Because it exists
(Whatever exists is permanent) as a jar or the like.

36. Shruti-nyaaya-virodhoaat cha.

The concept of momentariness of things is also contradicted by the Scriptures, and by logics.

The idea is that all that exists is momentary (in the sense of existing a moment and no more), is not one born out by reason. Besides, we have the authority of the Upanishads that things are not momentary. The Chhaandogya Upanishad, for example, says at one place, ‘All this, peaceful one, was verily in existence at the beginning,’ and at another, ‘How can that which exists proceed from that which does not exist?’

37. Drishaanta asiddheh.

The idea that things are momentary is also to be rejected, for it isn’t a fact.

The author denies in this aphorism the general principle of the momentariness of things. There can be no proof of such momentariness, and therefore it simply does not exist.


There can be no relation of cause and effect between two things simultaneously produced.

6. ibid., VI, ii, 2 & 5.
The author takes the example of the jar and the earth which goes into its making. Can the two simultaneously come into existence in the same moment? Obviously not, because when the clay is yet unformed in the shape of the jar, the jar does not exist, and once the jar is fashioned clay does not exist as such.

Nor can the two exist successively in the same moment, as the author goes on to demonstrate in the next aphorism.


Because, on the passing away of the antecedent, the consequent cannot arise and survive it.

The relation of cause and effect is inconsistent with momentary existence also because at the time the old thing is changing into the new, the new has not completely come into existence.

40. Tad-bhaave tadd-asyogad abhyaya-vyabhichaaraad api.

Moreover there can be no relation of cause and effect in a momentary duration, because the antecedent and the consequent are incompatible and always keep separate.

The cause and effect cannot co-exist because the two mutually exclude one another. In one moment of time both the cause and effect cannot subsist; and since the heretical schools insist on the "momentariness" of things, on their own supposition, there can be no such relation as of cause and effect.

41. Poorva-bhaave-maatre na niyamah.

In the case of mere antecedence there can be no uniformity.

Another possible argument of the heretical schools is answered by the author. The opponents may argue that at the moment the effect is produced, the cause no longer exists, and the effect will result merely by the existence of the cause at the moment preceding.

To this the author replies as follows: Does the effect result by mere antecedence of something belonging to different series or to the same series? If it is the former, the causation will be too remote; if the latter then too the effect being different from the cause there will be no uniformity.

Everyone is agreed that there is difference between material and efficient cause, and therefore the argument that there is uniformity between them will be wrong.

42. Na vijnana-maatraam baahya-pratiach.

The world is not a mere idea because there is intuition of objective reality.

The author refutes the Buddha view that external reality does not exist and the world is merely an idea. If this was granted, one would not say "This is a vase", but instead 'I am a vase'. External objects have an existence of their own and cannot be denied.

The Saankhya view is contrary to that of the Vijnana-vaadins and the Shankarites. Saankhya believes in a separate reality of objects, while the Vijnana-vaadins profess the thought alone theory.

[Writer's personal comment—Perhaps the truth is midway. That things do have an existence of their own cannot be denied. But at the same time they have an existence in the mind of the cogniser. For example, a solid inkpot cannot be denied. It has form, weight and hardness. But a blind man cannot see it, and one who has lost his sense of touch cannot recognise it by grasping it with his fingers. Even though the inkpot exists objectively, in the mind of such a person it does not.]

43. Tad-abhaave tad-abhaavat shoyam turhi.

Then if the one exists not, the other too does not exist; and consequently nothing exists at all.

The heretical schools may say 'as in dreams things seen have no existence, even so the objects of the world have no reality.' But such a nihilist view would refuse all existence to a void. If the external object itself is denied, how can there be any thought of it? The author refutes the idealism of Shankara and Gaudapaada in this aphorism. In his Kaarikaa on the Maandukya Upanishad the view taken by Gaudapaada is that it is very difficult to find any real difference between
waking experience and dream. This view is denied in the present aphorism.

44. Shunyam taitvant bhaavah vinashyati vastu-dharma-vvaad vinasaahasya.

The void is the reality (so say the heretics), and whatever exists perishes because it is in the nature of things to perish.

The followers of the heretical schools argue that since everything is a void and is perishable, who shall we say is bound, by what?

45. Apvaada-maatram abuddhaanaum.

That existence passes away, is a false declaration of unintelligent persons.

Saankhya believes in the theory of suu-kaaryya, i.e., the effect dwells in the cause even prior to its appearance as effect. Prakriti, according to Saankhya belief, contains the elements of consciousness or intellect even when apparently undeveloped. Nothing is destroyed; it only undergoes change. For example, the clod of earth changes into a jar, and then again it is destroyed and turns to earth. Even if 'destruction' implies disappearance, prakriti and purusha are not destroyed.

46. Ubhaya-paksha-samaana-kshematvaat aayam api.

The theory of nihilism, too, should be rejected because it is just as worthless as the other two confused before, viz., those of momentariness and idealism.

In this aphorism the author rejects the nihilistic theory of momentariness. As the recognisableness of things contradicts the theory of momentariness, and the fact that they can be seen contradicts that of idealism, so the perception of the entire universe negates the heretic belief that nothing exists.

47. Apuruursha-arthatvam abhyathaa.

In any case the void cannot be the object of desire for the soul.

The author points out another defect in the nihilistic theory.

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If voidness means non-existence, who is the sensible person who will evince desire for that which does not exist?

Further, the heretics may say that voidness is an object of desire for the soul because it implies cessation of pain. But this too is not possible because we know that the soul is naturally drawn towards pleasures and joys. Besides, how can liberation for the soul be possible if it is supposed to be non-permanent, as the heretics make it out to be?


Bondage does not accrue to the soul due to its entering into a body.

The soul's bondage does not result from any kind of motion, as for example that caused by its entering into a living body. In this aphorism the author repudiates the doctrine of the Kshapantkas, a section of the Baudhhas, other than the Shoonyavaadins, viz., that the soul is of the measure of the body.

49. Nishkriyasya tat-asambhavaat.

Because that which is not active cannot be capable of movement.

In the previous aphorism the author had said that the soul is not bound because of its entering into a body. The reason for this stipulation is stated in the present aphorism. The soul, says the author, is all-pervading in the body. This being so, how can it move, or change its place?

50. Moortavaat ghanaadhi-vat samaana dharma-aapattuu apathaddhaanaah.

The soul cannot be other than all-pervading. If it was limited it would be of the nature of a jar and other such articles, and this would contradict the principle of its imperishability.

Material things, like a jar, etc., are made up of parts and subject to change, and if the soul possessed a similar property, it too would be perishable. But the truth is otherwise. Moreover,
if one supposed the soul to be of finite size, it would have to expand if it entered a large body as for example that of an elephant, and contract if it entered a small body. If it was believed to thus expand and contract it must be made up of parts, and so non-eternal, which too is against the truth.

51. Gati-shruti api-yogad aakaasha-vat.

Movement can be ascribed to the soul only as one may say that the space enclosed in a jar 'moves' when the jar is moved. In reality space or ether does not move at all.

Movement does not really belong to the soul. The Scriptures may speak of the 'departure' of the soul, but this departure is just like the movement of space within a jar when the jar is moved. The soul thus 'appears' to move, but really does not.

52. Na karmanaa api atat-dharma-vat.

Nor does bondage of the soul accrue from the merit or demerit arising from works, for these do not belong to the soul.

Merit or demerit following actions do not bind the soul because such merit or demerit is not the soul's property.

In the previous aphorism the theory of the soul's bondage through activity has been refuted; in this one, such bondage through destiny is also refuted.

53. Atri-prasakti anya-dharma-ive.

If the case was otherwise the implication would go too far.

If the position was different from that stated by the believers of Saankhya, i.e., if bondage and its cause were conditioned by different circumstances, bondage would overtake even the emancipated soul. This cannot be, therefore the view taken by Saankhya stands justified.

54. Nirguna-aadi shruti-virodha cha iti.

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The view that the soul's bondage arises from any of the causes advanced by the heretics, is contrary to the Scriptural texts which declare the soul as qualitiless.

The argument of the preceding aphorism is concluded. The author says: 'What is the use of further discussion? If the soul's bondage was due to any of the aforesaid causes, it wouldn't be of the nature declared by the Vedas: saakshee chatraa nirgunaascha, i.e., "The soul is conscious, attributeless, aloof and the eternal witness."

55. Tadyogah prakriti api avivekaat na samaanatvam.

The soul's association with prakriti takes place through non-discrimination. Hence there is no similarity.

The soul is connected with prakriti due to lack of discrimination. But when it is emancipated this non-discrimination vanishes. Therefore the soul which is bound and the one which is emancipated are on different levels.

This argument is advanced by the author to meet a possible objection of the heretics. They may say: 'The conjunction of the soul and prakriti, however caused, may exist in the soul both in its bound state and its emancipated state.' 'No,' answers the author, 'this cannot be, because the two—the bound soul and the emancipated—are on different levels.'


The removal of non-discrimination can be by discrimination alone, as of darkness by light.

AVERSE or non-discrimination, can be removed by siveka, discrimination, alone. One cannot accomplish this directly by works or actions. In this aphorism the author establishes this superiority of knowledge over works. Of the three paths of devotion, works and knowledge Saankhya prefers the path of knowledge.
57. Pradhaana-avivekya avyay-avivekasya taddhaane haanam.

The non-discrimination of all other things from the soul, follows from the non-discrimination of the soul from prakriti. Therefore with the annihilation of this there is annihilation of that.

The root cause of non-discrimination, says the author, is the failure to discriminate the soul (purusa) from prakriti. All other non-discrimination is ancillary to this. Therefore the moment one can understand that the soul is different from prakriti, i.e., the body and all its concomitants are apart from the soul, the root of non-discrimination is destroyed.

58. Vaak-maatram na tu tattvam chitta-sthiteh.

The bondage of the soul is merely verbal and not real, because it resides in the mind.

Bondage etc. are mere figments of imagination and live in the mind alone. They are to the soul as the 'redness' of a crystal when imposed on red cloth. As the crystal is transparent but only appears red, so the soul is beyond bondage and only appears to be bound.

59. Yukritah api baadhyate dik-moodha-vad apraksheeh.

Moreover bondage cannot be removed by mere disputation without direct vision of the truth. He who attempts to remove it thus by reasoning is like one perplexed about the points of a compass.

Direct perception of truth is knowing it intuitively not by argument. The person who thinks he can find truth by disputation is like one who has lost his bearings. Even though he has a compass he can't set it and find out the direction. A direct vision of the truth — of the nature of the soul and prakriti — is needed. For example, if one views a piece of white chalk with a jaundiced eye, he will see it yellowish. Someone may tell him the chalk is white, but he can perceive the whiteness for himself only when his jaundice is cured and his eyes can see the whiteness of the chalk.

60. Achakshushvanama anumasanena bodhay dum-aadithikhaiva vahne.

The knowledge of imperceptible things can be obtained by inference, as one may not see a fire but infer that it is there by the smoke.

One can see gross things and know them as such. But that which is unseen — like the soul and prakriti — can be known by inference (anumana), as when one sees smoke he infers there is a fire, even if he does not see the fire.

Saankhya is a rational system (manasa-shstro). While the aphorism emphasises the inference of the unseen by signs, it does not rule out revelation. A verse of the Saankhya Kaarikaa says, 'The knowledge of super-sensible objects is obtained from Samaanya to Drishtha inference; what is not proved even by this and is imperceptible, is proved through revelation.'

61. Sarvam-rajasa-tamasam saamya-avasitah prakriti prakriteh

Prakriti is the state of equipoise of purity (sattva), activity (rajas) and solidity (tamas). From prakriti proceeds the cause of the universe (mahat); from mahat the I-sense (ahankaara); from that the five subtle elements (tan-maatraas); from that the five maatraas the two sets of organs (indriyas); and from them the gross elements (sthoola-bhootas). Then there is the soul (purusha). Such is the group of the twenty-five principles.

Prakriti (nature) is believed to be an equilibrium of the the three guyas — sattva, rajas, and tamas. By the interaction of purusha, which acts on prakriti by mere proximity like a magnet placed near iron filings, the entire cycle of creation is set moving. The aphorism narrates what this cycle is.

The following table shows what the principles derived from prakriti are. Purusha is neither cause nor effect. Prakriti is

cause only. *Buddhe, ahankaara and the tan-maatras* are both cause and effect, and *manas*, the five senses, the five organs of action and the five gross elements are effects only.

1. **PURUSA** (neither cause nor effect)

2. **PRAKRITI** (only cause)

3. *Buddhe* or intellect
4. *Ahankaara* or self-sense
5-9. Five *tan-maatras* of sound, touch, smell, form or colour and taste
   (causes & effects)
10. *Manas*
11-15. Five senses
16-20. Five organs of action
21-25. Five gross elements of ether, air, light, water and earth (only effects)


The knowledge of the existence of the five subtle elements is from the gross elements.

Gross is that which is visible, and gross elements are those things (subtle elements or atoms) which have distinct qualities. The knowledge of the subtle elements is derived from the existence of these gross elements. Everything that is gross is formed of something less gross. Pursuing this argument, one infers that behind the gross elements there exist the subtle ones.

It is significant that Sankhya works backwards from gross to subtle. The subtle is inferred from the presence of the gross and not the other way round. This shows how unreasonable is the charge of pantheism, sometimes levied against Indian philosophy.

63. *Baahya-nabhyuntara-bhyaam tath cha ahankaarasya*.

The knowledge of the I-sense (*ahankaara*) is inferred by the external and the internal organs as well as by the subtle elements.

The function of the I-sense is conceit (*abhimaana*). The organs of the senses (*indriyas*) and the subtle elements (*tan-maatras*) have conceit as their material cause because they are substances which are the products of conceit. Since they are the products of conceit, which is the function of the I-sense, they lead us to it (the I-sense). Therefore, the aphorism says, the I-sense is inferred from the sense organs and the subtle elements.

64. *Tena antah-karanasya*.

The knowledge of the existence of the intellect is by inference from the I-sense.

*Antah-karana* (*mahat*) literally means 'inner sense' or *buddhe*, i.e. the intellect. Whenever a concept arises in the mind it is accompanied by the I-sense. For example, one says, 'This is mine', or 'This ought to be done by me', and so forth. People think of their own troubles, their own problems, their own friends and relations. Thought, therefore, is coloured by the I-sense. This egoism or consciousness of the self is an essential link between the mind and its ideas. Thus the author concludes that I-sense leads us to the intellect.

65. *Tatah prakriteh*.

The knowledge of the existence of prakriti is by inference from mahat.

*Mahat* (the Great) is the first product of the evolution of prakriti and the cause of the whole universe.

That the *antah-karana* is also an effect is proved by the authority of the Vedas. That *mahat* proves the existence of prakriti can be inferred from the following argument: *Buddhe* possesses the properties of pleasure, pain and dullness, and so it must be the product of something which has these three qualities. Such a thing is *prakriti*, which as we have seen is believed to have the three *gunas* in equipoise. Thus both on the authority of the Vedas as well as by reasoning we can say that the existence of *prakriti* is to be inferred from *mahat*.

66. *Samhata-pararth-tvaat puraskasya*.

The existence of the soul (*purusha*) is inferred from the fact that unintelligent nature must exist for the sake of another.
Prakriti is eternal and uncaused, and purusha is not a cause. Hence knowledge of purusha is not derived from prakriti as effect. But because prakriti is made up of the gunas, and is therefore a whole in which parts cooperate, it exists for another, i.e., purusha. Therefore knowledge of purusha is obtained.

67. Moole moolaa-ahvaavaam amoolum mooalam.

Since the root has no root, the root of all is rootless.

Prakriti is rootless in the sense that it is uncaused. If we assume that it has a cause, we would have to presume that that cause too has a cause, and so on ad infinitum. Therefore it can only be supposed that prakriti is rootless.

68. Paaramparyape ektra parinisthaaa iti sanjnaa-maatram.

Even if there be a succession, there is a stop at some point, and so prakriti, the root cause, is merely a name given to such a point.

The argument of the previous aphorism is continued. In case one maintains there is a succession of causes there must be a point at which the chain of successive causes is broken, and which one can cause the ‘root’.—Such a root-cause is prakriti.

69. Samaanaah prakrithe dvayoh.

As to the origin of prakriti the view of both is the same.

The ‘both’ means Saankhya and Vedanta. The author contends that there is no difference between the Saankhya view and that held by the Vedantists as to the origin of prakriti. Saankhya considers that prakriti is made up of the three gunas in equilibrium. The Vedantist too believes that everything in the world possesses these three gunas in various combinations. For example, if one’s wife causes joy to him she is of the quality of sattva, if she quarrels with him and causes him grief she is rajasic, and if she is indifferent she has a tamasic nature.

Another interpretation of this aphorism could be that the origin of both prakriti and purusha is the same. The Scriptures say that of both purusha and prakriti Vishnu is the cause. Again, purusha and prakriti both are declared to be eternal. Thus the origin of purusha and prakriti is the same.

70. Adhikaari-traividhyaat na niyamah.

It is not necessary that all should arrive at the truth, because those who are privileged to engage in this inquiry are of three kinds.

The three kinds of seekers are of the three classes, dull, mediocre and good. In this aphorism the author explains why it is that every individual does not attain release at one and the same time. Some attain release quickly, and some after a lot of time. The difference is due to the mode of approach. Those who are dull are misled by sophistry such as that advanced by Baudhhas, etc. The mediocre are duped by arguments which seem strong in refuting the Saankhya theory but really prove what the opponents set out to disprove. Or the mediocre seekers are put on the wrong track by false arguments. The good seekers, on the other hand, can readily discriminate the soul from nature and arrive at the truth. But it isn’t really necessary that all men must have equally receptive minds and be uniformly successful in the quest.

71. Mahat-aakhyam aadyam kaaryam kaaryam tat manah.

The first product of prakriti is called mahat.

The first evolve of prakriti is the principle of mahat (the Great). This is called manas—the thinking principle, the intellect (buddhhee), i.e., that which has the function of thought (manana).

72. Charamah ahankaara.

The next product of prakriti is ahankaara.

The meaning is clear. Next to buddhhee comes ahankaara which means consciousness of self or I-sense.

73. Tat-kaarya-tvam uttareshaam.

The subsequent Evolutes are the products of ahankaara.

The reference is to the eleven organs (indriyas)—the five senses and the five organs of action and the eleventh, mind, and the five subtle elements which are the products of the subtle elements are also evolutes of ahankaara. All these proceed from the I-sense.
74. Aadya-hetvaa tad-dvaaaraa paaramparya api anu-vat.

Even though the evolution is successive prakriti and through it mahat is the cause of all as atoms are ultimately the cause of a jar.

The author anticipates a possible objection. Someone may say, 'Since you believe in progressive evolution, i.e., from prakriti mahat, from mahat ahaankaara, from ahaankaara the subtle elements, and so on, it means the one before is the cause of the one following, and they are not all the products of prakriti'. To such an objection the author answers, 'Prakriti is the cause of each and all. A vase, for example, is made from clay, and the immediate cause of the vase is therefore clay; but the clay is in turn, by a number of successive stages, made up of atoms ultimately. So the root cause of the vase is the atoms. Similarly the root cause of the evolutes is prakriti'.

75. Poorva bhavaive dvayoh ekatarasya haane anyatara-yogah.

While both soul and nature are antecedent to all evolutes, since the soul by its inherent characteristic cannot be a cause, it is nature which is the cause.

The author removes a possible doubt. One may wonder that when both purusha and prakriti are supposed to be eternal, how is it that only prakriti is cause and not purusha. The reason, explains the author, is because purusha does not undergo transformation. This is also asserted by the Vedas and other Scriptures. The Yoga Suttra says, 'The modifications of the mind are always known to purusha because of his un-changeability.' Purusha is like the king whose soldiers fight, but even though not active, he experiences the grief of defeat or the joy of victory. He is the onlooker and witness to the show which goes on.

Therefore even though both prakriti and purusha are eternal, it falls to the share of the former to be the cause of the changing universe.

9. Y.S. IV. 18.

76. Parichchhimna na sarva-upadaanaam.

What is limited cannot be the substance of all things.

The argument is that a thing which is limited cannot be the material cause of all things. For example, yarn is the cause of cloth but not of a vase whose cause is clay. Similarly clay can be the cause of a jar but not of yarn. It is therefore simpler to assume a single cause for all—like prakriti.

77. Tat upatti-shruteh cha.

That prakriti is the cause of all is proved by the Scriptures.

The authority of the Scriptures merely supplements the argument of prakriti being the cause of all things, advanced in the preceding aphorism. It is not meant to replace it. The Veda confirms the same. As for example pradhaana-adagga jaggayate—'the world is produced from pradhaana'.

78. Na avastuvaah vastu-siddhah.

A thing cannot be produced from nothing.

An objection may be made that since a vase comes into existence by fashioning clay, where none was in existence before, things can come into being from nothingness. The author answers this argument.

If we could have existence out of non-existence, then assuming that the effect is of the nature of the cause, the world which did not exist before would be unreal when it came into being. Thus the world would be a non-entity, which is absurd.

79. Abaadhaaat adushta-kaarana-janya-tvaat cha na avastuvaam.

The world is not unreal because its reality is uncontradicted, and also because it is not the product of depraved causes.

In this aphorism the author denies the Vedantic view that the world is unreal and a mere dream. The Vedantists hold that one may see a pearl oyster and mistake it for silver, and so the world we see is really not there and we mistake it for the world. But, says the author, this analogy does not work
because no one has seen the world as not to exist, as he sees the pearl oyster. So the contradiction that lies between the pearl oyster and the silver cannot arise in the cognition of existence.

Again, the thing may appear unreal due to some shortcomings, as for example one sees things as yellow with a jaundiced eye. But all men at all times know the world as real. Hence the world cannot be inferred to be unreal by reason of being the product of depravity.

Nor can the world be a dream, for dreams are contradicted by waking experience; but there is no Vedic testimony or other proof to the effect that the reality of the world is contradicted by something else. Hence the view sometimes expressed by certain Vedantists that the world is like a dream is not correct.


If the cause of the world would be an entity the world would be an entity (as it is); and if the cause of the world is supposed to be non-entity, the world would be non-entity, i.e., not existing. And how could this be?

The author meets a possible argument of an opponent, that even if non-existence were supposed to be the cause of the world, the world would still be existent. How can that be? says the author. The effect is always of the same essential form as the cause. So if non-entity is the cause of the world, the world would be non-existent. Since we know the world to exist, its cause can only be an entity and not a non-entity.

81. Na karmanah upadanaatva-ayogaat.

Works cannot be the substantial cause of any product.

In this aphorism the author refutes the possible argument that works can be the cause of the world, and therefore there is no need of the concept of prakriti. To this argument the author replies that man's good or evil actions may confer merit or demerit, but they can't give birth to something material like the universe.

82. Na aamshrevikut api tat-siddhih sadhyatvena aavrity-yogaat apurusha-artha-tvam.

Liberation cannot be obtained from Scriptural observances because being the result of works they are temporary and liable to repetition, and cannot give eternal release.

Moksha cannot result from the performance of rites and ceremonies enjoyed by the Vedas as prescribed by the preceptor. Such acts yield only temporary result, and even if a being gets temporary release by performing them, it has no lasting value, and such a being is liable to be cast again into the round of births and deaths. The Chhaandogya Upanishad says: 'Victory obtained over the world both by works and merit, wears away'.

83. Tatra praapta-vivekasya an-aavrity-shruth.

The Scriptures proclaim that he who has been able to discriminate between purusha and prakriti is not born again.

The Vedic texts which say that one who has gone to the world of Brahma does not return again, should be taken to mean one who has obtained determinate knowledge, not one who has performed religious acts. If this was not the meaning it would be in conflict with other texts of the Vedas which mention reversion to this world even from the world of Brahma. Therefore the text na sa punaraeavartate (He does not come back again) should be taken to mean those who, while residing in the world of Brahma, have obtained discriminative knowledge.

84. Duhkhakat duhkhakat jala-abhishekavat na jaada-vinokah.

By causing pain to living creatures in the performance of sacrifices comes pain to the sacrificer, not liberation from pain, as a chill is not relieved by being more drenched.

The author condemns animal sacrifice enjoined in the Scriptures. The Bhagavatam 100 is of this view: 'As mud cannot

purify muddy water, or wine relieve intoxication, even so a hundred sacrifices cannot wipe out the sin of killing a living creature.\footnote{12} Besides, works in general too, cannot give release from pain. Action involves an element of pain, and so if release is considered to be a product of action, it too would not be devoid of pain. At any rate it would be short-lived.

85. Kaaamye aakaamye api saahdyutvaa-avishekhaat.

Liberation is not possible even by disinterested action, because whether action be done desirelessly or with desire, in either case it makes liberation seem something producible and therefore perishable.

The aphorism is interpreted differently by the two commentators, Vijnana and Aniruddha. The above interpretation is that of Vijnana. Aniruddha makes some distinction between disinterested action (nishkaama kama) and action performed with desire. In effect, therefore, Vijnana’s interpretation completely denies the belief that desireless action also leads to the goal of liberation, while Aniruddha merely waters it down.

What is created is also destroyed. The liberation which is obtained through works, whether selfish or selfless, is of temporary and ephemeral nature and like something produced for sometime. Since it is producible it is also perishable; for what is produced has in it the germs of destruction. All that can be said for desireless action is that it has a greater element of sativa in it than in the other kind of action, but along with sativa it has the other two gunas also. Therefore that too results in pain. The Scriptures also say: ‘None can attain immortality by works, progeny or riches, and only some by renunciation’\footnote{13} Renunciation involves the relinquishment of egoism, which is rare, and is the result of knowledge of the truth.

86. Nija-muktasya dhiivansaa-maataaram param na saanaatvan.

One who is free by nature sheds finally all bondage. There can be no comparison between liberation which is attained by knowledge and that which is attained by mere works.

The objector may say: ‘Even if the seeker obtains liberation through discrimination between purusha and prakriti, it is not lasting, and one returns to the world. So I and you, who are a believer of Saankhya, are on the same plane.’ To this the author replies as follows.

One who is by his own nature free can never be bound. The bondage is really due to the failure to discriminate between the soul and prakriti. Once this discrimination is achieved, the bondage is destroyed for ever. The destruction of non-discrimination is absolute. This being so, how can the liberated being return to earth? Thus there is no such similarity between the two cases as the objector imagines.

87. Dvayoh ekaturasya vaapi asannikrishaartha-parichibhiitah pramaa tat-saadhukham yat tat trividham pramaanaam.

Right notion (pramaa) is the determination of something not existing from before in the soul and the intellect together or in either one of them. Proof (pramaana) is that which is in the greatest degree productive of such right notion.

Knowing something which is not till then known by the soul or by the intellect is considered ‘right notion’. This condition has been imposed (i.e., of not being known by the soul and/or intellect) in order to distinguish ‘right notion’ from memory (smriti).

When the senses cognise an outside object there is a modification of the intellect in the form of the object to be cognised. Thus the outward objects are reflected in the mind ‘as in a lake the trees that stand on the bank.’\footnote{14} Evidence or proof (pramaana) is that which causes right notion to be produced. It is therefore the basis of such notion.

14. Yoga-Vaishishtha Ramayana, Ch. IV, p. 15.
88. Tat-sidhav sarva-siddheh na aadhika-siddhih.

Only three kinds of proof are required, and no more, for from these all others follow.

The three kinds of proof are (a) Perception—pratyaksha, (b) Inference—anumana, and (c) Testimony—shabda. Some people may think that there ought to be others too, like comparison, conjecture, and so forth. But these, the author argues, are all contained in the three broad heads above mentioned. For like reason, Manu classifies proofs too under three heads: 'For the person who wishes to know his duty right knowledge is of three kinds—perception, inference and Scriptural testimony.'

89. Yat sambaddham sat tadanakaara-allekhi vrijnaanam tat pratyaksham.

Perception is that discernment which, conjoined with the thing perceived, portrays its form.

'Conjoined' means assuming the form of the thing with which it is conjoined as for example water assumes the form of the vessel into which it is poured. This implies direct vision of the thing perceived not vitiated by any defect.

90. Yoginaam abahya-pratyaksha-tvaat na dosah.

The definition is not faulty because it does not apply to the perception of the yogees, for theirs is not an external perception.

Perception for those who are adepts in the practice of yoga is alaukika=extraordinary. They can have insight into the past and the future also. The definition of perception given in the preceding aphorism cannot be said to be defective inasmuch as it does not cover this type of perception. It is in fact not meant to cover it, because the perception it defines is of a different type, being laukika=popular, i.e. external perception. Thus the definition given in the aphorism cannot be rejected as being too narrow.

91. Leena-vastu-lahtha-chishya-sambhedaat vaa adoshah.

15. Manu Samhitaa, XII, 105.

92. Eeshavara-osiddheh.

It is not a fault in the definition that it does not extend to the perception of God, because God is not a subject of proof.

The author answers the possible objection that God's perceptions which are from everlasting cannot result from emergent conjunction.

If there was evidence to prove God's existence, only then there would arise the question of His perception. But no such proof exists. It should be noted that it is not said that God does not exist, only that the evidence of His existence is not there.

The objector may say that the definition does not cover God's perception because that is eternal and not produced through contact. To this the answer is that the definition given in the Saankhya aphorism merely says that perception assumes the form of the thing perceived (see aphorism 89). God's perceptions may be of the same kind, though on a different plane, and coming from a different source.

93. Mukta-baddhayoh anyatara-abhaavaat na tat-siddhih.

God's existence cannot be proved because He can neither be free nor bound. Nor can He be something other than free or bound.

God cannot be bound because if He is so, He suffers from merits and demerits, and cannot therefore be considered as
omnipotent God. If He is conceived of as, free, He can't be an agent or doer, and a Creator of the universe. Hence He is beyond proof. Besides, if we say He is neither bound nor free, but something other than these two, He would not be comparable with anything the human mind could conceive of and something very extraordinary. So it is not possible that He could be of a different character than the bound and the unbound.

94. Udbhayathaa api asatkaratvam.

Either way He would be inefficient.

The same sense as in the preceding aphorism is continued. If God were free He would have no desire to create, if bound He could not create as He would be powerless to do so.

95. Mukta-aatmanah prashansaa upoasaa siddhasya vaa.

The Scriptural texts which mention God are either glorifications of the liberated soul or homages to the Perfect Ones.

One may ask if the existence of Eeshvara is not capable of proof, how shall we account for the Vedic texts which establish Eeshvara? The texts of the Vedas, explains the author, are either for the glorification of the soul or for extolling the principal deities like Brahma, Vishnu etc.

96. Tatu-namidhaaatu atdhishthaatritvam mant-vat.

The government of the soul over prakriti is through its proximity.

Someone may argue that the soul's superintendence or creativeness was through a resolve to create or govern. But this is not so. The soul's creative power is due to its proximity to prakriti as a magnet acts on iron filings which are near it.

This aphorism enunciates a cardinal principle of Saankhya philosophy. Purusha is conceived as being inactive. How then can it precipitate the cycle of evolution from the quiescent prakriti, beginning from mahat and ending with the gross elements? If it is said that it does this by acting on prakriti this will contradict the Saankhian concept of the possessiveness of purusha. The difficulty is resolved by saying that the mere proximity of purusha disturbs prakriti's equilibrium, like a magnet drawing iron filings placed near it, and causes the chain of evolution.

97. Visheshha-kaaryeshu api jeevaaanaam.

The superintendence of jeevas (individual souls) too is through proximity.

The same argument as that advanced for the Universat Soul is continued in this aphorism for individual souls. If no superintendence was assigned to the soul, says the objector, even a dead man could do things like eating and drinking. The author says that the function of eating and drinking and such other acts, is not that of the soul (aatmam), but of the jeeva (the subtle body—sukshma sharcera) associated with vaayu or prana.

In the creation of individual things also the jeevas act by proximity and not by any activity on their part.

98. Siddha-roopa-buddhritvaat vaayka-artha-upadeshah.

The teachings of the Veda about knowledge are not invalid because they declare the true forms of the Reality.

The author has already said in the previous aphorisms that the existence of God cannot be proved. Does this mean that the truths enunciated by the Vedic seers are without authority? No, says the author, because these seers and gods are the knowers of direct truth, and their utterances have the authority of evidence.

100. Pratibhaa-dhrtah pratibadh-aatman anaaanaam.

Inference is the knowledge of the connected through perception of the connection.

The author defines inference. One sees smoke and infers there is fire because fires and smoke always go together.

101. Aapta-upadeshah shabduh.

Testimony is a declaration by one worthy of belief.

This excludes those persons or schools whose creeds are not worthy of belief, like those of the heretics. The declaration must be competent and fit. Since it arises from understanding.
which is the function of the internal organ, the knowledge is that which arises in the soul—shabda bodha (knowledge by hearing).

102. *Ubhaya-siddhah praamaanata tad-upadesah.*

The establishment of the existence of both purusha and prakriti is from evidence, hence the declaration thereof.

Someone may object that the Saankhya system gives instruction to discriminate between purusha and prakriti, but no proof has been advanced to establish them; therefore how can one believe in them? To counter this, the author says: there is proof, and so the instruction given by Saankhya is justified. He proceeds to give such proof in the aphorisms which follow.

103. *Saamaanyato drishtat ubhaya-siddhah.*

The establishment of nature and soul by analogy.

Since prakriti is not an object of perception it is known in a general way (saamaanyena). It is known that the effect is preceded by the attributes of its cause, and every effect in nature is formed of the three gunas. Therefore something of which the three gunas are constituents, exists. And that is prakriti.

As for the aatma (Self), the proof is that prakriti, which is a structure of many parts, must exist for another, as a house exists for someone who lives in it, a chair for someone who sits, and a bed for someone who sleeps.

The proof for both purusha and prakriti is the kind of inference which is called saamaanyato drishtat—the opening words of the aphorism. According to the Saankhya philosophy there are three kinds of inference:

(a) Poorea-vat—that which infers an object belonging to the class of objects perceived, e.g., the inference of fire from smoke. We see smoke, and where we have seen it we know there must be fire, as in the kitchen, a blaze, and so forth;

(b) Shesha-vat—inference by the method of difference. In this the object inferred does not belong to the class of known objects, e.g., we differentiate clay from other things, because of its clayey nature.

(c) Saamaanyato drishta—this is inference which belongs to neither of the two kinds aforementioned. It is this which forms the proof of both purusha and prakriti. In this kind of inference something unperceivable is inferred from what can be seen. For example, an axe is an instrument for cutting, so we say the indriyas are the instruments for knowledge of the external form of things.

Using the saamaanyato drishta inference we say for prakriti that the mahat which follows from it must have for its material cause, pleasure, pain and bewilderment, like a bangle is made of gold. For purusha the argument is that it exists for the benefit of another.

104. *Chid-avasaanah bhogah.*

*Bhoga* (experience of the world’s joys and sorrows) ends in consciousness.

An objector may say that since prakriti is eternal it will always be partaking of the world’s joys and sorrows and consequently there can never be emancipation. To this the author replies as follows:

When discrimination comes with the knowledge of the aatma the experience of worldly pleasures and sufferings ends. Thus the experience of pleasure and pain is not eternal. It ends when one discriminates between purusha and prakriti. Prakriti can procreate only till such discrimination arises. When this happens prakriti returns to its quiescent state, and there is no more bhoga.

105. *Akartha api phala-upabhogah anna-adhyavat.*

Even one who is not the agent of an action may enjoy its fruit, as the case of food (which is cooked for another).

The aphorism answers a possible objection. Someone may say that if prakriti is an agent and the purusha experiencer, then it means that the purusha experiences the consequence of acts not done by it.

To this the author answers, 'Well, what you say is in a sense possible. It may happen that the agent is one, and the enjoyer or sufferer, another. For example, a cook prepares the food, but it is eaten by the person for whom it is cooked.'
106. \textit{Avivekaat vaa tatsiddhe kartuh phala-avagamah}.

Or, to put it better, it is a wrong notion that the agent derives the fruit of his action, because this follows from non-discrimination.

The soul is neither agent nor experiencer, but because it is reflected in the 
\textit{mahat}, it thinks itself to be so. In truth it is \textit{prakriti} which is the agent, but the idea of the soul being the agent arises from failure to discriminate between \textit{purusha} and \textit{prakriti}.

107. \textit{Na ubhayam cha tattva aukhyaane}.

And when the truth is known there is neither agency nor experience.

When by means of evidence \textit{prakriti} and \textit{purusha} are seen as different entities, there is neither an agent nor an experiencer, neither pleasure nor pain.

108. \textit{Vishayah avishayah api ati-dooro-aadheh haana-upaadanaa-hhyaam indriyasya}.

An object may be discernible at one time and undiscernible at another, depending on the distance and so forth, which may make it easy or difficult for it to be perceived by the senses.

Having discussed the subject of evidence, the author now states the distribution of the subject matter of evidence.

A thing is seen because of its connection with the senses, and ‘not seen’ because of absence of such a connection. The reasons for a thing not being seen can be many, as for example:

1. Because of the great distance, as a bird flying very high.
2. On account of great nearness, e.g., one can’t see the colli-rium applied to his eyes.
3. On account of physical impediment to vision, e.g., a flower-pot placed on the other side of a curtain.
4. On account of mental distraction, e.g., a man who is greatly worried or grieved, or whose mind wanders, may fail to see an object before him.

5. On account of extreme fineness, e.g., one can’t see an atom or germs with the naked eye.

6. On account of suppression, e.g., failure to hear the sound of a glass fall because of the bigger noise of a storm raging outside.

The \textit{Saankhya Kaarika} enumerates these conditions:

‘Non-apprehension of objects by the senses arises from extreme distance, extreme nearness, impairment of the senses, absent-mindedness, extreme fineness, intervention, suppression by others, and combination with likes.’ The last mentioned, i.e. ‘combination with likes’ means mixing of similar things, e.g., if cow’s milk is mixed with that of a buffalo, we can’t tell the one from the other.

109. \textit{Saussityaat tat-anupalabdhih}.

Because they are extremely subtle, \textit{purusha} and \textit{prakriti} cannot be seen.

The author gives the reason for non-perceptibility of \textit{purusha} and \textit{prakriti}.

The word ‘subtle’ used in the aphorism does not denote that \textit{prakriti} is of such atomic size of nature that it is difficult to know it, but that it is difficult to investigate.

110. \textit{Kuksya-darshanaat tad-upalabdhih}.

\textit{Prakriti} exists because its existence can be seen from the effect.

How is the existence of \textit{prakriti} established? The author explains this in the aphorism. As the existence of the atoms is established by seeing the jar which is their product, similarly the existence of \textit{prakriti} is inferred from seeing the products of the three \textit{gunas}.

111. \textit{Vaadi-vipratipatthah tad-asiddhah iti chet}.

16. The \textit{Saankhya Kaarika} of Eeshwarakrishna, VII.
If it is said that this does not stand proved because of the contradictory theories of different thinkers.

The author anticipates a doubt. Different theories of the origin of creation are given. The Vedantists think it is Brahma which is the cause of the world, the Nyayaikas that it is the atoms, and the believers of Saankhya that it is prakriti. There being so much disagreement, might not it be said that prakriti is not the cause? The Saankhya thinkers believe that a product exists antecedent to its production, and therefore prakriti, which is eternal, exists as cause. But others, like the Vedantists, may deny this existence of cause antecedent to effect. The conclusion of the author in regard to this doubt is expressed in the next aphorism.

112. Tattha api ekatara-drshityo ekatara-siddheh na apalaapan.

Since each doctrine follows from the opinions of each, mere denial is ineffective.

Mere denial of one's theory by another is no reason why it is disproved. If the Saankhya belief were to be negated merely because others believed differently, why should it not be supposed that other beliefs are wrong because Saankhya has a different belief?

113. Trividha-virodhha-apatteh cha.

If we were to infer any cause other than prakriti we would have a contradiction of the threefold aspect of things.

Someone may object 'Even if it is admitted that a cause is inferred from the presence of an effect, how can it be said that the cause is prakriti?' The author replies to such an objection.

Everything in the world has the triple qualities as base—sattva, rajas, and tamas. If we did not believe prakriti, which is formed of the three gunas in a state of equilibrium, to be the cause, there would be a contradiction of the fact that all things are made of the triple qualities. Atoms do not have the three qualities in them. Therefore they can't possibly be the origin of creation. It is clearly prakriti which is the origin.

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There can be no production of what is non-existent, as a man's horn.

An effect can be the production of what existed before, but it can't be the production of what never exists.

A thing like ether is purely existent, and a vase partakes of both existence and non-existence. Ether pervades space eternally and a vase is made of clay which contains atoms, so it includes both what existed before and what exists now. But a thing like a man's horn never existed. It is purely imaginary. Therefore there can be no production of it.

115. Upadaana niyamaat.

Because there must be some material of which the product consists.

The author states in this aphorism the reason why an effect must be something before. He refutes the Vaisheshika theory that an effect of a particular form can be produced from antecedent non-existence. The argument is as follows. A jar can be produced only from clay, and a piece of cloth from thread. One can't make a jar from thread, or cloth from clay. Thus there is uniformity in regard to effect and cause. If effects were non-existent prior to their production, this uniformity would not be possible. Hence nonentities, having no distinctions of their own, can't determine the production of effects.

116. Sarvatra sarvadaa sarva-asambhavaat.

Because all things are not produced everywhere and at all times (which might be so if we could dispense with the material's).

The argument contained in the preceding aphorism is continued. Everything is not produced in all places and at all times. For this reason too there must be some material of which the product consists.

117. Shaktasya shakya-karanaat.
Because it is that which is capable of making anything which can make it.

The production of a nonentity cannot take place also because the potentiality of anything is nothing except the not-yet-come-to-pass or the undeveloped state of the effect. So that which is competent can produce the effect which is capable of being produced from it, and the production of a nonentity is not possible.

118. Kaarana-bhaavaat cha.

And also before the effect has the same nature as the cause.

Another argument is advanced by the author. The cause and effect are of the same nature. The jar is of the nature of earth, which is its cause. The two are not completely identical. We can't say that a jar is earth. How can one carry water in a cloud of earth? But it is a sort of identity in difference. Between the existent and the non-existent, however, there can't be any identity whatsoever.

The Scriptural texts also prove the above theory—viz., that effect and cause are of the same nature, and that between the existent and the non-existent there is no identity. The Bhagavad Geeta says 'The unreal has no existence, and the real never ceases to be. Thus has the reality of both been perceived by the knowers of truth.' 17 The Brhaddaranyaka Upanishad says 'That which is the same as this was then unmodified.' 18


If it is alleged that 'that' cannot become what already is, the answer will be found in the next aphorism.

The author apprehends an objection. Someone might say 'that if the effect exists in the cause then the effect and the cause are one in point of time; and one will not be able to say, for example, of a jar it will be produced, it is produced, it is destroyed.' In brief one may say, 'how can that thing become, which already is?'

17. Bhagavad Gita, 11, 16.

120. Na abhiyakti-nibhandhanau vyavahaara-avyavahaau.

- No such an argument (that what is cannot become) is of no avail, for if we use the term 'production' it implies what is produced, and if we do not use the term it implies what is not produced.

The whiteness of a white cloth which has become dirty, is removed by washing, and when the potter makes the pot it comes into being, but if we strike it, it breaks and ceases to be a pot. Manifestation is not a fiction. It is seen in the extracting of oil from sesamum seeds by pressing them, or extracting milk by milking a cow, or carving a statue by chipping stone, or getting rice from paddy by threshing, and so forth.

Thus when we use the term 'production' we speak of something which comes into existence, and when we do not use it, it means nothing has come into existence. But by the employment of the term 'production' we cannot mean that what was not an entity has become an entity.

121. Naashah kaarana-layah.

Destruction of a thing implies its dissolution into its cause.

If production means manifestation, what, someone may ask, does destruction imply? The author answers this question.

The Saankhya theory does not believe that anything is finally destroyed. Destruction means merely change from one form to another. If someone hits a jar and breaks it, the jar is resolved into the particles of clay from which it was fashioned. This dissolution of the jar into earth is called its 'destruction'.

But someone may say 'if destruction means just disappearance, what has disappeared must re-appear'. This objection, says the author, can only be advanced by those who have slow understanding, and lack of discrimination. The wise man will at once see that whatever disappears does make a re-appearance. For example, if thread is destroyed by burning it becomes ash and mixes with the earth. The earth again yields a cotton tree, which yields flowers buds and pods, and from that cotton. From cotton we make the thread again.
122. Paaramaparyata hit anveshanna vija-ankura-vat.

There is no infinite regression because they seek each other, like the seed and the plant.

Someone may ask, 'Is this manifestation something real, or something unreal? If you suppose it to be unreal there would be absence of all products and of all manifestations. Therefore you will say it is real. And in that case, since a manifestation arises from another manifestation, there would be a series of manifestations, each arising from the other, ad infinitum.

The author answers such an objection in this aphorism as follows: 'Let it be so,' as the objector says. Let there be thousands of manifestations. Even then no fault arises in thinking thus, for the change comes reciprocally, and there can't be, nor is, any starting point, as for example the seed and the plant.

123. Utpatti-vat vaa adoshah.

At all events our theory of 'manifestation' is as faultless as yours of 'production'.

Another argument advanced by the author is contained in this aphorism. The theory of 'manifestation' of Saankhya is on an equal-footing with that of 'production' advanced by the heretics. The same argument they wish to apply to the Saankhya belief can be applied to their's too. If production is produced, there will be series of endless productions ad infinitum, just as it is alleged with manifestation. If it is not produced, this could be either because it is unreal or because it is eternal. If the former, then it does not exist at all, and if the heretics say it is eternal, there would be the production at all times of all possible effects, which is absurd. If the heretics say 'what is the need of considering any ulterior productions from production' the same can be said of manifestation too.

124. Hetu-mat anitayam varyaapi sakriyam anekam aashritam

A product of prakriti is caused, non-eternal, non-pervasive, mutable, multitudinous, dependent and mergent.

125. Aanjaryaad abhedata hit guna-saamaanyaa-deh tot-
siddhikh pradhanaanyapadeshaad vaa.

We do not explicitly enumerate the twenty-four qualities of the Nyaaya because they are ordinary in import as against the three qualities of Saankhya. and are in reality nothing different. Or, to put it in other words, they all follow from prakriti, in which the three qualities of Saankhya themselves exist.

Someone may ask 'If you believe that there are just your twenty-five principles (see aphorism 61) and no more, do you mean to say that you deny such common acts as knowing and seeing?'

To an objection of this sort the author replies: 'The twenty-five principles which we (the followers of Saankhya) profess fit the ordinary qualities of seeing and knowing, hence we do not leave them out, as you suppose. Besides prakriti and its three qualities are the origin of all things which can be seen or known, and also from which follow the twenty-four principles enumerated by the Nyaaya school of thought.'

126. Triguna-achetanatu-aadi dvayoh.

Prakriti and its products have common qualities, like being constituted of the three gunas and non-consciousness and so forth.
The author describes the resemblance between prakriti and its evolutes.

Both prakriti and its evolutes are formed of the three guṇas—satva, rajas, and tamas—and both are non-conscious.


The qualities are mutually different by being pleasant, unpleasant, and dull.

The author explains in what the three guṇas, which constitute prakriti, are mutually different.

The satva quality is pleasure or pleasantness, lightness, goodness, and illumination.

The rajas implies unpleasantness, pain, passion, and restlessness.

The tamas means darkness, heaviness, dullness, and inactivity.

128. Laghu-aadi-dharmaiḥ saādharmyaiḥ vaidharmyaiḥ cha guṇaṇaṁ.

By means of the property of lightness etc., the similarity and dissimilarity of the guṇas arise.

The author has already explained in what the guṇas are dissimilar. In this aphorism he finds a ground for their similarity.

The guṇas exist in things in different proportions. Thus when we say something is sattvic, all that we mean is that the element of goodness and purity predominates. It does not mean that the other two guṇas are completely absent. So too for the other two guṇas—rajas and tamas. This is the significance of the word etc. Thus the three qualities are mutually present in varying proportions in all things, in order to fulfil the purpose of puruṣa.

129. Ubbhoṣa-anyatvam kaaryatvam mahaṭ-aadeḥ ghato-aadi-vat.

Since the evolutes are different from puruṣa and prakriti—which are uncaused, they are effects like a jar and the like.
is something more subtle than maha. The attributes of maha can be directly perceived, while no attribute of prakriti can be perceived directly.

137. Tat-kaaryatah tat-siddhe na apalaapah.

The existence of prakriti cannot be denied because it is established through her products.

It may be insisted that something other than prakriti could be the cause of the world, and that there is really no need of it. To this the author replies: The cause must either be an effect or a non-effect. If we suppose it to be an effect then the same argument could, with equal propriety, apply to the cause of that effect, leading to regressus in infinitum. If it be the root of primordial effect then this itself is that, viz., prakriti. Thus there can be no denial of prakriti.

138. Saamanyaena vinudha-abhaavaat dharmavat saadhanaam.

No proof of the existence of purusha is required because there can be no dispute as to its existence, as in the case of dharma.

It may be objected: Let us grant that prakriti exists. Even then purusha cannot exist, because if existence of causes is inferred from their products, the soul, which has no products, cannot be said to exist.

To counter this argument, the author says: There can be no dispute about the general question of the existence of the Self, for everybody is agreed that there must be such a thing as Self. One may dispute what its specific characteristics are, i.e., whether it is manifold, or one; pervading, or non-pervading; and so forth. But one can’t dispute its very existence; just as all systems of philosophy agree that dharma exists, even if they have different concepts about it.

139. Shareera-aadi-vyuttriktaah punuvam.

The soul is something other than the body etc.

Lest someone may consider the Self to be the body, senses, and the like, the author affirms that purusha, the experiencer,
is other than the things beginning from *prakriti* down to the gross elements.

140. *Samhata-para-arthasastra*.

Because a structure is formed of multiple parts existing for the benefit of another not so formed.

The argument contained in this aphorism is analogous to that contained in aphorism 66 *supra*. The author gives the reasons for the proposition stated in the previous aphorism, in this and the subsequent ones. As a bed is for someone who sleeps in it, a house for someone who occupies it, so *prakriti* etc., exist for the benefit of the unformed *purusha*. The body etc., are formed of a combination of many organs, while the soul is not formed of any such combinations. As that which is thus formed, exists for that which is unformed, so the soul is other than the body, and the body exists for it.

141. *Triguna-aadi-viparyaya*.  

The *purusha* is different from body etc., also because in him there is the reverse of the properties of the three *gunas*.

The author gives a second argument for distinguishing the soul from the body.

The three *gunas* are the properties of the body etc., because the body etc. partake of them. The soul is experient, and if we consider these properties as belonging to him, the act and the agent become one, which is an impossibility. A thing and its owner are two different entities. Besides, when we say 'I feel pleasure', 'I feel pain,' or 'I am deluded,' the 'I' is obviously different from the pleasure, pain, or delusion, felt.

142. *Adhikshaana cha iti*.

And finally, the soul is different from body etc., because of its superintendence over them.

The soul is the superintendent. As the supervisor is different from those he supervises, so too the soul is different from the chain of evolutes. The superintendent is the core of intelligence, the brain behind the show.

143. *Bhokiti-bhaavam*.

The soul is other than the body etc., because he is experient.

The aphorism of the previous aphorism is continued. Although the soul is not really experient, it becomes so because it is reflected in *buddhi* (see aphorism 58) and so comes into contact with the objects of experience. A thing cannot directly be the experient of itself. If this were so, there could be no experience as such. So, concludes the author, the soul which becomes the experient of the world through *buddhi* is different from the evolutes.

144. *Kaiqalya-artha pravritti cha*.

The soul is other than the body etc., because all activity is for its isolation.

Yet another argument is advanced by the author. Activity exists so that the soul can find release from it. Is this activity for the benefit of the soul, or for *prakriti*'s benefit?

*Prakriti* cannot be in a state of absolute isolation, because the three *gunas* are its very essence. If they depart, nothing will be left behind. If this happened, *prakriti* would be proved to be non-eternal, whereas in reality it is eternal. The isolation (*kaiqalya*) of that alone is possible of which the qualities are not constituents, and this can only be the soul.

145. *Jula-paakaasha-ayogat prakaasha*.  

Since light does not belong to the unintelligent, it must be of the nature of the intelligent, i.e., *purusha*.

The author now goes on, in this and the aphorisms following, to narrate the nature of the soul.

It is a settled point that the unintelligent is not self-manifesting. If the soul is held to be unintelligent, as by the followers of *Vasishthika* philosophy, there would be something else to illuminate it, and non-finitude would occur. Also connection of light cannot take place in the unintelligent, as for example, you cannot produce light in a stone. It follows that the soul shines of itself, like the sun, and not by borrowed light, like the
moon. This view is also confirmed by the Scriptures. The Brihadaaranyaka Upanishad says, 'How can one know that by which all this world is known? How can one know the Knower?'

146. Nirguna-tvaat na chi-dharmas.

And the soul has no intelligence as its attribute.

The author anticipates an objection. The opponents of Saankhya (the Nyayaikas) may say, 'Maybe the soul is unintelligent. But even while being so, it has intelligence as an attribute. Thus it can illumine the world without itself being intelligent.'

To this the author answers: 'If the soul were considered to have an attribute it would be liable to constant change, and so could never obtain release which the Scriptures promise. Moreover, the view that the soul has attributes, is contradicted by the Scriptures themselves, which declare it as nirguna, i.e., devoid of attributes.

147. Shrtyaa siddhasya na-apalaapah tat-pratyaksha-baadhaat.

What the Vedas establish cannot be ignored, because the Vedas themselves deny that the soul has attributes.

The author points out that the theory of the heretics is contradicted by the Vedas. The Brihadaaranyaka Upanishad says, 'The soul is free from attachment,' and according to the Shvetashvatara Upanishad, 'The soul is intelligent, pure, attributeless, and the witness.' Thus the Scriptures too establish that the soul is without qualities.


'If the soul was not intelligent, he would not be the witness of the state of dreamless sleep, or of the dream state.

There are two interpretations to this aphorism—one taken by Aniruddha, and the other by Vijnaana Bhikshu, who reads

20. Ibid., IV : iii : 15.

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'sakshitvam' for 'asaakshitvam'. The one given above is according to the former. If we take—Vijnaana Bhikshu's interpretation, the aphorism would read, 'The soul is merely the witness of the states of dream and of dreamless sleep, hence his being of the nature of light does not affect them.'

The author points out yet another defect in the opposite theory. If the soul was unintelligent, it could not be a witness to the states of dream and of dreamless sleep. On waking, the man would not remember that he had slept badly or well.


By the allotments of several births etc., it follows that there is multiplicity of souls.

By 'etc.' is meant the inclusion of growth and death. In this aphorism the author refutes the Vedantic theory of One soul. According to this it is held that the soul is one, but due to the activity of maya it is viewed as many. In respect of this the author says that if the soul were one, by the birth of one being all others would be born. But we see this is not so. While one creature is dying, another is being born. Therefore, he concludes, contrary to the Vedantic concept, there is plurality of souls.

150. Upandhi-bhede api naana-yogah aakaashasya iva ghataa-adadhik.

The Vedantins maintain that the soul is really one, but appears divided, as space is one but it is confined into separate jars.

The author apprehends another possible argument which the Vedantists may advance to hold on to their One-Soul theory. They might say that the soul is really one, but appears many, like space is one but due to its being enclosed in separate jars it seems many. When the jars break the space inside them mingles with the outside space, and is thus in truth one.

To this, the author says 'It may be correct that, as the
Vedantists say, the jar space mingles with space in general, and so the soul does not perish; but it is wrong to say that due to this the souls are not many. The objection that if the souls were not many, how could one explain diverse appointments of births and deaths, applies here too.

151. Upadhi bhyate na tu tad-vaan.

It would be an absurdity to say that bodies are different, but the soul one.

To say that there are different beings, and they all have the same soul, is something absurd. If one thing were destroyed, it does not follow that the other is destroyed too—for example, if death comes to a man of the name of Hari Dass, it will not merely because of that reason come to another man called Ram Charan. But if we assume, as the Vedantists do, that the soul is one, with Hari Dass’s death Ram Charan would die too. Bondage and liberation, too, do not occur simultaneously to one, i.e., one part of the person does not keep bound while the other part is liberated. The Vedantists give the example of space and smoke. They say that these are together. But this togetherness implies conjunction not pervasion, and it would be meaningless to speak of bondage and liberation affecting one and the same person.

152. Evam ekatvam parivartamaanasya na viruddha-dharma-adhyacat.

Thus the Saankhya theory of multiplicity of souls does not hold a contradiction as the theory of a universal soul does.

The meaning is clear. The author commends the Saankhya view because it avoids the contradiction entailed in the Vedantic one of the one soul—the contradiction that bondage and liberation exist everywhere throughout all, as one.


Even though the soul be thought to possess the contradiction of another, this is not really so, for the soul is an absolutely simple and unqualified entity.

The Vedantists may object: ‘Prakriti’s condition as an agent is attributed to purusha, which is quite different from prakriti. How can this be?’

To such an objection the author replies, ‘It is a mistake to consider purusha an agent. He is not formed of qualities, and he is neither born, nor does he die.’


There is no opposition to the Scriptural declaration of the soul’s non-duality, because the reference in such texts is to the soul in general.

The Vedantists may say that the Saankhya doctrine of plurality of souls is at variance with the Scriptures which declare Brahman as ‘one without a second.’ The Katha Upanishad says ‘There is nothing diverse here. He who sees things as diverse goes from death unto death.’ Thus when the followers of Saankhya consider the soul as many, they contradict the Scriptural observances.

To this the author of the aphorisms replies that there is no contradiction involved because the Scriptural texts refer to the genus of the soul, and by ‘genus’ is meant ‘sameness’, i.e., being of the same nature. The texts nowhere imply that there cannot be more souls than one. Diversity does not rule out multiplicity. It only means that there is no difference in the soul’s nature. Thus the Scriptural texts are not contradicted by assuming many souls.


The soul who knows the cause of bondage to be due to the failure to distinguish between purusha and prakriti, and who proceeds to so discriminate between them, knows that he was not bound even when he seemed to be so.

The Vedantist may contend that even if souls are assumed to be many, the bondage and liberation of the same soul are just as incompatible as in the case where the soul is assumed, to be one.

To this the author replies: 'If the soul whom we call "bound" knows that this bondage is only because of differentiating between prakriti and purusha, he is not really bound. Therefore liberation is not a change of condition. It is rather the removal of a misconception. Hence bondage and liberation in the same soul are not incompatible.

156. Na andhu-adrishta chakshushhnaam anupalambhah.

Because the blind do not see; it does not follow that those having eyes cannot also see.

This aphorism again answers a likely objection of the Vedantists, who may say, 'All right, granted that non-perception is removed by perception, as you say, i.e., so long as the soul does not see the difference between himself and prakriti he is bound, but when he sees it, he is free. But this assumption we apply to the one soul, and we do not agree that there can be many souls.'

To this the author answers: 'Maybe you do not see the justification of there being multiple souls, but that does not mean it is not there. There may be many arguments in favour of the soul's multiplicity, despite the fact that they do not strike you. Because a blind man does not see, can it be said that even one with eyes does not?'


The Scriptures do not assert non-duality, for if we are to believe them, they assert that Vaama-deva and others have been liberated.

The argument of the previous aphorisms (see 149 supra), is continued. The Scriptures inform us that Vaama-deva and the others have achieved liberation. If the soul was one, how could different beings be liberated at different times? The release of one would result in release of all.

Vaama-deva was a sage, and the author of many hymns. It is said that the rishi was reluctant to be born in the normal way, and when his mother came to know this she prayed to Aditi, who thereupon came with her son, Indra, to expostulate

with the rishi. In one of his hymns he says that he came forth 'with speed like a hawk'. A commentator explains this thus: 'Taking the form of a hawk, he came forth from his mother's womb by his yogic power, for the sage was endowed with divine knowledge from the hour of his conception.'

158. Anaadau odyo yaavat abhaavat bhavishyat api evam.

If there has not been a void till now in this world which has come down from eternity, there isn't expected to be one in future too.

The Vedantist might argue that if one believes the soul to be many, someone or the other will always be liberated from time to time, and by degrees all will be liberated, resulting in a universal void.

To this the author replies: 'There has never yet been such a void even though the world has been existing from eternity. So there is no likelihood of a universal void occurring due to the release of separate souls.

159. Idaaneem iva sarvaro na aptya-uchchhkheda.

The soul is ever free, but seemingly appears not to be free.

Someone may ask: 'Is the soul essentially bound, or is it free? If you say its essence is bondage, it follows it can never achieve liberation. If you consider it free, it does not need liberation, and what is the use of the means prescribed by you for its liberation, such as meditation and so forth?'

To such an objection the author answers: 'The soul is neither bound nor liberated; rather it is ever free (see aphorism 149 supra). Only it realises not its freedom. That realisation is effected by meditation and the like, which are therefore not as you allege, without meaning.'

161. Saakshaa-sambandhir saakshivam.

The soul is a witness through its connection with the sense organs.

It has been shown that the soul is the witness (see aphorism 148 supra). Someone may object that since it is so, release for
it is not possible even when it has distinguished between purusha and prakriti.

To this the author replies as follows: 'The soul is witness through its connection with the senses. When discrimination has been attained, there is no longer this connection. Hence the objection is not valid.'

162. Nitya-mukta-ivam.

The nature of the soul is to be for ever free.

To the question 'Of what form constantly is the soul?' the author replies that it is at all times free. Pain and bondage are transformations of buddhe, and do not belong to it.

163. Audaaseennyam cha iti.

And finally the soul is indifferent to pleasure and pain.

'Indifference' here means 'inactivity' or 'non-agency'. The meaning is clear. The word iti (= finally) denotes that the exposition of the soul's nature has been completed.

164. Uparagaat kartaivam chir-saamnidhyaat.

The soul's agency is from influence of prakriti, from the proximity of Intelligence, from the proximity of Intelligence.

Someone may object: 'The Scriptures say that the soul is agent. How do you take it to be a non-agent?'

To this the author replies: 'The soul fancies itself to be the agent because of the influence of prakriti by means of prakriti's proximity to Intelligence.'

The phrase 'proximity of Intelligence' is repeated in the aphorism to denote that this completes the First Book.

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**Of the Evolutions of Prakriti**

Ajaam ekaam lahit shakla-kriyaaam Bahveek prajcah sraajajnaam saropah.
Ajo 'svamajatah anushete Jahaati ayenaam bhuktat-bhogaam ajak anyaha.

Unborn, she is of red white and black colours, with numerous offspring who resemble her. There lies beside her one unborn male who is attached to her, while the other unborn male, after having enjoyed her, has forsaken her.

In this book the author explains in detail how Creation proceeds from prakriti, and in what way purusha differs from prakriti and its evolutes.

1. Vimukta-moksha-artha rva-artha vaa pradhanaasya.

Of prakriti (the agency or the being of a maker) is either for the release of what is really though not apparently released, or else for the removal of itself.

The soul (purusha) is, as we have seen, really free from the bondage of pain, but when he becomes connected with the body he suffers pain by reflection, or in other words like a shadow is cast of an object, pain as a shadow becomes associated with the soul.

Prakriti evolves the world for the sake of removing this reflected pain of the soul. Or prakriti may evolve the world too for removing the actual and real pain which belongs to

1. The unborn woman = prakriti
Red, white and black colours = the three gunas
The numerous offspring = the various objects of creation
The unborn male lying beside the woman = purusha.
Dispassion comes not by mere instruction but through direct cognition which can take place only when the false vaasanaas which have been accumulating from eternity are destroyed, which is possible through yogic contemplation. Emancipation, therefore, is not easy, and is attained after much effort.

4. Vahu-bhritya-vat vaa prativayam.

As a householder has many dependants, every one of the gunas has innumerable souls to liberate. Hence the stream of creation flows for ever.

As a householder has many dependants, e.g., wife, sons, daughters and so forth, so too each of the gunas have a number of purushas in bondage whom it has to free. Even when a certain number of purushas have obtained release, creation must go on for the purpose of releasing other purushas. Souls have different durations of bondage. For some who soon obtain discrimination between purusha and prakriti, it is speedy; for those who have risen to the level of mere worship, it is gradual; and for those who have made no effort there is no release.

5. Prakriti-vaastava cha purushasya adhyaasa-siddhir.

And since bondage, creative activity, etc., really belong to prakriti, it follows that they are wrongly ascribed to the soul.

One may object: Why is it asserted that only prakriti creates, when from Vedic texts it is proved that the soul too creates?

In reply the author says: prakriti casts her shadow in purusha and catches his reflection. The change which appears in purusha is merely superimposition (adhyaasa), and is not real in any sense. Although a few of the Vedic texts speak of purusha as creator, as for example, ‘From this Self is evolved aakaasha,’ this attribution of creativeness to the soul is only figurative.


Because the reality of prakriti’s creativeness is proved from the reality of the products.

2. Taittireya Upanishad, II : 1.
An opponent may say: ‘How can you be sure that creativeness is real even in the case of prakriti, when the Vedas consider creation to be of the nature of dream?’

Creativeness is real, answers the author, because it results in real products. We see around us things possessing form and shape, and having substance and materiality. This is ample proof to show that creation is real and not dream like.

Those texts of the Vedas which declare the resemblance of creation to a dream, should be taken to mean that things which are created are ephemeral and not eternal, and that the soul appears to create, but does not really do so. If we think otherwise, there would be contradiction of those Vedic texts which show the reality of creation. Moreover the things seen in dream are not completely non-existent inasmuch as they are transformations of the mind.


The rule is with reference to one knowing, as escape from a thorn.

Someone may object that since activity is of the very nature of prakriti, she will cause activity in all souls without discrimination. Then what is the use of seeing the discrimination and non-discrimination between purusha and prakriti?

To this, the author replies: It is like one who sees a thorn lying, and warns another not to come that way, but does not warn all. So prakriti affects some and not others. The word ‘chetana’ here means ‘one knowing’. As one who knows there is a thorn, avoids it, so does ‘one knowing’ escape the effect of prakriti. But to others it is a cause of pain.


Even though there is conjunction of the soul with prakriti, this bondage does not exist immediately, just as is the case with the burning action of iron.

An objector might say: It is not fit for you to say that the creative character is only fictitiously attributed to the soul. Rather the soul undergoes transformation into mind etc. just as when wood comes into conjunction with the earth it crumbles and becomes like earth.

To this the author replies: The conjunction between soul and prakriti is not of this kind. It cannot be said that by such conjunction the soul directly becomes creative. As an example, the author takes the conjunction of a piece of red hot iron with some other material like cloth or wood. If placed on it the hot iron causes burning. But the power to cause burning does not belong to the iron. It is produced because of the conjunction of the iron with the fire in which it has been heated and only fictitiously belongs to it. Just so creativeness does not directly belong to the soul, but is only fictitiously attributed to it. Taking another example, if we superimpose a crystal on red cloth, the crystal does not acquire redness thereby. It only ‘appears’ red. The redness seen in it is fictitious, not real.


Creation results from passion, release from dispassion.

The author explains how creation really occurs and what its object is. The fruit of creation has been stated to be liberation (see Book 2, aphorism 1). Now the author states what the instrumental cause of creation is. When there is passion, there is creation; and when dispassion arises, the modifications of the mind are suppressed by yogic concentration, and release is obtained.


The creation of the five elements is in the order of mahat and the rest.

In Book 1, aphorism 61 the author had declared the twenty-five principles. Now he declares the order of their evolution and the details concerning it.


Since creation is for the soul's sake, the origination of these (i.e. mahat etc.) is not for their own sake.
The author points out the difference between the creative character of prakriti and that of the other evolutes. Prakriti is eternal, and in her case creativeness has the purpose of release of the soul from bondage. But mahat and the rest are non-eternal, and are perishable, and so unfit for release. Hence creativeness in their case is not for their own sake.


Space and Time came from aakaasha (ether) and the uphaa-dis.

Someone may ask: 'Space and Time are known to all. How is it then that they are not included in the tattvas of the Saankhya?'

The author replies that in reality Time and Space are eternal and absolute, and as such are the source of ether. They are all-pervading. But being conditioned by limiting objects, Space and Time become limited, and in their limited aspects they arise from ether. Thus there are two aspects of Space and Time—the eternal and the limited. In the former they are the source of ether, and in the latter (limited aspect) ether is their source.


Buddhe (intellect) is the power of judgment.

The intellect is a synonym of the Great Principle. Judgment or ascertainment is its function. The two are said to be synonymous because a property, and that of which it is a property, are indivisible.


Virtue etc. are the products of mahat.

The author states what the products of mahat are. They are virtue, knowledge, dispassion and possession. These are qualities of mahat, and not of the soul. as some may mistakenly think.

15. Mahat śaaraagwat vipareetam.

The same mahat when coloured by rajas and tamas gives rise to opposite products.

16. Abhimaanah ahankaarah.

Ahankaara (self-consciousness) is self-conceit.

Having defined the principle of mahat, the author goes on to define in this aphorism, ahankaara, its product. Ahankaara is that which makes the 'I' or the ego, in the same sense as the potter makes the jar. It is the thing called antah-karaṇa (inner sense). It is only in regard to an object that has been grasped by the intellect that the concept of 'I' or 'mine' takes place.


The products of ahankaara are the eleven indriyas and the five tan-maatras.

The eleven organs (indriyas) are the five organs of action, i.e., the functions of the tongue, feet, hands, and of the organs of evacuation and reproduction; the five organs of perception, i.e., the functions of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch, and the eleventh, monas—the doorkeeper of the senses.

The five tan-maatras are the five fine elements—the essences of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. Unlike the gross elements, the tan-maatras are devoid of difference, and they are not perceived by ordinary human beings.

All these, the author says, are products of ahankaara.


The eleventh indriya, which is of the nature of the pure (sattva), proceeds from modified ahankaara.
Someone may ask: 'Do the sentient and the illuminating come from one and the same cause?'

In reply the author points out a distinction. The manas (intellectual organ) is of the nature of sattva (purity). The implication is that the other indriyas are from rajas and tamas. The remaining ten indriyas—the five organs of action and the five of perception—proceed from rajas, and the tan-maatras from tamas. The Saankhya Kaarika, too, mentions this:

Saattvikah ekaadashakah pravartate vikrito ad ahankaaraant.
Bhoota-aadheh tan-maatras tah taamasah tasi jasaat ubhayam.

'The sattvic element proceeds from the modification of ahankaara. The tan-maatras are constituted of tamas and the organs of action and perception of rajas.' 13


Together with the organs of action and perception, the internal organ of manas is the eleventh.

The meaning is clear. The author tells us what the eleven indriyas are.

20. Ahankaarika-tva-shruthena bhautikaani.

The indriyas are not formed of the gross elements because the Scriptures testify that they are formed of ahankaara.

The author refutes the view (held by the Nyaayikas) that the indriyas are formed of the bhoota (gross elements). The scriptures, too, assert that the indriyas are products of ahankaara, thereby referring that they emerge from the gross elements, e.g., the Chhaandogya Upanishad, which says:

'I will be many....' 14


Because the Scriptures declare the absorption into deities, it does not follow there is necessarily an originator.

Such texts of the Scriptures as are referred to in this

3. Saankhya Kaarika of Eeshvarakrishna, XXV.

OF THE EVOLUTIONS OF PRAKRITI

aphorism are like the one in the Maitree Upanishad: 'Verily the eye goes back to Aadipta.' But the fact that the Scriptures speak thus of absorption into the Godhead, it does not follow that they refer to an originator.

Someone may argue the assumption that the indriyas are formed of ahankaara (see previous aphorism) is not possible, because of certain declarations of the Scriptures like the one in Maitree Upanishad aforesaid, or the one in Brihadarat

anyaka Upanishad which says, 'Of the purusha the speech returns to Agni, praana to Vaayu, and the eye to Aadipta.' That is to say, the product returns to the originator (purusha), and therefore the organs cannot be said to emanate from ahankaara. But, says the author, in these texts the Scriptures cannot be said to mean a return to an 'originator' for the reason which follows. When a thing ceases, it can be said to be resolved into its originator only in some cases, as for example when a jar ceases to be, it is resolved into earth which originated it. But in other cases the analogy is inapplicable. For example, when a drop of water falls on the ground and is absorbed into it, it cannot be said that the ground into which it is absorbed is the originator of the drop of water. So it cannot be presumed that when the Scriptures speak of absorption into the deities, they mean an originator.

22. Tad-upatti-shrutha vyavaha-darshanaat cha.

The indriyas are not eternal because in the Scriptures we hear of their production, and also because we see their destruction.

Some people are of the view that the indriyas, particularly the mind etc., are eternal. The author rejects this view.

All the organs, without exception, have a beginning, so the Scriptures proclaim. The Mundaka Upanishad says, 'From Him are produced praana, manas, and the other indriyas.' Thus we can be sure that they come into being. And with equal certainty we know that they are destroyed, because when age sets in, the mind too, along with the other organs, like sight and the rest, decays.

5. Maitree Up. VI : 6
23. **Ati-indriyam bhaantaanam adhishthaane.**

The sense is suprasensuous. People mistakenly think that the sense exists only in the place of its sight.

The author repels the mistaken belief that the indriya, for example, is only in the eyeballs. The senses are suprasensuous, not to be confused with the site in which they reside.

24. **Shakti-bhele api bheda-siddhu na ekatvam.**

If a difference of powers be conceded, and this being so a difference is established, there is not a oneness of the indriyas.

In this aphorism the author rebuts the view that one single organ performs different functions through diversity of powers. Even if it is conceded that one single organ has diversity of powers, there is the fact that these different powers also possess the character of the organs. Thus there is not oneness of indriyas.

25. **Na kalpana-virodah pramaana-trishtasya.**

One cannot theoretically dispute that which one sees and therefore knows.

If someone objects that it is not logical to assume that various kinds of organs arise from the single Self, the author replies, 'But this is what we see and know for ourselves, how can anyone dispute it?'

26. **Udbhaya-autmakam manah.**

The manas partakes of the character of both perception and action.

The manas has the nature of both the organs of action and those of perception. The operation of manas is thus in both directions. It is the leading organ. The other ten are kinds of powers.

Without the association of the manas the senses cannot function. For example, one may gaze and gaze at an object, but if his mind is elsewhere, he may not actually see it. The ear may hear the sound of words, but if the mind is not attentive, the person does not really 'hear' them.

27. **Guna-parinaama-bhedaat nanaaatvam avasthaa-vat.**

The diversity of manas is due to the difference of the transformations of the gunas; as is the case with the diverse conditions of the same man.

The author explains how (as he has stated in the previous aphorism) the mind identifies itself with both the organs of action and those of perception. As one man takes the role of a lover in relation to his beloved, is indifferent to one who does not matter to him, subservient to one whom he fears, sympathetic to those who evoke his pity and so forth, even so the mind becomes different when associated with different organs, the cause of this different being the various modifications of the three gunas.

28. **Roopa-aadi-rasa-male-antar ubhayoh.**

Of both the object is that which begins with colour and ends with the dirt of the juices.

The author mentions the entire gamut of the objects of the organs (those of action as well as of perception). The objects of the organs of perception begin with colour, and are—colour, taste, smell, touch and sound. The objects of the organs of action are speech, grasping, movement, pleasurable excitement, and last of all those which excrete. These are called 'the dirt of the juices (rasa mala) i.e. the waste products of the body.'

29. **Drashtri-tva-aadi autmanah karana-tvam indriyaanaam.**

The being, the seer etc. belongs to the soul; the instrumentality to the organs.

The author points out the essential difference between the soul and the indriyas.

The Self or soul is unchanging and immutable, but it acts through the indriyas due to mere proximity like a magnet placed near iron filings, draws them. As a king, even though he does not fight actively, inspires his soldiers to fight by his
mere presence in the battlefield, so the soul, although inactive and unmoving, becomes through the instrument of the eye etc. the seer, the speaker, the enjoyer, the thinker, and so forth.

30. Trayaanaam svaalakshanyam.

The three internal indriyas have their own diverse distinguishing characteristics.

The differences between the natures of the three internal organs, viz., mahat, ahankaara and manas, is pointed out by the author. The distinguishing characteristic of mahat (or buddhe) is ascertainment, of ahankaara self-conceit, and of manas deliberation or doubt.

31. Saamshirta-karana-vrittiḥ praana-aadyaḥ vaayavaḥ pancha.

The five airs, beginning with praana, are the common modifications of the three internal organs.

In the previous aphorism the author had stated the distinguishing qualities of the internal organs (mahat, ahankaara and manas). In this aphorism he mentions a common aspect of the three. The five airs are, praana and its five modifications. These, the author says, are the common kinds of transformations of the three internal organs. A similar idea occurs in the Saankhya Kaarika: 'Saamaanyo-karana-vrittiḥ praana-aadyaḥ vaayavaḥ pancha.' (The common modifications of the internal organs are the five airs, beginning with prāna). 8

32. Kramashah akramashah cha indriya-vrittiḥ.

The modifications of the organs take place both successively and simultaneously.

The organs come into play either by degrees or in a single moment all together. For example, if one sees a thief moving outside in dim light, he will first by his eyes assay to peer at him and decide whether the man is a thief or some neighbour who has strayed in, or some man of the household itself. Thereafter by the impression through sight created on the mind, he will from his judgement about the man's being a thief or not. Then ahankaara will come into play, and he will consider 'I have some money, perhaps this man has come to steal it.' Lastly, by means of his buddhe he will control himself and determine to catch the thief. In this case the organs act successively. But if the fear from the thief is great, the householder sees the man in dim light and instantly shouts 'Thief!' hearing which the thief runs away. In this case the indriyas, manas, ahankaara and buddhe, have all acted simultaneously and in an instant, without getting the time or opportunity to act successively one after another.

33. Vrittah panchatayyah klishtaa-kleshaah.

The modifications of understanding (buddhe), which are the cause of the world, are of five kinds, some painful, others not painful.

The author brings together modifications of buddhe with a view to showing that they are the cause of the world. Whether these modifications are painful or not painful, they are in either case only of five kinds. The pain-giving ones are those bound by roajas and tamas and which are experienced in worldly life, while those which are devoid of pain are experienced by the practising yogins. The latter have been declared by Patanjali to be 'Real cognition, unreal cognition, imagination, deep sleep and memory.'

34. Tat-nivrittaḥ upashanta-uparagah sva-stihā.

When the worldly modifications cease, the soul, no longer coloured by them, abides in itself.

When the worldly influences of ignorance, egoism, desire and aversion, and love of life are destroyed, the soul, no longer tramelled by them, regains its original nature. 9

The soul appears to have a form other than its true one, only because of the limiting factors of buddhe (upadhis). Once these are removed, the soul shines in its own nature.


35. Kusuma-vat cha manih.

As by a flower the gem appears tinged.

The author explains how the soul gets tinged by the qualities (gunas). They do not affect him permanently but only as a rock crystal, which is really transparent, appears to be coloured red when placed over a red hibiscus. It no longer looks red when the red flower is removed. Similarly when the upadhis cease, the soul recovers its nature.

36. Purusha-artha m karana-udbhavah api adrishta-ullaasaa.

The organs rise into activity for the sake of the soul due to the unseen force, adrishtam.

The aphorism is as a sort of explanation to an objector who might raise the question: 'If you say that purusha (the soul) cannot act and deny Eeshvara too, then by whose efforts do the organs come into play?'

The explanation given is that they come into play because of the unseen force called adrishtam, which in turn results from the merit or demerit of the soul concerned.

37. Dhemu-vat vatsaaya.

As the cow does for the sake of the calf.

The author illustrates the statement he has made in the previous aphorism. The organs act for the soul spontaneously, as the cow produces milk of herself for nourishing her calf. Similarly it is seen that buddhe (understanding) wakes up of its own accord from deep sleep.

The same idea is contained in the Saankhya Kaarikaa too:

Svaam svaam pratipadyante paraspara-aakoota-hetukaam vrittima. Purusha-artha eva hetuh na kenachit kaaryate karanam. (The organs go into their respective modifications by mutual desire. The purpose of the soul is the only cause of their activity, none other).

38. Karana irayodasha-vidham avaantara-bhedaat.

The organ is of thirteen kinds, there being subsidiary differences.

The author enumerates the organs (indriyas) as thirteen—ten external (those of action and perception) and three internal, viz., mahut (buddee), ahankaara, and manas. The word vidham (=kinds) has been used in the aphorism to show that there are really endless modifications of these thirteen because of the differences existing between individuals. The word ‘subsidiary’ (=avaantara) denotes that buddee alone is the principal organ and its functions are more than one.


There are thirteen organs in the sense that they are conjoined to the most efficient of them—buddee, as in the case of the axe.

In the previous aphorism the author has stated that there are thirteen organs. But being the most efficient, buddee is the immediate agent of the soul, and the merit of the others lies in their possessing some of its quality. What that quality is, the author goes on to explain. It is just like an axe which cuts a piece of wood into two with one blow. Similarly does buddee sever the fruits of action and brings the soul liberation. But the blow could never have been given if it were not the iron blade, and the wooden handle, which form the axe. Similarly, though the job is done by buddee, it needs the aid of the other organs (indriyas) also.

40. Drayoh predhaanam manah loka-vat bhruvyavarghe shu.

Among the two (the internal and the external organs), the principle is manas, as a head-servant among servants.

The manas (mind stuff) is the principal organ because it is he who delivers the goods finally to the soul. His position amongst the other organs (both internal and external) is like that of a head-waiter among waiters, or like a prime minister among ministers. He supervises and superintends over the others.
41. Avyabhichaarsat.

...Buddhe is the principal because it never wanders away.

The understanding pervades all the other organs, and there is no result apart from it. Without it the other organs would be powerless to achieve the object of liberating the soul. Therefore it is the principal organ. In the two following aphorisms the author gives two more reasons why this is so.

42. Tattha aashasha-sanskaara-aadhuara-trat.

So too, because it contains all past impressions.

The buddhe is the receptacle of all past impressions (sanskaaras). This quality does not belong to the other organs like the eye, ear, and so forth. or the ahankaara and manas. A blind or a deaf man cannot recollect objects seen previously. But even after the dissolution of ahankaara and manas, recollection persists. Hence buddhe is pre-eminent.

43. Smritiyaa onumaanaat cha.

And also because of its power of reminiscence.

Buddhe's power lies in chintan (the faculty of thinking). It thus makes contemplation or meditation possible which is the gateway to liberation. Therefore, too, it is the leading organism.

44. Sanbhavet na svatah.

Recollection cannot come to the soul.

The soul is immutable and unaffected directly by the gunas. Hence if anyone were to think that the soul can have the capacity of recollection he would be mistaken.

45. Aopektvik guna-pradhaana-bhaavah kriyaavisheshat.

The condition (as regards the soul's organs) of secondary and principal is relative, because of the difference of function.

The author anticipates an objection. Earlier, in aphorism 26 of this Book it has been said that the manas identifies itself both with the organs of perception and action. Therefore, someone may ask, why not give manas pre-eminence instead of buddhe? To this the author replies as follows:

The condition of being principal and secondary is relative to the performance of specific acts. For example, in the operation of seeing, manas is principal (i.e., one can't see unless the mind too is attentive). In the operation of manas, ahankaara, is principal (it is self-consciousness which operates the function of thought). In the operation of ahankaara, buddhe is the principal (because without understanding one can't have self-consciousness).

46. Tat-karma-aritvaa tat-artham abhicheshtha loka-vat.

All the effort of a particular intellect is for a particular soul because it has been coveredant by the works of that soul.

Still someone may ask: 'Why is one particular buddhe, and not another, the instrument of that particular soul?"

As in the world the owner of a thing uses it, and the servant who is engaged by someone does his work alone, even so the intellect is acquired by the soul by virtue of the karma for which he is responsible. That particular intellect, and no other, is yoked to that soul because of the performance of action (karma) of that particular soul. It should be clarified that the soul does not really 'perform' action. But as the king gets the credit or discredit for victory or defeat, even though such victory or defeat is achieved by the army, merely because the army is his, even so, although the soul does not 'perform' action, action is ascribed to him.

47. Samaana-karma-yoge buddheh praadhaanyam loka vaaloka vaat.

Admitting that the various organs of the soul all act equally, pre-eminence belongs to the buddhe—just as in the world, just as in the world.

Note the repetition of 'just as in the world', which is to indicate that this is the end of the Second Book.
The author declares that *buddhe* is pre-eminent. As the prime minister of a country is pre-eminent, although all other ministers equally work for the good of the country, so is *buddhe* pre-eminent. Despite the fact that all other organs also work for the soul’s redemption; *buddhe* is at the top.

**BOOK THREE**

Of Dispassion

_Tyagah prapajcha-roopasya chidaatma-tvaa-loka naut._
_Tyaago hi mahataan poojyah sadihya moksha-mayo yatah._

The abandonment of the illusion of name and form by the recognition of the non-material ever enlightened Brahma everywhere, is _tyaga_, which is honoured by the great and leads to immediate absolution.

_Aprokshanubhuti_, 106

Now after having learnt of the evolutes of _prakriti_, the third book is commenced, the object of which is the study of _vairagya_ or dispassion.

The _maha-bhootas_ (Great Elements) and the dyad of bodies is to be described, and after this the going into wombs and the like. The object of this is to describe the lower dispassion which is the motive of the performance of acts and the means of knowledge; thereby leading up to the study of the higher dispassion which is known to be the source of all knowledge. Thus the third book commences.

1. *Aisheshat vishesha-aarambkah.*

The diversified world of sense proceeds from the undifferentiated.

In the subtle elements, the *tan-maatras*, there is no distinction like calmness, fierceness, dullness and so forth. The subtle elements are manifested only in the minds of the yogis, in whose minds they exist as undisturbed calm. But the gross
elements which originate from them are discernible and distinguishable. It is in them (and not in the subtle elements) that pleasure, etc. are manifested to greater or lesser degrees.

2. Tasmaat shareerasya.

Therefrom, of the body.

Having described the origin of the gross elements in the preceding aphorism, the author goes on to describe the origin of the body.

The pairs of bodies, gross and subtle, originate from the twenty-three principles.

3. Tad-beejuat sanskritit.

From the seed thereof is worldly existence.

The author has said in the previous aphorism that the cause of the body is the twenty-three principles. Now he proves that sansaara (worldly existence) of the purusha cannot be accounted for otherwise than by means of the twenty-three principles.

It is from the seed, i.e., the subtle causes in the form of the twenty-three principles, in other words from the body, that the sanskriti (the going and coming) of the soul takes place. For the soul to thus go and come, a body is essential. Because the soul is all-pervasive and immovable, there cannot be its spontaneous going and coming. Conditioned by the twenty-three principles, and because of the limiting factor of the upadhikṣ, it migrates from body to body for the purpose of experiencing the fruits of previous works.

4. Aadviveekaat cha pravarttanam avisheshhaanaam.

And, till there is discrimination, there is the operation of the indiscernibles.

The limit of sansaara is stated by the author. Lest someone may think that because the originators of the gross elements are existences, there would be constant origination, and therefore no release, the author clarifies thus: The nature of originators belongs to the gross and subtle elements only till one cannot discriminate between purusha and prakriti. When such

vireka (discrimination) is achieved, there is no longer any necessity of sansaara or transmigratory existence.

5. Upahlogaat itarasya.

On account of the necessity of the other's experiencing.

In the previous aphorism the author has stated that worldly existence is inevitable till one attains discrimination and realizes that the soul is different from prakriti. In this one he states the reason for the continuance of such worldly existence. It is necessary because those souls who have not achieved discrimination should continue experiencing the fruits of their works.

Saankhya, as we have seen, believes in a multiplicity of souls. Even if some of the souls have achieved discrimination, still the world must go on because others who have not achieved it will have to keep on exhausting their good and evil deeds.


The soul is now quite free from both.

During worldly existence the soul is free from the pairs of opposites, viz., cold and heat, pleasure and pain, and so forth. There are different interpretations to this aphorism. Samprati (=now) is taken to mean 'during pralaya (dissolution)' by Aniruddha, 'at the time of creation' by Mahadeva, and 'at the time of transmigration' by Vijnana Bhushu. Parti-muktah is taken to mean 'entirely free' by Vijnana, and 'bound' by Mahadeva. Aniruddha reads pari-svaktah for pari-muktah, and interprets it as 'overpowered' or 'enveloped'.

The general meaning of 'now', i.e., 'during the time of worldly existence', has been taken in translating the aphorism.

7. Manta-putri-jan sthoolam praayashhah itarat na tathaa.

The gross body usually arises from father and mother. The other one is not so.

The author distinguishes between the gross body and the subtle body—the sthooli shareera and the linga shareera. The former, the gross body, the author says, usually arises from
father and mother. The word 'usually' is used because there is no mention in the Smitis also of a gross body not born of a womb. The other, the subtle body, does not arise from father and mother because it arises from creation. The subtle body is believed to last through a cycle of creation and dissolution which is about 31,10,40,00,00,00,00,000 years! But in pralaya it ceases to exist.


Pleasure and pain belong to the body which exists from the beginning, and not to the other.

The experience of pleasure and pain belongs only to the subtle body which exists from the beginning of creation and not to the gross body. When a body is lifeless there is no experience of pleasure or pain for it. Therefore pleasure and pain which are the gamut of worldly experience, belong to the gross body only in a secondary sense. Primarily they belong to the subtle body.


The seventeen, as one, are the subtle body.

The author defines the constitution of the subtle body. It is both container and what is contained in it, like the forest is both the trees which are in it as well as the collective trees which go by the name of a forest and which is one.

The seventeen are the eleven organs, the five subtle elements, and buddhe. Anahantara is included in buddhe.


Differentiation of individuals follows from diversity of karma.

Someone may ask: 'If the subtle body is one, how does it resolve into forms as diverse as that of a bee and an elephant?'

The author explains this. In the beginning there was the Hiranyakasipu, the Golden-Egged Brahman, but afterwards there were many divisions of this, as from one subtle body of the father there are produced many forms of it like the sons and daughters. The reason of it is their different karmas.


From it being applied to the subtle body it is applicable also to the gross body which is the tabernacle of its abode.

The objector may say: 'Since the character of being a body is attributed to the subtle body only because it is the house of experience, why is the gross organism regarded as though it were a body?'

This, the author says, is because of the constant association of the subtle body with the gross one. Because the gross body is the receptacle of the subtle body, the two constantly accompany each other, and when one thinks of the 'I' he means both the subtle body as well as the gross one.


The subtle body cannot exist by itself without the gross body just like a shadow and a picture.

An objector may ask: 'What proof is there of a separate body of six sheaths which may be considered as the vehicle of the subtle body.' In other words, what is the proof of the existence of the gross body?

The author says, the subtle body cannot stand independently without a support, as a shadow cannot be cast without the object of which it is the shadow, or as a picture cannot hang without a support to it. Therefore when the subtle body abandons a gross body in order to go to another world, it necessarily takes another gross body of flesh and blood to serve as a tabernacle for it.


Even though it is corporate (i.e., possesses a definite shape of its own) it cannot stay independently because of its association with masses, as in the case of the sun.

Someone may say: Why not suppose the subtle body itself

The six sheaths are hair, blood, flesh, veins, bone and marrow.
to be the support? What is the need then of its taking the support of the gross body?  

To this the author answers: All lights or illuminating sources are seen as standing only by association with earthly substances. For example, the sun, which is a source of light, consists of an incandescent mass. Therefore the subtle body which is constituted of sattva (light) must be associated with the gross elements (bhutas).


It is of atomic magnitude for there is the evidence of the Scriptures that it acts.

The author fixes the magnitude of the subtle body to be of atomic size. It is finite or limited, but not actually an atom. In the ninth aphorism of this book the subtle body has been declared to be made up of parts. It is stated to be finite in this aphorism. The reason for its being finite is that the Scriptures proclaim that it acts, as for example the Taittireeya Upanishad tells us ‘The linga propagates sacrifice and karmas as well.’

15. Tad-annatva shrutah cha.

And also because the Scriptures declare that it is formed of food.

The author gives another reason for concluding that the subtle body is finite, viz., that the Scriptures declare it to be formed of food— annam vai pranaa = Food verily is prana. The Chhaandogya Upanishad, too, declares this, ‘Verily manas is constituted of food, prana of water, and voice of fire.’ The manas, therefore, cannot be all-pervading like the aatmaa (soul).


The migration of the subtle body is for the sake of the soul, just like a king’s cooks.

The author explains why the subtle body has a worldly

existence migrating from one body to another. He does so with the help of an example. As the cooks of the king, even so the subtle body assumes a mundane existence for the sake of the soul.

17. Paancha-bhautikah dehah.

The gross body is formed of the five elements.

The meaning is clear. Compare this with Shri Rama’s words to Taaraa, wife of Baali in the Ramacharita-mamasa: ‘Chhit jal paavak gogan sameera. Panch rachis ati adham sareeraa.’ (This base body is formed of the five elements—earth, water, fire, ether and air.)

18. Chaatv-bhautikam iti eke.

Some say the gross body is formed of the four elements.

Some people are of the view that only four elements go to form the gross body, i.e., to say, ether (aakaasha) is excluded because it can’t originate anything.

19. Eka-bhautikam iti apana.

Others say the gross body is formed of one element only.

Others think only one element, i.e., that of earth constitutes it, and the others are merely supporters.


Consciousness is not a natural product of the elements because it is not found in each separately.

The author rejects the theory of sentiency of the body. If the elements are separated from one another consciousness is not discovered. So if the elements combine or come together it should not be thought that will give rise to consciousness. Therefore consciousness is in no way natural to the body, but comes from without.


If consciousness were innate in the body, there would not be the death of anything in the world.

Another defect in the theory that consciousness is innate in the body is mentioned by the author. If this were so, the body would never die, for that which has consciousness as property is eternal.

The nature of a thing remains so long as the thing remains. For example, water has fluidity. So that till water remains in the form of water, it will have fluidity. If consciousness is taken to be the body's nature, therefore, the body would ever retain the quality of consciousness, and death or deep sleep, in which consciousness is absent, would never come to it. But as we know both these things happen to the body, consciousness cannot remain innate in it.


If it be said that the production of consciousness in the body is like the power of an intoxicating mixture, the answer is this cannot be, for it does not exist even in a minute form in the separate elements.

The aphorism answers a possible objection. Someone might say: The power of intoxication, even though it may not show itself in the constituents of a mixture severally, comes to the surface in the mixture, even so consciousness may not be present in the individual elements which form the body but it may be generated in the body which is their combination.

To this the author replies: The constituents which form the intoxicating mixture do have the power to intoxicate even though to a minute degree; just as if many men heave a block of stone they pool their strength and make it strong enough to move it. But it is strong because it is a combination of the minute strength of each man. In the case of the body, however, the elements which form it do not have the nature of consciousness even to a minute degree; they don't have it at all. Hence the pooling of consciousness cannot take place. Therefore the argument does not apply to the body.


Through knowledge, release is obtained.

The author goes on to tell how release is obtained.

By means of the transmigration of the subtle body through different births, discrimination between the soul and the non-soul arises, and thence emancipation which is the soul's chief end.


Bondage arises from misconception.

When one misconceives the noble aim of the soul, which is release, and thinks it lies in worldly enjoyment, bondage arises in the shape of pleasure and of pain which is allied to pleasure.


Since knowledge is the precise cause of liberation there is neither association of anything with it (as good works etc.), nor alternativeness (e.g., of good works in its stead.)

Lest someone says that release is possible by good works, etc. in addition to knowledge or in place of knowledge, the author asserts conclusively, 'No, only knowledge, and nothing else, can lead to liberation.'

Note: There appears to be differences in the views expressed by the Scriptures about this point. The utterances in favour of karma, etc. as instruments of liberation are:

The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad: 'Knowledge and works are the means of release.'

The Eesha Upanishad: 'He who knows both knowledge and action triumphs over death by his works, and enjoys immortality by knowledge.'

On the other hand, the view that knowledge alone leads to liberation is also supported by Scriptural texts.

The Shevaashvutara Upanishad says: 'I know the great Purusha shining as the sun, beyond dullness or darkness. Only

6. Eesha Up., XI.
by knowing him does one triumph over death, there is no other path.]

The Mahanaaraayana Upanishad says: 'Some do get immortality by renunciation, but not by works, progeny or wealth.'

The author, however, subscribes to the 'knowledge alone' view on the strength of the relevant Scriptural utterances.


The release of the soul does not come from both knowledge and works, etc. just as there is no cooperation between the illusory dream state and the non-illusory waking state.

Another defect in the theory that works, etc., combined with knowledge can accomplish liberation, is pointed out by the author by means of an illustration.

Let us say that action is comparable to the dream state, and knowledge to the waking one. Cooperation can only be between things belonging to the same time. But dream and waking do not belong to the same point of time (when one is dreaming he is not awake, when awake not dreaming). Similarly we may say there can be no cooperation between works and knowledge.

27. Itarasya aap na-aatyanikam.

Even of the other, the non-illusoriness is not absolute.

Even then someone may still say that in the worship of the One Self there is non-illusoriness and so this worship can replace the acquisition of knowledge, and thus give release.

To this the author replies: 'Even when one worships the One Self, the condition of non-illusoriness is not created because imaginary things also intervene in our thoughts and disguise the object of worship (the One Soul).'

28. Sankalpite aap evam.

Moreover illusoriness lies in that which the mind fancies.

33. Nirodah chhardi-vidhaaraana-abhyaaam.

Dhaaraanaa is the restraint of the prana (breath) by means of expulsion and retention.

The author mentions another means of restraint. This is bringing the life-breath under control or regulation by means of in-breathing, retention of breath, and out-breathing. The same is what is called dhaaaranaa.

34. Sthira-sukham aasanam.

Posture is that which makes one steady and gives one ease.

Saankhya does not insist that the practising yogi should adopt all kinds of complicated and tortuous poses for practising meditation. All that is needed is a pose which is easy and helps in steadying the mind.

35. Sva-karma sva-aashrama-vihata-karma-anushthaanaam.

Svakarma is the performance of the acts prescribed for one's own stage of life.

The meaning is clear. It should be noted, however, that the word used is sva-aashrama, that is to say one should perform the duty which is enjoined by the stage of life in which one is.

Hindu philosophy distinguishes four such stages—the brahmacharya, student whose duty is to pass his days in serving his preceptor and studying the Scriptures; the grihastha, householder, who enters family life with wife and children; the vaanaprastha, anchorite, or dweller of the woods, who after discharging his worldly duties retires to the forest; and finally, the sannyasee, religious mendicant, who, freed from all bonds, wanders about intent only in God and strives for attainment.

This aphorism says that one should do his duty according to the stage in which he is, i.e., if he is in the grihastha stage he should discharge his family obligations, if in the vaanaprastha stage have nothing to do with the world, and so on. The meaning should not be taken in the narrow sense of caste or class.

36. Vairagaayaat abhyaasaat.

And meditation is through dispassion and constant practice.

Another way of accomplishing the object of meditation is stated, viz., by constantly practising it and by acquiring dispassion. Dispassion is of two kinds—the lower one is from a surfeit of things, when one has so much that he says 'this is enough'; and higher dispassion, which comes of the knowledge that material things are of no use in giving satisfaction.

37. Viparyaya-bhedaaah pancha.

The kinds of misconception are five.

The misconceptions are five in number, and these result in bondage. These are—ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and fear of dissolution. Compare with the observation of Yoga Sootra on this point : 'avidyaas asmitaa raaga-dvesha abhinive-shak kleshak' (Ignorance, egoism, attachment, aversion, and love of life—these are the afflictions).

38. Ashakti ahstaavinshati-dhaatu.

Disability is of twenty-eight kinds.

The incapacities or disabilities are seventeen of the buddhi and eleven of the indriyas (organs).

39. Tushita navadhaa.

Complacency is of nine kinds.

In this aphorism and the next, the author makes a mention of the nine defects of buddhi in the form of complacencies, and (in the next aphorism) the seven defects of buddhi in the form of perfections. The nature of these will be explained later on, in the aphorisms following these two.

40. Siddhith ashta dhaa.

Perfection is of eight kinds.

These too are defects of buddhi, which the author will explain later.

10. Y S., II : 3.
41. *Araantara-bhedaah, poorna vat.*

The minor sub-divisions of misconception are as declared of old.

The ancient teachers had many more classifications of misconceptions. They believed these to be of sixty-two varieties in all. Roughly their sub-division ran as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Kinds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avidya (ignorance)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asmitaa (egoism)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raaga (desire)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dvesha (aversion)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhinivesha (fear)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>62</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The *Saaankhya Kaarika* too speaks of sixty-two misconceptions:

*Bhedaah tamasah ashta-vidhah mahasya cha dasa-vidhah mahaamahah*  
*Taamiarah ashtaadasha tatha bhavati andha-taamiarah.*

(The distinctions of ignorance and egoism are eightfold each; tenfold of desire; and eighteen each of aversion and fear).

42. *Evan itarasyaah.*

Similarly, there are further sub-divisions of disability.

The disabilities have been mentioned to be of twenty-eight kinds (see aphorism 38). This sub-division of disabilities has also been made (as for misconception), by the ancient teachers.

43. *Aadhyaatmika-aadi-bhedaat navadhaa tushith.*

Complacency is ninefold through the distinctions of the internal and the like.

11. *S.K., XLVIII.*

The nine kinds of complacencies spoken of in the aphorism are given in brief below. They fall into two divisions. The first four are called *aadhyaatmika*, i.e., with reference to the soul, and the next five are external because they arise from or in relation to abstinence from external objects.

(A) COMPLACENCIES WITH REFERENCE TO THE SOUL

1. Ambas—In which one thinks: If release comes from knowing the difference between *purusha* and *prakriti*, why not worship *prakriti*, why bother about *purusha*?

2. Salia—Release cannot come by discrimination but by observing a vow.

3. Ogha—Even by observing a vow, release is not obtained. It comes in course of time.

4. Vrshiti—Even through time’s influence release does not come. It comes through luck.

(B) EXTERNAL COMPLACENCIES

1. Paara—When one abstinates from acquiring objects because of pain and trouble.

2. Supaara—When one abstinates from preserving objects of enjoyment because of pain or trouble.

3. Paara-paara—When one abstains in view of the pain arising from the thought of waste.

4. An-uttama-ambhas—When one abstains in view of pain arising from the thoughts of defects of enjoyment.

5. Uttama-ambhas—When abstinence is in view of the pain arising from the thought that the enjoyment cannot be had without killing animals.

44. *Ooha-aadi-bhik shitdhh.*

Perfection is of eight kinds through reasoning and the rest. These eight varieties of perfection are:

1. Taara—argument or thinking.

2. Sutaara—verbal knowledge.
3. Taara-taara—study.
4. Ramyaka—companionship of guru, celibate students and the like.
5. Sadaa-muditaa—external and internal purity.
6. Pramoda—prevention of aadhyaatmika pain, i.e., pain caused by the Self.
7. Mudita—prevention of adhibhautika pain, i.e., pain caused by the elements.
8. Modamaana—prevention of aadhidaivika pain, i.e., pain caused by the gods and other such.
   There can be no real perfection without the removal of misconception.

   This aphorism is to answer a possible objection. Someone may ask: 'How is it that you say perfections can be got only by reasoning, etc., when the Scriptures establish that the eight perfections (beginning with the power to assume atomic size) result from recitation of mantras, austerity, contemplation, and so forth?'

   To this the author replies: 'The perfection you speak of takes place positively, and without abandoning something else (in the shape of misconception). Therefore it is only seeming perfection, not real.

46. Daiva-aadi-prabheda.

   Specific creation is that of which the sub-divisions are the divine and the rest.

   In aphorism 10 of this Book the author had said, 'The differentiation of individuals follows from diversity of their karma (actions).’ This is now amplified. There are six kinds of people, according to their works—gods, demons, human beings, departed spirits, those living in hell, and grovelling creatures. The last named, i.e., the grovelling creatures, include creatures of the world other than human beings, viz., (i) wild beasts, (ii) domesticated creatures, (iii) birds, (iv) reptiles, and (v) the immovables.

47. Abramastamba-paryantar tatr-krite srishtih aavivekamat.

   Creation, from Brahma right down to a pillar, exists for the sake of the soul (purusha), till there be discrimination between purusha and prakriti.

   Creation is for the sake of purusha and unless the several souls affected by creation do not all achieve discrimination between purusha and prakriti, it goes on and on.

48 to 50. Oordsam sattva-vishaala.
   Tamas-vishaala ‘milatat.
   Madhye rajas-vishaala.

   Afoft it is abundant in sattva.
   Towards the foot in tamas.
   In the middle in rajas.

   The three worlds of creation are described in aphorisms 48 to 50. The world of the devas (gods) in which sattva (purity) predominates is above, that of the serpents (naagas) called mooilah, which is in the nether regions is the one abundant in tamas (darkness), and in the middle is the world of mortals in which there is mainly the quality of rajas (passion).


   The diverse operation of prakriti is through diversity of karma, just like a born slave.

   One might ask how from one single prakriti, several creations appear, abundant in sattva, rajas, and so forth.

   The author replies to this by taking the imagery of a man who is a born slave. Just as his service to his master varies according to his aptitude, smartness, etc., even so the one prakriti is responsible for various kinds of creation with one or the other gunas predominant.

52. Aavritth tatra api uttara-uttara-yoni-yogaat heya.

   Even there, there is return to the miserable states of existence, so the higher world, too, is to be shunned.

   Of what use is release, one may ask, for one who has achieved the higher worlds? There is return even for him, says the
author, to *sansaara* or transmigratory existence. Therefore the higher world, too, is to be shunned.


The pain produced by decay and death remains in the higher world as in the lower.

Common to all planes of existences is the suffering of decay and death. Therefore even the higher world is to be shunned.

54. *Na kaaaraan-layaat kriita-kritya-taa magna-vaad utthanaaataat.*

Not through absorption into the cause is there accomplishment of the end, for one who dives rises again.

For one who fails to achieve discrimination between *purusha* and *prakriti*, there may be absorption into *prakriti* because of dispassion. But the end is not gained by this because as one who dives into the water comes up again, so too the souls which are absorbed into *prakriti* reappear.

55. *Akaaarya-vee api tad-yogah paara-vashyaat.*

Although *prakriti* is not constrained to act, yet this happens because of her being devoted.

It may be said that if the soul does not act because of its eternality, the same may apply to *prakriti* also.

To this the author replies that though *prakriti* is independent of the will of another, and thus no one compels her to act, yet she acts because of the end of the soul, i.e., because she is interested in the end of the soul, which is discrimination.

56. *Sah hi sarva-vit sarva-kartaat.*

For he becomes the knower of all and the doer of all.

One may ask what the form of the Supreme Self is. The author says, the idea 'I am the knower and the doer of all things' comes to the Supreme Self because he is reflected in *prakriti*. The Being who in the previous creation was absorbed in *prakriti* becomes in another creation the omniscient and omnipotent Eeshvara.

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**OF DISPASSION**

57. *Eedrishta-eeshvara-sidhiih sidhhaa.*

Such existence of an Eeshvara is admitted.

It is agreed by everyone that there is an emergent Eeshvara, i.e., emerging from one previously absorbed into *prakriti*. What the Saan-khya disputes is merely the existence of an eternal Eeshvara.


The creation of *prakriti*, even though spontaneous, is for the sake of another. For she is not the experiencer, as the camel carries saffron for the sake of its master.

Although the creation of *prakriti* proceeds from herself alone, it is for the sake of another, i.e., for the sake of the experience and release of the *purusha*—just like the carrying of saffron by the camel is for the sake of its master.

59. *Achaaana-tve api ksheeravat cheshtitam *pradhaa-nasyaa.*

Even though non-intelligent, *prakriti* acts spontaneously, as is the case with milk.

One might say that *prakriti* is non-intelligent, while the acting for the sake of another (as in the example of the camel given in the previous aphorism) relates to an intelligent being; therefore spontaneous creativity is not possible for *prakriti*.

To meet this objection the author says that *prakriti* operates for the sake of *purusha*, as milk which is not intelligent oozes out of a cow’s udders for the calf, or as milk of itself turns into curd.

60. *Karma-vat driishteh vaa koala-aadeh.*

Or as with the case of spontaneous acts of time, and the like.

The author gives another illustration. As the agriculture operations, like planting of paddy and the like, give result spontaneously in time, even though the plants are devoid of intelligence, or as the seasons come and go of themselves, even so unintelligent *prakriti* operates spontaneously for *purusha*.
61. Sva-bhavaat cheshritam anabhisandhaanam bhritya-vat.

Prakriti acts from her own nature, not from thought, like a servant.

Another example is given. As a good servant acts just from habit in serving his master well, not to bring about his own enjoyment, even so prakriti acts from instinct and habit alone.


Prakriti's activity is necessary because of the attraction of karma from eternity.

As the operation of karma has been from all eternity, the energising of prakriti is necessary and pre-determined through karma's attraction.

63. Vivikta-bodhaat srsti-nirvrittih pradhaanasya sruva-vat paakte.

With the arising of discriminative knowledge, prakriti ceases to create, as in the case of a cook when cooking has been done.

Prakriti ceases to create as soon as discrimination between it and purusha is achieved; as when food has been cooked, the job of the cook is over.

64. Itaroh itara-vat tad-dashaat.

Even when another is released, one who is devoid of discriminative knowledge remains bound.

An objector may say, 'If this is so then with the release of one soul, all others would be released.'

To this the author replies: The soul which remains bound remains so by the fault of prakriti herself, namely, because in the case of that particular soul she has not been able to fulfil the object of discrimination. Therefore even though other souls are released, that one remains bound.

65. Dvayoh ekatarasya va audaasevayam apavargah.

Release means the aloofness of both purusha and prakriti, or of either one of the two.

OF DISPASSION

The 'aloofness' of prakriti is her non-activity towards one who has achieved discrimination, while that of purusha means his non-attachment to prakriti. The aloofness of both purusha and prakriti implies separation from each other, or the solitariness of the soul alone which thinks 'I may be released.'

65. Aaya-shrishtih-uparaage api na virajyate prabuddha-rajju-tarvasya eva ugra-gah.

Prakriti does not desist from creative activity towards others, as one who mistakenly still considers the rope to be a snake remains afraid of it even though the one who realises the truth of the rope being just a rope is no longer afraid.

The example of the rope and the snake is given merely to illustrate the fact that even when some souls attain release others remain bound, the former being like those who have realised the rope to be a rope, and the latter like those who still keep on thinking it to be a snake. But it does not show (as some Vedantists interpret the example) that purusha is reality and prakriti unreality.


And from connection with karma which is the cause.

Aniruddha reads u-yogaat (non-connection) for yogaat. The author has given the reason why prakriti does not cease to act in respect of the souls other than those which have obtained release. This, he says, is because karma does not operate in respect of the souls possessing discriminative knowledge, but keeps on affecting the other souls which have not yet attained such knowledge.

68. Nair-upakshye api prakriti-upakasaare avivekah nimitam.

Though the souls are equally indifferent, prakriti serves them by virtue of non-discrimination.

Since all souls are equally indifferent and do not solicit prakriti to serve them, what makes prakriti proceed to act towards one and not to act against another? Karma and the power of adrishtam cannot be the principle of determination because there is nothing to determine what karma belongs
to which soul. The answer given by the author is that even souls are indifferent, *prakriti* acts simply through non-discrimination. She acts towards the souls who need her service because of their tendency or *vaasanaa* to exhibit herself, thinking 'the soul is my lord.'

69. *Nartaakee-vat prayrittasya api nivritthi chaaritaarthaarchyaaat.*

As a dancer stops when the entertainment is over, even so *prakriti* ceases to act when the end is attained.

It has been said that activity is *prakriti*'s nature. This being so how can she cease to act when discrimination arises? To this the author replies: *Prakriti*'s nature to energise is only with reference to the soul's purpose, not universally. Hence the cessation of her activity is only with the attainment of the object of the soul, just as a dancer engaged to entertain the assembly leaves when the entertainment is over.

70. *Dosha-bodhe api na upasarpanam pradhaanasya kula-vadhoo-vat.*

Moreover when *prakriti* realises that her fault has been seen by *purusha*, she no longer approaches him, like a woman of noble family.

Being ashamed at *purusha*'s having seen her fault in the shape of her transformations and taking the shape of pain and so forth, she no longer approaches the soul, as a woman of good family does not approach her husband who has seen her fault.

71. *Na ekaantatah bandha-mokshena purushatya avivekaad rite.*

Bondage and liberation do not really belong to the soul, and would not even appear to do so, were it not for non-discrimination.

Bondage and liberation in the sense of being involved in pain and being freed from it do not actually belong to the soul but result only because of non-discrimination.

72. *Prakriteh aanyasyaat sa-sangatvat prashhvat.*

Bondage and release really belong to *prakriti* because of her association, as in the case of a beast.

The author declares that bondage and liberation belong really to *prakriti*. As a beast is bound by a rope and also released because of the rope being unbound, even so *prakriti* suffers pain through being attached to dharma or merit, which are the causes of pain.

73. *Roopath septabhih naitnaanam badhaaanti pradhaanam koshakaaraavat vimochayoti eka-roopena.*

*Prakriti* binds herself in seven ways, and in one way liberates herself.

The seven ways in which *prakriti* binds herself are by merit (dharma), dispassion (*vairaga*), lordliness (*aishwarya*), demerit (*adharma*), ignorance (*ajnana*), non-dispassion (*a-vairaga*), and non-lordliness (*a-aishwarya*). Just as a silk-worm builds a cocoon around it and thus imprisons itself within it, in the same way does *prakriti* bind herself with these seven bands. She releases herself with *jnaana* (knowledge) alone. Therefore it is said in the aphorism that it is in one way that *prakriti* releases herself.

74. *Nimitatvaam avivekasya na drishta-kasniha.*

Non-discrimination is the efficient cause, so that there is no disparagement of sense-evidence.

The author anticipates an objection. It has been stated that bondage results from non-discrimination, and discrimination brings release. But non-discrimination or discrimination are not things to be avoided or secured, and in the world only pain and pleasure are objects of aversion and desire. So the theory about discrimination and non-discrimination contradicts what is actually seen in the world.

To this objection, the author answers: It has only been asserted that non-discrimination and discrimination are the efficient cause of bondage or release. Therefore there is no repudiation of what is actually seen.
75. Tuttva-abhyaasaat na iti na iti tyangaat viveka-siddhih.

Perfect discrimination achieved by abandoning everything is expressed by 'not this, not this'; and is obtained by the study of the twenty-five principles.

The author explains how discrimination can be developed. Discrimination is attained by cultivating the twenty-five principles of Saankhya, in the shape of abandonment of conceit, and thinking in respect of all non-intelligent things ending with prakriti 'not this, not this'. In other words by understanding that the soul is different from prakriti and its evolutes, and that these latter (apart from the soul) are only supplemental to study.

76. Adhikaari-prabhedaat na niyamah.

Because there are degrees of competence in those engaged in the quest of liberation, it is not necessary that each and all should at once be successful.

It may be thought by someone that since the cultivation of the principles leads to release, all those engaged in such cultivation will be released together. The author says that this is not so. Those more assiduous in their quest gain the objective soon, but others who are sluggish may take longer, even not in their present birth. The period after which the seeker attains liberation depends on his competence and sincerity of effort.

77. Baadhita-anuvrittyaa madhya-vivekatah api upa-bhogah.

Because whatever pain has been repelled returns again, there comes even from ordinary discrimination, experience.

The author declares that release can be attained only from perfect discrimination. For one who has medium discrimination, experience is a mere return of vaasanaa or the previous tendency of experience. When one has perfect discrimination he experiences ultra-cognitive trance from which there is no return.

78. Jeevan-muktah cha.

So too is the released during life.


The proof of the jeevan-muktah is from the relation of the instructed and the instructor.

Someone may object that there is no proof that there can be release of one living. The author says that the Scriptures mention the relationship of the disciple and the preceptor. The preceptor can be only one who has obtained release. Therefore it is clear that one can obtain release even in this life.

80. Shruti cha.

There is moreover the shruti on the subject.

The Scriptures also testify to such a conclusion—that release is possible even in this life. 'For the wise there is release from joy and pain even while living.' At another place it is said, 'Man is released by initiation only, and even while being released can be endowed with a living body. The potter's wheel still revolves even though disjoined from it.' Similarly, the Naaradeeya Smriti says, 'He~is the jeevan muktah who looks on all things as Self, who is above virtue and vice, and whom neither society nor the Scriptures confine.'

81. Itara-thaa andha-paramparaa.

Otherwise the blind would be leading the blind.

Someone may say, even a man of sluggish discrimination may be an instructor. To this the author answers: 'If this were so, and the instructor himself were ignorant, it would be the case of the blind leading the blind.' The preceptor would mislead his disciple and he in turn mislead another whom he teaches, and so forth.

82. Chakra-bhramana-vat dhrita-shareerah.

Even though possessing a body the emancipated sage goes on living, like the whirling of a wheel.
How, one may ask, can life go on when all karma has been exhausted by the acquisition of knowledge?

The author says, just as when the potter ceases to act, even then, due to the previous momentum, the wheel keeps revolving for some time, so the jeevan mukta keeps on living because he has to exhaust the previous prarabdha karma, even though no fresh karma is created due to the rise of discrimination.

83. Sanskaara-leshatat tat-siddhi.

Through the least remains of sanskaaras the body is retained.

Someone may ask, 'How can the body remain even after the object of meditation, etc., has been achieved?' To this the author answers, 'The body is retained by even the least remnant of those impressions of objects which are the causes of possession of a body.'

84. Vivekaat nih-sheha-dukhha-nivrittau krita-kriya-taa na itaraat.

What was to be achieved has been achieved when discrimination has brought about an entire cessation of pain not otherwise, not otherwise.

The author explains in this aphorism when supreme release is obtained.

Release can only be obtained when all pain, of whatever kind it is, ceases completely, without any pain remaining. In no other way can release be obtained.

The repetition of 'not otherwise' denotes the end of the Book.

BOOK FOUR

Of Fables

Knowledge and love of God are ultimately one and the same.
There is no difference between pure knowledge and pure love.

Sayings of Shri Ramakrishna

After the Book of Dispassion, there is now this Fourth Book, the purpose of which is the narration of stories for the awakening of the disciple.

The Fourth Book of Kapila's Saankhya Sutras is somewhat different from the remaining ones in contents, inasmuch as it narrates familiar stories from the Scriptures for bringing about discrimination between purusha and prakriti.

1. Raaja-putra-vat tattva-upadeshaat.

Discrimination between soul and prakriti comes from instruction as to the truth, as in the case of the King's son.

The story referred to is as follows: The son of a certain king was expelled from the city because of the evil confluence of stars. He was brought up by a forester, and adopted the life and manners of foresters. It so happened that the king died without any other son, and so the ministers brought him back to the palace and told him, 'You are not a hunter but the son of a king.' Knowing this he instantly recovered the

1. The star is called 'Ganda', and birth under this asterism is considered inauspicious.
manner of a prince. In the same way the soul, having been instructed by some kind person that he is nothing but part of the First Soul or Pure Consciousness, realises his own nature.

2. Pishaacha-vat anya-artha-upadesha api.

Discrimination results as in the case of the pishaacha even though it was meant for another.

The reference is to the legend that when Lord Krishna was instructing his disciple, Arjuna, about the distinction between prakriti and the soul, a pishaacha who was standing nearby, happened to overhear it, and even though the discourse was not meant for him, he too obtained discriminative knowledge. Even so it may happen in the case of others.

3. Aavrittih asakrit-upadeshaat.

Sometimes there is need of frequent instruction.

Sometimes it is necessary to repeat the instruction of discriminative knowledge over and over again, as for example in the Chhaandaogya Upanishad, Aaruni and other preceptors repeat the instructions given by them to Shvetaketu and others several times.


Since dispassion arises from observing that death and birth come to father and son.

Discrimination arises from dispassion when one sees that for the father as well as for the son (i.e., for everyone), there is birth and death.

5. Shyena-vat sukha-dhakhi ryaaga-viyoga-aabhyaam.

One experiences pleasure and pain at the same time from abandonment and consequent separation—as in the case of the hawk.

The idea is that because pleasure is mixed with pain, both should be avoided. The mention of the hawk is a reference to a story by which the author illustrates his point. A man found a baby hawk, and reared him for some time. When it had grown up, he thought it was better to restore the bird to the forest. The hawk was pleased because he was freed of bondage, but sorry to part from the man who had brought him up so lovingly.

6. Ahi-nirvanayec-vat.

As in the case of the snake’s skin (things to be abandoned should be abandoned).

As a snake readily abandons its old skin, knowing it ought to be quitted, even so one who desires liberation should abandon prakriti which he has enjoyed for a long time, and now knows it fit to forsake.


And there should be no return to prakriti, like an amputated hand.

Again, the author relates a story to illustrate that once abandoning prakriti, she should not be espoused again.

A certain muni went to his brother’s hermitage to steal fruits, etc. The brother saw him and accused him of theft. The muni said, ’Tell me how I should make penance for my wrongdoing.’ The brother said, ’There can be no penance except that you cut off the hand which has committed the theft.’

The muni informed the king and amputated his hand. Similarly if one reverts to performing prohibited acts by mistake, he should take steps to obtain freedom from them.

8. Asaadhana-ama-chintanam bandhaaya yahatavat.

What is not a means of release should not be thought of, as in the case of Bharata.

The author explains that the thought which is not congenial to release should not be cherished at all.

The story of Bharata and the fawn, mentioned in the Vishnu Purana, illustrates this. A king of the name of Bharata was almost on the verge of obtaining liberation, when he saw a female deer deliver a young fawn, and die instantly after doing so. He reared the fawn, never thinking of anything else,
with the result that at the moment of his death his mind was attached to the swn, and he was not able to obtain release.


From association with the many there is hindrance to concentration because of the influence of desire or passion and the like, as in the case of the shells in a girl's bracelet.

Association should not be made with the many because when this is done there is disturbance through the manifestation of passion and the like, and this hinders concentration—just as a jingling is produced when shells in the bracelet on a girl's wrist strike each other.

10. Dvaabhiyaam api tattha eva.

This happens even from the company of two.

The author goes on to say that even if two persons come together there is hindrance to concentration because of conversation, etc. Therefore one ought to abide alone.


He who has no hope is happy, like Pingalaa.

The author relates another story. A courtesan called Pingalaa spent sleepless nights, hoping for the arrival of her lover, Bhujanga, for whose embrace she was restless. Thus she was greatly despondent. But once when she had thus waited in vain for a long time, she determined to give up all hope or expectation of his coming, and having thus resolved, she slept peacefully.

Compare this thought with the one expressed in A.E. Houseman's poem:

I to my perils
Of cheat and charmer
Came clad in armour
By stars benign.
Hope dies to mortals

And most believe her.
But man's deceiving
Was never mine.
The thoughts of others
Were light and fleeting
Of lover's meetings
Or wealth or fame.
Mine were of troubles,
And mine were steady,
So I was ready
When troubles came.


One may be happy even without exertion, like a serpent happy in a hole made by another.

The building of a house is a tedious and troublesome task. But a snake can find comfort in a hole made by a rat or some other animal, just as in which he himself might have made (compare with the saying: 'Fools build houses, wise men live in them!' ). The idea is that one should shed all exertion to obtain enjoyment, as this can be obtained without such exertion, and devote his whole-hearted attention to concentration.


Though one may subscribe to many shastrias and preceptors, the essence of the teachings is to be imbibed, as the bee sucks the nectar of flowers.

The meaning is that one should ignore the points of disputations and differences in various Scriptures, and absorb only their essence, just as the bee goes round various flowers and, rejecting all their constituents, sucks the nectar only.


There can be no interruption in the meditation of one whose mind is one-pointed, as the maker of arrows.

As in the case of a maker of arrows, who is so intent in fashioning them that he does not notice even the king who has

Through transgression of the rules enjoined there is failure to achieve the object, as in the world.

Aniruddha reads *brata* (a vow) for *krita* (enjoined rules). The author says that as in the world, if one does not follow the instructions for taking a certain medicine, the medicine is not effective, even so if those who practise concentration transgress the Scriptural rules for its practice, knowledge is not attained by them.


Moreover, if these rules of meditation are forgotten, there is harm, as in the case of the female frog.

The author further cautions the aspirant against forgetting the prescribed rules of meditation, and illustrates his point by the story of the female frog.

Once a certain king who was out hunting saw a beautiful girl in the forest. Overcome by her loveliness he asked her to marry him. The girl agreed, but made this stipulation: 'If ever you show me water, I will have to depart.' The king agreed, and scrupulously avoided showing her water. But one day, when wearied with sport, she asked the king for water; he too, forgetting her stipulation, showed it to her. Instantly she turned into a female frog. Kaamaroopini, daughter of the king of frogs, and entered the water. The king tried to find her by casting nets into the water, and other ways, but he could never get her again, and was filled with sorrow.

17. *Na upadesha-shravane api krita-kriya-tava paramarshaat virochana-vat.*

Without reflection, even through instruction the end is not gained, as in the case with Virochana.

'Reflection' here means giving heed and pondering over the words of the preceptor. Mere hearing of the teacher's instructions, without pondering over what is said, does not bring release. For example, both Indra and Virochana went to the world of Brahman to obtain knowledge of the Saankhya Principles. Virochana came back after hearing Brahman's instruction, but he did not reflect thereon. So he failed to obtain release.

18. *Drishtah tayoh indrasya.*

Of these two, reflection was seen in the case of Indra alone.

In the previous aphorism we have been told that Virochana did not obtain release because he did not reflect. What, someone may ask, was Indra's fate? In reply to such a question, the author says: Indra reflected devotedly on Brahman's instruction, and through long cultivation of, and pondering on, what he had heard, he was able, unlike Virochana, to obtain release.


Having shown reverence, performed the duties of a celibate student, and served the preceptor, one has success after a long time, as in Indra's case.

The author mentions the acts which are necessary for obtaining release. All these were performed by Indra for a long time, before he could obtain it. These are: (i) reverence to the guru, (ii) carrying out the duties laid down for a student celibate (brahmacharee), and (iii) serving the guru. These have to be done constantly for a long time before release can follow.


There is no limitation of time, as in the case of Vaamadeva.

It has been said in the previous aphorisms that celibate duties, reverence and service to the guru, have to be done for a long period of time before release occurs. Is such time necessary for one who gets release by knowledge? No, the author says, in such case release is instantaneous, as in the case of Vaamadeva who, because of instruction in a previous life when he was still in the womb, developed knowledge as soon as he appeared.
21. Adhyasta-roopa-upaasanaat paraam-puryena yajna-upaa-
sakaanaam iiva.

Through devotion to attributed forms (of the deity) knowledge
is approached by degrees, as in the case of those who devote
themselves to sacrifices.

Someone may object: One can reflect only on a known
thing, whereas no one has seen the soul. And if it has been
seen, what is the need of reflecting on it?

Apprehending such an objection, the author says: Who has
seen dharma or merit? Yet in order to acquire it people per-
form sacrifices.

22. Itara-laabhe api aurviteh pancha-agni-yogatah jana-
siruteh.

Moreover, after other ends are attained, there is return to
birth as one hears from the shruti of birth, after performance
of the Five-fire sacrifice.

What need is there of knowledge of the soul, someone may
ask, for one who has attained to the world of Brahman? The
author replies: Even one who attains the world of Brahman
by performance of the sacrifice of Agnihotra—the five offerings
to the five fires in the form of heaven, cloud, earth, man and
woman (mentioned in the Chhaandogyaa Upaanishad)—returns to
the earth again. Therefore the object is not accomplished by
the performance of sacrifices.

23. Viraktasya heya-kaanaam upaadaya-upaadanaam hansa-
sheeravat.

He who is free from passion avoids whatever needs to be
avoided and accepts what is worthy of acceptance, as in the
case of the swan and milk.

The author sets forth the nature of the dispassionate. Just
as the swan dwelling in Mansarover can separate milk from
warm, even so the dispassionate person avoids what should be
avoided and accepts that which should be accepted. What is

2. Chhand., Up., V : IV: J ('That world, my child, O Gautama, is the
fire, etc.')

OF FABLES

to be avoided by such a dispassionate person is sansaara and
what should be accepted and striven for is release.


Or this comes through association with one who has attained
excellence, as in the case thereof.

The avoidance of the avoidable and acceptance of the accept-
able can take place also through association with those who
have attained excellence, as for example Alkarka obtained dis-
\cruination simply through his association with Dattaatreya.


One should not associate with those swayed by passion, as is
the case with the parrot.

One should not associate with people infected with desire;
as the parrot, fearing that he may be captured because of his
lovely form, does not go near people desirous of possessing
him.


Or else he may be bound like the parrot.

There is a pun on the word guna, which means both ‘a rope’
and ‘the qualities’.

The idea of the previous aphorism is continued. As a par-
rot is bound by the cords of the hunter, even so a man associat-
ing with a person affected by desire or passion is tied by the
cord of qualities, i.e., he too becomes bound by desire as the
person whom he associates with, is.


Not by enjoyment is desire appeased, as in the case of the
saint.

Someone may object, the person who indulges in enjoy-
ment will get fed up of it after some time, and so obtain dis-
\cruination in the end, so what is the need of knowledge?

To this the author answers: Even saints, like Kanva, Sau-
bhari, and so forth, were unable to appease their passion and
obtain dispassion, through enjoyment. How then can ordinary seekers hope to do so?


*Passion is appeased through seeing the faults of both (i.e., prakriti and her products).*

How, it may be asked, can worldly people, who are attached to things of the world achieve dispassion?

In reply to such a question, the author says: This is accomplished through seeing and realising that *prakriti* and her products are all essentially painful; as in the case of the sage, Saubhā, dispassion took place only through seeing the fault of such association.


*The seed of instruction does not sprout in a man of impure mind, as in the case of Aja.*

As a seed does not sprout in a barren field, so the seed of knowledge does not sprout in a mind rendered impure by passion and the like, as in the case of King Aja, in whose mind the instruction given by Vāśishtha did not stay because he was afflicted with the grief of his wife's death.


*Not even a mere semblance of true knowledge is produced in an impure mind, as in the case of a dirty mirror.*

Even though a person may be instructed, it is not necessary that the knowledge arising in his mind may be in accordance with the instruction, for that depends upon the receptivity of the mind of the aspirant also.

As it is not necessary that a lotus may be of the best variety even though it may have sprung from the best kind of seed, for its quality depends also on the soil in which the seed is cast, even so it is not necessary that the instruction given will bear fruit. This will depend on the receptivity of the aspirant's mind. (The mind of the aspirant is compared to the soil, the seed to instruction.)
Of the Demolition of Counter-Theories

The Brahmans who do not know the truth,
Vainly recite the four Vedas.

Sarah's Treasury of Songs

The authors' own doctrines having been fully established,
he now goes on to answer the objections made by others in respect of the Saankhya doctrine. Amongst other objections,
the author disposes of (in the opening aphorism of this Book)
the one that the benediction implied by the expression 'Well' in the First Book of the Aphorisms is purposeless.

1. Mangala-aacharanam shishtha-aacharaat phala-darshanaat shruti-tah cha iti.

The use of a benediction is justified because it is a good practice, bearing fruit, and also because it is approved by the Scriptures.

The sense is clear. The author gives the reasons why a benediction (mangala) is necessary at the beginning of a book. The word its signifies that these are the only reasons, and none else.


The fruit follows from the merit or demerit of actions performed, not because the world is governed by an Eeshvara.

The meaning is clear. The fruit follows from the kind of works performed by individuals. God can only reward or punish living beings according to their good or bad actions.

[Note: It is significant that the existence of God is not denied. The expression Eeshvara-adhishthi (= that which is presided over by God), signifies that the fact that there is a God directing creation is admitted. What is denied is merely the belief that He can distribute deserts to individuals in some manner other than according to their works.]


And if a God was governor of the world, then with a view to securing his own benefit His rule would be for a selfish end, as is the case with ordinary governors.

The meaning is clear. The author gives another argument for supposing that man is benefited or penalised for his works, not because of superintendence of a God.


Otherwise Eeshvara would be like a human lord.

Someone might say : What is the harm if His own benefit is the motive of Eeshvara's superintendence?

In such a case, the author says, the lord will also be like a worldly man, involved in sansaara because of the non-fulfilment of his desires.

5. Puari bhaashikal va.

Otherwise Eeshvara will be like the human lord, or nominal.

Another defect is pointed out by the author in the opponent's supposition that there is no harm if God makes His own benefit the motive of His rule.

If, despite His 'worldliness' (which the supposition that He rules for His own gain naturally endows Eeshvara with), He were still called the all powerful Eeshvara, the term 'Eeshvara' would be reduced to a mere technical name, because of the contradiction being involved in thinking of Him as selfish and

Without passion superintendence is not possible, because of all activity, passion is the cause.

Another reason is adduced by the author. Passion (raaga) is the cause of all activity, and if we assume God to be responsible for fashioning the world, He will be presumed to be active, which means He will be swayed by passion.

7. Tadyoge api nitya-muktaḥ.

Moreover, if passion be conjoined with Him, He will not be eternally free.

If someone should say: All right, let there be passion in God, what's the harm? the author says in reply: If we admit this, God cannot be considered to be eternally free. Hence it cannot be assumed that passion is conjoined with God.


If one says that the condition of Eeshvara arises through connection with prakriti, it would imply attachment, which the Scriptures deny.

If one supposes that the soul is joined to the properties of prakriti, i.e., the properties of desire and so forth, it would mean that the soul is attached to these, and this view is contrary to the views expressed in the Scriptures. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, for example, says: asango khyan purushah (Truly this purusha is free from attachment).1


If it be said that the condition of Eeshvara arises from mere proximity, then the condition of being Eeshvara will belong to all purushas.

If one said that the condition of Eeshvara follows from mere proximity to prakriti, as in the case of the magnet and the iron, it would follow that this condition of being Eeshvara would belong to all purushas without distinction, because it is only with conjunction with experiencers that prakriti creates mind and other evolutes.


There is lack of evidence to prove an eternal God.

It may be said: It can be proved that there exists an eternal God. How then can it be said that all souls are Eeshvara? The author says: There is no evidence to sense perception to prove that there is God. Apart from evidence for the senses, the other can be inference or testimony. These two are inapplicable (for reasons which the author will make clear in the two aphorisms which follow).

11. Sambandha-abhaavaat na anumaanam.

There is no inferential proof of there being God because of absence of invariable association.

Inference can be a proof only when there is concomitance between the thing to be inferred and that from which it is inferred. For example, if we see a forest aflame on a mountain we say, 'The trees on the mountain are a fire.' The reasoning runs like this—Because smoke is seen: Wherever there is smoke there is fire (e.g., the hearth of the kitchen): The mountain too is smoking: Therefore there is fire there. It will be noted that all these things—the trees which are a-flame and giving off smoke, fire, etc., are concomitant, i.e., in association with one another. Now if we were to pose a similar argument to infer God’s existence, it would be something like this: Creation must have God as its cause: Because it is an effect: Whatever is an effect has God as its cause: Therefore creation must have God as cause. One can see at once the fallacy of such an argument. The statement 'Whatever is an effect has God as its cause' cannot be established because an effect being actually created by God has never been seen. Thus the principle of inference fails and the argument is vitiated.


The Scriptures moreover speak of the world being a product of prakriti, not of God.

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The other way in which the existence of God could be proved is by verbal testimony. But the testimony of the Scriptures is that the world was produced from Prakriti, not from God, e.g., Pradhoona aajagadut padyate—The world was produced from Prakriti. Similar is the view contained in the Svetasvastra Upanishad: “The unborn Purusha consorts for enjoyment with the unborn Prakriti of red, white, and black colours, the creator of many progeny like herself. The other unborn (purusha) deserts her after she has been enjoyed.” So too the saying in the Brihadaaranyakas Upanishad: “Truly the same was then undifferentiated; it is differentiated by means of name and form.” Thus Scriptural testimony is also to the effect that the world came from Prakriti.

In this way in aphorisms 10 to 12 the author states that there is no proof of the existence of God either through sense perception, or inference or testimony.

In the next seven aphorisms (13-19) the author goes on to refute the view of an opponent in regard to what he had stated in the First Book (aphorism 20), namely, that bondage does not arise from ignorance.


Of him who is devoid of attachment there is no connection with the property of ignorance.

It has been established in aphorism of 20 of the First Book that bondage does not result from ignorance. The opponents to this say that Prakriti does not exist, but there exists avidya (ignorance) which is beginningless and which is destroyed by knowledge. Avidya alone causes bondage, they say, and release comes with its destruction. But this is not possible because the soul can have no association with anything at all, and how then can it be united with the property of ignorance?


Since the existence of this supposed negative ignorance is established only on the ground of its pretended conjunction, there is a vicious circle.

Another defect in the views of the opponent is pointed out by the author. They say that without avidyaa there is no creation, and without creation no avidyaa. Thus they argue in a circle.


It is not as in the case of the seed and the sprout, for the Scriptures teach that the world does have a beginning.

The Nyaayikas may say: ‘But then, as in the case of the seed and the sprout, non finality is not a fault. That is to say, avidyaa is caused by avidyaa may be just as reasonable as to say that the sprout is caused by the seed, and so forth.’

To this the author replies that the argument may be correct if the world was beginningless. But the world does have a beginning, as the Scriptures assert, ‘Only this, the existent was there at the beginning, the one without the second.’—And we also learn that all that is ceases to exist at the dissolution of the world.


In supposing avidyaa other than vidyaa, contradiction of Brahman is implied.

The Vedaantins may say that they give a special meaning to avidyaa, and therefore, as the followers of Saankhya conceive of Prakriti, so too avidyaa has an unbroken eternity.

To controvert this view, the author says: ‘If the meaning of avidyaa is just “other than vidyaa”, then because avidyaa is capable of being destroyed by knowledge, it will be supposed that Brahman, which too is “other than vidyaa” is capable of destruction when knowledge arises.

17. Abaadhe naishphalyam.

If there were no exclusion, there would be no result.

If, on the other hand, ignorance were not really destroyed by knowledge, then knowledge would be of no avail, because it would be powerless in preventing ignorance.

18. Vidyaa-baadhyatve vidyaa jagatata api evam.

On the alternative theory that avidyya can be prevented by vidyaa, the world too will be avidyya.

If ignorance is believed to be that which is excluded by knowledge, in that case the whole world, including prakriti, mind, and so forth, would also be ignorance, because the Scriptures exclude these from the Self, as for example the Brihadaaranyaka Upanishad says, 'Not large, not small.'

If we conceive of the entire worldly system as ignorance also, such ignorance would be annihilated by one man's knowledge, and so become invisible to others.

19. Taddopatva saaditvam.

If ignorance be of the form thereof, it must have a beginning.

It may be said that the nature of avidyya belongs to the world also. In this regard the author says: Even if we grant that to be ignorant means simply being excluded by knowledge, still such a thing cannot have, as the followers of the Vedanta think, an external existence in souls, for the soul is spoken of in the Scriptures as consisting of knowledge alone. Therefore ignorance can only be a property of understanding, as held by the Yoga system, not a property of the soul as the Vedantists and others think.

In the next six aphorisms (20 to 25) the author proceeds to clear up the objections which a possible opponent might make to what was said in aphorism 2 of this very Book, viz., that the activity of prakriti is due to the efficient cause of karma.


There is no denial of dharma because of the diversity of the effects of prakriti.


OF THE DEMOLITION OF COUNTER-THEORIES

An opponent may deny that dharma is the cause of the world because it is not perceived by the senses. To such an objection the author says: We see that prakriti (nature) is kind to one person and unkind to another. Even so karma can be of different kinds, good or bad, and it may have, consequently, different effects.


The existence of dharma is established by the Scriptures, tokens, and so forth.

The author mentions the proof in regard to the existence of dharma. The Scriptures mention it. For example the Brihadaaranyaka Upanishad says, 'One becomes virtuous by virtuous karma, and vicious by vicious karma performed in previous lives.'

22. Niyamah pramaana-anta-avakaashat.

There is no rule that a thing is not existent because it is not seen, for there can be other kinds of proofs also.

The author shows that the argument advanced by the opponent that dharma does not exist because it can't be perceived is fallacious.

23. Udbhaya-tra api evam.

It is so, moreover, in both cases, dharma as well as adharma.

The author proves the existence of adharma or demerit, like that of dharma or merit. The same argument applies to both.


If the existence of dharma is proved as of course, the same is in the case of adharma.

Someone might say that dharma exists as a natural consequence, because the Scriptures, etc., constantly proclaim its necessity. But how can the same be said to be the case with adharma?

To this the author replies that the same argument applies

to adharma also, otherwise there would not be prohibitory injunctions asking people not to do certain things, e.g., parvadraana gacchheth (One should not approach other people's wives).


Dharma, etc., are the attributes of the internal organs (antah-karana or buddhee).

An opponent may say: 'If dharma, etc., are admitted, the result may be that purushas will undergo transformation because of their possessing dharma, etc.'

To meet this objection the author answers that dharma, etc., and this includes all those that the Vaisheshikas mention as the peculiar qualities of the soul, are attributes of buddhee, not of the Self.


And there is no absolute exclusion of the gunas.

The gunas, like purity and its allied properties like happiness, and their products like mind, etc., are not denied essentially, but only as joined to the soul. Just as we deny that the heat in the red hot iron belongs to the iron.

27. Pancha-avyaya-yogat sukha-samvedh.

And through the five members of the syllogism we know that happiness, etc., exists.

Though happiness in particular is mentioned, it is considered here as representative of the entire material world. The syllogism referred to consists of the proposition, reason, example, synthesis and conclusion, and the argument is thus:

(i) Proposition (pratijnaa)—pleasure exists
(ii) Reason (hetu)—because it produces motion in something
(iii) Example (udayakaranam)—whatever produces motion in anything is real, as are sentient beings
(iv) Synthesis (yanaya)—pleasure produces motion in things, for exampleorrriphation and so forth

(vi) Conclusion (nigamana)—therefore pleasure exists.


Not from a single act of apprehension is a connection established.

There can be no certainty of pervadedness (vyayahti) by seeing once only. The idea is that simply by seeing once there can be no certainty of inference. For example, we may see a white cow, and thereby infer that all cows are white. This would be wrong, for the very next cow we see may be brown.

The aphorism is in answer to the Chaaravaaka school of thinkers who accept no other proof than sense perception.


Pervadedness is the constant co-existence of both or of one.

The author explains what pervadedness is. It is, he says, togetherness or co-existence, in other words, concomitancy (i.e., the predicate and the reason) or in the case of one of them (the reason) only.


Pervadedness is not, as some think, an additional principle, over and above the twenty-five, for it cannot postulate entities.

The author declares that pervadedness (vyayahti) is not a separate principle, as some people maintain.

Supposing pervadedness were to be considered an additional principle, that would not affect the unfailiing association of the principles. So what is the use of postulating it? If we do so we will have to suppose some further entity in which pervadedness resides. So it is proper to consider (as the Saanakhya view is) pervadedness as simply belonging to the things already existing.


The Aachaaryas say that pervadedness is another principle in addition to the twenty-five, resulting from its own power.

There are certain teachers who say that pervadedness is a
separate principle, having a power which can be produced by the thing pervaded. But this definition is too wide. For example, smoke, when it passes away to a different place, does not retain the characteristic of being pervaded by fire. By passing away to another place that power is lost. The author therefore says that smoke has to be qualified with the characteristic of being limited to the time of its production.

32. *Aadhaya-shakti-yogah iti panchashikha*

Panchashikha says that pervadedness is the power of the sustained.

Panchashikha was a celebrated professor of the Sankhya doctrine.

Pervasiveness, the author says, as conceived by Panchashikha, consists in the power of being the container, and pervadedness is the power of being contained. Thus intellect and the rest which follow from prakriti are thought to be pervaded by prakriti and so forth, that is to say each product in succession is sustained by the preceding one in the series of evolutes.

33. *Na svaroopa-shaktih niyamah punar-rauda-prasakteh.*

The relation is not an essential power; for in that case we would be faced with a tautology (waste of words).

Someone may ask: 'Why is there postulated the power of the sustained? Why not consider pervadedness as simply an essential power of the thing pervaded?' To this Panchashikha replies in this aphorism.

Pervadedness cannot be an essential power, for if we suppose this, we would have a tautology. For just as there is no difference between a 'jar for water' and a 'water jar', so is there no difference in the case of 'intellect' and 'what is pervaded'.

34. *Visheshana-aanantahka-prasakteh.*

Because we should find the distinction meaningless.

The author himself explains the tautology. If we assume this (see previous aphorism) it would have no meaning, and be mere empty words.

35. *Pālava-śādi-su anupattah ca.

And because pervadedness would not be reconcilable in twigs and so forth.

Twigs of trees get their original life from the tree. But this power of life does not belong to the twig because it was not in the twig when it was ripped off. We see, however, that this is not so, and when the twig is severed the power of the tree is no longer with it. Thus there is no pervadedness when the twig is cut off from the tree.


The connection of the own power of the thing depends on the establishment of the power of the thing in relation of being the thing, because the argument in both cases is the same.

There are three terms in Hindu logic which are used in the theory of inference. These are vyaapya, vyapaka and vyapapti. Vyapya means that which is pervaded, vyapaka is that which pervades, and vyapapti means pervasion. For example, in the instance of fire and smoke frequently used, smoke is the thing pervaded, fire is the thing pervading, and the arising of smoke from fire is the pervasion. Taking another example, namely, the mortality of human beings, humanity is the vyapya, mortality the vyapaka, and pervasion of humanity by mortality, vyapapti.

The question arises whether vyapapti is a mere relation of two things or also a thing in itself. It is only a relation of things, not a thing in itself. But how does this relation become possible? Does it arise from a primary property of the vyapya, as the teacher says, or from an accidental characteristic of the vyapya as Panchashikha maintains? The first cannot be the case, as it leads to tautology. The third is really included in, or implied by, the second; and these two suggest that vyapapti is something more than a relation. The fault in this supposition has already been pointed out in aphorisms 31 to 32 and 36 of this Book. The relation of vyapapti (pervadedness) therefore is that of co-existence and attributes in the widest sense.

In this context the author says that since it is proved that
the power of the thing as the contained is pervadedness, development of the own power is also pervadedness, because of the sameness of the argument.

The argument regarding pervadedness is concluded in this aphorism.


The relation of word with object is that of the expressed and expresser.

The author now proceeds to reply to the objection some may make, that words do not have the power to convey knowledge.

The author cautions against thinking that words and objects are identical. If this were so a jar could be cognisable by the ear alone, and sound by the eye. If one simply said 'fire', his mouth would begin to burn!

It is only through one's knowing the connection between a given word and its meaning, that sense is made, and is then raised in the mind by that particular word.

38. Trivih sambandha-siddhih.

The connection between a word and its sense is determined by three means.

The three means are: (i) Information from one competent to tell the meaning, e.g., someone tells a youngster, 'This is a jar', so he knows what a jar is. (ii) From the usage of the old man who orders his son, we hear and, seeing the consequences, realise what the object is. For example, the old man says 'Bring the white cow.' His son brings the cow denoted, and we know then that this is a 'cow'. (iii) Application to the same thing which has a familiar name. As if someone says, 'A bird is eating the mango,' we conceive of the picture of what usually happens when mangoes start ripening on a tree, and so visualise a bird in our mind.


Not only in respect of acts is the rule, because it is seen in both cases.

The idea contained in this aphorism is that verbs can be either indicative or imperative. The former give some information, as for example one may say to a prospective father: 'A son has been born to you.' The other may be in the nature of a command, as when one orders his son, 'Bring the visitor in.'

If one objects that statements can only be of the imperative kind, he would be wrong. These statements must divide themselves in the two types—saadhyaa paara, i.e., imperative, and sadhaka paara, informative. The reason for this is also given by the author. We all know that the Vedas too have main divisions—the karma kaanda, the portion laying down injunctions and prohibitions, and the jnana kaanda, which deals with philosophical doctrines. The assertions of the karma kaanda have of necessity to be of the saadhyaa paara (authoritative) kind. But if those of the jnana kaanda too were of this kind, they would be meaningless and therefore useless. Thus these must be of the sadhaka paara (informative) type. So the view of the opponent that statements of the authoritative kind only exist is mistaken.

40. Loke vyapanamasya Veda-artha-praavetih.

He who is accomplished in the secular connection of words with meaning can follow the import of the Vedas.

One may ask, granted that words in their worldly aspect can be understood, but how will one understand the Vedic words?

To this the author replies: The power of words is not different in the Vedas from that in the world, because there is a saying, 'Whatever is the worldly, the same is Vedic.'

41. Na trivih aparvuuhiya evaat Vedasya tad arthaasya atimidiyya evaant.

Not by the three means (mentioned in aphorism 38), someone may object, is the relation of word and object established in the Vedas, because the Veda is not the work of a person, and what it says is something transcending the senses.

An objector may say that the three means of the connection between words and sense just mentioned (see aphorism 38) do
not apply to the Vedas, because firstly, the Vedas are not of human origin, and, secondly, the meaning contained in them is beyond the reach of the senses. The author repels the sophism following the assertion that what is meant by the Vedas is something transcending the senses.

42. Na yajna-videh svarupa-tah dharmatvam vasiśthihpayat.

Not so, because sacrifices, etc., mentioned in the Vedas are aimed to confer merit.

The import of the Vedas cannot be supra-sensuous, because they speak of sacrifices leading to merit, and pre-eminently yielding fruit to the sacrificer. Thus conferring largely material reward, they cannot be said to be for a transcendental end.

43. Nija-shaktih vyavpatyeva vyavachchhikilaye.

The inherent power of Vedic words is ascertained by the particular knowledge of their meanings.

Though the Vedas are not of a personal origin, yet they contain teachings handed down to successive disciples, and these teachings are in words which have their natural connotation. Hence the words used in the Vedas do not have any mystic or arbitrary implication.

44. Yoga-yogyayeta prateet-janaka-tvaca tat-st Chadih.

This really happens because the words yield knowledge both in the case of things adapted to the senses, and not so adapted.

Still, someone may ask, how can these be in the case of Vedic words, in the case of pious, fruits of action and so forth a supra-sensuous meaning? The author explains this. Words denote objects through concepts. This is true of both secular words and those used in the Vedas. A jar, for example, denotes all jars, whether present before the eyes or not. In the Vedic statements, however, the fruits of action enjoined, such as merit, are all supra-sensuous. This is the difference.

45. Na nitya-tvam Vedanam kauya-tva-striye.

The Vedas are not from eternity, for the Scriptures speak of their production.

The Shruti says: ‘He practised penance, as a result of which the three Vedas were produced.’ Therefore the Vedas do not possess eternity.

46. Na purushaye-tvam tat kartah abhauvat.

Nor can the Vedas be said to be of personal origin, because there does not exist the person who could be their author.

The Vedas cannot be of human origin. Some people think that they may be originating from Eeshvara. But Saankhya holds that Eeshvara is akarta, i.e., non-active. Hence how could He be the author of the Vedas?

47. Mukta-amukteyoh ayogya-tvad.

Because of the unfitness of the liberated as well as the unliberated.

An objector may say: Well, someone else, and not Eeshvara, may be the author of the Vedas.

In reply to this the author says: One who is liberated cannot be the writer of the Vedas, because he is free of all desire, etc., and the unliberated cannot be the author of the Vedas because he is incapable of the knowledge of dharma and so forth.

48. Na apaurushaye-tvam nitya-tvam ani va ca dadhitvah.

As in the case of sprouts, their eternity does not follow from their not being of a personal origin.

Someone might say: Because they are not of personal origin, the Vedas are eternal.

To this the author says: This is not so, as in the case of sprouts which are not produced by any man, yet they neither end and die.

Sa iti yoga-caryatah api va ca pravartana ca nirodah.
49. Teshuva apī tad-yoge drīsh-ta-baudha-audi prasaktin.

If it was so, there would be contradiction of what is seen, and the like.

Someone might still argue that the sprouts, etc., must also have a creator because they are effects.

To counter this, the author says: We find that whatever is the work of a man is produced by a body. Since the creator of the sprout is not seen, the evidence of perception is against the supposition that the sprouts have been produced by some man. In other words, sprouts spring by themselves, they are not created by anyone.

50. Yasmin adrishte api krita-buddhi upayāyane tat prakshepayam.

That only is the work of man, which, even though invisible, takes an effort to understand.

Even then an objector may say: Since the Vedas were uttered by Brahma, they are his work.

To this the author replies: Whether a thing is visible or invisible, in either case it can be called a man's work only if there takes place an effort of understanding. The breathing of a man, for example, when he is sound asleep, cannot be called a man's voluntary act. Therefore—the Vedas, which issue spontaneously from Brahma, without being consciously produced by him, as though they were his very breath, cannot be said to be deliberate and conscious work.


From the manifestation of their own powers the Vedas themselves convey right knowledge.

The author controverts the view that the authoritativeness of the Vedas depends on something other than the Vedas themselves.

The authoritativeness of the Vedas is not due to the announcer's knowledge of the truth, but because they themselves point it out. For example, the medical formulas contained therein lead to positive cures.

52. Na asatāḥ khyānam nivartita-vat.

There can be no cognition of what does not exist, like the horns of a man.

It is apparent that a man can have no horns. Similarly there can be no knowledge of what is false. The Vedantists give the example of the rope being mistaken for a snake, saying that till the mistaken impression exists, the rope has the effect of a real snake. But the idea of the rope being a snake is false. If one can have knowledge of this falsity (as the Vedantists think), it is just like saying that a man can have horns.

53. Na sarah haadha-darshanan.

The knowledge here is not of the real because exclusion of the qualities is seen.

In this aphorism the author condemns the theory of the Meemaamsaist, Prabhaakara, whose followers differentiated between the object and its cognition. For example, in the statement 'It is silver' they said that 'It' is the object as seen by the eyes, and 'silver' is the thing remembered. Because one fails to see the difference between the two, he gets the firm idea that it is the metal, silver. This argument is false, says the author, firstly because one can say of another metal 'It is not silver', and therefore when one says 'It is silver', he means conclusively that it is the metal silver, and secondly the seer concludes that he is seeing silver because of the non-cognizance of the difference between the object silver, and the remembrance of silver.

In this way, says the author, the cognizance of the gunas (qualities) is not absolutely real, because they are not admitted at the time of dissolution of the world. Thus the objective world consisting of the gunas is not perfectly real.


It is not that of which one can't express anything, because no such thing exists.

Someone might say: Even if the world is different from both the real and the unreal, the absolute denial of the world's non-existence is not justified.
In regard to this the author says: An object which neither exists nor does not exist, is not known. One can form suppositions only on the basis of what is seen.


There is no such thing as cognising otherwise, because your own proposition is self-destructive.

The notion of the Nyaya (anyathaa-khyaati) of cognising otherwise (i.e., that nature belongs to one, which really belongs to another), is contradicted in this aphorism. It is not proper to say that one thing appears under the character of another, e.g., a rope appearing as a snake, for this is not self-destructive. For example, seeing a rope one may say ‘it is a snake.’ But the snake does not come into existence by saying this. The attribution of a quality which belongs rightly to one thing alone, to another, is wrong.

56. Sat-asat-khyaatiḥ baadhaka-baadhakaat.

The qualities (gunas) show existence as well as non-existence, according to whether they are denied or not denied.

The author sums up his doctrine. Things exist, and this is not denied because things (and things are made up of qualities) are constantly present. But their existence in the soul is denied. For example, when a transparent crystal is placed on a red cloth, there is redness. But this redness is not in the crystal.

57. Prateeti-uprteeti—bhruam na sphota—aatmakaah shabdah.

Because of intuition and non-intuition, word is not of the nature of Sphota. Sphota is discarded by the author. The followers of Yoga believe in Sphota (Shabda or word). They say that apart from the letters occurring in a word, there is the expression itself. Just as a jar means the whole jar, and also the parts which form the jar—the conch-shaped neck, the base, the ornamental sides and so forth—so does the word ‘jar’ mean the letters j-a-r as well as the entire expression ‘jar.’ Saankhya opposes such a distinction, and believes that the letters placed in the particular order they are in the word are enough to convey its sense. The expression or Sphota possesses either cognisance or non-cognisance. If the former, this is redundant, seeing that the letters in the word convey the sense, and if the latter, the expression is powerless to convey the meaning, and so is useless.

58. Na shabda-nityaa-tvam kaaryaa-prateetah.

Sound is not eternal, for it is an effect.

The eternity of the Vedas has already been denied. Now the author denies the eternity of letters. Immediately after hearing the sound, one feels it is not. A sound is made, and then dies away. How then can it be eternal? If we suppose it to be eternal, things like jars would also be so.


There is the manifestation of something which was previously there too, as a jar by a lamp’s light.

The author anticipates an objection. It may be said that the letters forming the word are revealed by Sphota, as a jar in the dark is made visible by lighting a lamp.

He answers the objection in the next aphorism.

60. Sat-kuaryaa-siddhaanah chet siddhaa-saadanaam.

If it is the tenet of existent effect, it is proving what is already proved.

The idea is that if someone insists that the Sphota gives meaning to the word, as a lamp lights up the place where a jar is kept and reveals it, it does not mean that the Sphota has given sense to the word. In fact the sense is already there. Just as the jar already exists: it is not made by the lamp.


One can’t say that the Self is non-dual, for its differences are known only by signs.

It is proved that the soul is different for different persons, because of the sign that one being gives: it up but another does not do so.

(Note—Saankhya believes in plurality of souls. Each body
has a soul which is different and distinct from another. The Vedantic idea of all souls being one—of the nature of Brahman—is rejected by Saankhya.)


Moreover, the Self and not-Self are distinct, as proved by the testimony of the senses.

We see with our own eyes the distinction between the not-Self (the inert and lifeless), and the Self. When the soul leaves the body, the body dies. Moreover if the soul of one leaves a body, only that particular body dies, not others. This proves also the difference of one soul and another.

63. Na ubhaya-bhyyaam tatra eva.

Nor, for the same reasons, is there non-difference between the Self and the not-Self.

The conscious soul and the non-conscious body, even when they are together, cannot be considered one, because one sees with his own eyes the separation of the two at the moment of death. The reasons for this difference are those already given previously in aphorisms 61 and 62.

64. Aiyaa para-tram amrekaaman tatra.

In the Scriptures non-duality refers to something else in regard to the non-discriminating.

Someone might object that the idea of non-difference between the Self and the not-Self conveyed in these aphorisms is in conflict with that contained in the Scriptures as, for example, 'The Self is verily this.'

To this the author says: The object of putting it thus in the Scriptures is something else, viz., in order to encourage people to worship the Self. For, in the world, due to failure to discriminate, the experiencer and the experience are mistaken as one and the same. In order to disabuse people of such a concept, the Scriptures say thus, 'The Self is verily this,' in


Neither the Self, nor ignorance, nor both, can be the material cause of the world, because the Self is devoid of attachment.

Even those who insist on the One Soul doctrine cannot postulate a material cause for the world's existence.

The Self alone, or the ignorance in it both together like the two halves of a jar, cannot be the cause of the world, because the Self is unattached and alone. Because of having the quality of aloneness, the Self can neither cause the material world itself, nor be joined with ignorance and then cause it, nor cause it both by itself and itself and its conjunction with ignorance. And should the Vedantists yet insist that ignorance resides in the Self, like air in the sky, they contradict their own theory of the Self's non-duality.


Bliss and knowledge both cannot belong to one, because the two are different.

The author refutes the idea that the Self is both knowledge and bliss. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad says, 'Brahman is in reality knowledge and joy.' This cannot refer to the Self for the Self takes up its abode in a body and experiences the pleasures and afflictions of life. Where there is pain, there cannot be pleasure. Therefore though knowledge can be the Self's attribute, it can't be bliss.

67. Dukkha-nivritteh gaunan.

The import of the word 'bliss' is metaphorical, meaning the cessation of pain.

If bliss is not the nature of the Self, what of the Scripture which declares that to be its form? To this the author replies: 'Bliss' is used in a metaphorical sense, meaning thereby the cessation of pain, for it has been said—sukham dukshasu...
This is praise of liberation for the sake of the dull.

The author mentions another reason why liberation is conceived as bliss. The Scriptures mention the nature of liberation to be joy, so that those who are of dull nature may be encouraged to seek it.

69. Na vyuapakata-tvam manasa karana-tvam indriya-tvam vaa.

The mind (manas) is not all-pervading because it is an instrument, and also because it is an organ.

The author denies that the mind (i.e., the internal instrument of the mind) is all-pervading. The reason he gives is that the manas is an instrument, like an axe or such. The word vas ("or") in the aphorism implies a distributive alternative, not an optional one. That is to say that while the entire internal instrument is an instrument, the manas is not all-pervading because of its being an organ also.

70. Sakria-tvam gati-shrutat.

The mind is also not all-pervading because it is movable: the Scriptures speak of its motion.

Another defect is pointed out by the author. The Scriptures say that there is the going of the soul into another world. But since the soul is all-pervading, it cannot go. Therefore it is really the internal organ, the manas, which has movement, and as it moves, it cannot be all-pervading (see Book I, aphorism 51).


The mind is not partless because, like a jar, it comes into contact with the various senses simultaneously.

In order to establish that the mind is an effect, the author discards the view that it has no parts. The mind is of medium size, neither infinite nor atomic, like a jar, and it has parts because it comes into contact with the senses at one and the same time.

72. Prakriti-purushayoh anat sarvam anityam.

With the exception of purusha and prakriti, all else are non-eternal.

The meaning is clear. Apart from the soul and prakriti, the other principles like mind, ether, etc., do not have eternity.

73. Na bhaaga-bhaasab abhaangabh nirbhaaga-tva shruteh.

Without parts are the partless (purusha and prakriti). Thus do the Scriptures say.

The Svetasvatara Upanishad says that purusha and prakriti are without parts, without action, without change, blameless and unsullied. Therefore there is the testimony of the Scriptures too, to prove the eternity of purusha and prakriti.

74. Na aananda-abhayyaktah mukteh nir-dharma tvaat.

Emancipation is not the manifestation of joy because the soul has no attributes.

In these, and subsequent aphorisms, the author repudiates various theories of release in the interest of maintaining his own, viz., that release is cessation of pain.

In the present aphorism he contradicts the view held by some that release or liberation means the manifestation of bliss. The soul cannot have any property like joy, etc., nor can it have any manifestation. Its nature is of the eternal. It cannot therefore manifest any quality such as joy and so forth.

75. Na vishesha-guna-uchchhahat tvat.

Nor, likewise, can release be the destruction of particular qualities.

It has been stated that the soul does not have any qualities. This being so, the question of destruction of any qualities does not arise. So those who are mistaken who think that release consists of the destruction of special qualities existing in the soul.

76. Na vishesha-gath nibhikriyasya.
Nor is emancipation the going of the soul to any particular place, for it is motionless.

As the soul has no power of motion, release cannot consist (as some think) in its abandoning the body and going to other worlds.

77. Na sakura-uparesa-uchchhittih kshcanika-tva-aadi-doshaat.
Nor is release the removal of the impress of objects, because of the fault of momentariness.

Some, like the Nihilists, think that release is the destruction of vaasaanae which had kept it in bondage. But this too cannot be; for when one vaasaanaa is destroyed another takes its place. Thus vaasaanae are momentary, and how can the destruction of something merely momentary result in release?

Nor can emancipation be total annihilation, because apart from other things, such extinction is not the soul’s aim.

Self annihilation is not the object desired by purusha, as some schools, like the Naastikas, seem to think.

79. Eram shoonyam api.
So too the void is not release.

The purusha, similarly, does not have as its object a void brought about by the destruction of all creation.

80. Sayogasa cha viyoga—ontah iti desho-aadi-lashyah api.
Nor is release the acquisition of lands and the like, because separation follows union.

One may think that emancipation means the attainment of domain, wealth, and so forth. But this cannot be, for with what one is joined from that he is parted also.

12. Vaasaanaa is an impression which remains unconsciously in the mind because of past actions.

81. Na bhaagi-yogah bhaagasya.
Nor is emancipation a connection of the part with the whole.

Aniruddha says the aphorism as Na-bhaaga-yogah akhaagasya (meaning, there can be no connection of the part with the partless).

Emancipation is also not the merging of the part (the soul) in the whole (Brahman), as some others think. Such a conjunction ends in disjunction, as we have already seen, and achieving this is not the soul’s aim.

Nor is release the power of becoming small as an atom and so forth, because the destruction of these too is inevitable.

The meaning is clear. The acquisition of supernatural powers is not emancipation, for these are destructible, and soon vanish.

Similarly, release does not mean the attainment to the position of Indra and the like.

Such attainment of superhuman power as belongs to Indra and other gods is also perishable, and so emancipation cannot consist in their acquisition.

The organs (indriyas) are not formed of the elements because the Scriptures say they are derived from the I-sense (ahankaaraa).

It is the I-sense, and not the gross elements which give rise to the organs. This, says the author, is also the belief of the Scriptures, as for example: “From him is produced prana, the mind, and all the sense organs—ether, air, fire, water and earth.”

13. Mundaka Upanisad, II : i : 3
35. _Na sat-pṣadaṛtha-niyamah tad-bodhaat muktiḥ cha._

There are not six categories; nor is release due to their knowledge.

The author refutes the six categories maintained by the followers of the Vaišeshika. One doesn’t achieve emancipation by knowing them, he says.

36. _Shodasā-adi-su api evam._

So too with the sixteen categories.

The sixteen categories of the Nyāya, too, are negated by the author. Knowledge of these does not lead to liberation.

37. _Na anu-nitya-tvaḥ kārya-tvaḥ śrūveḥ._

Atoms are not eternal, because the Scriptures declare them to be effects.

The Nyāya view that atoms are eternal, is repudiated by the author for the purpose of what he had stated in Book 1, aphorism 61 that the five elements are products. This is also affirmed by the Scriptures, as reported in the words of teachers like Manu, who says, ‘The atomic parts of the five gross elements are said to be perishable.’

38. _Na niś-bhaag-āyam kārya-āyam._

Being products they cannot be without parts.

An objector may ask ‘How can an atom, which is without parts, be a product?’

In regard to this the author says: Because the fact that the Scriptures speak of them as products cannot be otherwise accounted for, the so-called atoms of the earth element are not without parts.

39. _Na roopa-nibaddhakaaat pratyyukṣha-nīyamah._

It is not necessary that direct cognition should result from colour and form.

40. _Manu-Sanhitā, 1 : 27_

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It is not necessary that direct cognition can result only from colour and similar objects of the sense. It may also result from mystic practices and so forth.

90. _Na puruṣānu-catuṣṭāvīdhīyaṃ dṛṣṭa-bhīṣyaṃ taddvyogat._

There are not four types of dimensions, because two can account for them.

A question can be raised, ‘Is the dimension of an atom a reality or not?’

The author says that there is no need of having a fourfold classification of dimension as small, great, short and long. Only two kinds can serve, namely, the minutely small and great. Short and long are included in these two. If we go beyond the two, we may as well postulate endless varieties like, thin and fat, straight and crooked and so forth.

91. _Anitya-tve api sthirata-vyogat prati-abhijñaaṃ saamāyasya._

Even though these individuals are not eternal, recognition takes place through the persistence of genus.

It has been asserted that the unity of puruṣas is by means of their genus, and by implication the same is the case with prakṛti. In this context—the author refutes here the Nihilist’s denial of genera.

Even though human beings are impermanent, still each has a distinctive quality or genus which is permanent, so that it can at once be said ‘This man is so and so, and none other.’

92. _Na tad-apalaapak tasmat._

Therefore genus cannot be denied.

Thus, says the author, when genus is perceivable, its denial would not be logical.

93. _Na anu-nivṛtti-roopa-āyam bhāva-protibeh._

It (genus) does not imply exclusion of something else, because it can be perceived as a positive entity.

Genus does not imply excluding something other than itself.
The expression 'This is of so and so genus' means pointing to something positive. If it were not so, things could only be cognised negatively as for example 'This is not a jar.'

94. Na tattva-antarum saadadhyam pratyaksha-upalabdheh.

Likeness does not mean distinctness, because it can directly be apprehended as a similar quality.

Likeness is sameness in many parts. When such sameness is perceived one says 'This is similar to that.' As for example, a beautiful face is likened to the moon because the two share the common quality of yielding pleasure to the beholder.

95. Nija-shakri-abhiyakreha vaa vaishishtyataa rod-upalabdheh.

Nor is likeness inherent power, because its cognition can only take place under a difference.

For visualising likeness we must be able to say 'this is like that', i.e., compare the similarity in different things. Therefore likeness is not the power or quality of just one thing. For example, when we say 'This knife is sharp,' it signifies only the power of the knife to cut. No likeness is involved. But when we say 'the stiletto is as sharp as the knife,' we have a likeness.

96. Na sanjna-sangjna-sambandha upi.

Nor, moreover, is similarity the relation between the name and the named.

Even a person who does not know the connection between a name and the thing named, may have knowledge of a likeness. As for example, a man may not know that the flower called a rose has that name. Yet if he is shown two such flowers, he will be able to know the likeness between them.


The relation of the named and the name is not eternal, because both the correlates are non- eternal.

Since both the name and the named are uneternal, so too is the relation between them. Therefore the likeness of an object

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of the past cannot be seen in a present object through such relationship.

98. Na ajah sambandhah dharmigraahaka-maana-baadhoat.

Nor can the relationship be unoriginated, since this would mean self-contradiction.

The author anticipates an objection: What if the correlates be unrelated? Then the relation may be eternal even then. Relation can be proved to exist, says the author, only when there is disjunction. This disjunction cannot be possible if the relation is eternal. Hence relation is not eternal, for this is disallowed by the very evidence by which connection is known.


There is no such thing as co-inherence, because there is no proof of it.

The author discards the Nyaya view of the existence of co-inherence (samavaaya). Samavaaya (interpenetration, intimate relation, or co-inherence) is one of the categories in Nyaya. The author discards it. Is samavaaya unrelated or related? If the former, how can it invest another with relation? If it is related, samavaaya must itself be the relation by which it is related, and that would give relation to another and then that to another leading to an infinite regression. Therefore no such thing as samavaaya exists.

100. Ubhaya-tra up anyatvaa-sidheha na pratyakshaan anumaanam vaan.

Neither perception nor inference is the proof for co-inherence, because the case is disposed of in regard to both alike.

As regards the perception of qualifiedness and also its inferring, the case is disposed of by the natural state of the thing and its qualities, neither is evidence for the imaginary category called co-inherence. The idea is that when the nature of the objects is self-evident, e.g., when one sees a jar he knows 'the jar is red', what is the need of the proofs of co-inherence and inference?
101. Na anvayvatvam eva kriyaayah ne disthasya
tat-tat-vaah eva aparokaha-pretateeh.

Action is not a matter of inference, for he who stands very
near, has, indeed, direct cognition both of it and what it
belongs to.

According to Saankhya, the conjunction of prakriti and
purusha takes place and this causes creation. In regard to this
the non-believers say: 'Nothing possesses the quality of action
which results in agitation, for everything is momentary. No
motion can be inferred from conjunction. The fruit, for example,
which drops to the ground is a different fruit from the one
which was hanging from the branch.'

In reply to such an objection, the author says, 'One who
stands very near, has immediate intuition of just the action and
what possesses action. If action would be inferred by means of
mere conjunction, and disjunctions when a man climbs up
the tree (and moves up by clutching and releasing the branch),
it would be inferred that not only he moves but the tree also
moves!'

102. Na paanacha-bhautilkam shareeram bahoonam upadad-
ana-ayogataa.

The body is not made of five elements because many hetero-
genous things are unfit as material.

Only things which are homogeneous can combine to form
something. Such heterogeneous materials as earth, water, fire,
air, and ether cannot combine to form the body, as some people
think.

103. Na sthoolum ni liyamah aatiibahakasya api vidyamaana-
tvab.

The body is not necessarily the gross one, for there is also
the (transmigrating) subtle body.

Some people may deny the existence of a subtle body and
say there is only the gross body. In order to meet with such
an objection the author says: 'There can be no movement of the
manas without a vehicle. This vehicular organ is called the

subtle body. The Scriptures too speak of it: 'The purusha of
the size of a thumb, the internal body, is always seated in the
heart of all beings. One should distinguish it from the external
body patiently...'13

104. Na aprapta-prakashtaka-svam indriyaamaa aprapitah
sarva-prapitah vast.

The senses do not reveal what they reach to, because of their
not reaching, or because if they reached, they would reach
everything.

The point is, while having cognisance of objects, do the sen-
eses reach them or not? The opponent says they do not, because
if they reached them, they would reach even an object screened
off by a curtain or behind a wall.

Regarding this the author says: If, as the opponent alleges,
the senses did not reach the object cognised, they could not
know not only screened objects but also objects placed just in
front. In that case, for example, a man could not normally see
even a chair before him or smell a flower right under his nose!
Therefore it is wrong to say that the senses do not reach the
objects. If, on the other hand, one says that the senses cognise
objects without reaching them, they would be able to have
knowledge of things even below the earth's surface.' It is clear
therefore, that the senses cognise objects by reaching them.

105. Na tesas-apasarpunat tajjasam chakshuh vrittibah tatu-
siddheh.

Not because light glides (and so does sight) is the eye formed
of light, because this is accounted for by the theory of modi-
ification.

The author repels the view of the followers of Nyaya that
sight is luminous because we see light like a ray, glide rapidly
to a distance.

The eyes are not luminous. Sight, with the assistance of a
non-luminous substance, darts off to a distant object as a cre-
ature would throw out its tentacles to feel something and then

withdraw them again, or as the breath emerging from one's nose smells a distant flower, by the process of modification.


Because the objects reached by the senses are manifested, there is proof of modification.

What is the proof of such modification as is mentioned in the preceding aphorism?

To know objects, the senses reach them without, as we have seen, severing connection with the body. Thus there must be connection of the senses both with the body as well as with the object. The connection of the senses with cognised objects can only be explained by some specific modification of the senses themselves. This modification is called vṛtti.

107. *Bhaga-gunaabhyām tatva-antaram vṛttih sambandha-artham sarpaṭi iti.*

This modification is other than a fragment or a quality (or the senses) because they glide forth in order to connect with objects.

The author gives the essential nature of the vṛtti or modification of the senses.

The modification of the eye, for example, is neither a fragment of the sight like a spark from burning coal, nor a quality, like colour and so forth. If it were merely a fragment it could not establish connection with the object seen, and if it were a quality it could not glide forth to the object, for a quality cannot move by itself.

108. *Na draya-niyamah taś-yogaat*

Modification is not invariably the name of a substance, because it has an etymological meaning as well.

If modification is a substance, someone may ask, how can its sense be stretched to cover an attribute (modification) of *budhācchā* in the form of desire and so forth?

To this the author replies: 'It is not stated that modification is substance, and nothing else. There is also its etymological

meaning—vṛtti aravittana jeevane vṛtti denotes manner of existence and life.'


The material of which the organs are formed does not differ from locality to locality: the rule is as with the like of us.

The sense organs have as their material cause the *ahankaara* (I-sense) at all places, whether in this world or in the world of Brahman and so forth. Difference of place has no effect on their formation, just as the subtle body, which migrates from one place to another, is the same universally.

110. *Nimitta-vypadeshaat tat-vyapadesah.*

The mention thereof is due to the mention of the efficient cause.

An objector may ask: 'In that case how do you account for the fact that the Scriptures speak of the organs as being material (formed of the elements)?'

This is just to indicate their importance. Just as fire is said to arise from fuel, though fuel is not really the substance of fire, even so the sense organs are said to arise from the elements, viz.: 'For, O gentle one, of food is formed—manas.' It is through the assistance of the elements of fire and so forth that the senses arise from the I-sense (*ahankaara*) as fire arises with the assistance of fuel.


A customary, though not exhaustive, division of gross bodies is the heat-born, egg-born, womb-born, vegetable, thought-born and artificial.

The different varieties of gross bodies are mentioned by the author, with the caution that this is not an exhaustive list. The divisions are:

16. *Chhaandogya Upanishad, VI: v: 4*
Heat-born: Flies, mosquitoes, teeth, and so forth.
Egg-born: Birds, reptiles etc.
Womb-born: Human beings and mammals.
Vegetable: Trees, plants and foliage.
Thought-born: Those produced by means of mantras, incantations, and so forth.

112. Sarvasya prithivee-upadhaanam asaadhaaranyaat tad-vyapadeshak paraavat.

Earth is the material cause in all bodies because of some speciality, as in the preceding case.

Which element, it may be inquired, is predominant in the body?
It is earth alone which is predominant, says the author, because of intensity through excess. In other words, by far the greatest constituent of the body is earth.

The vital air is not the principal thing in the body because it subsists through the power of the organs.
The author denies the supposition some may make that the vital air (prana) is the originator of the body.
The vital air is only a modification of the organs of the body. It lasts only so long as these organs are functioning. When death occurs, and the organs cease to work, prana too is no more. Thus the vital air is dependent on the organs (indriyas).

The house of experience (the body) is built only through the supervision of the experiencer (the soul) otherwise there would be no realization.

If it is said that the vital air is not the cause of the body, the body may come into existence even without the vital air. Regarding this, the author says as follows:
It is through the operation of the soul (which contains the
doctrine of the demolition of counter-theories) that the body is built; and if the vital airs were absent the body would (as after death) rot. Therefore, by the particular process of circulation of the juices, etc. of the body, the vital air is the concomitant cause, because it holds the body together.

The master does not supervise directly. He does so through a servant.
But then someone may say it is the vital air itself which has superintendence over the body because it is active, while the soul which is immutable, cannot be expected to thus govern.
To this the author replies: The vital air governs as you say, but it does it through his servant, the vital air, just as a king gets a city built through his builders.

In trance, deep sleep, and release, the soul rests in the condition of being the form of Brahman.

In Book I aphorism 1, it was said that prakriti's agency is for the emancipation of what is really though not apparently emancipated. In relation to this an objector may say: 'How can the soul be eternally free, when we see it bound?' In order to demonstrate its eternal freedom, the author says that in the three states of trance (samadhi), deep sleep (sushupti), and release (moksha), the soul rests in its own intrinsic form (svarupa), because of dissolution of upadhis (limiting factors) which bind it—as with the breaking of a jar the space confined therein is set free.

117. Dvyarth sabeejān anyatra tat-kathāh.
In the case of the two it is with seed, while in case of the other there is absence of seed.
The author tells the distinguishing feature of release as against trance and deep sleep. In the case of trance and deep sleep the seeds, i.e., sanskaras (impressions of past experiences) remain, which can lead to a return to the world (samsāra), while in release they are absent.
There are not the two only, for the third is also evident.

That is to say, release or emancipation ('the third' in the aphorism), is also a matter of experience, not only the other two, viz., deep sleep and trance. This is in reply to a possible objector who might say 'Deep sleep and trance are evident; but what evidence is there of emancipation?'

During deep sleep, too, the soul identifies itself with Brahma, but because of desire and like faults existing in the mind, that identity is soon abandoned. But should such faults be annihilated by knowledge, there will exist permanent identity with Brahma. And this is what we know as emancipation.

The more potent fault such as deep sleep, overpowers the revelation of objects by memory; the secondary cause does not debar the principal.

The author anticipates a possible objection, namely: Since vaasana prevails in a person in deep sleep, it is not reasonable to say that Brahma-hood is achieved in that state.

In reply to this objection he says: When a person is in deep sleep, the memory of objects is suspended, for memory is then too weak to have its effect. In these circumstances there remains nothing to prevent the identification of the soul with Brahma.

A single impression lasts out the experience. But each experience does not have a different impression, or else we will have to suppose too many where one would do.

In the third Book, aphorism 83, it was said 'The retention of the body takes place through the least trace of sanskaraas.' Regarding this, someone may raise the following objection:

In the case of the emancipated person, experience is seen to occur constantly in regard even to one and the same object, just as in the case of those not released. This is unaccountable, because after the first instant of experience the previous sanskaraa is destroyed, and new sanskaraas cannot be created for the emancipated person due to his attaining knowledge. So how can he keep on having experience in respect of one and the same object constantly?

In reply the author says: 'There isn't one sanskara for each action, for in that case one would have to postulate many sanskaraas where only one will suffice. It is rather that the sanskaraas are destroyed gradually, as for example if one shoots an arrow, its momentum gets less and less till it finally falls to the ground. Or as when we switch off an electric fan the blades keep revolving for some time after the fan is switched off.'

Not only that is a body which has knowledge of external experience. The relationship of experient and experienced belongs also to trees, shrubs, climbers, annuals, trees bearing flowers which are hardly visible: grasses, creepers and so forth.

The author rejects the view of the atheists that vegetables etc. do not have a body and so have no knowledge of the external.

In this aphorism the author anticipates the modern theory that plants, too, have life. There is also the evidence of the Scriptures that if trees and plants are not properly tended they wither just as a man would without adequate sustenance: 'The branch which is abandoned by the jeeva withers.'

The Smriti also subscribes to the same view.

The conclusion that trees, plants, etc. have life, is borne out by the Smritis too. For example, 'The brahmin who does not bless one who salutes him takes birth in a cremation ground in the form of a tree on which kites and vultures sit.'


Not merely through the body is there performance of meritorious acts, for the Scripture tells us the distinction.

If trees, plants and so forth are bodies, they will have, it might be said, the competence to perform meritorious acts.

In regard to this, the author says, 'The fitness for merit or demerit does not accrue, merely due to having a body, because the Scriptures declare that only bodies of certain classes, like Brahmins, etc. are thus qualified.


Of the three, there are three kinds of bodies—the body of merit, the body of experience, and the body of experience-cum-merit.

The author classifies bodies into three types. 'Of the three' means of those who are good, middling and sluggish. The three kinds of bodies are:

(i) The body of merit (karmic body), is that possessed by the dispassionate, like renowned sages, etc.

(ii) The body of experience (the bhojo body) is that of beasts, and human beings drowned in enjoyment and sense pleasures.

(iii) The body of both bhojo and karma is that possessed by royal sages, i.e. those who are dispassionate but also experiencers.

125. Na kinchit api anushayinah.

Not any one of these is that of the yogins.

A fourth kind of body is mentioned by the author, viz., that possessed by the yogis (the dispassionate), according to Vijnana. This is the body belonging to ascetics like Dattatreya, Jadabharana and others. This is the body of one who has obtained knowledge. He is unaffected by karma and meritorious action, because he is above all moral obligations.


Buddhe etc., are not eternal even when they exist in a particular site, as in the case of fire.

The theory held by some of the eternity of buddhe, is refuted by the author. The non-existence of an eternal Eeshvara was declared before, and now the author disproves the eternity of knowledge, desire, etc.

Buddhe is used here in the sense of the Saankhya evolute of mahat, but denoting knowledge etc. Even when these arise in the particular site of Eeshvara, they cannot be deemed to be eternal, as we deduce from the example of ordinary fire, that empyrean fire is also not eternal.

127. Aashraya asiddhe cha.

And because the alleged site does not exist.

In the preceding aphorism the author has denied the eternity of knowledge, etc. even in the site of Eeshvara. In this aphorism he advances another argument to support this, by simply saying that the site of Eeshvara cannot in fact exist in consequence of the non-existence of Eeshvara Himself.


The superhuman powers of yoga, like the cures affected by drugs and the like, are not to be repudiated.

Someone may ask: If you deny eternity of knowledge, etc. how do you explain omniscience adequate for giving rise to creation, seeing that in worldly life (apart from effects of penance, etc.) such superhuman powers are not seen?

To this the author replies: Just as drugs have the effect of curing disease, even so yoga gives rise to perfections and superhuman powers.

129. Na bhootha-ekaitaam prathi-eka-adrishteh saanhatye api cha sanhatye api cha.

Since it is not found in each of them separately, consciousness does not belong to the elements even in their combined state, even in their combined state.
The author refutes the view that consciousness belongs to the elements, because such a view is against the establishment of purusha.

The argument is: Since consciousness does not exist in the elements separately, so it cannot exist in a combination of them, for there can be nothing in the product which does not pre-exist in the cause.

The repetition of 'even in their combined state', as usual, marks the end of the Book.

Book Six

Of the Recapitulation
Of the Teaching

When the separation of the informed Spirit from the mortal frame finally comes about, and Nature ceases to act in respect to it, emancipation is at last obtained.

Tattva-Kaumudi, kaarika 68

After having stated the teaching in the first four books, and having established it by refutation of counter theories in the sixth, the author now gives a summary thereof. Such a summary will undoubtedly cause the teaching to be more deeply entrenched in the minds of the disciples, as repeated strokes on the head fix a peg more firmly in the ground. Besides, the summary is not mere repetition, because many new arguments are advanced.

   The soul exists, for there is nothing to disprove its existence.

   The soul exists because we refer to it when we say 'I think'. There is no evidence which contradicts such an idea. Therefore all that needs to be done is to discriminate it from things in general.

2. Deha-adhi-vyutthita-khaasau vaichitryaat.
   The soul is absolutely different from the body, etc., because of its diversity.

   The author goes on to describe the soul in particular, and mentions two ways in which the soul differs from the body, etc.
pain there is no recurrence thereof, and so it is not liable to waste.

6. *Yathaa dukkhaat kleshah purushaaya na sattha sukhaad abhidalaabah.*

There is not so much desire for pleasure as there is annoyance from pain.

Someone may say: When pain ceases there is also cessation of pleasure too, and so the stopping of pain cannot surely be the soul’s aim.

To this the author replies: The aversion to pain is much greater than the desire for pleasure. Besides, when the soul is averse to pain, it is simply pain which it wishes to avoid. It does not bother about desiring pleasure.

7. *Katra api kah api sukhi iti.*

- For, only some one, somewhere, is happy.

The idea is, pain is immensely more abundant than pleasure, so it is the cessation of pain which is clearly the soul’s aim.

8. *Yad api dvikhashavalam iti dukkha-pakshe nikhishanti vichaksana.*

- Pleasure is also mixed with pain; therefore the discriminating throws it to the side of pain.

The meaning is clear. The *Yoga Suttra* also has the same view: ‘All, indeed, is pain to the discriminating. ’


If it is said that this (i.e., cessation of pain) is not the soul’s aim because there is no acquisition of pleasure, this would not be so, for there are two kinds of things desired.

The author rejects the view that simple cessation of pain is not the object of the soul, but the cessation of pain mixed with the desire for pleasure.

There are two kinds of objects which are desired, first ‘May I be happy’ and the second ‘May I not be miserable’. The latter kind, says the author, is the truly desired one.

1. *YS, II:15.*

Some may say that the soul is quality-less for the Scriptures speak of it as being free from association.

The author anticipates an objection, namely, the soul being devoid of all qualities like pleasure and pain, and so forth (as indeed the Scriptures say), how can its aim be cessation of pain? How can it be freed of a quality which never belonged to it?


Though pain is the property of something else, it exists in the soul because of non-discrimination.

The doubt raised in the previous aphorism is cleared up. Though such qualities (as pleasure, pain, and so forth) belong to buddhe only, they abide in the soul in the form of a reflection because of the failure to discriminate. This fact has already been established in the first Book as well as in aphorism 74 of the third.


Non-discrimination is beginningless, otherwise two objections could arise.

The author clarifies whether non-discrimination has a beginning, or is without beginning. In supposing it to have a beginning, there are two difficulties:

(i) Prior to the arising of it there would be release, and on the arising thereof, bondage. Thus there would be bondage of the released.

(ii) If non-discrimination were the effect of karma, we would have to find out a previous instance of non-discrimination to account for that karma, and so on, leading to an infinite regression.


Non-discrimination cannot be everlasting in the same way in which the soul is, or else it could not be eradicated.

If non-discrimination is without beginning, says the objector,
If there is again bondage of the released soul, release would not be the end of the soul.

19. **Avishesha-aapattiḥ ubhayah.**

Non-difference between the released and the bound would be the consequence.

If bondage comes to the released also, there would be no difference between the bound and the liberated because they would be alike liable to future bondage. So bondage cannot befall the released.

20. **Muktih antaraya-dhastak na parah.**

Disease is nothing but the removal of the obstacle to the soul’s recognition of itself as free.

But then if a distinction is made between the bound and the released, how is it said that _purusha_ is eternally free? (See Book 1, aphorism 19)

To this the author replies: As when a white crystal is placed on a red cloth, its whiteness is not destroyed but it is produced again when the red cloth is removed, so the soul is for ever free, and its bondage and release are only phenomenal, like the imposed redness of the red cloth on the crystal and its ‘removal’ on the removal of the cloth.

21. **Tatra api avirodhah.**

Even in that case there is no contradiction.

Someone may object that if both bondage and liberation are unreal, those texts must be wrong which set forth a positive aim for the soul (not merely the removal of something unreal).

To this the author replies: Even if liberation is considered to be the removal of an obstacle, there is no conflict with its being the object of the soul.

22. **Adhikaarit-treal-vidhyaat na niyamah.**

It is not necessary that liberation should be achieved by merely hearing about the obstacles, for there are three sorts of those competent.

23. **Daardhyo-artham uttaraśtaḥ.**

There is need of other means, apart from hearing, for the sake of confirmation.

The author says that not only hearing is the visible cause in the case of cognition, but there are others too, i.e. thinking, meditating, etc. As the _Brihadaranyaka Upanishad_ says: ‘Lo, the Self has to be beheld to be heard about, to be reasoned about, to be constantly meditated upon.’

24. **Sihira-sukham aasanam iti na niyamah.**

Posture is whatever is steady and easyful; hence it is not restricted.

The author removes any possible misconception about posture. This should be such as leads to ease and steadiness. It is not necessary that it should be only a particular type like the _mayur aasana_ and so forth.

25. **Dhyānam nir-vishayam manas.**

Mind without an object is meditation.

Meditation is that state in which the internal organ (the _manas_) is void of any modification. The word _dhyāna_ is used here in the sense of trance or _samaadhi_.

26. **Ubbhaya-thāa api avisheshah chet na evam uparauga-niro-dhaat risheshah.**

If one says there is no difference between the Self in concentration and the Self not in concentration, this is not so. There is a difference inasmuch as there is absence of reflected pain in the one case and presence of it in the other.

2. _Bṛhad, Op., II : iv : 5._
Someone may object: The soul remains the same during concentration as well as in non-concentration. What is the need then of concentration?

There’s a difference, says the author. In the case of concentration there is exclusion of the tinge of reflected pain, but this is not so where there is no concentration.

27. Nis-saṅge api uparaṅgah āvikṛtaat.

Though the soul if unassociated with anything, the tingeing is through non-discrimination.

The objector says: How can there be tinge in what is unassociated, as the soul is?

To this the author replies: Although a real tinge does not exist, there is a seeming tinge, hence it is simply a reflection to the knowing.


As in the case of the hibiscus and the crystal (see Book 1, aphorism 19) there is not a tinge but only a seeming of such.

There is no actual tinge when a transparent crystal is placed over a red cloth or a red hibiscus; even so in the case of budhī and puruṣa there is no actual tinge but merely an appearance of it, due to non-discrimination.


The aforesaid tinge is debarred by dispassion and the practices of meditation, concentration and the like.

The supression of the mind’s modifications is through the practices of yoga, like concentration, meditation and so forth. Saṅkhya thus upholds the yoga practice as laid down in Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras.

30. Laya-vikṣiptopayaḥ vyacarittraṁ iti achaṇḍyayah.

Suppression of the tinge is by means of the exclusion of inaction and distraction—thus do the teachers say.

The mind’s condition of being dissolved in sleep, as well as that of waking certainty is removed by meditation. Thus the state of sleep as well as waking are replaced by the tureya state of meditation. The same is the view of the Yoga Sūtras.


There is no fixed rule about localities; yoga follows from tranquillity of the mind.

Just as there is no particular posture which is advocated for yoga practices (see aphorism 24 ante), even so there is no binding of place, e.g., caves and so forth. The aim of yoga is tranquillity of the mind, wherever one can achieve it.

32. Prakṛteḥ nāḍya-vaṇaṇaḥ-tāc api aṣṭeḥ kaaraṇa-iva-śrīkṛteḥ.

Prakṛti is the primal material; for the others, according to the Scriptures, are products.

Should one say: What is the use of prakṛti? Let material causality belong to akṣara, etc.; the author makes it clear that the Scriptures declare that akṣara, etc. are merely effects, and of them too, prakṛti is the cause.

33. Nitya-tva api na aatmanah yogya-iva-abhaavoḥ.

Though the soul is eternal, it cannot be the material cause of the world because of its want of suitableness.

Why can’t the soul be the material cause of the world? persists the objector. So the author says: It is true that the soul is eternal, but it cannot serve as material cause for, firstly, it is not associable, and, secondly, it is quality-less. Therefore it lacks these two essential requirements of materiality.

34. Shruti-virodhaat na kutaḥ-āpaśadāya aṣṭa-iva-sākhāh.

The deplorable sophist fails to have a clear concept of the soul because his notions are at variance with the Scriptures.

The author condemns the wrong views held by Vaisheshikas and others who consider the soul as being the material cause of pleasure, pain and other such qualities. Such views are contradictory to the Scriptures which speak of the paraśa as a jīvam
...itvaadi (unborn, etc.).

But if it is said that the soul is the cause of the world as the sky is the recipient cause of the clouds, Saankhya will not quarrel with such a view because all its objects to is there being any transformation as product of the soul.

35. Paaroaparyo api pradhana-amsa-riddhih anu-vat.

Even though mediatly prakriti is inferred as the ultimate cause, as are the atoms by the Vaisheshikas.

Another objection made is: When only the earth is seen as the cause of things mobile and immobile, how can prakriti be the material cause of all?

To this the author replies that even though the immediate cause is the earth, but just as the immediate cause of the jar may be clay, still ultimately the clay too is derived from atoms, so the earth too is ultimately derived from prakriti.


From seeing change all around the universality of prakriti is established.

The meaning is clear. All around we see transformation taking place, and this points out to the all-pervadingness of prakriti.

37. Gati-yoge api adhya-kaarunataha-naanith anu-vat.

Though motion attaches to prakriti, it does not destroy its character of being ultimate cause; as is the case with atoms.

Let no one object that prakriti cannot be the ultimate cause because it has the quality of action, the author makes it clear that this characteristic of activity possessed by prakriti does not interfere in its capacity to be the ultimate cause—just like the atoms of the Vaisheshikas.

38. Prasidhika-vadhikyam pradhanagyaya na niyamah.

Prakriti is in addition to the nine substances (of the Nyaya-yikas). It is not necessary that they should be only nine.

Lest an opponent may object that there are already nine substances of the Vaisheshikas, and how can there be another, viz., prakriti, apart from them, the author makes it clear that there is nothing to restrict the substances to nine only.


Sattva and the rest are properties of prakriti because they are its constituents.

The gunas—sattva, rajas and tamas—are not qualities of prakriti, because prakriti is in fact made up of these. The qualities of a thing are different from its constituents.

40. An-upabhoge api punarthaṃ srishtik pradhanayasya ushirakukkumara-vahunavat.

Prakriti, though it does not enjoy, creates for the sake of the soul, like a camel carrying saffron for its master.

The aphorism has been explained in Book III. aphorism 58. Activity is for the sake of enjoyment of the purusha.

41. Karma-vaiChityaavat srishti-vaiChityaavat.

Diversity of creation is according to the diversity of karma.

There is no difference in the material but it arises in the instrumental cause, as for example, gold is one, but it is differentiated into various kinds of ornaments like bangles, rings, necklaces, and so forth.

42. SamaavaiChashyaabhyam kaaryaa-dayam.

The two-fold effect is by means of equilibrium and inequilibrium.

In prakriti the three qualities (gunas) exist. When they exist in balanced proportions there is equilibrium. But when one or the other is to a greater or less extent the equilibrium is disturbed, resulting in creation and destruction.

43. Vimuktia-sodhaat na srishtih pradhananasya lokavat.

When the emancipated being has understood that he never was other than emancipated, prakriti creates no longer, as when the king's purpose has been accomplished the minister no longer toils.
Someone may object: If prakriti's very nature is to create, there will be worldly existence even after the attainment of knowledge.

To this the author says: When by means of direct vision of purusha, one is released, creation by prakriti does not thereafter take place, as when the king's purpose is fulfilled, the task of his minister is concluded.

44. Na anya-upasarpune api mukta-upahogah nimitta-abhasvaat.

Even on prakriti's approach to others, there does not take place the experience of the released one, due to absence of a concurrent cause.

Since the activity of prakriti continues even after the release of the souls, someone may say that as prakriti does not cease to act, the released soul will also be bound again. But the author explains that this is not possible because even when prakriti approaches others (who are not yet released), those released are not affected due to absence of a concomitant cause, i.e., any inter-relation between the bound soul and the released one.

45. Purusha-bahvayo dyavasthao-tah.

Multiplicity of souls is proved by the distribution voiced by the Vedas themselves.

The author discards the view of there being only one Self. The Scriptures mention different distribution of bondage and release. As the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad says: 'Those who know This become immortal, while others experience sorrow only.'

46. Upaaddhit chec tai-siddhau punah dveitaam.

If upaadhi is acknowledged there is duality again.

The opponent may say: Distribution of bondage and release will be according to the differences in upaadhitis.

Not so, says the author (for reasons already given in the first Book of these aphorisms). Moreover the moment we


acknowledge the existence of upaaddhi, the theory of non-duality automatically breaks down.

47. Dravyagam api pramana-virodhaah.

Even by the two non-duality is contradicted.

Even by acknowledging the two, viz., the soul and ignorance, the evidence for non-duality is contradicted.

48. Dravyagam api virodhaah na pasee sam uttara cha sau-dhaka-abhavaya.

The prima facie view of the Vedanta is not an objection to dualism, for we also acknowledge two; and the subsequent dogma of a single Self is not allowable because no proof exists for it, and if it did exist, it would mean duality.

Two more defects in the theory of the soul's non-duality are pointed out by the author. The first is that the prima facie view of non-duality of the Vedanta is not acceptable. The Saankhya acknowledges two also, viz., purusha and prakriti to the Vedanta's Atman and Brahman. Secondly, there exists no proof to establish a single Self. And if one affirms there is, that itself impairs non-duality.

49. Prakrtas-tah sam-taadhaau karma-kartari-virodhaah.

If it is said the Self is demonstrated by its own light, there is contradiction of subject and object.

The Vedantists say that the Self shines with its own light. This, the author says, is not possible, and involves a contradiction between subject and object, for illumination is seen where there is a relation of the object of illumination and light.

The Saankhya idea says the author, of modification of buddhav by reflection, e.g., the reflection of the sun in a pool of water, is more logical.

50. Jada-vyanavarttak jagat prakrtasvayut chit-roopaah.

One who is other than the non-intelligent and of the form of intelligence, illuminates the unintelligent.

The opponent may argue that there is no contradiction of subject and object because the property of illumination belongs
to the object itself. To this the author replies as follows.

'The property of the form of illumination does not exist in the intelligent principle in the same way as it exists in the sun, etc. Rather, that of which intelligence is the essential form, illuminates the non-intelligent. It is intelligent because it possesses some property different from the non-intelligent.'

51. Na shruti-virodhah raaginaam vairasyanyo tat-siddhah.

There is no contradiction of the Scriptures, because the texts which assert absolute non-duality are intended to produce apathy in those having desires.

Someone may ask: If you establish duality by means of such proofs, what will happen to the Scriptural texts which declare non-duality?

There is no contradiction to the Scriptural texts, says the author, for the mention of non-duality in the Scriptures is only for the purpose of creating dispassion in the minds of those who are attached to worldly desires.


The world is real because it is the product of non-defective causes, and because there is no impediment to its reality.

There is no reality in dreams, or any distorted vision of things which arises from diseased organs. But in the waking world there are no such defects noticed. There is also no proof of the unreality of the world. Hence the reality of the world itself gives the lie to the concept of non-duality.

53. Prakaara-antar-asaambhaavaat sad-uptiitih.

Because of the impossibility of any other mode, production must be of the existent.

The author declares that the universe is real, not only as it exists at any particular moment, but always. The unreal can never be expected to come into existence and therefore what does come into existence, i.e., the world we see around us, is what existed before also in a subtle form.

54. Ahaakaaraah karta na puruusah.

Ahaakaara is the agent, not purusha.

Puruusha is not liable to transformation. It is the internal organ (ahaakaara) which possesses contents and that is the one which is active.


Experience ends with knowledge, because it is earned by the karma thereof.

The end of experience is to realise that the soul is different from prakriti. When this realisation comes, the purpose of experience is achieved. Karma causes experience—it is not in fact the soul's karma, but the karma assigned to the soul till such time as discrimination does not come—much as the fruits of a king's ministers are made over to the king.

56. Chandra-ahaa-loke api aavrityoh nimitta-sad-bhavaat.

Even from the world of the moon, etc. there is return to worldly existence because the cause of transmigration is still present.

Even if one reaches higher worlds, the germ of transmigration, i.e., non-discrimination is still there. Unless discrimination is achieved, the end is not gained.

57. Lokasya na upadeshaat siddhah poorna-vat.

Emancipation is not achieved by the instruction of the denizens of higher worlds, as it was not before.

Just as mere instruction of preceptors etc. does not end in release without effort by the aspirant, even so the mere instruction by beings of higher worlds does not cause it.


There is the Scripture which declares emancipation on reaching the world of Brahma. This emancipation is easier achieved in that world than in this, but only by proper means.

Release can take place in the world of Brahma too, but
again by hearing, reflection, and so forth, not by mere going there.


And in accordance with the Scripture about its going, though the soul is all-pervading, it reaches its new body through the sspa-ched, as in the case of the sky.

As when we move a jar, space which is really all-pervading but here enclosed by the jar, moves along with the jar, even so the soul, conditioned by an adjunct, moves from one body to another.


This (constitution of a body) is not the case of more organic matter without a soul, because where there is no soul we find putrefaction.

This is a matter of common experience. When the soul leaves the body, the body cannot maintain itself as such, and begins to rot and smell.


If you say that the body is formed due to karma, it is denied, for an unconnected agent cannot act on matter, as water which does not irrigate a field is not competent to produce the plant.

This is to answer a possible objection, namely, that a body may be created not by the superintendence of the soul, but by karma.

The author says that this is not possible. Karma cannot give rise to a body because karma is unconnected with semen, and other such elements which, operating through the soul, produce the body—as water unconnected with the seed can’t operate through tillage, etc. to produce the plant.

62. Nirguna-tvaat asamambhavaat ahankara-dharmah hi etc.

For it is impossible for the soul through karma to cause the body, because it has no qualities—karma, etc. being properties of ahankara, not of the soul.

Thus, the Saankhya view is clearly emphasised, viz., the soul superintends the body directly without any intermediate agent like karma, etc.

63. Vishista-ysya jeeva-travaa asavya-yaatiroaa.

The characteristics of jeeva belongs to that which possesses a distinction, as is proved by direct and indirect arguments.

To be living, the being must have the vital airs, personality, and other such distinguishing features. The limitedness of jeeva is thus different from the supreme soul, or parusha.

64. Ahankaara-kartri-adheena aaraa-siddhii na Eeshvara-kartri-adheena pramaana-abhaaavaat.

The accomplishment of effects depends on the agent as ahankaara, not an agent as Eeshvara, for there is no proof of that.

The author denies the belief of the followers of the Vaishe-shika that the universe follows from a supreme Eeshvara, without the play of ahankaara. There is no evidence to prove that such creation is from Eeshvara alone.

65. Adirsha-viihoote-samana-trava.

It is the same as in the case of the arising of adirshita.

Says the objector: ‘All right, granted that ahankaara is the cause of all the rest; what pray is the cause of ahankaara?’

The author answers the objection by an analogy. As those who believe karma to be a cause think it to be operative from a particular point of time, as if it were to result from other karmas, there would be an infinite regression; so also is the case with ahankaara. In other words ahankaara too arises from time alone as cause, and does not have another maker.
66. Mahatah anyat.
   From mahat is the rest.

   Apart from creation which abhankaara causes, there are other effects viz., preservation, order, etc., and all these arise from mahat. The character of Vishnu as the Preserver of the universe is due to the principle mahat being his adjunct—as is said in the Bhagavata: ‘What is said to be the chitta of Vaasudeva, that consists of mahat.’


   The relation of owned and owner in the case of prakriti with purusha, even if it be attributed as by some, to karma, is without beginning, as the seed and the plant.

   Those who think the relation of purusha and prakriti depends on karma, conceive of karma as a continuous stream without a beginning.

   We assert, says the author, the same kind of beginninglessness for purusha and prakriti—as the relation between a seed and a plant.

68. Avrika-nimitah vai Panchashikha.

   Or (the case is likewise one of infinite regression) if the relation between purusha and prakriti be attributed to non-discrimination, as Panchashikha holds.

   Panchashikha was a celebrated teacher of the Saankhya doctrine.

   Even if we consider the relation of the owned and owner (of prakriti and purusha) being due to non-discrimination between the two, as is held by renowned teachers like Panchashikha, the relationship will again be beginningless, as has been already stated.

69. Linga-sharire-nimitakah in Sanandana-aacharya.

   The relationship of owner and owned between purusha and prakriti is due to the instrumentality of the subtle body—thus is the belief of the teacher Sanandana.


OF THE RECAPITULATION OF THE TEACHING

- The author states the view of another teacher of Saankhya, viz., Sanandana, who says that the subtle body (linga sharire) is responsible for the relation of owner and owned between purusha and prakriti, for it is by means of the subtle body that such experience takes place.

70. Yuvaca tat yu tapashebhirhitih purusaba-arthaah purusha-arthaah.

   Be that the one way or the other, the uprooting thereof is the end of purusha; the uprooting thereof is the end of purusha.

   The author states his own opinion. Whether it be through exhausting of karma, or through knowledge, or through anything else, the end of purusha is clearly the cutting short of samsara by the relation of the nature of prakriti and purusha.

   The repetition of ‘the uprooting thereof is the end of purusha’ is to mark the end of the Book.